BARBARIANS AT THE GATES: A POST-SEPTEMBER 11TH PROPOSAL TO RATIONALIZE THE
LAWS OF WAR
William Bradford1
“And were a civilized nation engaged with barbarians, who observed no rules of war, the former must also suspend their observance of them,
where they no longer serve to any purpose, and must render every action or encounter as bloody and pernicious as possible to the first
aggressors.”2

I. Introduction
A. Humanizing War with Law: Aspiration
Since the dawn of man,3 war4 has been justified as an object of divine ordination,5 the natural state of
humanity,6 and a tool in the progressive betterment of character,7 culture,8 and civilization.9 In this hyperth
ideological age tragically symbolized by September 11 , 2001, war, to the dismay of those who hoped

material transformations might weaken its siren’s call,10 waxes ever more destructive,11 driving efforts to
abolish force as a moral imperative12 and, less quixotically, to induce compliance with an accreting body
1
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DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPALS OF MORALS 20 (1777).
3
War is as old as humanity. See LAWRENCE H. KEELEY, WAR BEFORE CIVILIZATION (2000) (examining
anthropological research tracing war to before the origin of the human species); Edoisiagbon Aikhionbare, War and Peace in
Contemporary International Relations: An Empirical Study of the Concept of Intermediacy in International Law and Politics 2
(1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Texas Tech University) (noting that, in every historical age, war has been admitted
among the relations between peoples as a legitimate means of protecting rights and settling disputes).
4
Although the issue of whether an armed conflict is a “war” in the Constitutional sense is relevant under U.S. law, the terms
“war” and “armed conflict” have become essentially synonymous in international law. EDWARD K. KWAKWA, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: PERSONAL AND MATERIAL FIELDS OF APPLICATION 1 (1992).
Both are employed in reference to the phenomenon of organized violence between contending political communities, whether
such violence is directed across or within state borders. See L. FREEDMAN, ED., WAR 2 (1994) (defining war as a state of law
involving a high degree of violence in the relations between organized human groups).
5
See, e.g., ST, AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD 392 (G.G. Wash et al, transl. 1958) (contending that, despite its miseries, war is a
state of affairs of which God approves) (citing Ecclesiastes 3:8)); ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA Secunda
Secundae, Question 40 (same); HELMUT VON MOLTKE, STRATEGY (positing that war is an integral aspect of the divine
ordering of the universe); Darrell Cole, Death Before Dishonor or Dishonor Before Death? Christian Just War, Terrorism, and
Supreme Emergency, 16 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 81, 98 (2002) (contending that “we fail to be all that we
are intended by God to be . . . when we refuse to fight just wars[,]” and “soldiers are elevated by God through [war.”).
6
See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 105 (1660) (describing natural condition of mankind as a state of perpetual war of all
against all—“bellum omnium contra omnes”); NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, IL PRINCIPE (1515) (W.K. Marriot transl.)
(positing war as an evil necessary to the existence of the state); STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE 306-10 (suggesting
human violence has biological, environmental, and cultural determinants). Liberation theorists suggested war was the vehicle
through which “the embittered, the dispossesed, the naked of the earth, the hungry masses yearning to breathe free, express their
anger, jealousies and pent-up urge to violence.” JOHN KEEGAN, HISTORY OF WARFARE 56 (1994). For communist and
fascists, war was creator and purpose of the state. See, e.g., BENITO MUSSOLINI, DIZIONARIO ITALIANO (1932) (“War
alone brings up to its highest tension all human energy and puts the stamp of nobility upon the peoples who have courage[.]”).
7
See JOHANN K. BLUNTSCHLI, DES MODERNE KRIEGSRECHT (1866) (stating that “war is an element of the world order
established by God” which fosters the “noble virtues of man—courage, self-sacrifice, obedience”).
8
See KEEGAN, supra note 5, at 46 (positing that war may be the product of the forceful perpetuation, against resistance, of
culture, defined as “that great cargo of shared beliefs, values, associations, myths, taboos, imperatives, customs, traditions,
manners and ways of thought, speech and artistic expression which ballast every society”).
9
th
See DAVID WELLS, THE WAR MYTH 78 (1967) (noting that 19 century Continentals analogized war to the process of
national or cultural selection whereby the most fit civilization(s) would survive a contest with lesser civilizations and that this
relentless war of extermination was essential to human progress); HERBERT SPENCER, SOCIAL DARWINISM (1857)
(describing war as the means through which “the ethical health of nations is maintained”).
10
See KEEGAN, supra note 5, at 58 (examining “(e)xpectations that . . . rising living standards, literacy, scientific medicine, the
spread of social welfare” would trigger the arrival of effective anti-warmaking attitudes in the world.”).
11
See R.J. RUMMEL, DEATH BY GOVERNMENT 13 (1994) (noting that in the last century alone, wars have claimed the lives of 203
million combatants and civilians and squandered vast fortunes).
12
“War abolitionists,” committed to the view that the horrors of war can be mitigated only its elimination, cling to the hope that
“at some future point reason will prevail and all international disputes will be resolved by nonviolent means.” Scott R. Morris,
The Laws of War: Rules by Warriors for Warriors, 1997 ARMY LAW. 4, 13 (1997). The Kellog-Briand Pact is a monument to
this creed. See Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact or Pact of Paris), Aug. 27,
1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 (renouncing recourse to war for the solution of international disputes). For many, the
abolition of war is a Kantian imperative outlawing the use of force against human beings. See IMMANUEL KANT,
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of rules, known as international humanitarian law (“IHL”), to “humanize” armed conflict. This
progressive regulation15 has met nearly universal approbation16: many ethical people, instinctively
GROUNDWORK ON THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 101 (H.J. Paton trans. 1964) (“Always act so as to treat humanity . . .
never merely as a means but always as at the same time as an end.”). For a discussion of war abolitionism, see FRANK
PRZETACZNIK, THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL CONCEPT OF WAR 182 (1994).
13
IHL, also known as the “laws of war,” is a set of “articulated norms, customs, professional codes, legal precepts, religious and
philosophical principles, and reciprocal arrangements” that serves as the normative and positive structure of legal relations during
armed conflict. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 44 (1979). IHL is thus related to, although distinct from,
“military law,” defined as the “domestic, foreign, and international law associated with the planning and execution of military
operations[.]” Robert L. Bridge, Operations Law: An Overview, 37 AIR F. L. REV. 1, 3 (1994). Many ancient cultures,
religions, and belief-systems developed rules distinguishing between combatants and noncombatants and limiting methods and
means of warfare, and as such the roots of IHL are “as old as war itself, and war is as old as life on earth.” JEAN PICTET,
DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 6-7 (1985); see also LAO TZU, TAO
TE CHING (citing ancient Chinese doctrine that “he who delights in the slaughter of men cannot have a place in the State.”);
HOMER, THE ILIAD (S. Butler transl. 1955) (describing those who unjustly shed blood in warfare to be “unfit to pray to the
gods.”); MICHAEL HOWARD, GEORGE J. ANDREOPOLOUS, & MARK R. SHULMAN, HISTORY, WAR, AND LAW
(1994) (describing legal constraints of ancient Greek and Roman warfare); Karima Bennoune, As- Salamu Alaykum?
Humanitarian Law in Islamic Jurisprudence, 15 MICH. J. INT’L L. 605, 617-27 (identifying Islamic legal proscriptions on
methods, means, and objects of warfare); DIETER FLECK (ed.), THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED
CONFLICTS 15 (1999) (indicating that medieval Japanese war was regulated by a quasilegal code known as bushido);
THEODOR MERON, HENRY’S WARS AND SHAKESPEARE’S LAWS: PERSPECTIVES ON THE LAW OF WAR IN THE
LATER MIDDLE AGES 7 (1993) (describing regulation of medieval warfare by a set of customs and canon laws known as the
jus armorum (code of chivalry)). Still, limits on warfare remained largely customary as late as the Middle Ages, and the
evolution of a positive regime of IHL traces to the late Renaissance scholars Grotius, Vattel, and Bynkershoek, who carried
forward medieval chivalric codes while interweaving theories of natural law, theology, and secular morality. Id. at 211-13. The
th
th
19 and 20 centuries witnessed the systematic codification of customary principles of IHL, beginning with the Lieber Code,
drafted by Francis Lieber, a law professor at Columbia University with sons in both the Confederate and Union armies, at the
behest of President Lincoln. Kenneth J. Keith, Rights and Responsibilities: Protecting the Victims of Armed Conflict, 48 DUKE
L. J. 1081, 1090 (1999). The Lieber Code established explicit rules regarding rights and duties of combatants and noncombatants, and in particular prisoners-of-war, applicable during the U.S. Civil War. See Instructions for the Government of
Armies of the United States in the Field, General Orders No. 100, Apr. 24, 1863 [“Lieber Code”]. The Lieber Code inspired
imitations; states borrowed liberally from its provisions in crafting their own military manuals. ASTRID J.M. DELISSEN &
GERARD T. TANJA, HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 15 (describing Lieber Code as the “Adam and Eve of
all subsequent law of war manuals”); THOMAS E. HOLLAND, THE LAWS OF WAR ON LAND 73-74 (1907) (listing states
adopting military manuals incorporating the Lieber Code, including Britain, France, Spain, Italy, Portugal); WELLS, supra note
8, at 4 (noting near-direct translation of Lieber Code in military manuals of Germany, France, and Russia). Over the next nine
decades, IHL was progressively codified in treaties, now numbering in the dozens, the object and purpose of which has been to
provide a conventional framework for the customary rules and principles evolving in the direction of greater protections for
individuals. IHL is thus both the point of origin as well as the very core of human rights law. Theodor Meron, The
Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 239, 244 (2000) (tracing complementary development of IHL and
human rights law). The strand of IHL known as “jus ad bellum” or “Hague law” answers questions such as when resort to
warfare is permissible and what means and methods may be employed therein, whereas “jus in bello” or “Geneva law” specifies
who and what are legitimate subjects of war. See William J. Fenrick, Should Crimes Against Humanity Replace War Crimes?, 37
COL
UM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 767, 770 (1999) (distinguishing between principle components of IHL). By strictly limiting,
rather than expressly authorizing, certain forms of conduct in war, IHL is a “prohibitive” legal regime. Richard Baxter, SoCalled “Unprivileged Belligerency”: Spies, Guerillas, and Saboteurs, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 323, 324 (1951). Several
fundamental IHL principles have been distilled: 1) non-combatants are immune and entitled to active protection by belligerents;
2) a combatant rendered hors de combat by virtue of wounds or surrender may not be attacked; 3) wounded and sick are the
responsibility of the party in whose power they are located; 4) prisoners of war are entitled to basic rights and privileges,
including immunity from reprisal; 5) all persons are entitled to be protected against torture and denial of judicial guarantees; 6)
methods of warfare are limited, and means which cause unnecessary suffering are prohibited; and 7) distinctions must be drawn
between civilian and military targets, with only the latter subject to attack. PICTET, supra this note, at 61-62.
14
See Bennoune, supra note 13, at 608 (noting that the essential goal of IHL is to place “humane restrictions” on war). Not all
admit this possibility; for many, humanization of war requires its abolition. Meron, supra note_, at 240. However, the notion
that wars can and should be limited by sacrificing some aspects of military expediency to the alleviation of suffering dates to
antiquity. See TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBURG AND VIETNAM 20 (1970) (stating that “the concept that the ravages of
war should be mitigated . . . by prohibiting needless cruelties” is an “instinct almost as old as human society”); PICTET, supra
note 13, at 6 (contending that “traces of a desire to attenuate the horrors of combat” can be located in earliest mankind);
QUINCY WRIGHT, A STUDY OF WAR 160-61 (1965) (correlating “rise of a civilization” with legal regulation of war).
15
IHL is an ongoing and intensive process of international deliberation and negotiation oriented toward the development and
codification of formal rules restricting the methods and means of war and protecting certain persons and things from attack. R.
C. HINGORANI, PRISONERS OF WAR 195 (1982). Evidence is discernible in the development of international instruments,
the jurisprudence of international and domestic tribunals, state practice, and statements by government representatives.
16
th
Prior to the advent of the modern IHL regime in the 19 century, military strategists and natural law theorists insisted that the
“humanization” of war could only obtain in the absence of legal regulations on the ground that mitigating the intensity of war
would enhance its social acceptability and thereby prolong it. See, e.g., Lieber Code, supra note 13, at para. 2 (1863) (“The more
vigorously wars are pursued the better it is for humanity. Sharp wars are brief.”); WALZER, supra note 13 at 47 (citing Prussian
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antipathetic to war, welcome any anodyne, and few proclaim its absolute independence from legal
regulation.18 Indeed, the distinction between “murder” and “war” is now difficult to sustain without
reference to positive law,19 and the term “war crime”20 has entered the popular lexicon21 accompanied by
22

images of atrocity that provoke moral outrage. Empirically, states and individuals obey IHL at least
some of the time,23 and the phrase “laws of war” is no longer ipso facto oxymoronic.
B.

Frustration: Compliance Deficiencies
However, incorporation of humanitarian principles—fundamentally moral conceptions—into law

presents ontological problems, and thus has war proven recalcitrant to legal restraint: the non-derogable
limitations24 IHL purports to impose have been transcended its entire developmental history.25 Prior to
General von Moltke for the proposition that the “greatest kindness in war” is not the mitigation of combat but the swift defeat of
an enemy). Natural law critics of the legalization of war also base their arguments on efficiency considerations, maintaining that
the odds of success in war are inversely proportional to the degree of adherence to legal restraints on the conduct of military
operations, as well as the absolute right to engage the enemy in any manner with any means. Id.; see also STEPHANIE
GUTMAN, THE KINDER, GENTLER MILITARY: CAN AMERICA’S GENDER-NEUTRAL FORCE STILL WIN WARS?
275 (1999) (arguing that in combat the “fiercer, angrier, most-blood-lusting force will win” and that armies must be guided not
by law but rather “driven by . . . a killer instinct.”); BOURKE, AN INTIMATE HISTORY OF KILLING 368 (1989) (“What the
hell else is war than killing people?”) (quoting Lieutenant William L. Calley, incredulous at his conviction by court-martial in
1969 of the murder of Vietnamese civilians at My Lai). A shrinking number of commentators still rejects much of the IHL canon
as an infeasible, if philosophically attractive, attempt to “shift the balance established between military necessity and
humanitarian principles in such a way as to hamper the ability of states to use military force[.]” Guy B. Roberts, The New Rules
for Waging War: The Case Against Ratification of Additional Protocol I, 26 VA. J. INT’L L. 108, 146 (1985).
17
See ROBERT L. O’CONNELL, OF ARMS AND MEN 24 (1998) (noting anthropological research suggesting an inclination to
“fight by the rules” and limit war is an emotional vestige of intraspecific combat within groups of our hominid ancestors).
18
th
See J. M. SPAIGHT, WAR RIGHTS ON LAND 5 (1911) (observing that, by the turn of the 20 century, “no nation . . . has not
rendered homage to the laws of war”); HINGORANI, supra note 15, at 6 (highlighting formal recognition of obligations erga
omnes under IHL); WALZER, supra note 13, at 33 (suggesting that recognition of legal responsibility for the conduct of military
operations has undergone universalization in the post-U.S. Civil War era).
19
See TAYLOR, supra note 14, at 19 (“War consists largely of acts that would be criminal if performed in time of peace . . . [but]
are not . . . because the state of war lays a blanket of immunity over the warriors.”).
20
The term “war crime” refers generally to “one of a list of acts generally prohibited by treaty but occasionally prohibited by
customary law and . . . committed during armed conflict . . . by a perpetrator linked to one side of the conflict[.]” Fenrick, supra
note 13, at 771. War crimes are understood to be that limited category of acts committed during armed conflict that are
prohibited without reference to the status of a belligerent. See Waldemar A. Solf & Edward R. Cummings, A Survey of Penal
Sanctions under Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, 9 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 205, 214 (1977).
21
See GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945 182-84 (1994) (tracing earliest use of “war crimes” to Nuremburg).
22
See Christopher C. Joyner, Arresting Impunity: The Case for Universal Jurisdiction in Bringing War Criminals to
Accountability, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 153, 153 (1996) (noting that war crimes “sicken the conscience of civilized society”
and that “brutal acts of plunder, torture, rape, and murder that [IHL] forbid[s] . . . appall . . . all of humanity.”); JANIL KASTO,
JUS COGENS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW 41 (1994) (positing that revulsion to war crimes “unites the human race”).
23
Explanatory theories posit that states comply with IHL in order to preserve their reputations, increase the potential for
reciprocity, avoid reprisals, and serve the interests of justice. HINGORANI, supra note 15, at 192-93 (enumerating hypotheses).
24
Much of IHL has been constructed as absolute, unqualified prohibitions on conduct in war that do not permit derogation even in
extremis and do not take into consideration the relative justice of the cause. See WALZER, supra note 13, at 230 (noting that
“the rules of war are a series of categorical and unqualified prohibitions . . . that . . . can never rightly be violated even in order to
defeat aggression.”); OSIEL, supra note_, at 161 (stating that IHL “prohibit(s) [violations] unequivocally, in all circumstances
and without exceptions[.]”); J. PICTET, COMMENTARIES 193 (1965) (suggesting that IHL has evolved to the point that “no
possible loophole is left; there can be no excuse, no attenuating circumstances.”). The notion that the substantive content of IHL
is the product of a universal consensus—the “general consent of mankind”—supplies the categorical imperative for such
absolutism. IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSICS OF ETHICS 63-79 (M. Shefi
trans., Shatz Stein ed. 1994) (elaborating the absolute proscription of killing human beings in all circumstances). While the
absolutist school has much to argue in its favor—namely, clarity, consistency, and the perception of moral superiority in the
sense that the amelioration of the rigors of war may best be achieved by refusal to permit any derogations whatsoever lest
loopholes become escape hatches for crafty but malevolent actors, some commentators suggest that the practical exigencies of
actual military operations are such that absolutism may be ill-suited even to absolutist purposes. See, e.g., WALZER, supra note
13, at 231 (suggesting an alternative, utilitarian doctrine “that stops just short of absolutism” and “might be summed up in the
maxim: do justice unless the heavens are (really) about to fall.”). Others simply reject the notion that IHL is akin to other species
of law, contending instead that “[t]he law of war is different [from labor or environmental law] in that there are more gray areas
than black and white.” William Hays Parks, The Law of War Adviser, 18 MIL. L. & L. WAR REV. 357, 385 (1979).
25
See BEST, supra note 20, at 290 (characterizing the observance of IHL as “indifferent and lamentable”); see also MERON,
supra note_, at 369 (noting that violations of IHL are “not exceptional”); WALZER, supra note 13, at 232 (indicating that
violations of IHL are routinely committed even by “morally serious” soldiers who are capable of differentiating right from
3

World War II, IHL was enforceable only insofar as states possessed the political will to prosecute their
own nationals,26 and suppression of violations was left largely to an informal regime of reprisal.27 The
recent record of compliance is improving yet still sparse.28 Confronted by realist, just-war, and
29

behavioralist explanations for failures to restrain self-interested soldiers and states in combat, IHL
scholars, by the 1980s, were lamenting a regime shrinking to the “vanishing point” of international law.30

wrong); MARK J. OSIEL, OBEYING ORDERS: ATROCITY, MILITARY DISCIPLINE, & THE LAW OF WAR 161 (1998)
(stating that “atrocious misconduct has been, if not a virtual constant, then at least persistent and perennial[.]”). As empirical
evidence of the frequent violation of IHL, note the creation of judicial fora for the specific purpose, inter alia, of prosecuting
violations of IHL that occurred in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s. See Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. S.C. Res. 827 (1993); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1598 (1994).
26
Obligations under IHL traditionally extended only so far as to the passage of domestic legislation and the domestic
investigation and prosecution of offenses. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.S. 3317, at Art. 129 (limiting international legal obligation of parties to the passage of the necessary domestic
legislation to provide for effective punishment of offenders). Enforcement of IHL was left subject to affected states that, in many
instances, ordered or tolerated systemic violations of IHL. HINGORANI, supra note 15, at 197. States loathe on political
grounds to sanction their military personnel for executing state policies have been even less amenable to exposing themselves to
embarrassment resulting from the extradition of individuals accused of violating IHL. BEST, supra note 20, at 396.
27
See Solf & Cummings, supra note 19, at 205 (surveying modalities employed in the suppression of war crimes). For a
definition and discussion of “reprisal,” see infra at note_.
28
Prior to the establishment of international criminal tribunals in the 1990s, the number of prosecutions of war criminals could be
counted on the fingers of one’s hands. See DELISSEN & TANJA, supra note 13, at 201 n.18 (reporting the paucity of
prosecutions enforcing IHL between 1945 and 1988). In all likelihood, the majority of war crimes go unreported. See BEST,
supra note 20, at 397 (opining that most war crimes go unnoticed, and “what they amount to as a proportion of those that [are
reported] . . . defies calculation.”). For a survey of various mechanisms employed or proposed to enhance enforcement of IHL,
see Jamie Mayerfeld, Who Shall be Judge? The United States, the International Criminal Court, and the Global Enforcement of
Human Rights, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 93 (2003); see also Adam Roberts, The Laws of War: Problems of Implementation in
Contemporary Conflicts, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 19-20, 30, 35, 38-40 (1995).
29
Explanations for compliance deficiencies cluster in several camps. Legal realists contend that existing enforcement mechanisms
offer inadequate support for IHL because international law generally, and IHL specifically, is structurally indisposed to the
governance of state behavior in an anarchical system wherein power remains the primary currency and decisions with respect to
the conduct of war are rendered with a view toward power maximization, rather than adherence to law; where violation of IHL
would maximize power it is therefore optimal to do so, and IHL is thus little more than the codification of abstract aspirations
certain to be disappointed in practice. See Raymond Aron, The Anarchical Order of Power, in CONDITIONS OF WORLD
ORDER 25, 25, (Stanley Hoffman ed. 1968) (describing the international system as an “anarchical order of power” where might
th
equates with right and law is irrelevant); HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 279-314 (5 ed. 1978)
(expressing deep skepticism with regard to the capacity for law to trump power in international relations and in particular in the
issue- area of armed conflict); KEEGAN, supra note 5, at 63 (summarizing realist pessimism regarding the malleability of the
nature of the international system by noting that “[t]he most important limitations on warmaking . . . have always lain beyond the
will or power of man to command.”). Some realist commentators contend that IHL itself contributes to the perpetuation of war
by making it “more acceptable, more endurable”. See F. KALSHOVEN, BELLIGERENT REPRISAL (1991) (suggesting that
rather than limit the methods and means of war, those who would make the phenomenon more rare ought to de-legalize
international conflict to the point they become “unbearable beyond endurance” and therefore less rational as a policy
instrument.). Law and economics realists reject the assumption that IHL is governed by a desire to humanize war and suggest to
the contrary that it is merely a “device for limiting the efficiency of military technology” and thereby equalizing power disparities
between the powerful and the weak; as such, it is not in the interest for the powerful to consent to or comply with it. Eric Posner,
A Theory of the Laws of War, 70 U. CHJI. L. REV. 297 (2003).
Another school of IHL skeptics, just war theorists, argue that states fighting in a just cause, defined generally as a war
initiated by legitimate authority for the sole purpose of checking unjust aggression, are obligated to derogate from the positive
laws of war to the extent necessary to triumph over unjust adversaries. See S. PUFFENDORF, THE LAW OF NATURE AND
OF NATIONS 1298 (C. & W. Oldfather trans., 1964) (commenting that reason dictates fewer restrictions on the fighting of a just
war and that, since victory admits of no impediment, parties are permitted “to use force to any degree . . . [they] think
desirable.”). In effect, the justice of the cause sanctions and even necessitates violations of IHL, and moderation in the struggle
against terrorists and rogue states is therefore vice rather than virtue. See VITORIA, ON THE LAW OF WAR 180 (suggesting
that the highest form of morality when threatened by transcendent evil is not adherence to an artificial program of legal regulation
but victory, whatever the cost to the rules). Just war theory is considerably more complex than herein presented. For a detailed
discussion of just war theory, see generally WALZER, supra note 13.
In turn, behavioral theorists fix upon the tension between the rational self-interest of combatants and the selfabnegation demanded of them by an oft-irrational and incoherent legal regime promulgated without reference to any broad theory
of human behavior in combat. For behavioralists, it is axiomatic that when confronted by a choice between self-preservation and
violation of IHL, many “otherwise law-abiding individuals will commit crimes in order to save their own lives; national
governments will likewise break treaties and international rules if necessary for their own preservation.” TAYLOR, supra note
14, at 33; WALZER, supra note 13, at 14-15 (“The moral theorist . . . must come to grips with the fact that his rules are often
violated or ignored . . . [because] to men at war, [these] rules often don’t seem relevant to the extremity of their situation.”);
4

C. Formalization: The International Criminal Court
Despite its history, IHL has been resurrected by the post-Cold War passion of its proponents. Freed of
the restraints of bipolar paralysis,31 dedicated to the suppression of war crimes as part of a human rights
agenda,32 and convinced that the path to this goal ran ineluctably through law, the torrent of globalization
was steered toward the establishment of the first permanent tribunal33 with universal jurisdiction to punish

FLORY, supra note_, at 9 (warning that “exigencies in battle . . . may be so great as to warrant violation” of IHL by states and
individuals pursuing self-preservation). Behavioralists also seize upon the propensity for soldiers to exhibit irrational responses
to the stressors of combat and, in so doing, to transcend the rules of IHL. OSIEL, supra note 24, at 161 (suggesting that the
“frenzy of combat elicits primordial passions that are nearly impossible to restrain[,]” such as a “soldier’s sudden impulse to
avenge a close comrade who was killed, perhaps through an enemy’s act of deception”). Empirical data supports the premise that
compliance with IHL is a function of its conformity to the normative conventions and practical necessities of soldiers. Id. at 3132 (identifying “widespread disregard” for restrictive rules of engagement that enhanced the threat to U.S. ground forces during
the Vietnam War as foundation for the assertion that “[i]t has since become an article of faith among U.S. officers that these rules
placed American forces in undue danger and were therefore tactically imprudent (and morally indefensible).”); Mark Martins,
Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of Training, Not Lawyering, 143 MIL. L. REV 3, 5 (1994) (asserting that, rather
than cleave closely to external legal constraints, “[w]hen the shooting starts, soldiers follow those principles that . . . potent
experiences have etched in their minds . . . [and that] conform to both tactical wisdom and to relevant legal constraints on the use
of force.”) (emphasis added). By failing to incorporate exceptions for soldiers’ instincts and passions, the absolutist regime of
IHL has charted an irrational course toward the rocky shoals of human nature. SeVIRGINIA HELD, SIDNEY
MORGENBESSER, & THOMAS NAGEL, PHILOSOPHY, MORALITY, AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 60 (1974)
(contending that “the distinctions between what is obligatory and what is prohibited appear to rest on no intelligible grounds or
persuasive principles.[]”); WALZER, supra note 13, at 47 (conceding the facial irrationality and “alien”-ness of much of IHL in
relation to the experience of soldiers); BEST, supra note_, at 290 (stating that the “whole IHL enterprise is objectively
paradoxical and far-fetched: war on the one hand, human nature on the other.”). In short, for behavioralists, an absolute
obligation to self-sacrifice is at odds with the instinct to self-preservation, and IHL is “a bunch of rules made up by lawyers who
sit behind a desk, rather than by real soldiers who have felt the sting of battle.” Morris, supra note 11, at 4.
30
Hersch Lauterpacht, The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War, 29 BRIT. YBK. INT’L L. 360, 382 (1952) (conceding that
“if international law is, in some ways, at the vanishing point of law, the law of war is, perhaps even more conspicuously, at the
vanishing point of international law.”).
31
See Eric L. Chase, Fifty Years After Nuremburg: The United States Must Take the Lead in Reviving and Fulfilling the Promise,
6 U.S.A.F.A. J. LEG. STUD. 177, 182 (1995/1996) (attributing ineffective enforcement of IHL post World War II—a “betrayal”
and an “assault on the Nuremburg process”—in large measure to Soviet machinations in the UN Security Council that privileged
political objectives at the expense of justice).
32
Advocates of IHL concentrate their labors toward ensuring that states investigate and prosecute, or extradite, their own
nationals for violations of IHL. VON HEBEL ET AL., supra note_, at 9. Enhancing universal respect for, and compliance with,
human rights law as a regime independent from political considerations is the ultimate objective. BEST, supra note 20, at 400
(stating that a fundamental objective of IHL advocacy is the creation of supranational institutions with the “authority and power
so universally effective and irresistible that no national or regional interest will be able to thwart . . . the principles of the law”).
33
See Final Act of the U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court,
U.N. Doc. 32/A/CONF. 183/9, 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) [“Rome Statute”], at Art. 1 (establishing the ICC as a “permanent
institution”). The subject of a permanent international criminal court was first visited in the aftermath of World War I when, in
1920, the League of Nations appointed an Advisory Committee of Jurists to examine a High Court of International Justice with
jurisdiction to try crimes “against international public order and the universal law of nations.” VON HEBEL ET AL., supra note
31, at 16. Although a commission was appointed by the Allies to prepare the prosecution of Kaiser Wilhelm II and other
German defendants for war crimes related to the invasion of neutral Belgium, unrestricted submarine warfare, and extrajudicial
killing of POWs, the proposed High Court did not come to pass. Commission on the Responsibilityu of the Authors of the War
and on Enforcement of Penalties, 14 AM. J. INT’L L. 95, 117 (1920). In 1943 the UN War Crimes Commission was established
to prepare the trial of Axis war criminals, and on August 8, 1945, the Allies created the Charter of the International Military
Tribunal (Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 27). Allied Control Council Law No. 10 of December 20, 1945, granted
jurisdiction to the IMT to try Nazi defendants charged with crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, and
the first judgment was rendered in October 1946. VON HEBEL ET AL., supra note 31, at 18-21. However, the IMT mandate
was terminated after the Nuremburg trials, and although in 1981 the United Nations General Assembly authorized the
International Law Commission to codify international crimes as a precursor to a permanent international criminal court, the
subject, as a practical matter, lay dormant for decades. Id. at 24-25; see also UNSC Res. 670 (1990), at para. 13 (suggesting that
criminal liability for violations of IHL with respect to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait would attach to individuals but demanding no
specific enforcement); UNSC Res. 686, 687 (opting to confine criminal responsibility for violations of IHL to states).
In 1993 and 1994, the UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter to restore international peace and
security, created ad hoc tribunals with jurisdiction to punish individuals for violations of IHL occurring in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. See Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia [“ICTFY”], U.N. S.C. Res.
827 (1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704 of 23 May 1993); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda [“ICTR”], U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (1994) (1994). Champions of international criminal tribunals “rejoice[d] that [for the first time] . . . a person
suspected of [violations of IHL] may finally be brought before an international judicial body for a dispassionate consideration of
his indictment by impartial, independent and disinterested judges coming . . . from all continents of the world.” The Prosecutor
5
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serious violations of IHL by individuals.

35

Despite a contentious drafting histoprocess, state after state

acceded to the Rome Statute,36 and the International Criminal Court [“ICC”], hailed as a triumph of
international civil society over statist impunity37 certain to bring the worst violators to brook,38 entered
39

40

into force in July 2002. However, long-standing U.S. rejectionism manifested in heated objections.

v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1- AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction by the
[ICTFY], at 79 (Oct. 2, 1995). The International Law Commission, hoping to capitalize on the momentum, reconvened a
Working Group that recommended “that [the UN] convene an international conference . . . to conclude a convention on the
establishment of an International Criminal Court.” Report of the International Law Commission on its Forty-Sixth Session, 1994,
UN Doc.A/49/10, paras 23- 91); see also UNGA Res. 49/53, Dec. 9, 1994 (creating an Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment
of an International Criminal Court). However, although the ad hoc tribunals have achieved some success, they are not permanent
tribunals, and lack the efficiency, accrued institutional expertise, and enhanced legitimacy that are often associated with a
permanent international criminal court. Henry T. King & Theodore C. Theofrastous, From Nuremburg to Rome: A Step
Backward for U.S. Foreign Policy, 31 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 47, 65 (1999) (elaborating limitations of ad hoc tribunals).
34
See Rome Statute, supra note_, at Art. 25 (providing for criminal responsibility for commission of crimes within ICC
jurisdiction whether committed “as an individual, jointly with another or through another person”). Although individual criminal
responsibility for violations of IHL was arguably a principle of customary international law prior to World War II, the ICC is the
first permanent international tribunal with a statutory basis for jurisdiction over individual criminal defendants.
35
The Rome Conference commenced 15 June 1998, and five weeks of intense negotiations ensued during which a “Like-Minded
Group” of over 80 militarily weak states, committed to a powerful court and supported by an array of NGOs such as Human
Rights Watch and the ICRC, emerged in opposition to a “Third Group” of states, led by the U.S. and other members of the
Security Council, concerned about the potential for a court with overbroad jurisdiction. VON HEBEL ET AL., supra note 31, at
2-3. Multiple U.S. jurisdictional amendments that would have limited prospective jurisdiction were defeated. See Melissa K.
Marler, The International Criminal Court: Assessing the Jurisdictional Loopholes in the Rome Statute, 49 DUKE L. J. 825, 832
(1999) (describing overwhelming defeat of joint U.S.-Indian jurisdictional amendment that would have permitted the state of
nationality to declare that its accused national committed the crime in pursuit of official duties and thereby prevented the ICC
from exercising jurisdiction in the absence of a Security Council referral); VON HEBEL ET AL., supra note 31, at 60
(describing defeat of U.S. jurisdictional amendment requiring consent of state of nationality of accused). Although a Third
Group succeeded in amending ICC jurisdiction to permit a 7-year exemption from twar crimes, the tide of U.S. influence was
forced back by a consortium of Like-Minded states and NGOs. For a discussion of the travaux preparatoires, see M. CHERIF
BASSIOUNI, DOCUMENTS OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE ROME CONFERENCE (1999).
36
The Rome Statute was adopted by a non-recorded vote of 120 in favor, 7 against, and 4 abstentions on 17 July 1998. See U.N.
Diplomatic Conference Concludes in Rome with Decision to Establish Permanent International Criminal Court, United Nations
Press Release, L/ROM/22 (Jul. 17, 1998). The U.S., Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Yemen, China, and Israel voted against. ALTON FRYE
(ed.), TOWARD AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 7 (1999).
37
The signing of the Rome Statute in July 1998 was heralded as long-awaited milestone in the progressive erosion of the consentbased system of state sovereignty. For its champions, the ICC symbolizes a transition to an ethically-superior order “in which the
highest forms of power and legitimacy [are] fused in international organizations, establishing the constitutional supremacy of
international law over all national law[,] and in which . . . states [are] subordinate to that order.” Anderson, supra note_, at 84.
In the ICC, proponents see a future wherein states will ensure that violators of IHL are prosecuted or extradited and enforcement
of IHL deters would-be transgressors, leading ultimately to greater peace. VON HEBEL ET AL., supra note 31, at 9.
38
Article 5 of the Rome Statute provides that the ICC has jurisdiction only over “the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole[.]” See Rome Statute, supra note 32, at Art. 5. Moreover, ICC jurisdiction is limited to
cases arising out of armed conflict and does not reach acts committed during “isolated and sporadic acts of violence[.]” Id. at Art.
8(2)(d). The Rome Statute thus does not formally criminalize all violations of human rights but rather is addressed exclusively to
serious violations of IHL. See Meron, supra note 13, at 265. Accordingly, Articles 6-8 create jurisdiction solely over genocide
and specifically enumerated lists of crimes against humanity and serious war crimes. Rome Statute, supra note 32, at Arts. 6-8.
39
th
Article 126 provides that the ICC would come into existence 60 days after the 60 ratification, and thus the Statute entered into
force on 1 July 2002. See http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXVIII/treaty10.asp (listing
ratifications). For a discussion of the structure of the ICC, see Robert Cryer, Commentary on the Rome Statute for an
International Criminal Court: A Cadenza for the Song of Those Who Died in Vain?, 3 J. ARMED CONFL. L. 271 (1998).
40
During the early 1990s, Congress produced aspirational language supporting an international criminal court. See, e.g., S.R.
103-71 (May 20, 1993) (expressing that the “time is propitious for the [U.S.] to lend its support to . . . an international criminal
th
court]”); 103 H.R. J. Res. 89, 105 Cong. (1997) (calling on the President to “continue to support and fully participate in
negotiations . . . to . . . establish an international criminal court”). The Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, David
Scheffer, indicated a firm executive commitment to implementing this sense-of-Congress. Foreign Relations Nominations:
Congressional Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Comm. On For. Rel., Federal Document Clearing House, Jul. 15, 1997.
However, determined legislative hostility to the ICC had manifested as early as 1994. See 140 CONG. REC. S96, 100 (daily ed.
Jan. 26, 1994) (offering Amendment No. 1254, proposed by Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), to the Department of State
Authorization Act of 1994, which, although tabled, stated as its purpose “to strike all language . . . relating to support for an
international criminal court.”). As international momentum in support of the ICC developed in 1998, Senator Helms pronounced
the ICC Treaty “dead on arrival” at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee if the U.S. did not retain the power to veto an
indictment. See Helms Declares U.N. Criminal Court “Dead-on- Arrival” in Senate Without U.S. Veto, GOV’T PRESS REL.
Mar. 26, 1998. Helms further advised that the creation of “any permanent judiciary within the U.N. system would be totally
inappropriate, insomuch as . . . it would grant the UN a principal trapping of sovereignty.” Id. Many legislators joined in the
characterization of the ICC as a “monster that must be slain. “ See Jesse Helms, Personal View: Slay This Monster, FIN. TIMES,
6

D. Rejection: The U.S.—Sole Indispensable Nation—Actively Opposes the ICC
1. Arguments for Public Consumption: Sovereignty, Accountability, Legitimacy
U.S. critics prophesied that, rather than administer universal justice, “rogue” prosecutors and statesparties,41 eager to circumscribe U.S. hegemony, would prosecute members of the U.S. Armed Forces42 for
acts not widely-recognized as violations of customary IHL,43 especially the blurry, unsedimented

Jul. 30, 1998, at 12. Subsequent to promulgation of the Rome Statute, Congressional Republicans developed a four-point action
plan: 1) withdrawal of U.S. troops from any state ratifying the ICC; 2) veto any Security Council referral to the ICC; 3)
withholding of funds to the ICC; and 4) revision of Status of Forces Agreements to preclude extradition of U.S. military
personnel to the ICC. Post-Cold War International Security Threats: Terrorism, Drugs, and Organized Crime Symposium, 23
MICH. J. INT’L L. 655, 754 (2000). Congressional Democrats have introduced legislation supporting the ICC, but none of their
proposals have enjoyed significant support. See American Citizen’s Protection and War Criminal Prosecution Act of 2001, S.
th
th
1296, 107 Cong. (2001) (introduced by Sen. Christopher Dodd, D.-Conn., Aug. 1, 2001); H.R. 2699, 107 Cong. (2001)
(introduced by Rep. William Delahunt, D.-Mass., Aug. 2, 2001). Executive opposition has found expression in statements from
senior Department of Defense officials who, in measured fashion, have sought to limit the criminal exposure of U.S. military
personnel. See Department of Defense News Briefing, American Forces Press Service, Thursday, June 11, 1998, Remarks at
NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium (statement of Defense Secretary William Cohen expressing concerns that the ICC would
compromise U.S. interests in providing “one hundred percent protection” to its forces serving overseas); see also Department of
Defense News Briefing, Thursday, September 14, 2000, Rear Adm. Craig Quigley, July 2000 [“DOD Briefing”] (“We still don't
think that the ICC in its current configuration is the right thing for the United States to sign on to.”).
41
See Marcella David, Grotius Repudiated: The American Objections to the International Criminal Tribunal and the
Commitment to International Law
, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 337, 357 (1999) (conceding possibilities for polit icization of ICC by a
“rogue prosecuto[r]”); Michael L. Smidt, The International Criminal Court: An Effective Means of Deterrence?, MIL. L. REV.
156, 200 (2001) (“A politicized ICC . . . could become a sort of human rights advocate, responsive to any and all complaints
regardless of the source or seriousness of the allegations.”). The election of Luis Moreno Ocampo, prosecutor of Latin American
military personnel in highly politicized contexts, as first Chief Prosecutor is unlikely to allay such concerns. Luis Moreno
Ocampo Named ICC Chief Prosecutor, HARV. U. GAZETTE, Apr. 24, 2003, at 8.
42
Concerns abound that the ICC might be pressed into service, by states-parties jealous of U.S. wealth and power, to check U.S.
influence through the malicious prosecutions of U.S. military personnel. See, e.g., Robert Kagan, Europeans Courting
International Disaster, WALL ST. J., Jun. 30, 2002, at B7 (suggesting that, as the “dominant economic, political, cultural and
military force,” the U.S. is particularly vulnerable to the machinations of weaker states that would manipulate the ICC to bring
unfounded criminal charges against U.S. military forces to neutralize U.S. power); Marler, supra note_, at 833 (noting U.S. and
French concerns about the potential for politically-motivated prosecutions); Madeleine Morris, Universal Jurisdiction in a
Divided World, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 337 (2001) (describing politically motivated prosecution as a weapon in waging
interstate quarrels); Bill Newel, For Crimes of International Law, a Guide, BOST. GLOBE, Jul. 23, 2001, at A1 (quoting Cherif
Bassiouni, principal drafter of the Rome Statute, as conceding that political prosecutions in the ICC are a “very real possibility”).
Experience raises the question whether adjudication of violations of IHL is invariably a political exercise. WELLS, supra note 8,
at 119 (noting many legal scholars believe the World War II tribunals lacked any basis in IHL as no precedent existed declaring
conspiracy to wage aggressive war a crime, “following orders” was a permissible defense, and law was applied ex post facto);
Centre for Human Rights, Justice, Accountability and Social Reconstruction: An Interview Study of Bosnian Judges and
Prosecutors, BERK. J. INT’L L. 102 (2000) (claiming ICTFY is “plagued by a crisis of legitimacy.”); Ron Popeski, Russia
Criticizes Milosevic Handover, REUTERS, Jun. 29, 2001 (reporting criticism of ICTFY as a “kangaroo court”); Morris, supra
note_, at 354-59 (2001) (noting that states, claiming to be enforcing IHL but conducting war by other means, are resorting to
universal jurisdiction to prosecute nationals of opponent states) (citing Plainte avec Constitution de Partie Civile,
http://www.Mallat.com/articles/complaint.htm (June 18, 2001) (Belg.)) (accusing Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon of
command responsibility for war crimes committed by Lebanese nationals). Moreover, concerns about politicization extend to the
judges. Darin R. Bartram and David B. Rivkin, Jr., The ICC’s First False Step, WALL ST. J, Feb. 17, 2003, at 18. The 18 ICC
judges enjoy broad powers but are without general guidance on the legal principles that will inform their decisions and are not
directly accountable to states). Colin Warbrick, International Criminal Courts and Fair Trial, 3 J. ARMED CONFL. 45, 45
(1998);but cf. Ruth Mackenzie & Philippe Sands, International Courts and Tribunals and the Independence of the International
Judge, 44 HARV. INT’L L. J. 271, 284 (2003) (suggesting states exercise significant control over international judicial bodies).
43
International law consists of treaty-based, as well as customary, sources of law. See Statute of the International Court of
Justice, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055 (1945) (enumerating sources of international law as treaties, custom, general principles, and the
opinions of expert commentators). Customary international law [“CIL”] evolves from the practice of states consistent with the
subjective understanding that such practice is legally obligatory. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases(F.R.G. v. Denmark &
Netherlands), 1969 I.C.J. 4. State practice, particularly by directly affected states, is the most concrete element. Michael
Akenhurst, Custom As A Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 18 (1977). To become binding, the practice must
be consistent, settled, and uniform. Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 413,
433 (1983). The progressive development of IHL has proceeded largely by codification of the customs of soldiers. A.P.V.
ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 2 (1995). It is universally accepted that the foundational principles of IHL are
necessity, proportionality, and distinction. Still, it is arguable that much of the substantive content of the more hortatory
declarations and conventions has not yet passed into the corpus of customary IHL. The substantive provisions of military
manuals vary widely from one state to another, suggesting the absence of a body of custom widely accepted by states. Theodor
Meron, Determining Customary International Law Relative to the Conduct of Hostilities in Non-International Armed Conflicts, 2
AM. U. INT’L L. & POL’Y 471, 491-92 (1987). Although the ICJ has specifically addressed the question of the requisite degree
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principles of necessity, proportionality, and distinction. By unjustifiably increasing the criminal
exposure of U.S. forces engaged in thankless peace and humanitarian operations with which the world
of consistent practice necessary to constitute custom, determining that it need not be universal, no authoritative judicial
pronouncement exists to delineate the precise boundaries of customary IHL. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 I.C.J. 1, para. 186 (“The Court does not consider that, for a rule to be
established as customary, the corresponding practice must be in absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule.”). Moreover,
nearly all states are members of IHL treaties; there are no non-parties to whom one can refer to determine whether customary
IHL obligations are operative. See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note_, at 5 (stating that, although little support for
the customary legal basis of a norm may be found in the conduct of state parties where state parties follow a practice solely in
accord with treaty obligations, if non-parties are doing so it is likely the result of a customary obligation); Meron, supra note_, at
247 (noting that although the legal obligations of IHL treaties were once limited to parties, the crystallization of the substance of
those treaties as customary IHL, and the accession of almost all states to those treaties, has rendered moot question as to the
applicability of such treaties as between non-parties) Furthermore, even manuals of states legally sophisticated states do not
identify provisions of various IHL conventions they believe declaratory of custom. KWAKWA, supra note 3, at 32-24. Worse,
few studies pointedly address the formation of customary IHL, nor do various international judicial decisions discuss the process
by which conventional norms are transformed into CIL. As a result, the substantive boundaries of customary IHL are subject to
constant contestation. See Stuart Walters Belt, Missiles Over Kosovo: Emergence, Lex Lata, of a Customary Norm Requiring the
Use of Precision Munitions in Urban Areas, 47 NAVAL L. REV. 115, 148 (2000) (indicating that the determination and
application of customary norms of IHL is a contested process); Du Preez and Another v. Truth and Reconciliation Comm’n 1997
(3), S. AFR. L. REP. 204, 233 (A) (1997).(“Selecting what is and what is not part of custom is . . . fraught with political
considerations.”). Human rights advocates insist that the expanding body of norms and principles articulated since the late 1970s
constitutes a body of CIL directly applicable to the battlefield. Most states, however, have elected to incorporate, in criminal
codes and military manuals, only those rules and principles for which there is evidence of widespread state practice. Meron,
supra note_, at 247 (suggesting that human rights groups take an “idealistic” posiiton in regard to customary IHL that even
otherwise sympathetic experts find “problematic”). Some commentators restrict customary IHL further, stating that it is official
statements that delineate the scope and force of legal obligation. R.R. Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary
International Law, 41 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 275, 300 (1965) (stating that the “firm statement by the State of what it considers the
rule [of customary IHL) is far better evidence of its position than what can be pieced together from [its] actions . . . in a variety of
contexts.”); Cf. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457, 472 (Dec. 20, 1974) (holding that official declarations of CIL can
legally obligate a state). In short, the content of customary IHL is nebulous and insufficiently articulated so as to give notice. See
PAUL CHRISTOPHER, THE ETHICS OF WAR AND PEACE 167 (1994 (noting that the lack of clarity as to the content of
customary IHL makes it “virtually impossible . . . for soldiers to know with any surety whether certain orders they might receive
are lawful or not.”). The Rome Statute restates rules and principles of IHL as sources of law. See Rome Statute, supra note 32,
at Art. 21(1) (providing that primary sources of applicable law are the “Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and
Evidence” and “applicable treaties and the principles. . . of the international law of armed conflict[.]”). Despite the
amorphousness of custom-based IHL, Article 21 endows the ICC with competence to pronounce the “principles of the
international law of armed conflict.” Moreover, although Article 9 purports to establish a textual basis for specific elements,
amendment of the Statute could enable a two-thirds majority of states-parties to define new crimes without reference to practice,
and further provides that enumerated elements are not dispositive but merely intended to “assist” the ICC in its “interpretation” of
Articles 6-8. Id. at Art. 9(1). By arogating to itself the power to define custom, the ICC may displace state sovereignty. VON
HEBEL ET AL., supra note 31, at 43 (stating the Rome Statute “must prevail [in a conflict with domestic law].” Due to this open
grant to redefine customary IHL, the U.S. is unwilling to subject its Armed Forces to ICC jurisdiction.
44
The overwhelming bulk of death and destruction incident to war is governed not by positive IHL but rather by “military
necessity,” the slipperiest, most elastic concept in the IHL canon. Burrus M. Carnahan, Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War:
The Origins and Limits of the Principles of Military Necessity, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 213, 219 (1998). Traditionally, the customary
IHL principle of necessity implicitly authorized all operations undertaken in the immediate interest of self-preservation provided
a minimal threshhold requirement—that they be intended and tended directly toward the military defeat of the enemy—was
satisfied. ROGERS, supra note 42, at 5 (defining military necessity as “the principle that a belligerent is justified in applying
compulsion and force of any kind, to the extent necessary for . . . the complete submission of the enemy[.]”). However, by World
War II the range of actions considered permissible by necessity had narrowed. See United States v. Krupp, 10 WAR CRIMES
REP. 138-39 (1949) (retreating from the general authorization of military operations by reference to military necessity in holding
that “[t]o claim that [IHL] can be wantonly—and at the sole discretion of any one belligerent—disregarded when he considers his
own situation to be critical, means nothing more than to abrogate the laws . . . of war entirely.”); In re von Leeb and Others, 12
WAR CRIMES REP. 1, 93 (1949) (holding that if necessity constituted general authorization for all belligerent acts “it would
eliminate all humanity and decency and all law from the conduct of war, and it is a contention which the Tribunal repudiates as
contrary to the accepted usages of civilized nations.”); United States v. List et al., 11 TRIALS WAR CRIM. 1, 1255-5 (1949)
(“Military necessity or expediency do not justify a violation of positive rules. [IHL] is prohibitive law.”); LAW OF LAND
WARFARE, DEP’T ARMY F.M. 27-10 (1956) (defining military necessity as “that principle which justifies those measures not
forbidden by international law which are indispensable for securing the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible.”)
(emphasis added); W.V. O’Brien, The Law of War, Command Responsibility, and Vietnam, 60 GEORGETOWN L. J. 616 (1972)
(stating that military necessity “consists in all measures . . . indispensable and proportionate to a legitimate military end, provided
they are not prohibited by the laws of war or the natural law[.]”) (emphasis added). An uneasy compromise exists between the
prohibitionism of IHL regulators and the pragmatism of soldiers. Henry Shue & David Wippman, Limiting Attacks on Dual-Use
Facilities Performing Indispensable Civilian Functions, 35 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 559, 559 (2002). Many commentators have
doubts as to the continued applicability of the principle. See WALZER, supra note_, at 5-8 (criticizing Athenian justification for
killing the entire male population of Melos during Peloponnesian Wars on ground that to fail to do so would have inspired
resistance elsewhere); Francesco Forrest Martin, Using International Human Rights Law for Establishing a Unified Use of Force
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bailiff has selflessly saddled itself, a politicized ICC with a mandate to remake IHL will induce
isolationism.49 U.S. opponents further opined that, despite textual deference to complementarity,50 the
Rule in the Law of Armed Conflict, 64 SASK. L. REV. 347, 394 n.166 (2002) (rejecting necessity as justification for Allied
bombing of Dresden). For others, the proscription of so much conduct heretofore permissible has drained necessity of
operational significance. ROGERS, supra note 42, at 3. To still others, determination of necessity is a balancing test that weighs
the value of the legitimate objective against the suffering caused in its attainment; it is essentially a proxy for proportionality. J.
Nicholas Kendall, Israeli Counter-Terrorism: “Targeted Killings” Under International Law, N.C. L. REV. 1069, 1070 (2002).
Despite theoretical disagreements, necessity, though it does not have a general suspensory effect on IHL, may yet be invoked in
“exceptional circumstances. . . in regard to acts otherwise prohibited.” N. Dunbar, Military Necessity in War Crimes Trials, 29
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 442 (1952). The validity of a defense is fact-intensive, and tribunals called to render judgments accord a
margin of appreciation to soldiers in recognition of imperfect knowledge of the facts of the battlefields. See PRZETACZNIK,
supra note 11, at 36 (stating that although many battlefield actions are “presumptively illegal,” the sole circumstance under which
necessity is inapplicable as a defense is where the method employed was illegal per se); McCOUBREY, INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 249 (1990) (stating that necessity “recognizes the potential impracticability of full compliance with
legal norms in certain circumstances and . . . may mitigate or expunge culpability for prima facie unlawful actions [.]”).
45
The customary principle of “proportionality” dictates that military force not be employed to cause damage “excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.” HENRY SIDGWICK, ELEMENTS OF POLITICS 254
(restating the principle as the prohibition against “any mischief of which the conduciveness to the end is slight in comparison to
the amount of mischief.”); R.R. Baxter, Modernizing the Law of War, 78 MIL. L. REV. 165, 178-79 (1972) (defining
proportionality as the requirement that civilian losses be balanced against military advantage). “Proportionality,” however, is just
as elusive as necessity, for it is difficult to assess whether the method and means of warfare are in fact “conducive” to the end
sought and not excessive in relation to that end. See WALZER, supra note_, at 129 (“[T]here is no ready way to establish an
independent or stable view of the values against which the destruction . . . is to be measured.”); BARNETT, supra note_, at 73
(inquiring whether one must “necessarily assume . . . casualties in order to comply with the requirements of proportionality?”).
46
The customary IHL principle of “distinction,” which maintains that the only legitimate object of war is to destroy enemy armed
forces, imposes a strict prohibition against the deliberate targeting of noncombatant personnel and civilian targets. See
Christopher C. Burris, Re-Examining the Prisoner of War Status of PLO Fedayeen, 22 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COMM. REG. 943,
966 (1987) (discussing origins and application of principle of distinction). Not all scholars concur with the assumption that
noncombatants bear no responsibility for war and as a consequence should be spared its direct effects. See, e.g., The Collected
Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell, Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, eds., vol. III, 151-52 (1968) (suggesting that the
bombing of civilian targets in World War II “shattered the immunity of civilians, one of the things that have made war
possible[,]” and in so doing reduced the likelihood of future war); PAUL FUSSELL, THANK GOD FOR THE ATOM BOMB
AND OTHER ESSAYS 27 (1988) (“The intelligence officer of the U.S. Fifth Air Force declared on July 21, 1945, that ‘the
entire population of Japan is a proper military target,’ and he added emphatically, ‘There are no civilians in Japan.’”); MAO
TSE-TUNG, ON GUERRILLA WARFARE 73 (Samuel B. Griffith transl, 1961 ed.) (postulating that during an insurgency all
adults become combatants). Other commentators insist that distinction rests upon reciprocity. See Emanuel Gross, Use of
Civilians as Human Shields: What Legal and Moral Restrictions Pertain to a War Waged by a Democratic State Against
Terrorism?, 16 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 445, 464 (2002) (examining argument that deviation of one party from the duty to
distinguish combatants from noncombatantsreleases the other); PAUL RAMSEY, THE JUST WAR 435-36 (1968) (contending
that low-intensity conflicts by their very nature “enlarg[e] the area of civilian death and damage that is legitimately collateral[.]”).
Still others propound a “supreme emergency” exception whereby civilians may be attacked if state survival demands. JOHN
RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 98 (1999). In practice arguments about distinction centers upon not whether civilians may
be deliberately targeted but rather whether targeting decisions that cause unintended civilian casualties are illegal.
47
That the only state routinely willing and able to liberate the oppressed peoples of the world should endure criminal exposure
when so doing is offensive to ICC critics. See Statement of Senator Helms Before the U.N. Security Council (Jan. 20, 2000)
(“When the oppressed peoples of the world cry out for help, . . . free peoples . . . have a fundamental right to . . . come to the[ir]
aid. . . [I]f the [U.S.] is to serve as beneficent world sovereign . . . it must not be made to endure penalties by outsiders who object
to the means it chooses.”). Humanitarian intervention is, however, the scenario feared most likely to trigger ICC prosecution of
U.S. nationals. Jimmy Gurule, United States Opposition to the 1998 Rome Statute Establishing an International Criminal Court:
Is the Court’s Jurisdiction Truly Complementary to National Criminal Jurisdictions?, CORNELL INT’L L. J. 1, 4-5(2001/2002).
48
See, e.g., Madeleine Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States, 64 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 34
(2001) (expressing belief that the relative paucity of precedent for judicial enforcement of IHL will permit the ICC to exploit
definitional uncertainties and reach interpretations that criminalize erstwhile legitimate conduct); FRYE, supra note 35, at 39-40
(opining the ICC will become a forum for declaring “spontaneous customary [IHL]” at variance with traditional understandings).
49
See William Safire, Enter the Globocourt, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 20, 2002, at A27 (“[T]he lack of any effective mechanism to
prevent politicized prosecutions of [U.S.] service members . . . could create a powerful disincentive for U.S. military engagement
in the world.”) (quoting U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld). Critics of the ICC, which is silent as to the legality of
humanitarian intervention, suggest that the effects will be most pronounced in the area of “optional” military engagements in
which the U.S. is more invested than any other state. See Guy Roberts, Assault on Sovereignty: The Clear and Present Danger of
the New International Criminal Court, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 35, 45 (2001) (positing that the prospect of political
prosecution of U.S. forces engaged in such operations will depress U.S. participation); Smidt, supra note 40, at 199 (contending
that a politicized ICC will “limit severely those . . . controversial . . .interventions that the advocates of human rights . . . so
desperately seek from the [U.S.]”); David J. Scheffer, The United States and the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT’L
L. 12 (1999) 12 (judging the possibility for politically-motivated prosecutions as “so high . . . that the [U.S.] forces most likely to
. . . prevent . . . humanitarian violations may actually be deterred from responding[.]”); Christopher M. Van de Kieft, Uncertain
Risk: The United States Military and the International Criminal Court, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 2325, 2340 (2002) (suggesting
politically-motivated ICTFY war crimes investigation of NATO Kosovo campaign will deter future interventions).
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ICC would subvert U.S. jurisdiction, trump U.S. sovereignty, and vitiate the procedural rights of U.S.
defendants.53 Critics railed further at a lack of Security Council oversight they deem essential to ensuring
the political accountability and democratic legitimacy of the ICC.54
50

States are obligated to extradite suspects accused of a crimes giving rise to universal jurisdiction to a requesting state or to try
them domestically. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & EDWARD M. WISE, AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE: THE DUTY TO
EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (1995). The principle of “complementarity” transposes this
principle and provides that an international tribunal may exercise jurisdiction only where the state that would normally do so on a
territorial, nationality, or other basis is unwilling or unable. VON HEBEL, supra note 31, at p. 4. The Rome Statute incorporates
complementarity. Rome Statute, supra note 32, at Art. 17(1)(a)-(b) (determining a case to be inadmissible where it is “being
investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction, unless the State is unwilling or unable to carry out the investigation
or prosecution,” or where the case “has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to
prosecute . . . unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute.”).
51
The Rome Statute oblligates the ICC to defer to a state decision not to prosecute, as well as to a domesticacquittal, provided
neither is “for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility.” Id. at Art. 17(2), 20(3). U.S. concerns
center upon whether the ICC would defer to a decision, based on factual sufficiency, prudential considerations, or other goodfaith grounds, not to prosecute. See Gurule, supra note 45, at 8-9 (noting debate over whether ICC should intervene only when
state proceedings were a “sham . . . intended to shield the perpetrator” or more generally to “correct a perceived miscarriage of
justice [ .]”). Domestic critics envisage an activist ICC arrogating jurisdiction to create a peremptory, rather than complementary,
body that sets aside national adjudications with which it disagrees. See VON HEBEL, supra note_ (intimating the ICC is a
“’super’ international appellate court . . . rather than a court intended to complement States.”). By this view, the ICC is, at best,
redundant. See Department of Defense News Briefing, Read Admiral Craig Quigley, Sept. 14, 2000 (stating that the U.S. has a
“stable judicial system . . . fully capable of . . . prosecuting “all allegations of misconduct by U.S. service members.”).
Exacerbating these concerns is uncertainty as to whether the ICC will permit a state to refuse “disclosure of evidence which
relates to its national security.” Rome Statute, supra note_, at Art. 93(4). Under U.S. law, judges are deferential toward
assertions of the state secrets privilege. See Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (denying motion to compel
disclosure of information claimed privileged by CIA Director). Some question whether the ICC will be as deferential. Jacob
Katz Cogan, International Criminal Courts and Fair Trials: Difficulties and Prospects, _YALE J. INT’L L. 111, 139-40 (2002).
52
The ICC may exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed by nationals of states-parties as well as crimes committed on the
territory of a member state. Rome Statute, supra note_, at Art. 12(2). Further, exercise of territorial jurisdiction permits the ICC
to prosecute nationals of states that have not consented to its jurisdiction provided the territorial state acceptsad hoc jurisdiction
in the case in question. Id. at Art. 12(3). Moreover, the Security Council may make a referral whether or not the state of
nationality or territory is a party, thereby creating jurisdiction over the nationals of every state. Rome Statute, supra note_, at
Art. 13(b). Similarly, the ICC Prosecutor may initiate investigation proprio motu of all persons alleged to have committed crimes
on the territory of member states. Rome Statute, supra note_, at Arts. 12(3), 13(b), 15. According to critics, the ICC cannot even
in concert with the Security Council trump the lack of U.S. consent to jurisdiction over its nationals. Morris, supra note 46, at
64. Still, as written Articles 12-15 would permit, e.g., Iraq to invoke ICC jurisdiction for alleged crimes committed by U.S.
troops in Iraq while the ICC would be unable to “prosecute Saddam for massacring his own people.” U.S. Dep’t of State, Press
Briefing, Jul. 20, 1998. The U.S., objecting to the jurisdictional breadth of the Rome Statute, proposed unsuccessful amendments
that would have required the state of nationality of the accused to consent to jurisdiction or, in the alternative, barred the ICC
from asserting jurisdiction over crimes in any conflict of which the Security Council was seized. NEIER, supra note_, at 256.
53
International criminal tribunals must provide minimum procedural protections to defendants. International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966) at Art. 14(3); Trial of Joseph Alstotter & Ors, L. REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 103
(1948). The Rome Statute does incorporates extensive safeguards: defendants may not be charged with ex post facto crimes (Art.
22) or for conduct committed prior to entry into force (Art. 24); may not be placed in double jeopardy (Art. 20); are presumed
innocent(Art. 66(1), are entitled to a statement of charges (Art. 61(3)), counsel of choice (Art. 67(1)(b), (d)), speedy and public
trials (Art. 67(1)(a), (c)), examine adverse witnesses (Art. 67(1)(e), remain silent “without such silence being a consideration in
the determination of guilt,” (Art. 67(1)(g); may not be tried in absentia (Art. 63); are entitled to the exclusion of illegally obtained
evidence (Art. 69(7)), cannot be compelled to self-incriminate (Art. 55(1)(a)), and are entitled to appeal guilty verdicts as well as
sentences (Art. 81). However, predecessor tribunals have a mixed record in implementing such rights. See supra note
(criticizing IMT for ex post facto application of laws and violation of principles of nullem crimen sin lege and nullem poena sin
lege ); Human Rights Center & Centre for Human Rights, supra note_, at 103-04 (criticizing ICTY for murky procedural and
evidentiary rulings, politicized case selection, and lengthy detentions and trials). International trial judges have assumed wide
latitude to draft and amend rules of procedure and evidence, in effect claiming a legislative role. See Prosecutor v. Tihomir
Blaskic (Appeal of Judgment), IT-95-14-AR 108 (21 January 1998) (stating that “ it is the judge who finally takes a decision on
the weight to ascribe to [evidence]. The [ICTFY] is . . . a sui generis institution with its own rules of procedure[.]”). The
interpretation of evidentiary and procedural rules by predecessor tribunals has resulted in decisions, inconsistent with U.S.
conceptions, to admit hearsay. Id. at para. 7, 16, 17 (rejecting a “blanket prohibition” on admission of hearsay). That the broad
interpretive powers available to the ICC might be exercised to deprive defendants of protections inhering in the U.S. legal system
is of concern. Robert Christensen, UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOR. AFF. 391, 409-10 (2001). ICC defenders insist that international
criminal proceedings are autonomous from domestic process and “[t]he international . . . standard . . . is that the trial should have
been ‘fair enough’ rather than . . . ‘fairest of all.’” Warbrick, supra note_, at 54; King & Theofrastus, supra note 33, at 91
(querying “whether . . . U.S. constitutional standards must be adopted by the rest of the world, or whether generally accepted
principles of just treatment . . . will not promote a greater respect for [IHL].”). Nonetheless, as a matter of domestic law, U.S.
citizens are entitled to the full protections of the Constitution, including the right to trial by jury, even when tried outside the U.S.
See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957) (“When the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which
the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide . . . should not be stripped away[.]”). Domestic critics claim that
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Thus, although the ICC commenced operations in March 2003 after garnering the support of a
majority of states for which it is now the regnant paradigm for enforcing IHL, it lacks the backing of the
sole “indispensable nation.”56 The U.S. signed, but did not ratify, the Rome Statute,57 and subsequently

Article III, §2 of the U.S. Constitution grants the sole authority to try U.S. citizens to U.S. courts and that safeguards enshrined in
the Bill of Rights, including rights to a speedy jury trial, to confront witnesses, and to protection against hearsay, are glaringly
absent. Smidt, supra note_, at 219;see also David M. Baronoff, Unbalance of Powers: The International Criminal Court’s
Potential to Upset the Founders’ Checks and Balances, _ U. PA. J. CONST. L. 800, 804 (2002) (identifying numerous ICC
failures to provide defendants procedural safeguards guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution). Moreover, international tribunals do
not explicitly accord defendants the wide range of defenses available at common law. See Cryer, supra note_, at 277 (noting that
the Rome Statute categorically rejects superior orders defense); Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic IT-96-22-A, 7 October 1997
(refusing to recognize existence of a rule of CILor general principle of law with respect to a defense of duress); Matthew
Lippman, Conundrums of Armed Conflict: Criminal Defenses to Violations of the Humanitarian Law of War, 15 DICK. J. INT’L
L. 52, 109 (1996) (defining purpose of international criminal tribunals to be “confining conflict and circumscribing harm to
protected persons” and stating that “[d]eveloping doctrinal defenses . . . is of secondary significance.”). Accordingly, Congress,
in a precursor to ASPA, found ICC protection of individual rights inadequate as a matter of U.S. law. Protection of United States
th
Troops From Foreign Prosecution Act of 1999, H.R. 2381, 106 Cong. §2(5) (1999).
54
U.S. critics question whether the Security Council will retain primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and
security and the determination of threats to and breaches thereof. See UN Charter at Art. 24 (providing that the Security Council
has “primary responsibility” for maintaining international “peace and security”); id. at Art. 39 (according to the Security Council
sole authority to make a determination of aggression or a threat to or breach of international peace and security). The relationship
of the ICC to the UN remains uncertain, and nothing in the Rome Statute, which provides merely that the ICC will be “brought
into relationship with the [UN] through an agreement to be approved by the Assembly of States Parties[,]” implies any role for
the ICC in the maintenance of international peace and security. Rome Statute, supra note 32, at Art. 2. However, predecessor
tribunals, even where established as subsidiary organs of the UN, have been determined to be operationally independent.
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal of Jurisdiction), Appeals Chamber, IT-941-Ar 72, 2 October 1995, paras. 37-38. Moreover, crimes within ICC jurisdiction—aggression, genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity—are those most likely to constitute threats to international peace and security and thus within the primary
responsibility of the Security Council. Commentators suggest that by exercising jurisdiction over defendants in particular cases
where the Security Council has not made a finding of aggression or a threat to or breach of the peace, the ICC Prosecutor may
presuppose state responsibility for the crimes of which the individual is accused and in so doing usurp the exclusive competence
of the Security Council. See Vera Gowlland-Debbas, The Relationship Between the Security Council and the Projected
International Criminal Court, 3 J. ARMED CONFL. 97, 103 (1998) (indicating widespread dissatisfaction with potential conflict
between the Security Council and the ICC over definition and prosecution of aggression). While some suggest that in practice
the two institutions will reach an accommodation whereby the Security Council will act as a “filter mechanism” through the
judicious exercise of discretion, others envision structural conflict due to overlap of the material fields of operation. See id. at
111-13. This structural conflict thesis is supported by Article 16, which, rather than commit the ICC to deferring to veto of a
prosecution by a permanent member of the Security Council, requires an affirmative vote of the entire Council in a resolution
under Chapter VII to obligate the ICC Prosecutor to defer prosecution. Because the U.S. can, in theory, exercise its Security
Council veto power over ICC actions, the U.S. is desiours of preserving UN primacy, and U.S. officials staunchly opposed the
ICC because it will likely undermine that primacy. Hearing on the United Nations International Criminal Court Before the
th
Subcomm. On Int’l Operations of the Senate Comm. On Foreign Relations, 105 Cong. 1, 6 (Jul. 23, 1998). Failure to preserve
Security Council primacy threatened to decouple the influence of the U.S. polity, exercised through elected and appointed
officials, over the ICC; because the determination of what justice is and how it is to be administered is a fundamental
concomitant of self-government, domestic adversaries assail the ICC as an illegitimate attack on democracy. See FRYE, supra
note 35, at 41 (stating that administration of justice is legitimate “to the extent that it rests on popular sovereignty[,]” and that the
ICC, beyond the control of the U.S. electorate, is therefore democratically illegitimate). Moreover, although the Rome Statute
requires the Prosecutor to “analyse the seriousness” of referrals and find a “reasonable basis” to proceed with an investigation
(Art. 15(2)-(3)), the sole institutional safeguard against abuse of discretion--the Pre-Trial Chamber—is not directly accountable
to any official of any state. Elizabeth A. Neuffer, U.S. to Back Out of World Court Plan, BOST. GLOBE, Mar. 29, 2002, at A1.
55
See Julia Preston, U.S. Rift with Allies on World Court Widens, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2002, at A6 (noting approval of $40
million budget for 2003 and adoption of rules for electing judges and a prosecutor).
56
It ought to be patent that no serious peacekeeping or humanitarian intervention can proceed in the absence of the predominant
military capability of the U.S. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Lonely Superpower, FOR. AFF. (Mar.-Apr. 1999), at 35, 37
(1999) (referring to U.S. as the “indispensable nation” to global order). After the First and Second Gulf Wars, Haiti, Bosnia, and
Kosovo, even the staunchest opponents of U.S. hegemony would likely concede that the U.S. has a vital leadership role in the
maintenance of international peace and security and that U.S. participation is a necessary, if not necessarily sufficient, condition
for success; on at least this ground, the U.S. is indeed the sole indispensable nation. See Ambassador David J. Scheffer, Address
Before the Carter Center, (Nov. 13, 1997), http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/971113scheffertribunal.html (last visited
Jan. 8, 2002) (articulating the case for U.S. exceptionalism by noting U.S. participation in peacekeeping, enforcement of Security
Council mandates, and humanitarian intervention and stating that “[n]o other government shoulders the burden of international
security.”); Scheffer, supra note_, at 18 (further elaborating indispensability thesis).
57
President Clinton signed the Rome Statute on the last possible date--December 31, 2000. Elizabeth A. Neuffer, U.S. to Back
Out of World Court Plan, BOST. GLOBE, Mar. 29, 2002, at A1. Presidents Clinton and Bush refused to submit the treaty to the
Senate for its advice and consent as is required for a treaty to have effect as domestic law. See U.S. CONST., Art. II. §2
(providing that a treaty becomes law only upon a favorable vote of 2/3 of the Senate).
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withdrew its signature. Moreover, the U.S. has flexed economic muscle, and threatened to withdraw
from peacekeeping commitments, to dissuade ratifications and exempt its nationals from ICC
jurisdiction.59 The American Servicemembers’ Protection Act60 terminates military aid to states-parties,
precludes U.S. personnel assignments to missions in their territory, and, with the “Hague Invasion
61
Clause,” commands the President to employ “all means necessary,” including military force, to rescue

any U.S. national in ICC custody.62 In short, the U.S. has “washed [its] hands of the [ICC].”63
U.S. hostility strikes the devoted transnational cadre supporting the ICC64 as apostasy given the
history of U.S. leadership in the defense and promotion of human rights.65 In discourses strewn with
58

In May 2002, President Bush informed the UN that the U.S. was no longer a signatory to the Rome Statute. William Safire,
Enter the Globocourt, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 20, 2002, at A27. Whether the President has the authority, as a matter of domestic and
international law, to “unsign” a treaty is a subject addressed in recent scholarship. See, e.g., David C. Scott, Presidential Power
to “Un-sign” Treaties, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1447 (2002) (arguing that the President has unilateral authority to withdraw a signed
treaty from the Senate to negate the domestic and international legal consequences of a signature). Nonetheless, by virtue of the
withdrawal of its signature, the U.S. is not a participant in the Preparatory Commission, the body with the competence to draft
procedural and evidentiary rules, nor is it able to vote in the selection of judges or the prosecutor.
59
In 1998 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, under Chairman Jesse Helms, began to insert the following boilerplate
language expressing opposition to the ICC and warning other states of the consequences of supporting the ICC into the
ratification of instruments providing for “Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters”:
PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRMINAL COURT.—The United States shall
exercise its rights to limit the use of assistance it provides under the Treaty so that any assistance provided by the
Government of the United States shall not be transferred to or otherwise used to assist the International Criminal Court
agreed to in Rome, Italy, on July 17, 1998, unless the treaty establishing the court has entered into force for the United
States by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, as required by Article II, section 2 of the United States
Constitution.
See 144 CONG. REC. S12985 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 1998).
Senator Helms accompanied such provisions with warnings of “grave consequences for our bilateral relations with every nation
that signs [the Rome Statute].” James Podgers, War Crimes Court Under Fire, AM. BAR ASSOC. J., Sept. 1998, at 66.
Clarifying Helms’ warning, Defense Secretary William Cohen advised European allies that their support for the ICC would lead
to a “re-thinking” of U.S. overseas troop commitments and to the U.S. role in NATO. Alessandra Stanley, U.S. Presses Case
Against War Court: Two-Thirds of World Opposes Current Plan,U.N. Conference is Told , INT’L HERALD TRIB., Jul 16,
1998, at 5. At the same time, the Clinton Administration, concerned with the ramifications of the ICC with respect to the liability
of its forces, began to review status-of-forces agreements with states in which U.S. military personnel are deployed to “encourage
corrective actions in regards to this treaty.” Id.; see also William J. Clinton, Statement on the Rome Treaty on the International
Criminal Court, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 4 (Dec. 31, 2000) (expressing concerns about politically-motivated
prosecutions of U.S. forces). Congress responded with legislation prohibiting the U.S. from providing military assistance to a
non-NATO state party to the ICC unless that state provided treaty assurances that it would not extradite U.S. military personnel
to the ICC. American Servicemembers’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 107-206, 116 Stat. 899 (2002) (enacting H.R. 4775 (S. 2551)
[“ASPA”], at §2007. By conditioning U.S. financial and military aid upon cooperation with its agenda, the U.S. has secured
bilateral agreements that obligate states to refuse requests to extradite U.S. military, and in some cases civilian, personnel to the
ICC. See Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Ties Aid to Peacekeepers’ Immunity, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2002, at A1 (noting explicit
connection between foreign aid and guarantees of protection to U.S. military forces serving as peacekeepers); see also Kuwait to
Exempt U.S. on War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2002, at A3 (noting that 14 states had agreed to refuse any requests to
extradite U.S. nationals to the ICC). Similar pressure has resulted in exemptions from the EU and the UN. See UNSC Res. 1422,
nd
U.N. SCOR, 4572 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1422 (2002) (exempting all peacekeepers in Bosnia from ICC jurisdiction for one year
on renewable basis); Paul Meller, Europeans to Exempt U.S. from War Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2002, at A6 (reporting
decision by European Union to refuse ICC requests for extradition of U.S. military and diplomatic, but not civilian, personnel
charged with war crimes). Recently, the U.S. suspended military assistance to 35 states that refused to grant immunity to U.S.
citizens. Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Suspends Aid to 35 Countries Over New International Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 2, 2003, at A1.
60
Pub. L. No. 107-206, 116 Stat. 899 (2002). ASPA, designed to “protect United States military personnel and other elected and
appointed officials of the U[.] S[.] . . . against criminal prosecution by [the ICC . . . ]”, prohibits all agencies and entities of the
U.S., or of any state or local government, from cooperating with the ICC. Id. at §2006.
61
See Richard J. Goldstone & Janine Simpson, Evaluating the Role of the International Criminal Court as a Legal Response to
Terrorism, _ HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 13 (2003) (coining the phrase).
62
See H.R. 1794 (May 10, 2001) (amending, as earlier version of ASPA, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act 2002-03, H.R.
1646 (2001)) (instructing President to use “all means necessary” to effect release any U.S. or allied personnel detained against
their will or on behalf of the ICC).
63
Ambassador Pierre Prosper, U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes, WASH. POST., May 7, 2002, at A18.
64
For the most strident proponents of the ICC, the internationalization of judicial tribunals with competence to adjudicate
violations of IHL is “not a policy choice, but rather a cultural preference, more akin to a . . . religious choice than an argument
deduced from empirical reason.” Kenneth Anderson, What to Do with Bin Laden and Al Qaeda Terrorists?: A Qualified Defense
of Military Commissions and United States Policy on Detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y
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pious nostrums, universalists deride irresponsible attachments to a realist mode of governance—
organized upon principles of state power and sovereignty66—that more idealist theories and multilateral
institutions—organized upon general principles of equality and law—are said to have displaced.67 For
68

ICC partisans, not only is the Court institutionally superior to the ancien regime, but the meritless
objections actually militate in its favor.69 If the U.S. fears the prosecution of its soldiers, it need only

591, 594-95 (2002). For this cohort, the international is always superior to the domestic. See Kenneth Anderson, Secular
Eschatologies and Class Interests of the Internationalized New Class, in PETER JUVILER & CARRIE GUSTAFSON (eds.),
RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: COMPETING CLAIMS? 91 (1998) (claiming that an “International New Class,” with
claims to special legitimacy by virtue of their “planetary pretension,” is the engine behind a legal globalization agenda that
prioritizes enforcement of IHL through the ICC and privileges international institutions over local governance).
65
Although the U.S. has signed few and ratified fewer of the instruments elaborating “human rights,” to the extent that the
impetus for the development of international human rights law was born of the Allied defeat of Nazi Germany and the
development and application of legal standards to punish systematic violations of those standards by U.S. lawyers, one can argue
that the U.S. has led the promotion and protection of human rights since their legal origins. Although this argument is
undermined by the pattern of selective U.S. engagement in the defense of human rights (i.e., in Bosnia, but not in Rwanda; in
Kosovo, but not in Chechnya or Tibet), this position is buttressed by the fact that few other nations place their troops and their
treasure at risk in defense of the principles they proclaim.
66
Realists contend that only those institutions that reflect the interests of their states-parties can hope to be effective in the
creation enforcement of law. See VON HEBEL ET AL., supra note 31, at 40. International criminal tribunals depend for their
success upon the degree to which states are willing to sacrifice their sovereignty to aid in the “fortification of the global rule of
law.” FRYE, supra note 35, at 9. Where states are unwilling to comply with IHL obligations, military force is necessary to
ensure obedience, and only other states possess such currency in abundance; consequently, it to states that institutions must turn
if IHL is to be enforced, and states will only do so to the degree they perceive inherent advantage. Moreover, the most powerful
states will remain beyond the reach of IHL as no other state or states will have the power to enforce violations committed by the
most powerful states. The assumption that a stable IHL regime must reflect the practical interests and capabilities of powerful
states, rather than the moral aspirations of non-state actors or weak states, is central to realist IHL scholarship.
67
For a discussion of the globalist vision of IHL and the formal institutional enforcement model embodied by the ICC, see
generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER ET AL., TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (1998). Again,
however, note that not all academics are so critical of the U.S. position as are the most dedicated of globalists. See, e.g.,
Anderson, supra note 63 (arguing that “[t]o frame the issue as one of US unilateralism . . . as against the virtuously
internationalist world gets it wrong” as “some unilateral US actions tend in the direction of US imperialism as an alternative to
what I have called ‘international legal imperialism,’ the nascent imperialism, the willingness to impose supranational rule, that is
the consequence of assertions of the sovereignty of supranational institutions.”). In essence, the conflict between proponents and
opponents of the ICC may well be the spawn of an existential conflict between European elites who govern international NGOs
who have seized upon the ICC as a “means to resist, at least at the rhetorical level, American imperialism,” and U.S. democrats
whose transcendant moral and political principle—consent of the governed—does not permit joining in a “mystical” venture
toward an international civil society governed by decree from afar. Id. at 102-10. Anderson suggests that the scholarly and
activist community advancing the cause of the ICC has organized theoretical and practical energies around an internationalist,
legal imperialist agenda of the NGOs and their European elites. Id.
68
See HELD ET AL., supra note_, at 86-87 (contending that the ICC is the “best available way to mitigate the corrosive effects
of mortal combat . . . [g]iven the current realities of international politics[.]”
69
ICC advocates counter each asserted basis of opposition. To claims that the ICC Prosecutor will selectively prosecute, they
stress that the Rome Statute, under Article 20(3)(b), coupled with complementarity, eliminates the opportunity for politicization
of justice by placing the burden of proof upon the Prosecutor to demonstrate, prior to initiating a prosecution and to the
satisfazction of two of the three judges in the Pretrial Chamber, that the state of nationality of the accused affirmatively failed to
independently and impartially administer justice. See Mohamed El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery
to Implement International Law, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 689 (2002). With respect to the definition of crimes within ICC
jurisdiction, proponents of the Rome Statute contend that, although the definitions remain fuzzy, the sole method of remedying
these definitional shortcomings is accession to membership, as only members may participate in the work of the Preparatory
Committees charged with more precise articulation of the definitions of crimes. See David, supra not 40, at 404-05. Further,
defenders of the ICC point to the recent immunization of UN peacekeepers as a mechanism whereby states disproportionately
involved in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations may limit the criminal exposure of their engaged forces. See (note)
(asserting that, because Article 8 provides that the only war crimes within ICC jurisdiction are those committed as part of a “plan
or policy[,]”peacekeepers, the deployment of whom could not possibly be undertaken as part of a plan or policy to engage in war
crimes, would almost certainly never be haled before the ICC for isolated criminal acts). Insofar as the rights of the accused are
concerned, supporters of the ICC extol the abundance of provisions in the Rome Statute that ensure protection of criminal
defendants while suggesting that these provisions provide greater protection than is constitutionally necessary or functionally
prudent. See Podgers, supra note_, at 69 (citing claims that the Rome Statute provides “layers of protection” against undue
prosecutions); see also (note) (stating that jury trial is not applicable to trial of U.S. forces overseas because the Bill of Rights
have “no relation to crimes committed without the jurisdiction of the United States against the laws of a foreign country” (citing
Neeley v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 122 (1901)); id. (contending that the “list of the due process rights guaranteed by the Rome
Statute is . . . somewhat more detailed and comprehensive than those in the America Bill of Rights. Not better, but more
detailed.”); Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 88
GEORGETOWN L. J. 417 (2000) (suggesting that the safeguards afforded defendants in the ICC are actually “excessive”).
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ensure that they do not commit war crimes, or punish them when they do. By its opposition the U.S.,
according to this globalist philosophy, has stuck itself on the wrong side of history.71
If the asserted bases accurately portrayed the grounds upon which the U.S. eschews participation,
72

a quick solution could be crafted: the U.S. might accede to the Rome Statute, join in the (re)definition of
crimes within ICC jurisdiction, secure the permanent immunity of peacekeepers operating under Security
Council mandate,73 amend the Statute to enhance individual rights, and elaborate complementarity to
support deference to domestic judicial processes. However, the etiology of U.S. disaffection is traceable
less through statutory provisions than to a post-September 11th set of understandings concerning the
challenge posed by the intersection of international terrorism74 and weapons of mass destruction
[“WMD”],75 along with the proper role of IHL in the battle against this threat to civilization.76 Although
77
these criticisms are not meretricious, a “decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind” urges a declaration

of the causes that impelled the U.S. to reject a venture to which many states have committed themselves.
2. Criminalization of the War on Terror? The Bush Doctrine and the ICC

70

See FRYE, supra note_, at 27 (contending that the ICC will not substitute its judgment for that of U.S. courts unless the U.S.
“insist[s] on shielding criminal suspects from legitimate investigation and prosecution[,]” which is highly unlikely because “it is
firm American policy to prosecute any rogue soldier who might commit a war crime[.]”). An additional option is to accede to the
Rome Statute while suspending acceptance of ICC jurisdiction over war crimes for 7 years. See Rome Statute, supra note 32, at
Art. 124 (permitting a party to “opt out” of ICC jurisdiction over war crimes for a nonrenewable 7 year period upon accession).
71
Some critics of the U.S. abandonment of the ICC proclaim a devolution “back to the anarchic world of pre-Nuremburg.” King
& Theofrostus, supra note 33, at 104-05.
72
See, e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, Conservative Idealism and International Institutions, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 291, 297 (2000)
(arguing for qualified U.S. participation in the ICC under certain stated conditions).
73
See FRYE, supra note 35, at 32 (noting proposals to grant such immunity to U.S. peacekeepers out of recognition of the
“special responsibilities” shouldered by the U.S. in the maintenance of international peace).
74
Although the very definition of “terrorism” is to some extent a political exercise, the proliferating definitional offerings
coalesce around the notion that “terrorism” is the threat or use of violence with the intent to cause fear in a target group in order
to accomplish political objectives. See generally http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism.asp (listing 12 conventions and
protocols defining terrorism); ROSLYN HIGGINS & MAURICE FLORY, EDS., TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW (listing and discussing instruments related to terrorism). U.S. federal law defines terrorism as an activity that “(a) involves
a violent act or an act dangerous to human life that is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that
would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; and; (b) appears to be
intended (I) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion;
or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping.” 18 USC §3077 (2000). A leading academic
definition considers terrorism to be “the threat or use of violence in order to create extreme fear and anxiety in a target group so
as to coerce them to meet political (or quasi-political) objectives of the perpetrators.” OSCAR SCHACTER, INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 163 (1991). Although no single definition is universally accepted, the elements of civilian
targets, violence, and political extortion are found in almost every working definition, and the United Nations has imposed a duty
upon every state “to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another state or acquiescing
in organized activities within its territory directed toward the commission of such acts, when such acts involve a threat or use of
th
th
force.” S. C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 47 Sess., U.N. Doc. 7 (1992); see also S.C. Res. 1373, UN SCOR, 4385 mtg., U.N.
Doc./S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001), paras. 1-3, 6 (Sept. 28, 2001) (obligating all member states to deny financing, support, and
havens to terrorists and affirming the right of self-defense against “terrorist acts[.]”).
75
A “weapon of mass destruction” is defined as “any weapon or device that is intended, or has the capability, to cause death or
serious bodily injury to a significant number of people through the release, dissemination, or impact of . . . toxic or poisonous
chemicals or their precursors; . . . a disease organism; or . . . radiation or radioactivity.” 50 U.S.C. 2302(1)(2000).
76
Theories abound in answer to the question, “What is the purpose of law?,” with utilitarians, natural legal theorists, materialists,
legal positivists, libertarians, socialists, statists, developmentalists, critical legal scholars, and others weighing in with arguments.
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999). Many of the extant theories of
law converge around the hypothesis that the purpose of law is to direct and limit government in the collective organization of the
defense of life, liberty, and property, and to preserve civilization against threats to these core values, a hypothesis central to the
current work. See FREDERIC BASTIAT, THE LAW 6 (1850) (synthesizing several strands of legal theory to postulate the
purpose of law). The notion that law serves as firebreak against threats to civilization has acquired purchase in international
jurisprudence and illuminates the thesis that the nexus of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction is a threat to which law is
obliged to respond. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. (8 Jul. 1996)
(Shahabuddeen, J., dissenting) (stating that the purpose of law is not merely to resolve disputes but to protect civilization).
77
See U.S. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, Jul. 4, 1776, at preambular paragraph (conceding that the international
community, of which the U.S. was a constituent “People,” was entitled to a statement of causes for U.S. secession from Britain).
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Prior to the attacks of September 11 , 2001, terrorism was widely considered, like
narcotrafficking or counterfeiting a transnational law enforcement problem necessitating institutional
cooperation between civilian criminal justice systems of concerned states.78 The U.S. and other states
scored several apparently major legal victories against international terrorists in civil courts, an outcome
79
that seemed to support the utility of the transnational judicial response to terrorism, and the negotiations

toward the Rome Statute nearly included terrorism as a crime within ICC jurisdiction, underscoring
widespread support for judicial responses to the phenomenon.80 While eradication of the global scourge
of terrorism may benefit from allied judicial efforts, however, the attacks unleashed on the U.S. that
infamous morning fundamentally transformed, from the U.S. vantage point, perceptions of the nature and
magnitude of the danger and, consequently, the proper instrumentalities to employ and objectives to
pursue in response.81 September 11th—the first day of a new historical era—withdrew the veil of
ignorance, and the U.S. now concedes that, after a decade of denial,82 it is at war83 against a menace no

78

See Ronald J. Sievert, War on Terrorism or Global Law Enforcement Operation?, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 307, 313
th
(2003); see also MICH. J. INT’L L., supra note_, at 754 (contending, prior to September 11 , that terrorism could be reduced or
eliminated by states ceding sovereignty to transnational organizations”); Mark A. Drumbl, Victimhood in Our Neighborhood:
Terrorist Crime, Taliban Guilt, and the Asymmetries of International Legal Order, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1, 4 (2002) (suggesting
international terrorism is amenable to a civilian solution); Emanuel Gross, Trying Terrorists—Justifications for Differing Trial
Rules: The Balance Between Security Considerations and Human Rights, 13 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2002) (stating
that terrorism is “no different than any other criminal offense”); Robinson O. Everett, The Law of War: Military Tribunals and
the War on Terrorism, FED. LAWYER, Nov./Dec. 2001, at 20 (arguing that terrorism violates the laws of nations but not IHL).
Although it offered no assistance in enforcing its pronouncements condemning terrorism, for adherents to the criminal justice
paradigm the UN was the logical place to which to turn to organize such cooperative efforts. Smidt, supra note_, at 229.
79
th
On November 4 , 1998, Usama bin Laden and members of the Al Qaeda terrorist organization were indicted in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York for orchestrating acts of terrorism against U.S. nationals, including the bombing of
U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar As-Salaam, Tanzania. See Indictment, United States v. Usama bin Laden et al,, S(2)
98 Cr. 1023 (LBS) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 1998) (charging bin Laden and others with conspiracy, bombing U.S. embassies, 224
counts of murder, leadership of a “terrorist group dedicating to opposing non-Islamic governments with force and violence,”
seeking to obtain WMD, issuing orders to his followers to attack U.S. forces in all Muslim countries, and ordering followers to
commit genocidal war against all U.S. citizens), at http://www.fbi.gov/contact/fo/nyfo/pressrels/1998/11041998.htm. As the
capture and trial of these defendants was considered critical to U.S. national security interests, the conviction of several of these
defendants in the spring of 2001 was, at the time, considered to be a national security coup. See, e.g., Elizabeth Neuffer, Four
Guilty in Embassy Bombings, BOST. GLOBE, May 20, 2001 (reporting the conviction, on 302 counts, of four participants in the
destruction of U.S. embassies and the deaths of 224 people, including 12 Americans).
80
See Lucy Martinez, Prosecuting Terrorists at the International Criminal Court: Possibilities and Problems, 34 RUTGERS L. J.
1 (2002) (discussing negotiating history and prospects for future inclusion of terrorism within Rome Statute).
81
Immediately following the attacks, President George W. Bush declared a national emergency, and Congress delegated him
extensive authority to, inter alia, “use all necessary and appropriate force” in defense of the U.S. against the authors of
th
September 11 . See Declaration of National Emergency, Proclamation 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,199 (Sept. 18, 2001) (declaring the
U.S. to be in a state of emergency by virtue of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001); see also Joint Resolution 23 (JR 23),
Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong., Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (enacted Sept. 18,
2001) (authorizing the President to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such
organizations or persons[.]”). In jettisoning the judicial approach, the Bush Administration determined that the deterrence
th
failures that led to September 11 were attributable to the inadequacy of the judicial approach and that future such attacks could
only be prevented by re-establishing a credible threat of punishment for would-be attackers and that no institution other than the
U.S. military could mount such a threat. Smidt, supra note_, at 157-58; see also Ruth Wedgwood, The Law at War: How Osama
Slipped Away, 66 NAT’L INTEREST 69, 71-72 (2002) (deriding as a “very dangerous intellectual failure” the application of
criminal law, rather than force, to overcome the scourge of terrorism). Non-U.S, commentators appear not to have been so easily
swayed from the criminal justice model. See, e.g., Keith Hayward & Wayne Morrison, Locating “Ground Zero”: Caught
Between the Narratives of Crime and War, 140-57, in STRAWSON, ED., supra note_ (contending that the terrorists of
th
September 11 are best described by some indeterminate intermediate term between criminals and “agents of war”). Others
suggest that the U.S. abandoned the criminal justice model in favor of a military approach during the latter half of the 1990s, well
th
before September 11 . See, e.g., Todd M. Sailer, The International Criminal Court: An Argument to Extend its Jurisdiction to
th
Terrorism and a Dismissal of U.S. Objections, 13 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 311, 311 (1999). However, September 11
caused the U.S. to “s[ee] the existing evidence in a new light,” and the restructuring of U.S. foreign policy toward military
solutions to the problem of terrorism dates to that infamous day. See ASSOC. PRESS, Rumsfeld Defends War, Jul. 10, 2003.
82
Every year the President must submit to Congress a comprehensive report on the national security strategy of the U.S. See
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, §603(a)(1), 50 U.S.C. §404a (1994) (imposing this obligation).
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84

less threatening to its existence than the Great Wars, hot and cold, of the 20 century. In response, the
U.S. has pledged that, while it will mean a long hard struggle to defeat all the individuals, groups, and
states85 involved, victory in the War on Terror is certain.86
87

However, the U.S. faces foes that arm themselves with WMD, present no static targets, abjure
legal restraint,88 and deliberately murder civilians. U.S. armed forces, trained to observe and obey
limitations imposed by IHL,89 are distinctly disadvantaged by a grossly asymmetrical legal framework in

The U.S. National Security Strategy, issued in September 2002, rejects the judicial approach to combating terrorism and
confesses that “[i]t has taken almost a decade for us to comprehend the true nature of th[e] new threat” and react accordingly.
See National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002) [“NSSUSA”], at 15, available at www.
whitehouse.gove/nsc/nss.pdf.
83
th
The official U.S. assessment is that the attacks of September 11 effected a general declaration of war, by global terrorist
organizations and their state sponsors, against the U.S. See Elaine Sciolino, Long Battle Seen: “We’re at War,” He Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 16, 2001, at A1 (“We’re at war. There’s been an act of war declared upon America by terrorists, and we will
respond accordingly.”) (quoting address by President Bush to the National Security Council). Commentators concur with this
assessment. See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, Assessing Claims to Revise the Laws of War, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 81, 88 n.14 (2003)
(stating that “[o]nly a most technical and arid legalism could deny [that the U.S. is in a state of war with al Qaeda].”); Derek
th
Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 1-9 (2003) (concluding that the September 11 attacks
resembled acts of war within the meaning of IHL in that they were extraordinarily severe, orchestrated from abroad by an
organized enemy, directed against the U.S. as a whole, and treated as such by state governments and international organizations,
including NATO and the UN). The War on Terror has not been concluded with the defeat of the Taliban or the Hussein regime
in Iraq; rather, it has just begun. See President George W. Bush, Prepared Remarks Declaring End to Major Combat in Iraq, N.Y.
th
TIMES, May 1, 2003 (“The battle of Iraq is one victory in a war on terror that began on September 11 , 2001, and still goes on . .
. Any person, organization or government that supports, protects, or harbors terrorists is complicit in the murder of the innocent,
and equally guilty of terrorist crimes. Any outlaw regime that has ties to terrorist groups, and seeks or possesses weapons of
mass destruction, is a grave danger to the civilized world, and will be confronted.”). Arguments that juridically speaking it is
impossible to be at war with non-state actors may well be sound in terms of their fidelity to legal technicalities. See, e.g., Stacie
D. Gorman, In the Wake of Tragedy: The Citizens Cry Out for War, But Can the United States Legally Declare War on
Terrorism?, 21 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 669 (2003) (concluding that under domestic and international law only sovereign
entitles—i.e., states—possess the legal personality necessary to be the objects of a declaration of war). However, they miss the
point that terrorism poses as significant a threat to U.S. vital interests as do states and that the judicial response is inadequate to
resolve the threat. See Roberto Iraola, Military Tribunals, Terrorists, and the Constitution, 33 NEW MEX. L. REV. 95, 113
(2003) (“It is clear that a state of war exists between the [U.S.] and al Qaeda[,]” a terrorist group that “has openly proclaimed war
against the [U.S.] and has repeatedly carried out attacks against us.”).
84
See Charles Feldman & Stan Wilson, Ex-CIA Director: U.S. Faces “World War IV,” (quoting former CIA Director James
Woolsey as describing War on Terror as a “Fourth World War,” following World Wars I & II and the Cold War, in which the
threat to the U.S. is at least as extreme as these earlier conflicts); David Rivkin Jr. & Lee A Casey, That’s Why They Call It War,
WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2003, at B4 (describing War on Terror as a “long-term life or death struggle” in which the U.S. has
“never been more threatened.”).
85
State terrorism and sponsorship of terrorist groups is of special concern because states have the resources to project and sustain
violence on a systematic, global basis. See President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (January 29, 2002) (labelling
Iran, North Korea, and Iraq an “axis of evil” due to sponsorship of terrorist groups and signaling the U.S. would “not permit the
world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons.”).
86
See R. W. Apple, A Clear Message: “I Will Not Relent,” N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2001, at A1 (reporting a presidential address
to a joint session of Congress on Sept. 20, 2001, in which President Bush stated that the U.S. effort would not stop “until every
terrorist of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”).
87
In contrast to states, which present “fixed addresses” against which to direct measures in reprisal for their initial use of force,
terrorist organizations are a inchoate conglomeration of entities that operate as part of “shadowy” networks independent in some
instances of the control or direction of the states in which they are physically located, rendering it very difficult to employ antiterrorist countermeasures that do not simultaneously inflict harm upon these non-culpable states, many of which are as distressed
about the presence of terrorists in their midst as are the victims of their terrorism. See Mark A. Drumbl, Victimhood in Our
Neighborhood: Terrorist Crime, Taliban Guilt, and the Asymmetries of International Legal Order, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1, 47-48
(2002) (discussing the legal difficulties in directing proportional and precise military force against non-state actors).
88
Terrorism, the “totalitarian form of war and politics,” rejects any obligation to adhere to the dictates of law or morality and in
so doing “shatters [IHL].” , Thwarting Terrorist Acts by Attacking the Perpetrators or Their Commanders as an Act of SelfDefense: Human Rights Versus the State’s Duty to Protect Its Citizens, _ TEMPLE INT’L & COMP. L. J. 195, 233 (2001).
Among the more reprehensible tactics they employ is sheltering their number in areas populated by civilians in order to “exploit
the rules of the game . . ., which categorically state that the civilian population must not be involved in the armed conflict.” Id.
This and other violations of IHL were committed by forces fighting for the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq. See Neil A. Lewis,
U.S. Is Preparing to Try Iraqis for Crimes Against Humanity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2003, at A1 (listing Iraqi violations of IHL,
including mistreatment and extrajudicial killing of POWs, perfidious surrender, fighting in civilian garb, using civilians as human
shields, employing hospitals and ambulances to military ends, and placing cash bounties on U.S. pilots).
89
See U.S. ARMY, JA-422, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 5-2 (2000) (stating the policy of the U.S. to comply with IHL
under all circumstances to the extent practicable and feasible).
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which morally inferior warriors enjoy all its protections but respect none of its obligations. This legal
asymmetry, coupled with the destructive capacity of weapons brought rapidly and unexpectedly to bear
by enemies against whom deterrence is impossible,91 erodes the U.S. military advantage. The reduction in
power differential triggered by this synthesis of WMD and terrorists’ exploitation of legal compliance
disparities renders ultimate U.S. victory more costly, in lives and treasure, and more uncertain.
In light of this strategic reconfiguration, the U.S. has, albeit belatedly, enhanced the flexibility of
its policy options. The Bush Doctrine proclaims the rights to employ preemptive measures in selfdefense,92 depose regimes harboring terrorists,93 eliminate terrorist leadership,94 and bring ever-more
sophisticated weaponry to bear upon these adversaries.95 However, rather than reap gratitude for
shouldering a disproportionate burden in the War on Terror, the U.S. has been accused of opprobrious
conduct arising from the proactive use of force, the use of certain weapons systems,96 and collateral

90

See Michael F. Noone, Jr., Applying Just War Jus in Bello Doctrine to Reprisals: An Afghan Hypothetical, 51 CATH. U. L.
REV. 27, 32 (2002) (applying pejorative label “warriors” to individuals who war in the absence of legal restraint, and “soldiers”
to those who accept legal limitations on the available methods and means); see also Alberto R. Coll, The Legal and Moral
Adequacy of Military Responses to Terrorism, 81 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 297, 297-98 (1987) (relegating terrorists from
the category of lawful combatants to the pariah category of “unlawful belligerents”).
91
NSSUSA, supra note 81, at 15 (contending that deterrence is ineffective against the “deadly threat of Islamic terrorists whose
avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death[.]”).
92
The U.S. now embraces preemptive self-defense, a doctrine that claims the right of a state to use unilateral force, even in the
absence of legal authorization from the UN, to eliminate an incipient threat that is not yet operational but which, if permitted to
mature, could be reduced only at much greater cost. See id. at 15 (stating that the “immediacy of today’s threats, and the
magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries’ choice of weapons, do not permit . . . let[ting] our enemies
strike first.”); see also NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 3 (Dec. 2002), at
http:/www.whitehouse.gove/response/index/html (“Because deterrence may not succeed, and because of the potentially
devastating consequences of WMD use against our forces and civilian population, U.S. military forces and appropriate civilian
agencies must have the capability to defend against WMD-armed adversaries, including in appropriate cases through preemptive
measures.”); David E. Langer, Bush Renews Pledge to Strike First to Counter Terror Threats, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 20, 2002, at A3
(reporting message from President Bush to U.S. troops in Afghanistan stating that the U.S. will preemptively strike against states
developing WMD and that “America must act against these terrible threats before they’re fully formed[.]”). For an extended
discussion of the doctrine of preemptive self-defense at domestic and international law, see infra at note_.
93
See President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, Washington, D.C., 20
September 2001, available at www.usembassy.org.uk/bush83.html (“Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make.
Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support
terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.”).
94
Targeted killing of terrorist leaders may preclude subsequent acts of terrorism, produce fewer casualties than other options,
inflict greater disruption on terrorist groups, and leave no prisoners to become causes for future terrorist attacks. Daniel B.
Pickard, Legalizing Assassination? Terrorism, The Central Intelligence Agency, and International Law, 30 GA. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 1, 31-32 (2001). On this basis, the U.S. has added this policy option to its anti-terrorist arsenal. See John Diamond,
Shackles Loosened on U.S. Intelligence, USA TODAY, Jul. 9, 2002, at 8A (reporting that the Bush Administration has
authorized executive agencies to overthrow regimes and eliminate foreign leaders); James Risen & David Johnston, War of
Secrets: Not Much Has Changed in a System that Failed, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2002, at D1 (reporting that CIA Special
Activities Division has been activated for covert operations and authorized to use deadly force against terrorists). For a
discussion of the domestic and international legal regimes governing assassination, see infra at note_.
95
Examples of sophisticated weapons systems either in development, making their debut, or being used widely in the War on
Terror include precision-guided munitions [“PGMs”], lasers, depleted uranium munitions, carbon fiber bombs, and unmanned
aerial vehicles. See Richard Whitby, High-Tech Hardware in War on Terror, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 8, 2002, at A1.
96
Certain means of war, such as various types of ammunition that cause unnecessary suffering and biological weapons, have long
been proscribed by treaties. See e.g., Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (annexed to Fourth Hague
Convention of 1899, rev’d. 1907), 29 July 1899, at Art. 23(3) (limiting the methods and means of warfare that cause “superfluous
injury” or “unnecessary suffering”); Hague Convention of 1907 (committing parties to pass domestic military regulations
incorporating the protections of POWs provided for therein, precluding the use of many weapons systems, and providing
protection for religious and cultural institutions); Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571 (forbidding use of gas and bacteriological
weapons but not outlawing development); Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, April 10, 1972, 1015 U.N.T.S. 164 (1972) [“BWC”]
(prohibiting the development, stockpiling, and use of biological weapons); Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use
of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects
[“CCW”], 19 I.L.M. 1524 (1981) (prohibiting weapons that use fragments not detectable by X-ray, regulating mines and booby
traps, and regulating incendiary weapons); Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use
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damage resulting therefrom. The injection of the ICC into this equation bodes ill for the eventual defeat
of international terrorism. Despite the seemingly self-evident fact that U.S. operations are designed to,
and have the effect of, preventing depredations,98 the constellation of actors hostile to the War on Terror
may well, if permitted, hijack the ICC as an accomplice in the criminalization of the Bush Doctrine
99
(along with the civilians who crafted it and the troops who execute it) and the indemnification of

of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, 13 January 1993, 32 I.L.M. 800 (1993) (prohibiting development, production, or
use of chemical weapons); 1997 United Nations Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer
of Anti-personnel Mines and on their Destruction (36 I.L.M. 1507) (1997) (banning the use of land mines). In recent years a
movement the purpose of which is to deny technologically sophisticated states the legal capacity to employ advanced weapons
systems has gained momentum. See Smidt, supra note_, at 226 (discussing this development); BARNETT, supra note_, at120
(discussing longstanding efforts to prohibit napalm and fuel-air explosives); Roberts, supra note_, at 22-23 (suggesting that
cluster bombs, while not illegal per se, may be incompatible with the “fundamental principles” of IHL); Nicholas Wade & Eric
Schmitt, U.S. Use of Tear Gas Could Violate Treaty, Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2003, at (reporting contention that U.S.
use of riot control agents would violate the Chemical Weapons Convention); STUART MASLEN, ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES
UNDER HUMANITARIAN LAW (2001) (discussing process whereby anti-personnel mines have been proscribed by
multilateral treaty and efforts to extend the application of the treaty to non-ratifying states). This effort rests largely upon
declarations, unsupported by state practice, that the weapons system in question is violative of customary IHL principles. See,
e.g., Depleted Uranium: Hague War Crimes Prosecutor Not Ruling NATO Trial Out, LA REPUBBLICA, Jan. 14, 2001, at 14
(quoting Chief Prosecutor of the ICTFY as stating that the use of depleted uranium [“DU”] munitions by NATO may constitute a
war crime on the sole ground that DU munitions violate customary IHL); Smidt, supra note_, at 226 (speculating that lasers and
mines will soon be declared violative of customary IHL despite persistent state dissent); ICJ Advisory Opinion on Nuclear
Weapons, Jul. 8, 1996 (stating, in an advisory opinion, that the use of nuclear weapons, in addition to other environmentalaltering weapons, may give rise to a violation of customary IHL). The set of banned weapons recognized by the U.S. is
considerably narrower than the set claimed by NGOs whose aggressive moves to declare such systems prohibited augur ill for
technologically sophisticated states engaged in conflicts, such as anti-terrorist operations, where such systems have significant
utility. See Carnahan, supra note_, at 732 (discussing controversy in depth).
97
Whereas the customary IHL principle of distinction has traditionally imposed a strict prohibition against the deliberate
targeting of noncombatant personnel and civilian targets, thereby implying that specific intent to target noncombatants or
civilians is required to prove criminal liability, IHL activists, contending that advances in military technology have facilitated
much greater precision, now argue that the standard for criminal liability when an attacker misses a military target and causes
collateral damage should be mere negligence. See Roberts, supra note 48, at 46 (2001) (stating that the reduction in the burden
of proof in a case alleging a violation of the principle of distinction will leave combatants and civilian decisonmakers “constantly
subjected to second-guessing over weapon and target selection” and liable to prosecution for misjudgments made even in
conditions of great uncertainty). The subjection of targeting decisions, whether ex ante or ex post, to the review of a judicial
body such as the ICC is, for many commentators, not a serious option. Smidt, supra note_, at 229. The further introduction of a
negligence, rather than a specific intent, standard renders this proposal even more objectionable. See Anderson, supra note 63
(arguing that even employing this reduced standard, negligence “has to consist of more than a lot of collateral damage, including
gruesome civilian death and injury, that might be the result simply of a cruise missile aimed in good faith but gone astray.”).
98
See id. at 75 (contending that some interventions “serve . . . to increase the probability of the free choice of peoples[.]”). It
seems inarguable that operations in suppression of terrorism can reasonably be thought to fit within this category; the General
Assembly has approved this thesis in declaring support of terrorists as “acts of aggression” constitutive of an “armed attack”
th
against which the right to self-defense appertains. G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29 Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 (1975), at
Annex, Definition of Aggression, art. 3(g); see also Constantine Antonopolous, The Unilateral Use of Force by States after the
End of the Cold War, 4 J. ARMED CONFLICT L. 117 (1999) (arguing that UNSCRs 1368 and 1373, which recognize the
“inherent” right of self-defense against terrorism, implicitly authorize the exercise of such a right).
99
In the view of a number of senior civilian U.S. decisionmakers, they themselves, and not the troops they dispatch to do battle in
the War on Terror, are the most valuable prize to be claimed through the manipulation of the ICC agenda by the enemies of the
U.S. in concert with politically motivated prosecutors and judges. See FRYE, supra note 35, at 43 (suggesting that the “top
civilian and military leaders, those responsible for our defense and foreign policy[,] are the real potential targets of the ICC’s
politically unaccountable prosecutor[.]”). Recent indictments lodged against senior civilian and military decisionmakers, U.S.
and otherwise, including the heads-of-state of the U.S. and Israel, in the domestic courts of several states lends credence to this
speculation. See, e.g., Green, supra note_, at 314 (discussing phenomenon whereby a number of states, including the UK,
Canada, Australia, and Belgium, have amended their criminal codes to permit the exercise of universal jurisdiction in order to
indict senior military and civilian officials of other states for war crimes and crimes against humanity); Jeffrey T Kuhner, Iraqis
Target Gen. Franks for War Crimes Trial, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2003, at A1 (reporting the filing of a criminal complaint
against General Tommy Franks, commander of the Liberation of Iraq, alleging command responsibility for the commission of
war crimes by unknown U.S. soldiers, in a Belgian court granted universal jurisdiction under a 1993 Belgian law); note (reporting
that Spanish magistrate Baltasar Garzon, purporting to exercise universal jurisdiction, is seeking the extradition of 46 former
Argentine military officers accused of having committed human rights abuses during the “Dirty War” from 1973-1983); but see
Paul Geitner, “Universal Jurisdiction” is Removed from War Crimes Law, ASSOC. PRESS, Aug. 2, 2003 (repoting the
amendment of the Beligan law after its “abuse and manipula[tion] for political ends” and damage to relations with states with
which Belgium had had “excellent rapport”) (quoting Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel).
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terrorism.

In light of ongoing contestation over the parameters of IHL, it is not inconceivable that

exercise of ICC jurisdiction over the crime of “aggression” as it comes to be defined101 could result,
particularly if such exercise is at odds with Security Council,102 in an attempt to hale U.S. personnel to the
103

Hague to answer charges levied by a state sponsor of terrorism for operations that result in unintended
civilian casualties104 or the use of “disproportionate” force against terrorists.105 The potential for mischief

100

To require the U.S. to first absorb a terrorist attack prior to undertaking self-defense measures would be to “giv[e] the bad guys
a ‘free kick’ at the start of the conflict.” Robert F. Turner, It’s Not Really Assassination: Legal and Moral Implications of
Internationally Targeting Terrorists and Aggressor-State Regime Elites, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 787, 804 (2003).
101
A long quasilegislative history precedes attempts to define the crime of “aggression” at international law. See Jonathan A.
Bush, “The Supreme Crime” and its Origins: The Lost Legislative History of the Crime of Aggressive War, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 2324 (2002) (chronicling this history); see also Charter of the IMT, supra note_, at art. 6 (defining “crimes against peace”
as including “planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international law, treaties,
agreements, or assurances.”). Although the crime of aggression was included within ICC jurisdiction, the negotiating parties
could not agree upon a definition. See Van de Kieft, supra note 48, at 2359-63 (describing various proposed definitions of
aggression giving rise to individual criminal liabiliy as including an option that would require as a condition precedent a
determination of state responsibility for an unlawful war, a second option limiting individual liability to those ordering the
aggressive acts, and a third identical to the first with the exception that peacekeeping operations were exempted). As a result the
ICC will not exercise jurisdiction over aggression until the States Parties agree, by a 7/8 majority, to a definition and to any
conditions precedent and in no event will this occur prior to 7 years after the entry into force of the Rome Statute. See Rome
Statute, supra note 32, at Art. 5(1)(d) (granting the ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression); id. at Art. 5(2) (providing that
the ICC “shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in accordance with Articles 121 and
123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the [ICC] shall exercise jurisdiction[.]”); id. at Art. 121, 123
(providing rules and procedures for voting amendments to the ICC). Were the ICC to define aggressuib to rule that a necessary
and proportional response to a terrorist attack is not a measure in self-defense, such a definitional approach would incriminate
states operating in self-defense and simultaneously insulate terrorists, along with the states harboring them, from responsibility
for their actions if states that would otherwise employ force in response to terrorist attacks were dissuaded from doing so out of
concern that their actions would give rise to legal liability. See Smidt, supra note_, at 227-28 (commenting that an overbroad
definition of aggression “may have the unintended consequences of protecting [terrorists].”).
102
Although Article 5(2) of the Rome Statute provides that the exercise of ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression “shall be
consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations,” and although the UN Charter accords the Security
Council the “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” (Art. 24(1), see infra at note_) and
the exclusive competence to “determine the existence of any . . . act of aggression” (Art. 39), under the Rome Statute the ICC
Prosecutor is empowered, in theory, to usurp the authority of the UN Security Council by indicting an individual for the crime of
aggression without an Article 39 finding by the Security Council that the state of nationality of the individual committed an act of
aggression, an eventuality anathema to the U.S. See Jennifer Trahan, Defining “Aggression”: Why the Preparatory Commission
for the International Criminal Court has Faced Such a Conundrum, 24 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 439, 440 (2002)
(concluding that the ICC Prosecutor is not restricted by operation of the Rome Statute from making a determination of the
existence of an act of aggression independent of a contrary Security Council determination); King & Theofrastus, supra note_, at
100 (indicating that for some members of Congress the inclusion of the crime of aggression in the Rome Statute was a “new and
capricious attempt” reminiscent of the ICJ judgment against the U.S. for its support of the Contras, to circumscribe the role of the
Security Council and “reign in U.S. unilateral actions,” such as Grenada, Nicaragua, Libya, and Panama); see also Hearing on the
Creation of an International Court Before the Subcommittee on International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
th
105 Cong. 60 (“I think I can anticipate what will constitute a crime of ‘aggression’ in the eyes of [the ICC]: it will be a crime
when the [U.S.] takes any military action to defend its national interests, unless the U.S. first seeks and receives the permission of
the United Nations.”). In response to Congressional anxiety over the prospect that the ICC would effectively dilute the U.S. veto
of sanctions directed against it by the Security Council, the Congress, in the American Servicemen’s Protection Act, stated
emphatically that “[a]ny agreement within the Preparatory Commission that usurps the prerogative of the United Nations Security
Council under Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations to ‘determine the existence of any . . . act of aggression’ would
contravene the charter of the United Nations[.]” ASPA, supra note_, at §2002 (“Findings”).
103
U.S. critics of international institutions rail against the idea that democratic nations are susceptible to legal judgment by
dictatorships and rogue states. See Helms, supra note_. However, the international legal principle of the formal equality of states
does not permit a distinction to be drawn between democratic states and dictatorships with respect to the question of standing to
bring a complaint in the ICC. See Charter of the United Nations, at Art. 2 (enshrining formal legal equality of states). By the
same token, the principle does not prevent awarding the chair on the UN Human Rights Committee and the UN Conference on
Disarmament to states such as Libya and Husseinist Iraq respectively. See N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2003, at A1 (reporting naming
of Iraq as co-chair of the Conference with responsibilities for monitoring compliance with numerous weapons control treaties
despite its failure to comply with UN sanctions banning its own possession of various weapons systems).
104
The Rome Statute prohibits knowingly attacking a target that “will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians.” Rome
Statute, supra note_, at Article 8(2)(b)(iv). To take advantage of the reticence of military planners to run afoul of this legal
proscription and of the media attention to the casualties that unintentionally result from counterterrorist operations, terrorists
often cite military targets in civilian neighborhoods. MARK LLOYD, SPECIAL FORCES: THE CHANGING FACE OF
WARFARE 230 (1995) (“A government suspected of supporting terrorism has only to produce evidence of heavy civilian
casualties sustained during a retaliatory raid to divert attention from the iinitial purpose of that raid [because] . . . such evidence is
often enough to convince a shocked and militarily unsophisticated media that . . . the attack was little more than an outrageous
19

explains why some brand the ICC a pernicious institution that will grant terrorists moral ablution and
invite further evil,106 and it accounts, in part, for the covert orchestration of much of the War on Terror107
108

109

the better to evade a welter of scrutiny waxing unsympathetic to U.S. purpose.

atrocity.”); Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Remarks Outside ABC TV Studio, 28 October 2001, at
www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct2001/briefings.html (“[Al Qaeda terrorists] are using mosques for command and control, for
ammunition storage, and they’re not taking journalists in to show that. What they do is when there’s a bomb goes down, they
grab some children and some women and pretend that the bomb hit the women and the children.”). The possibility—perhaps
even the probability—exists that when the U.S. targets terrorists hiding in the midst of civilian populations U.S. ordnance “may
kill innocent civilians per accidens, as an unintentional byproduct of killing the enemy[.]” Cole, supra note_, at 97-98; see also
Steven Erlanger, NATO Powers Accused or War Crimes; Rights Group Says Civilians Targeted in Yugoslavia, PLAIN DEALER,
Jun. 8, 2000, at 5A (reporting description by Ambassador Scheffer of hypothetical scenario wherein a state party to the Rome
Statute seeks to indict U.S. nations when U.S. bombs accidentally destroy civilian targets and human shields behind whom
terrorist are hiding are killed). Indeed, U.S. operations during OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan have
resulted in the deaths of hundreds of civilians. Dexter Filkins, Flaws in U.S. Air War Left Hundreds of Civilians Dead, N.Y.
TIMES, Jul. 21, 2002, at A1 (reporting deaths of hundreds of civilians in Oruzgan Province). However, as a matter of policy the
U.S. makes good-faith efforts beyond those of any other state to avoid civilian casualties in its targeting decisions, and it employs
significant resources technological and personal to advance the principle of distinction as far as possible. See, e.g., U.S. General
Accounting Office, Operation Desert Storm: Evaluation of the Air Campaign, NSIAD-97-134, at 5.2.2 (1997) (requiring pilots to
place ordinance in a “particular corner, a vent, or a door” to count as a “hit” rather than a miss and thus to protect civilian life and
property); Emily Eakin, Ethical War? Do the Good Gus Finish First?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2003, at A1 (reporting that the great
lengths to which the U.S. Central Command went to avoid accidental collateral damage to civilians actually compromised
apprehension of members of Al Qaeda); Roberts, supra note_, at 21 (“There are strong reasons to believe US statements that
civilian deaths in Afghanistan due to the U.S. bombing were unintended.”). Consequently, U.S. planners, as well as many neutral
commentators hold “blame [terrorists] for the deaths of innocent people they hide among.” Cole, supra note_, at 97-98
(elaborating the principle of distinction as understood within the Christian just war theory); see also KEN ANDERSON ET AL.,
CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT, Press Release, Mar. 19, 2003 (attributing obligations to exclude civilians from military targets,
and responsibility for resulting casualties where civilians are not excluded, to defenders, rather than to attackers).
105
The U.S. accepts limitations on the use of force, imposed under the customary IHL principle of proportionality, in the conduct
of military operations. See U.S. ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, FM 27-10, Department of the Army Field Manual,
Washington, D.C., Jul. 1956, rev’d. Jul. 15, 1976, at para. 41 (“[T]he loss of life and damage to property incidental to attacks
must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained.”). However, just as the
precise meaning of the principle of distinction is contested legal terrain, the definition of proportionality, and the application of
the principle to military operations, is the subject of dispute. See supra at note_. The injunction not to employ force so as to
cause damage “excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated” suggests, to one commentator, that
the principle of proportionality “favors the option of intentionally killing the head tyrant as a means of ending aggression, rather
than sending our young men and women onto the battlefield to slaughter—and be slaughtered by—the tyrant’s young men and
women.” Turner, supra note_, at 800. Others argue that proportionality requires a balancing approach. Still others suggest that
in determining the proportionality of attacks against certain infrastructure one must take into account the “indirect and cumulative
effects” of the military action, and not merely the direct effects. Shue & Wippman, supra note 43, at 574. Although the Bush
Administration interpreted proportionality to require that strikes against the Taliban military structures and al Qaeda terrorist
camps be carefully calibrated, in practice it is impossible to adhere to universally-accepted standards of proportionality when
employing such devastating weapons systems as cruise missiles, heavy bombers, and cluster munitions. See Adam Roberts, The
Laws of War in the War on Terror (unpublished manuscript on file with author), at 7 (stating that the principle of proportionality
is in tension with the U.S. doctrine favoring application of overwhelming force in order to achieve decisive victory quickly and
with a minimum of casualties). Consequently, there is space to determine a breach of a legal obligation under almost any
circumstances. See Drumbl, supra note_, at 48 (stating that malleability of the principle of proportionality is “reason to be
concerned over the . . . incipient legalization of the use of . . . force in response to [terrorist] attacks.”).
106
The U.S. impression of the ICC as antipathetic to U.S. national security and conducive to malefactors is well-summarized as
follows: “However well-intentioned advocates for the [ICC] may be, the [ICC] represents a significant threat to the national
security of the United States and its allies . . . Since the forces of evil will recognize the deterrent influence of such politically
based prosecutions on potential responders, the leaders of these regimes may make entirely rational decisions to commit acts of
aggression, knowing they can act without fear of military intervention from foreign forces.” Smidt, supra note_, at 229.
107
Covert operations, also known as “special activities” or “special operations,” are a “peculiarly American invention” used by
every President since the founding of the U.S. Melvin A Goodman, Espionage and Covert Action, in Craig Eisendrath, ed.,
National Security: U.S. Intelligence After the Cold War (2000); Statement of Mitchell Rogovin, Special Counsel to the Director
th
st
of Central Intelligence, Hearings Before the House Select Committee on Intelligence, 94 Cong., 1 Sess., Part 5, 1729, 1731-33
(1976) (detailing long usage of covert operations as instrument in U.S. foreign policy). Such operations are defined in U.S. law
as “activities conducted in support of national foreign policy objectives abroad which are planned and executed so that the role of
the U.S. Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly[.]” Executive Order, No. 12,333, at 3.4(h); 46 Fed. Reg. 59, 941
(1981) Covert operations may lawfully be conducted only by the Central Intelligence Agency or by the U.S. Armed Forces unless
the President makes a finding that another agency “is more likely to achieve a particular objective.” Id. at 1.8(3). “Special
operations [are] conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military,
political, economic, or psychological objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive
areas” and which “requir[e] clandestive, covert, or low visibility techniques[.]” CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF, Joint Publication 3-05 (Test): Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (1990), at 3-5 (emphasis added). The principal
distinguishing feature of covert operations is that, unlike overt applications of force, they are intended to remain secret from the
20

public in order to permit government officials to plausibly deny responsibility for their effects. See Foreign Military Intelligence,
Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, S. Rep. No. 755,
th
nd
94 Cong., 2 Sess., Book I, at 490-91 (1976) (citing an early National Security Council document, NSC-4/A (1948), REISMAN
& BAKER, supra note_, at 305 n.30 (stating that although the doctrine of plausible deniability was formally abandoned in 1974
it is operative as a matter of policy). While the domestic legal regime governing covert operations is beyond the scope of this
article, the President has authority, acting through the National Security Council, to direct the Central Intelligence Agency or the
Defense Department to engage in covert operations. See National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 and 50 U.S.C.), at 50 U.S.C. §403(d)(5) (1994) (authorizing President to direct
the CIA “to perform . . . other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security).
108
Where the UN authorizes a military operation, the relevant Security Council resolution provides the broad mission, political
objective, and legal authority and creates a quasi-contract between the UN and states contributing forces. Marc. L. Warren,
Operational Law—A Concept Matures, 152 MIL. L. REV. 33, 48 (1996). Although under international law there is no explicit
prohibition against covert operations, and even if covert operations often result in greatly minimized use of force as compared to
overt military interventions, a general presumption against the legality of the use of force pertains. See UN Charter at Art. 2(4)
(“All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat of or use of force[.]”). While tactical considerations of
secrecy and expedience may suggest that a covert operation is more likely to achieve an outcome otherwise achievable by overt
force, absent prior authorization by the Security Council the political costs and the risk of legal exposure attendant to a covert
operation increase geometrically. See REISMAN & BAKER, supra note_, at 75-77, 115 (suggesting that while covert operations
conducted in accord with IHL may be “contributive and supplementary to rather than destructive of international law[ and
order,]” the inference of lawfulness does not attach to an unauthorized covert operation any more than it does to an unauthorized
overt operation); see also W. Michael Reisman, International Legal Responses to Terrorism, 22 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 3, 19 (1999)
(arguing that neutralization of terrorist targets by covert means does not excite as much condemnation as does an overt military
rd
operation, due to the opportunity for the plausible deniability by the attacking state and for 3 parties to more readily ignore the
consequences); Jami Melissa Jackson, The Legality of Assassination of Independent Terrorist Leaders, 24 N.C.J. INT’L L. &
COM. REG. 669, 713 (1999) (identifying increased international legal intolerance of covert operations across state borders).
However, American presidents have jealously defended their rights and claimed duties to employ covert operations when overt
military force would carry political and legal risks. See Marcus Eyth, The CIA and Covert Operations: To Disclose or Not to
Disclose: That is the Question, 17 BYU J. Pub. L. 45, 68 (2002); Legal Opinion by Lloyd Cutler, President’s Counsel, on War
Powers Consultation Relative to the Iran Rescue Mission (May 9, 1980), reprinted in Subcomm, on Int’l. Security and Scientific
Aff. Of the House Comm. On Foreign Aff., War Powers Resolution: Relevant Documents, Correspondence, Reports, 98th
Cong,., 1st Sess. 50 (1983) (claiming inherent Presidential powers to employ covert operations to rescue U.S. citizens held
hostage where mission success is surprise-dependent) (relying upon The Hostage Act, Rev. Stat. 2001, 22 U.S.C.§1732)
(providing that the “President shall use such means, not amounting to acts of war, as he may think necessary and proper to obtain
or effectuate the release [of U.S. citizens held hostage].” Accordingly, to the extent the U.S. Executive Branch has been
interested in the legality of covert operations, attention has been focused upon the domestic, rather than the international, legal
issues. Inasmuch as international law is considered in the covert operations context, presidents and commentators have opined
that the U.S. president has the authority, under domestic law, to authorize Executive Branch officials to violate international law.
See REISMAN & BAKER, supra note_, at 68 (I believe in the right of a country, when it believes that its interests are best
served, to practice covert activity.”) (quoting President Ronald Reagan); Statement of Assistant Attorney General William P.
Barr, Office of Legal Counsel, On the Legality as a Matter of Domestic Law of Extraterritorial Law Enforcement Activities That
Depart from International Law, Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House
of Representatives, Nov. 8, 1989 (concluding that as a matter of U.S. law the president can authorize executive officials to
conduct covert operations that violate the territorial sovereignty of other states in contravention of customary international law).
The U.S. has met significant political and legal resistance in response to the War on Terror. In response it has shielded
much of its battle plan from public review (and legal attack) and turned to covert operations as its principle weapon. See Thom
Shanker & James Risen, Rumsfeld Weighs New Covert Acts by Military Units, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2002, at A1 (reporting that
the Department of Defense has issued a classified directive ordering a focus upon the employment of U.S. special forces and CIA
paramilitary forces to “disrupt and destroy enemy assets” in countries where the U.S. is not at open war and where the local
government is not aware of their presence); see also Thom Shanker, Jump in Elite Forces’ Budget Foreseen, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8,
2003, at A10 (reporting expansion of Special Operations Command and authorization to independently plan and execute
th
counterterrorist operations). Shortly after September 11 , President Bush issued a finding that authorized the CIA and Army
Special Forces to kill two dozen terrorist leaders—the “worst of the worst”—if capture is “too dangerous or logistically
impossible.” CIA Gets 007 Tag from Bush: License to Kill, REUTERS., Dec. 16, 2002, at A1 (reporting finding as the “broadest
discretion ever bestowed on CIA to make use of covert operations). While the liberal use of covert measures is likely to
continue, the Bush Administration has not avoided all legal criticism. The consequences for the rule of law and for democratic
accountability are beyond the context of this Article; for a broader discussion, see Alberto R. Coll, Unconventional Warfare,
Liberal Democracies, and International Order, in ALBERTO R. COLL, JAMES S. ORD, & STEPHEN A. ROSE, LEGAL
AND MORAL CONSTRAINTS ON LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT, 67 INT’L L. STUD. 1 (1995).
109
Very few states have offered more than platitudes in support of the U.S.-led War on Terror, with most either remaining quasineutral and some even adopting an obstructionist approach in the UN Security Council. The reasons for this are beyond the
th
scope of this Article. The principle exception has been NATO, which in the immediate aftermath of September 11 invoked the
collective defense provisions of the NATO Charter to offer the U.S. military assistance if necessary. See North Atlantic Treaty,
Apr. 4, 1949, art. V, 63 Stat. 2241, 2244 (providing that “an armed attack against one or more of [NATO members] . . . shall be
considered an attack against them all”); Press Release, NATO Reaffirms Treaty Commitments in Dealing with Terrorist Attacks
Against the U.S. (Sept. 12, 2001) (reaffirming commitment to mutual defense under Article V of Nato Charter). Similarly,
despite a plethora of proclamations, the UN, has never demonstrated a firm commitment to eradicating terrorism, and group of
Afro-Asian states have carved out exceptions to language condemning terrorism on the theory that citizens of certain states, in
particular the U.S. and Israel, do not serve immunity on account of the “racist” or “colonial” policies of their governments. See
th
th
U.N. GAOR, 56 Sess., 14 plen mtg., U.N. Doc. GA/9922 (2001) (stating that ‘[a]cts of pure terrorism, involving attacks against
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The foregoing is not a veiled attempt to secret national interests within an international rubric:
there is a less parochial foundation upon which to reject the fruits of Rome. With their monstrous acts,
the 19 Islamic terrorists who crashed jets laden with civilian passengers into the World Trade Center and
the Pentagon may have struck targets physically within the U.S., but in so doing they and their
organizational and state supporters declared war upon Western civilization.110 Quite simply, there are no
categories of criminality that can contain such acts, and their authors can only be understood as
barbarians.111 Accordingly, the U.S. has concluded that, after defeating fascism and communism, the free
world is once more at war:112 the Bush Doctrine,113 disdaining judicial responses for military measures,
pronounces clearly that the nexus of Islamic terrorism and WMD must be defeated to “prevent the
triumph of an intolerable tyranny.”114
E. Accommodation: Toward a Rationalized Theory of the Laws of War
By reference to a series of events in the film Saving Private Ryan,115 a fictionalized account of the
Allied invasion of Normandy in 1944, and to a hypothetical scenario involving a U.S. covert operation to
eliminate WMD in the custody of terrorists, Part II juxtaposes the two contending paradigms—the code
of martial honor,116 a regime of professional self-regulation rooted in non-legal norms and obligations and

innocent civilian populations should be differentiated from legitimate struggles of peoples under colonial, alien, or foreign
domination for self-determination and national liberation[.]”). That the U.S. should be chary of submitting to the legal judgment
of states that propagate the canard that “one man’s freedom fighter is another man’s terrorist” should not be surprising.
110
See DANIEL BENJAMIN & STEVEN SIMON, THE AGE OF SACRED TERROR 36 (2002) (stating that the 9/11 attacks
were specifically directed, religiously motivated blows against icons of the West).
111
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On September 15 , President George W. Bush made a colloquial reference to the terrorists of September 11 as “barbarians” in
public comments urging Americans to return to their normal lives as much as possible but to anticipate possible future attacks.
See Bob Kemper & Tim Jones, Bush Warns of Long Fight Ahead, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 16, 2001, at A1 (“The American people
need to go about their business on Monday, but with a heightened sense of awareness that a group of barbarians have declared
war on the American people[.]”). This nomenclature has not yet found a formal place in law. However, the equation of terrorists
with barbarians is suitable inasmuch as both are counter-civilizational and both disentitle themselves from the category of rightsbearing subjects by their transgressions against the rights of others. See ALEXANDER & RAPOPORT, supra note_, at 294 “the
terrorist . . . not only violates particular rights, he also rejects the principles on which rights rest, and aims at destroying the
capacity of the government to protect them . . . [T]he terrorist is . . . an enemy of rights in general . . . The terrorist cannot
legitimately expect respect for his claims from those to whom he makes them, for he is exempting himself from the rightless
status to which he would relegate all others purely on the basis of his self-appointment[.]” The reconceptualization of terrorists
as modern-day barbarians is indebted to the work of Eric Hobsbawm, who in an influential 1994 essay opined that an ongoing
process marked by “the disruption and breakdown of the systems of rules and moral behaviour by which all societies regulate . . .
relations” and the erosion of “the universal system of . . . rules and standards of moral behaviour, embodied in the institutions of
states dedicated to the rational progress of humanity: to Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness, to Equality, Liberty and
Fraterntiy or whatever[,]” was dragging civilization into an abyss wherein a “dangerous classes” of predators “for whom no
accepted or effective rules and limits of behaviour exist any longer[,] . . . not even the accepted rules of violence in a traditional
society of macho fighters[,]” would transcend all boundaries of morality in their attacks. See Eric Hobbsbawm, Barbarism: A
User’s Guide, 206 NEW LEFT REV. 44, 47 -53 (1994). For an operationalization of the term, see infra at Part III.
112
See Gross, supra note_, at 523 (suggesting that Islamic terrorism is an existential threat to the “free world”, defined as the
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institutionalized in the system of courts-martial, and the judicial model embodied in the ICC —to
illustrate that only the former suppresses violations of IHL while immunizing all but those acts that can be
genuinely and universally branded criminal in order to grant soldiers a necessary margin of appreciation
in defending against manifestly evil adversaries bent on destroying civilization. Part III will resurrect an
ancient taxonomy denoting terrorists as a species of near-rightless outlaws—barbarians—with regard to
whom the West may place some aspects of IHL in abeyance and drape its military forces and civilian
commanders with broad immunities in operations against these malefactors. Proposals for measures
likely to draw law and justice into a closer relationship by rationalizing IHL in support its teleological
mission—the protection of the civilization it defends and reflects118—will be followed by a Conclusion.
II. Saving Private Ryan v. Trying Captain Ryan: A Functionalist Comparison of the Martial Code and
the ICC in the Enforcement of IHL
A. Saving Private Ryan: The Regime of Martial Honor, Allegations of War Crimes in World War II, and
the System of Courts-Martial
1. Martial Honor
Since ancient times, certain acts committed during war have been widely known to be
“manifestly wrongful, on account of their flagrant inconsistency . . . with [the] professional character as
an honorable [soldier.]”119 The medieval code of chivalry, which established a detailed set of rules and
principles for the violation of which one’s knighthood could be stripped, further elaborated this “soldier’s
code,” also known as the “martial code.”120 Knights engaged in a casuistic process of self-reflection and criticism, as well as collective argumentation, over whether particular actions breached this martial
code.121 By the late Renaissance a set of self-expectations, internalized by a transnational caste of officers
as a moral and professional behavioral code requiring, inter alia, the minimization of civilian casualties,
consistent with military objectives, as a matter not of law but of honor, had perfused the practice of war.122
Further, the martial code, by rejecting the “total, unrecognizable alienness” and inhumanity of the enemy
in favor of a conception of the foe as a fellow professional, directed the honorable soldier to refrain from
treachery and criminality in combating him.123 As the martial code diffused and matured, a body of
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For a contemporary presentation of the considerations involved in electing either a judicial or a military approach to problems
in international politics and law, see Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin Laden, 24 YALE J.
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supra note_, at 12 (arguing that IHL is “connected with the real existence of society”).
119
OSIEL, supra note_, at 207.
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but rather “[w]ould [my] actions pass muster if . . . evaluated by responsible, respectable soldiers of yesterday and today?”).
James H. Toner, Teaching Military Ethics, MIL. L. REV. 33, 37 (1993)
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collective narrative developed to inform and guide soldiers in the discharge of their duties; when in doubt
as to their obligations, soldiers conformed their conduct to “stories about the great deeds of honorable
soldiers” drawn from the “ongoing collective narrative of [their] corps.”124 In other words, as a
constituent part of their professional honor, soldiers have long recognized an obligation to accept personal
125
risks, and it is this self-selected and -imposed commitment, undertaken as the price of membership in an

epistemic community, to upholding the virtues of a shared profession that continues to inspire adherence
to the humanitarian principles underlying the positive legal regime of IHL.126
Admittedly, martial honor alone does not suppress all violations. Revenge, fear, and other
intractable instincts tapped by the horror of war can be overwhelming, and when their discipline
disintegrates and darker angels of their nature overcome them, some soldiers—no less emotional and
fallible creatures than their civilian counterparts—do indeed descend into inhumanity. However, their
failure to abide by the martial code, which reflects an internal deterrence regime while imposing a more
stringent standard of conduct than that demanded by IHL,127 strips wayward members of something of
incalculable value—their status, worth, and identity within the martial caste.128 When the threat of
professional banishment fails to enforce compliance with this strict behavioral template, the martial code
129

130

subjects individual transgressors to courts-martial and the unit(s) responsible to reprisals; each regime
brings internal standards of judgment to bear and can impose, where appropriate to specific delicts,
sanctions as serious as death. The propinquity of an accused to the peers called to judge him is simply not
proof against obloquy, castigation, and excommunication.
However, although courts-martial and reprisals inflict harsh punishment upon dishonorable
members of the martial caste, at the same time these self-policing regimes are intrinsically disposed to the
holistic examination of the wide welter of circumstances under which violations in question are alleged to
have been committed. Whereas many IHL proponents would impose a duty upon soldiers to utterly
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abjure self-preservation in obeisance to absolute legal prohibitions on the killing or destruction of certain
classes of persons and things,131 courts-martial, a more pragmatic forum, reserve judgment to other
military personnel who, by virtue of their own experience, are able to discern the extent to which
defenses, such as those grounded in military necessity, ought to be considered in immunization against
liability or in mitigation or extenuation of guilt.132 The decision to inflict reprisal requires the responsible
military commander to undertake a similar, if more informal, analysis with respect to the nature of the act
and whether it was committed out of a reasonable interpretation of military necessity, any potential claims
that the act did not trammel upon martial honor, and the utility of reciprocal violations in deterring future
such enemy acts. In sum, martial honor demands even more of soldiers than laws established by
outsiders to regulate them, and a rigid yet informal transnational regime vigorously enforces this code
upon the ultimate pains of professional banishment and death. However, in recognizing and accepting
that soldiers have an instinct, a right, and a duty to self-preservation that no law can abridge or even
regulate in any meaningful way, martial honor deviates from IHLabsolutism in a sense so profound it is
difficult to overstate. Nonetheless, few honest observers adjudge martial honor wanting with respect to
its capacity to preserve humanity in war while successfully defending civilization.
2. Saving Private Ryan
On the morning of June 6th, 1944, the first of 1 million Allied forces under the supreme command
of General Dwight Eisenhower invaded Nazi-occupied Europe, with initial landings upon a series of
code-named beaches in the Normandy region of France. Among other U.S. formations spearheading
OPERATION OVERLORD against fierce German resistance was the 75th Ranger Regiment.
The film Saving Private Ryan opens with C Company of the 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment,
already under fire from shore batteries, preparing to disembark from their landing craft and storm Dog
Green sector of OMAHA BEACH. The maelstrom of shot and shell obliterates much of the first wave,
including the majority of C Company, and their commander, Captain John Miller, aware that the success
of the invasion hangs in the balance, orders the shocked survivors, pinned by withering machinegun fire
and flak behind tank obstacles at water’s edge, to advance. Men disintegrate in puffs of warm crimson
mist as C Company drags forward and redeploys behind a natural berm strewn with pieces of their
buddies. With casualties mounting at an incredible rate, Captain Miller orders his troops to advance
through a draw and eliminate the fortifications atop the bluffs above OMAHA so additional forces can be
ushered ashore. Murderous machinegun fire rakes C Company during its struggle up the heights, but as C
Company and its sister companies turn the tide the German infantry manning the fortifications atop the
bluffs throw down their weapons in surrender. Rather than accept surrenders, however, C Company, its
members enraged at the mass slaughter of so many Americans, mows down the lines of now-defenseless
131
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Germans, as Captain Miller and his first sergeant silently observe. Although the battle yet rages along the
invasion beaches, Dog Green is quiet as Captain Miller surveys the beach below, carpeted with the bodies
of the 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, his shaking hands betraying unspoken emotions.
Several days later, after he reports to his battalion commander the intelligence gathered from an
engagement between the remnants of C Company and an entrenched German flak unit defending the
German withdrawal across Normandy, Captain Miller is ordered to select and lead a squad on what is
described as a mission of strategic importance the objective of which is the location and evacuation of
Private James S. Ryan. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General George C. Marshall, upon learning of
the combat death of Private Ryan’s three brothers in other theaters, has determined that the injury to
national morale would be too great were Ryan’s mother to lose all four sons in battle, and he orders
Private Ryan hastened to immediate safety.133 Captain Miller selects a squad of seven and sets out for the
last known location of Private Ryan, a town deep behind enemy lines.
After a day’s march the squad advances upon a machinegun nest at the base of a destroyed radar
installation that has been hastily emplaced to delay U.S. forces pursuing the German retreat. Against the
advice of his men, who counsel the bypass of the position, Captain Miller, reasoning that, despite the
importance of his strategic mission, follow-on forces will be forced to eliminate the machinegun if his
men do not, orders a modified frontal assault that results in the second death within his squad. After the
sole surviving machinegunner134 is captured, Captain Miller permits his troops to beat and otherwise abuse
the terrified, desperate German POW for several minutes while he ponders a course of action, his hands
once again shaking with the gravity of the situation and the depths of his internal anguish. One member of
the squad, Private First Class (PFC) Reiben, argues vehemently that the POW should be executed,
insisting that to release him will result in his rejoining his unit and revealing the existence of the mission
to the Germans, who will recognize the strategic nature of the mission and initiate a hunt for the squad,
whereas to take the POW along will encumber and compromise the success of the mission. Captain
Miller finally determines that the POW will be blindfolded and released upon his promise to surrender
himself to the first Allied patrol he encounters. The parolee, madly repeating the words to American
movies, deriding Hitler, and attempting to sing the U.S. national anthem the better to prove his love for
the U.S. and his hatred for Nazism, steps briskly into the distance. When PFC Reiben quarrels directly
with Captain Miller, Sergeant Horvath takes him to task for his insubordination, and the two nearly come
to blows before Captain Miller reorients the unit to the search for Private Ryan.
Private Ryan is located in the village of Ramelle with a subordinate unit of the 101st Airborne
Division defending a bridgehead, and, after he refuses to accompany the rescue squad until the German
armored counterattack against his position is defeated, the units are integrated in defense. During the
pitched battle, in which U.S. forces absorb heavy losses but hold the position until Allied air patrols
the heat of combat, soldiers who are frightened, angered, shocked at the death of comrades, and fearful of treacherous attacks by
enemies feigning death or surrender, are often prone to kill rather than capture.”).
133
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Private Fritz Nyland of the 101 Airborne Division was removed from the European Theater of Operations by order of the War
Department in June 1944 after it was discovered that all three of his brothers were killed in action in a single week. See
STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, BAND OF BROTHERS 103 (1992).
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destroy the bridge, the paroled German machinegunner, who has rejoined his SS unit, kills a member of
the squad in hand-to-hand combat and shoots Captain Miller. Reinforcements arrive on the heels of close
air support, and a group of German attackers throw down their weapons and surrender to Technical
Sergeant (T/5) Upham, a German linguist and intelligence analyst who has emerged from the building
wherein he cowered for much of the battle. Although Upham has leveled his rifle at the Germans, the
paroled machinegunner, recognizing Upham for the timid soul he is and hoping to rattle him, calls him by
name and derisively informs him in German, loudly so the others can hear, that he is “no soldier.”
Upham hesitates only a second before shooting the paroled machinegunner, after which he gruffly tells
the other German detainees to “scatter.” They do so, and the sole survivors, PFC Reiben, T/5 Upham,
and Private Ryan, gather around the dying Captain Miller, whose final words challenge Private Ryan to
live his life so as to earn the sacrifices of the men who died so he might live. In the final scene, Private
Ryan, now an aging grandfather surrounded by his extended family, pays his respects at the gravesite of
Captain Miller in the American Military Cemetery atop the bluffs overlooking Omaha Beach, and as the
film concludes it is clear that Private Ryan has indeed done everything he could to merit the valor of his
fallen comrades and that their sacrifice, made to rid the world of the great evil of Nazism, was not in vain.
3. War Crimes in Private Ryan?
a) Denial of Quarter
i. Antiquity
The earliest recorded history of war indicates that the killing of prisoners of war [“POWs”]
rendered hors de combat135 was common. The denial of quarter—refusal to grant clemency to combatants
no longer capable of offering resistance by virtue of wounds or other disability136—is one of the most
ancient and enduring practices of warfare, conducted by the Greeks, Romans, and others for whom “war,
naked and unashamed, kn[ew] of no right but the right to kill.”137 For the ancients war was a n
intercommunal effort bereft of rules or mercy: victory and defeat were absolutes, and all categories of
persons and property were legitimate targets.138 POWs were killed or enslaved out of enmity,139 with a
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SPAIGHT, supra note 17, at 3.
138
See Howard S. Levie, Humanitarian Law and the Law of War on Land, in International Humanitarian Law: Origins (John
Carey, William V. Dunlap, & R. John Pritchard, eds., 2003), at 181 (“From the caveman to Biblical times, and for centuries
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preference for the former, and soldiers who refused to crucify, mutilate, drown, or torture their captives
to death141 could be punished as moral reprobates for having committed, in effect, war crimes.142 Dead
POWs were not necessarily beyond insult: some cultures killed their captives for food.143 Although a
144

minority view counseled mercy, ancient practice ran strongly in favor of a norm in which the lives of
POWs and civilians were forfeit to the captor and their dispatch was acceptable moral conduct.145
ii. Middle Ages: 1000 A.D.—1648 A.D.
Although the medieval code of chivalry directed knights to extend certain reciprocal rights and
privileges in combat, including the right of quarter146 to surrendering foes upon the payment of ransom,147
military necessity justified the denial of quarter even to nobility where capitulants might subsequently
pose a threat were the tide of battle to turn148 or where the execution of POWs would demoralize the
139
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enemy and aid in victory.

Moreover, common soldiers and civilians were not subjects of the jus

armorum, and despite the growing influence of the Church150 most commentators proclaimed support for
the general right of a captor to kill all common soldiers,151 as well as residents of enemy territory who had
152

borne arms or mustered support for the war effort, as enemies of the state.

Practice followed this

restatement of customary right: throughout the Middle Ages belligerents routinely dispatched POWs,153
particularly in the context of the “untrammeled savagery”154 of inter-confessional conflicts, and entire
populations of cities were put to the sword in fits of religious cleansing.155 Conflict beyond Christendom
was even more brutal: Islamic practice condoned execution of Christian POWs who refused to convert,156
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Chronicles largely appeareth.”) (cited in Meron, Henry’s Wars and Shakespeare’s Laws: Perspectives on the Law of War in the
Later Middle Ages 166-67 (1993)); WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRY V, Act IV scene vi, at 35-38 (suggesting that he did);
RAPHAEL HOLINSHED, HOLINSHED’S CHRONICLES 38 (R.S. Wallace & Alma Hansen eds., 1923) (original publication
date 1587) (holding that although the killings were undertaken “contrarie to his accustomed gentleness” and “incontinentlie” they
were permissible under custom); HARRIS NICHOLAS, A HISTORY OF THE BATTLE OF AGINCOURT 124 (2d. ed. 1832)
(arguing that “imperative necessity” justified the order); 1 WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISHSPEAKING PEOPLES 319-20 (1956) (justifying Henry’s order to kill POWs on ground of necessity); KEEGAN, supra note_, at
84 (suggesting that the order was necessitated by an imminent French counterattack from the rear); HAROLD F. HUTCHISON,
KING HENRY V 124 (1967) (stating that “[b]y medieval standards Henry was obeying his soldier creed—military necessity
justified any butchery.”). But see DESMOND SEWARD, HENRY V 81 (1988) (“[B]y fifteenth-century standards, to massacre
captive, unarmed noblemen who, according to the universally recognized international laws of chivalry, had every reason to
expect to be ransomed if they surrendered . . . was a peculiarly nasty crime.”); ALBERICO GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI LIBRI
TRES 211-12 (trans. John C. Rolfe, 1933) (orig. pub. 1598) (describing denial of quarter to soldiers who “threw down their arms
on the ground . . . [as a grave] crime” and rejecting justification by necessity); PIERINO BELLI, DE RE MILITARI ET BELLO
TRACTATUS 40-41 (1563) (condemning killing of POWs as a “practice most abominable[.]”).
149
See FRANCISCO SUAREZ, SELECTIONS FROM THREE WORKS (Carnegie edn., trans. Gwladys L. Williams, Ammi
Brown, and John Waldron, 1944) (pub. 1550) (stating that slaughter of POWs may be necessary to terrify the adversary).
150
See FLORY, supra note_, at 13 (discussing early efforts by the Christian Church to improve the treatment of prisoners of war
by appeals to the “equality and brotherhood” of man); FOOKS, supra note_, at 10 (describing influence of Christianity in
promoting a custom to allow prisoners to pay a ransom in exchange for their liberation).
151
See III HUGO GROTIUS, LE DROIT DE LA GUERRE ET LA PAIX ch. 5 (published 1645) (stating that enemies captured in
war, as well as their descendants in perpetuity, are the property of the captor to dispose of as he should so choose); see also III
HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES ch IV, pt. X (Carnegie edn., Francis Kelsey transl.1925) (“So far
as the law of nations is concerned, the right of killing . . . captives taken on war, is not precluded at any time[.]”).
152
See GROTIUS, supra note_, at ch. 5 (approving the killing of every inhabitant of a town that refused the request to surrender);
th
W. HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 474 n.2 (8 ed., A. Higgins, 1924) (“quarter was not given to the garrison of a place which
resisted an attack from an overwhelming force, which held out against artillery in absence of sufficient fortifications, or which
compelled the besiegers to deliver an assault[.]”); FOOKS, supra note_, at 25 (noting that Oliver Cromwell ordered the execution
of the entire population of the Catholic city of Drogheda, including thousands of POWs whom he burned alive in a church).
153
See, e.g., FOOKS, supra note_, at 24 (referencing the mutual agreement between the Houses of York and Lancaster to refuse
quarter during the War of the Roses); id. at 41 (noting the execution of Bulgarian and Turkish prisoners of war by the Crusaders
at the Battle of Nicopolis on the ground that the advance of the Army of the Sultan rendered it too dangerous to do otherwise);
MERON, supra note_, at 109 (reporting that, prior to the English denial of quarter at the Battle of Agincourt, the French leaked
their intention to grant quarter only to English nobles and to amputate the right hand of every English archer).
154
SDACOPOW, supra note_, at 3-4.
155
See FOOKS, supra note_, at 23 (describing the common practice during European religious wars of killing all residents of
captured cities, such as Heidelberg, Magdeburg, and Kempten).
156
See L.C. Green, Enforcement of the Law in International and Non-International Conflicts—The Way Ahead, 24 DENV. J.
th
INT’L L. & POL’Y 285, 289 (citing 9 century Islamic code distinguishing Muslim from non-Muslim POWs and permitting
killing of latter provided the offer of conversion was rejected). Some scholars indicate that in practice Muslim captors would
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158

while Christian Crusaders reflexively denied quarter to Muslims to the approval of leading jurists.

Although merciful captors occasionally granted their captives the status of protected persons,159 savagery
reigned during the Dark Ages, and it was not until the dawning of the Enlightenment that chivalry began
to embrace common soldiers and civilians within its normative and protective fold.
iii. Enlightenment: 1648 A.D.—1800 A.D.
The humanitarian conception of the soldier rendered hors de combat as an unfortunate wretch
with a claim to protection against mistreatment,160 rather than an enemy of the state deserving of death,
acquired some purchase in the 17th century, inspired largely by the writings of Enlightenment scholars
who labored for the humanization of war.161 The development of secular international law subsequent to
the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 bolstered this development as POWs came incrementally to be viewed
as wards of the custodial sovereign rather than as the prizes of the capturing soldier,162 and by the 18th
century, although they could be confined and even sold into slavery163 to prevent their rejoining the fray,164
POWs were no longer reflexively put to death. State practice gradually incorporated principles of
restraint codified in domestic military regulations165 and bilateral agreements requiring that enemy POWs
be granted quarter,166 and during the American Revolution, a weak customary regime of exchange
permitted parole167 of officers upon their promise to refrain from future participation in the conflict, and
common soldiers could hope for release without ransom at the termination of hostilities.168 However, the

release non-Muslim POWs provided the parolees had not committed precapture crimes and pledged, upon their release, teach
illiterate Muslims to read and write. Bennoune, supra note_, at 634 (discussing alternate dispositions of non-Muslim POWs).
157
FLORY, supra note_, at 13.
158
See, e.g., VICTORIA, supra note_, at §§44-48 (holding that the refusal to take Muslim prisoners, and the execution of the
same, was ipso facto a matter of military necessity).
159
See, e.g., Green, supra note_, at 290 (noting that after the Siege of Limoges (1370) the English knights John of Gaunt and the
Earle of Cambridge, moved to mercy by the pleas of French captives, countermanded orders denying quarter).
160
A.J. BARKER, PRISONERS OF WAR 6 (1975).
161
See EMMERICH VATTEL, LE DROIT DU GENS, bk. III, ch. viii, paras. 140-141, 151 (1758 edn., C. Fenwick transl., 1916)
(commenting that the moment a soldier surrendered he was under the protection of his captor and could not be killed unless he
had committed a pre-capture crime justifying reprisal and death); MONTESQUIEU, ESPRIT DE LOIS, bk. 15, ch. 11 (stating
that soldiers rendered hors de combat were entitled to be spared from further injury); DE MARTENS, PRECIS DU DROIT DES
GENS MODERNS DE L’EUROPE bk. VII ch. 4, at 272 (18??) (holding that POWs were entitled to quarter except in reprisal for
denial of quarter on their own part); CHRISTIAN WOLF, THE LAW OF NATIONS ch. XVIII, para. 797 (Oxford edn. 1934)
(published 1734) (“Since once ceases to be an enemy as soon as he is in my power . . . it is not allowable to kill those who have
surrendered unconditionally.”); JOHANN TEXTOR, SYNOPSIS OF THE LAW OF NATIONS ch. XVIII, paras. 17-19
th
(Carnegie Foundation edn., 1916) (published late 17 century) (denying the right of a captor to kill a POW rendered harmless and
distinguishing between categories of former enemies who had promoted the war and willingly taken up arms from those who
were forcibly conscripted).
162
SDACPOW, supra note_, at 4.
163
See PUFFENDORF, LE DROIT DE LA NATURE ET DES GENS, bk. VI, ch. 3 (declaring that a conqueror might spare the
life of a prisoner upon his promise to accept enslavement) (cited in DU PAYRAT, PRISONNIER DU GUERRE 10 (1910));
GROTIUS, bk. III, ch.14, §9.
164
Howard S. Levie, Enforcing the Third Geneva Convention on the Humanitarian Treatment of Prisoners of War, 7 U.S.A.F.A.
J. LEG. STUD. 37, 37 (1996-97).
165
See Lawes and Ordinances of Warre Established for the Better Conduct of the Service in the Northern Parts, issued by the Earl
of Northumberland for the Army of Charles I (1640) (“None shall kill an enemy who yeelds and throws down his arms, upon
pain of death.”) (cited in II FRANCIS GROSE, MILITARY ANTIQUITIES 107 (1788)); Articles and Ordinances of War for the
Present Expedition of the Army of the Kingdom of Scotland, by the Committee of Estates the Lord General of the Army (1643),
at Art. VIII (providing that “[murder is no less unlawful and intollerable in time of war, than in time of peace, and is to be
punished with death.” (cited in GROSE, supra this note, at 132); id. at Art. XV (providing that “if it shall come to pass, that the
enemy shall force us to battle, and the lord shall give us victory, none shall kill a yielding enemy.”).
166
See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship and Commerce, United States-Prussia (1785) (obligating parties to provide reciprocal humane
treatment, including quarter, to prisoners of war).
167
See infra at pp._ (discussing the concept of “parole”).
168
Although this customary regime did ameliorate the treatment of some captured personnel and the parole of a great many
officers, the exceptions nearly swallowed the rule, and the British in particular committed major violations of the tacit agreement
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practice of denying quarter out of military necessity continued despite the fitful emergence of a protean
custom,169 and a majority of scholars conceded that, as a matter of law, a surrendering enemy was stripped
of all rights, including the right to quarter,170 and that any formal legal claims to protection at the hands of
171

the enemy were moral, rather than legal. As such, the POW could be, and often was, summarily killed.
iv. Pre-Modern Era: 1800 A.D.—1914 A.D.
As the 19th century progressed, POWs were increasingly viewed as unfortunates rather than
criminals, and in 1863 the Lieber Code172 marked the first major codification of a developing custom
favoring the qualified right of surrendering soldiers to quarter. The Lieber Code generally prohibited
Union troops to deny quarter173 or kill captured POWs174 on the ground that “[m]en who take up arms
against one another in public war, do not cease on this account to be moral beings, responsible to one

another, and to God.”175 However, military necessity continued to provide an important exception to the
waxing force of custom: a provision recognized that under circumstances of “great straits” a commander
was permitted “to direct his troops to give no quarter . . . where his own salvation makes it impossible to
cumber himself with prisoners.”176 Moreover, the Lieber Code explicitly denied quarter to enemy units
“known or discovered to give no quarter[,]”177 and enemy POWs who fit this description could be
executed within three days of capture.178 Furthermore, the Lieber Code was interpreted in concert with
other applicable regulations, one of which ordered Union troops to refuse wholesale surrenders by
Confederate troops eager to quit the war,179 thereby further qualifying its scope and applicability. In
to treat POWs with humanity. See B. TARLETON, A HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1780 AND 1781 30-32 (1968 ed.)
(chronicling British violations of the emerging custom that required humane treatment of POWs, such as the confinement of
Ethan Allen in irons on a prison ship and the refusal to grant quarter at the Battles of Waxhaws and Fort Griswold). Compliance
with what remained of the regime was secured not through any sense of legal or professional obligation but largely through threat
of reprisal, as commanders whose captured troops were threatened with execution resorted to reciprocal threats against enemy
prisoners of war in their own custody to protect their own personnel. See George L. Coil, War Crimes of the American
Revolution, 82 MIL. L. REV. 171, 185, 191-92 (discussing the treatment of POWs during the American Revolution).
169
See, e.g., id. at 182-84 (noting that British commanders during the Revolution justified the denial of quarter to American troops
on the grounds that Americans had made perfidious surrender (see infra at _ discussing perfidy), that British troops were so
enraged that they could not be expected to have restrained themselves sufficiently to accept prisoners, that ongoing resistance on
other parts of the battlefield made it impossible to safely accept prisoners, and that the British officer corps had been so
decimated that there was no functioning chain of command capable of issuing orders to restrain British enlisted soldiers from
dispatching American prisoners). Almost without exception, international law scholars expressly approved of a military
necessity exception to an emerging custom entitling surrendering soldiers to quarter. See, e.g., PUFFENDORF,supra note_, at
ch. 3; TEXTOR, supra note_, at ch. XVIII, paras. 17-19; MONTESQUIEU, bk. XII, chap. 3; PRADIER FODERE, TRAITE DE
DIPLOMATIE, bk. Vi, chap. IX (holding that unless an enemy provides reasonable assurances that he is helpless, quarter should
be denied); J. BLUNTSCHLI, DROIT INTERNATIONALE CODIFIE, art. 580 (providing that one may have legitimate reasons
to refuse quarter, such as if enemy resorts to reprisals or it is impossible to take prisoners due to inadequacy of forces).
170
See CHRISTIAN WOLFF, THE LAW OF NATIONS TREATED ACCORDING TO A SCIENTIFIC METHOD 409-50 (F.
Hemelt transl, 1964) (1764) stating that the “customs of certain nations” gave a “general license” to kill all enemy subjects,
including surrendering soldiers); MONTESQUIEU, ESPRIT DE LOIS, bk. XII, ch. 3 (supporting the argument that
extermination of prisoners of war conformed with positive international law); CORNELIUS VAN BYNKERSHOEK,
QUAESTIONUM JURIS PUBLICI LIBRI DUO 16 (T. Frank transl., 1964) (1737) (“[E]very force is lawful in war. So true is
this that we may destroy an enemy though he be unarmed. . . [I]n short, everything is legitimate against an enemy.”).
171
See Burrus M. Carnahan, Reason, Retaliation, and Rhetoric: Jefferson and the Quest for Humanity in War, 139 MIL. L. REV.
83, 85 (1993) (indicating that summary execution of POWs was declining in frequency but common during the Enlightenment).
172
See supra at note_.
173
See Lieber Code, supra note_, at Art. 60 (“It is against the usage of modern war to resolve . . . to give no quarter[.]”).
174
See id. at Art. 56 (“A [POW] is subject to no punishment for being a public enemy, nor is any revenge wreaked upon him by
the intentional infliction of any suffering, or disgrace, by cruel imprisonment, want of food, by mutilation, death, or any other
barbarity.”).
175
Id. at Art. 15.
176
Id. at Art. 60.
177
Id. at Art. 62.
178
Id. at Art. 66.
179
See U.S. War Dep’t, General Order No. 207 (Jul. 3, 1863).
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practice, the Lieber Code, although it discouraged denial of quarter upon moral grounds, was of limited
value in enforcing the rights of POWs against competing claims of military necessity, as both armies
executed POWs out of expedience and in reprisal for violations real and imagined of the customs of war180
181

and besieged garrisons were categorically denied quarter after their refusals to surrender.

Still, the Lieber Code exerted a transnational influence upon the codification of a customary
preference for granting quarter to defeated enemies that had been “hardening in the heads of decent
warriors for several centuries[.]”182 A series of states published military manuals incorporating much of
the Lieber code nearly verbatim,183 and the Brussels Conference of 1874184 and the Hague Convention
of1907 codified, as a matter of international law, the custom reflected in the Lieber general prohibitions
against the denial of quarter, whether ad hoc or in an advance declaration.185 Nevertheless, international
practice, whether justified by claims of military necessity or simply by the relative weakness of any norm
entitling defeated personnel to protection, belied diplomatic pronouncements and overwhelmed the
general presumption in favor of quarter for surrendering forces. Examples abound: despite having
promised quarter to secure the surrender of the besieged garrison at the Battle of Jaffa (1800), Napoleon,
unable to feed his own troops, ordered 4000 Arab captives slain.186 French forces fleeing their failed
invasion of Russia (1812) were denied quarter by Russian cavalry; victorious Mexican forces at the
Alamo (1836) refused quarter to permanently preclude seasoned veterans from rejoining the Texan
struggle for independence;187 and during the Russo-Turkish War (1877-78) Turks were denied quarter on
the ground that, in the words of the Russian commanding general, “there are circumstances under which it
is impossible to make prisoners—when your force is small and prisoners might prove dangerous, . . .
[S]ad necessity force[d] us to shoot them.”188 Both sides took extreme reprisals against POWs during the

180

See William E. Boyle, Jr., Under the Black Flag: Execution and Retaliation in Mosby’s Confederacy, 144 MIL. L. REV. 148,
148-50, 154- 55 (reporting a spiral of reprisals and counterreprisals taken against POWs during fighting between Confederate
forces under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Mosby and Union forces under the command of Generals Sheridan, Custer, and
Grant). For a comprehensive study and analysis of acts of reprisal against POWs of both armies during the Civil War, including
execution of POWs, denials of quarter, and maltreatment, see LONNIE R. SPEER, WAR OF VENGEANCE (2002).
181
See SPAIGHT, supra note_, at 99 (citing correspondence between garrison commanders and the commanders of besieging
forces offering the besieged the privilege of parole upon an unconditional surrender while threatening to deny quarter in the event
further military measures were necessary to overcome the fortifications).
182
DELISSEN & TANJA, supra note_, at 655.
183
See HOLLAND, supra note_, at 73-74 (1907) (listing states adopting military manuals incorporating the Lieber Code,
including, inter alia, Britain, France, Spain, Italy, Portugal); WELLS, supra note_, at 4 (noting near-direct translation of Lieber
Code in military manuals of Germany, France, and Russia published between 1880 and 1912). Commitments to these
codifications in an era of suspicion and nationalist resentments remained suspect, however, and the traditional position—that the
“humanitarianism as conceived by many modern civilized nations is a weakness rather than a virtue” and that the enemy could be
more easily cowed by terror than by kindness—remained dominant. See, e.g., GERMAN GENERAL STAFF,
KRIEGSBRAUCH IM LANDKRIEGE (1902) (stating that adherence to customs protective of enemy POWs was incompatible
with German “frightfulness,” a concept whereby enemies experiencing German ferocity and mercilessness would be all the more
likely to refuse to give battle in the future).
184
See 1874 Congress of Brussels (providing, in 146 articles, for the humane treatment of POWs).
185
See Hague Convention of 1907, supra note_, at Art. 23(c) (prohibiting killing of an enemy hors de combat); id. at Art. 23(d)
(prohibiting declaration that no quarter will be given). However, military necessity carved out exceptions from these codes of
military regulations. See, e.g., KRIEGSBRAUCH, supra note_, at (explicitly recognizing that necessity could release troops
from a general obligation to grant quarter).
186
JEAN PICTET, DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (1985).
187
FOOKS, supra note_, at 116. For much of the conflict, neither Russian nor Japanese forces requested or gave quarter.
SPAIGHT, supra note_, at 94.
188
Id. at 93 (citing V.L. NEMEROVITCH-DANTCHENKO, PERSONAL REMEMBRANCES OF GENERAL SKOBOLEV
165 (E.A.B. Hodgetts transl. 1884).
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189

Boer War (1899-1900), U.S. commanders ordered the slaughter of all males over ten years of age in
fighting against Muslim guerrillas in the Philippines (1900-02),190 and in the Russo-Japanese War (190405) Russia ceased granting quarter after receiving reports that wounded Japanese had feigned surrender
only to shoot Russian troops, who believed the Japanese hors de combat, bypassing their positions.191
Contemporary commentators, while memorializing a general custom proscribing the denial of
quarter, paid heed to state practice in unequivocally recognizing exceptions rooted in military necessity,
including in reprisal,192 in circumstances where capturing forces were numerically inadequate to
effectively subdue surrendering forces without unacceptably increasing the jeopardy of attack from other
enemy forces not hors de combat,193 and where a besieged force, obstinately resisting surrender beyond
the point it might reasonably expect to prevail, obligated attacking forces to incur needless casualties
storming the position.194 In short, although a custom disfavoring denial of quarter was crystallizing
scholars of the era described a stable, consistent practice, grounded in necessity, to deny quarter.
189

See STOWELL & MUNRO, II INTERNATIONAL CASES 205 (1916) (reporting 1899 massacre of Boer prisoners at
Elandslaagte and reprisal against British prisoners at Ladysmith during the Boer War in South Africa). For a general discussion
of war crimes committed during the Boer War, see Drew L. Kershen, A Symposium on Film and Law: Breaker Morant, 22 OK.
CITY U.L. REV. 107 (1997).
190
See FRIEDMAN (ed.), THE LAW OF WAR 800 (1972) (discussing the order from Brigadier General Jacob H. Smith to
Major L.W.T. Waller instructing his Marines to take no prisoners and that “[t]he more you kill and burn, the better you will
please me.”). For a discussion of the general suspension of IHL by U.S. forces in the Philippines during the period, see PETER
MAGUIRE, LAW AND WAR: AN AMERICAN STORY 51-66 (2001).
191
FOOKS, supra note_, at 120-21.
192
See F. DE MARTENS, PRECIS DU DROIT DES GENS MODERNS DE L’EUROPE bk VII ch. 4 272 (1899) (holding that
quarter could be denied in retaliation for denial of quarter by the enemy); FOOKS, supra note_, 120-21 (“To make quarter [with
respect to] the persons who have abused the confidence of the victor and shoot him in the back after being treated kindly, will
compromise the success of the battle and perhaps, frustrate the plans of the entire campaign.”); id. (“The commander must
remember that the blood of one of his own men taken by . . . treachery should be more precious to his eyes than that of thousands
of such villains committing acts against the laws of war.”).
193
BLUNTSCHLI, supra note_, at Art. 580 (condoning the denial of quarter when capturing forces are too few to adequately
secure surrendering soldiers without compromising either their mission or their safety); PAUL ERNEST PRADIER-FODERE,
TRAITE DE DIPLOMATIE (1899), bk. vi, ch. IX (stating that, if reasonable assurances cannot be provided that an enemy is
helpless, quarter may be denied out of an interest in self-preservation); THOMAS E. HOLLAND, LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF
WAR ON LAND 47, 58 (BRITISH FIELD MANUAL) (1904) (stating that “[a] white flag [indicating a desire to surrender] can
protect only the force by which it is hoisted,” and then only if every individual member of that force, as well as of other enemy
forces that might still pose a danger, ceases to resist); SPAIGHT, supra note_, at 266 (sanctioning the execution of prisoners who
attempt to aid, by whatever means, their “uncaptured comrades” and thus endanger their captors). However, at least one
commentator suggested that for capturing forces to execute POWs solely because they would otherwise hamper movement was
an “inhumane” policy sure to provoke reprisal, even if it could be justified as militarily necessary. SPAIGHT, supra note_, at
266 (describing the execution of Peruvian POWs by Chilean captors desirous of moving without encumbrance in 1882 as a
“wanton act” from which “bloody reprisals are sure to follow.”).
194
Military history is “full of incidents in which a platoon or squad, having taken casualties at the enemy’s hands, finally
prevails.” OSIEL, supra note_, at 120. The proposition that soldiers engaged in a life-or-death struggle should be required,
immediately upon the indication of a desire to surrender on the part of their mortal enemies, to denature the emotions of rage and
th
fear that impel them forward and to stifle any thoughts of reprisal and revenge for the deaths of their comrades struck 19 and
th
early 20 century commentators, many of whom were acquainted with combat, as incompatible with reality:
During the heat of battle there is not much opportunity for . . . pity . . . The soldier’s training does not make him a
machine to such extent that he is a passive weapon. The noise of battle, the sight of the dead and dying, the feeling of
weariness after long hardships, may weaken his sense of fairness, and cause him to refuse to give quarter, and force his
adversary to drink from the bitter cup of Death, even after he has asked for mercy by surrendering.
FOOKS, supra note_, at 113.
Similarly,
[I]t is often impracticable to grant quarter to troops who resist to the last moment. No war right of killing is recognized
in such circumstances; it is simply the necessity of war which justifies the refusal of quarter. It must often happen that
in the storing of a trench, when men’s blood is aboil and all is turmoil and confusion, many are cut down or bayoneted
who wish to surrender[.]
SPAIGHT, supra note_, at 91.
th
In practice, “Too late, chum,” has often been the response received by 11 -hour would-be surrenderees. KEEGAN,
supra note_, at 50-51. Psychologists have explained that the frenzy of fear, bloodlust, and primordial passion unshackled by the
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v. The Great Wars: 1914 A.D.—1945 A.D.
During World War I, several belligerents entered into bilateral agreements governing the status of
POWs, although few were ratified195 and most parties, including the U.S., accepted few if any legal
obligations.196 Although some belligerents recognized expanded customary duties, including the general
obligation to grant quarter,197 in either official policy statements or military manuals,198 most domestic
military legal systems retained explicit exceptions allowing the denial of quarter under categories of
circumstances, including military necessity and in reprisal,199 while others expressly ordered their military
forces to deny quarter in order to sow terror amongst their enemies.200 Moreover, as the very concept of
surrender remained as shameful to the martial mind as it was to the ancients,201 it was not difficult for
horrors of combat accounts for the denial of quarter and other abuses of POWs in such circumstances and that the grim practice
of soldiers is or should be excusable under the defense of temporary insanity. See, e.g., DAVID GROSSMAN, ON KILLING
179 (1995); JONATHAN SHAY, ACHILLES IN VIETNAM 77-102 (explaining the extreme reactions of soldiers to the
experience of combat). While not technically an exception based on military necessity, the denial of quarter predicated upon the
th
human emotions that render the actual grant improbable is essential to an explanation for the variation between 19 century
practice on the one hand and a restatement of an emerging custom relative to quarter on the other. See HOLLAND, supra note_,
at 58 (noting that, although the precise definitions are left to practice, after a “stubborn and prolonged siege” an attacking force is
relieved of a customary obligation to grant quarter and that one who would demand quarter must not delay his surrender until the
very last possible moment lest he disentitle himself); CARLOS CALVO (1873) at §2138) (suggesting that a garrison may be
massacred for futile resistance); HALL, supra note_, at (“I believe it has always been understood that the defenders of a fortress
stormed have no right to quarter[.]”) (citing the Duke of Wellington in correspondence c. 1820); BEST, supra note_, at 349 n.109
(restating general consensus of commentators that the exception to the right to quarter in the case of “a fortress refusing surrender
even when its walls had been breached, so that the besiegers had to go through the often hideous business of an assault[,]”
th
survived well into the 20 century).
195
BARKER, supra note_, at 16.
196
See Telegram from Lansing to Stovall, American Minister to Switzerland, U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations, 1918,
Supp. II (stating that the U.S. “does not consider [the] Geneva Convention [of 1906] binding in [the] present war . . . because all
belligerents [are] not signatory to [the] convention. Similar interpretation has been consistently given to [the] Hague
convention[.]” ).
197
See U.S. Rules of Land Warfare, 1914, supra note_, at para. 182 (stating that “[i]t is especially forbidden . . . to declare that no
quarter will be given[.]”);id. at para. 183 (“It is no longer contemplated that quarter will be refused to the garrison of a fortress
carried by assault, to the defenders of an undefended place who did not surrender when threatened with bombardment, or to a
weak garrison which obstinately and uselessly persevered in defending a fortified place against overwhelming odds.”).
198
See, e.g., FINAL REPORT OF GENERAL JOHN J. PERSHING 85 (instructing the Provost Marshal General, by order
General Pershing, supreme U.S. commander in World War I, “to follow the principles of the Hague and Geneva Conventions in
the treatment of prisoners, although these [a]re not recognized as binding in the present war.”). Official U.S. military regulations,
which superseded while incorporating much of the Lieber Code almost verbatim, denied the force of most, if not all, legal
obligations. See U.S. Dep’t of War, Rules of Land Warfare [“Rules of Land Warfare, 1914”], para. 9-34 (War Dep’t Doc. No.
467, Office of the Chief of Staff, Apr. 25, 1914) (recognizing that belligerents were permitted to “appl[y] any amount and any
kind of force which is necessary for the purpose of the war” while imposing only the very minimal obligation that soldiers refrain
from “all such kinds and degrees of violence as are not necessary[.]”). However, the Rules of Land Warfare (1914) did impose
duties and grant privileges arising from customary principles of necessity, humanity, and chivalry. See id. at paras. 8 & 9.
199
See id. at para. 368 (stating that failure to make a clear and good faith intent to surrender by either the hoisting of a white flag
or the disposal of weapons and the clear showing of hands disentitled the enemy to quarter); see also id. (“All troops of the
enemy known or discovered to give no quarter in general, or to any portion of the army receive none.”).
200
See BARKER, supra note_, at 28 (“As soon as you come to blows with the enemy he will be beaten. No mercy will be shown!
No prisoners will be taken! As the Huns under King Attila made a name for themselves, which is still mighty in traditions and
legends today, may the name of Germans be so fixed in China by your deeds that no Chinese should ever again dare to look at a
German askance . . . open the way for Kultur once and for all.”) (quoting Kaiser Wilhelm, reviewing troops in Bremerhaven in
July 1914); see also Theodore S. Woolsey, Retaliation and Punishment, 9 PROC. AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 62, 63 (1916) (stating
that the German General Staff considered IHL superseded by military necessity and that the exercise of humanitarianism with
respect to enemy POWs was a lapse “into sentimentality and flabby emotion” to be avoided).
201
See BARKER, supra note_, at 29 (describing the aversion to surrender felt by honorable soldiers as the “age-old idea that it is
better to die fighting than to be captured”). So deeply inculcated was this imperative of martial culture that soldiers would fight
to the death against vastly superior forces to avoid the moral stigma of capture. See FOOKS, supra note_, at 99 (relating the
officially-heralded saga of the five-day ordeal of a U.S. battalion commander who, despite being surrounded by a vastly superior
German force and without rations or medical supplies for his attrited force, refused to surrender). Moreover, so powerful was the
obligation to demonstrate bravery in the face of the enemy that soldiers who merely retreated under overwhelming fire knew and
accepted that they could be executed. See id. at 102-04 (noting that a French lieutenant, executed for withdrawing his company
rather than permit it to be overrun by the Germans, conceded that he had been wrong). The soldierly aversion to surrender
continues to the present day and is reflected in regulations enjoining U.S. military personnel from voluntary surrender and from
accepting parole. See U.S. Code of Conduct for Members of the U.S. Armed Forces, E. O. No. 10631, Aug. 17, 1955, CFR 6057
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several belligerents to indoctrinate their armies, even if they did not issue direct orders, to neither grant
nor request quarter,202 nor was it unusual that units would make this decision independent of their
command structure.203 Throughout World War I, quarter was systematically denied as a standing tactical
204

procedure, in reprisal for perfidious surrenders and for posing as casualties only to resume combat, out
of vengeance,205 and out of alleged necessities, including avoidance of encumbrances.206
On balance, the reflections of commentators assessing the lessons of the “Great War” reinforced
the conclusion that the fabric of a martial custom favoring the grant of quarter continued to be woven
through with exceptions. Where rapidity and secrecy were paramount, such as in the case of a small force
occupying a strategic position in advance of a main body for whom disclosure of their purpose or
encumbrance by POWs would enhance the likelihood of their own destruction207 and compromise the
208
mission of the larger force, or where the exigencies of combat precluded the immediate extension of

protection to all those manifesting an intent to surrender,209 jurists conceded the legitimacy of military
(1955) (amended by E.O. No. 12633 of Mar. 28, 1988, 53 CFR 10355, (prohibiting military personnel from voluntary surrender,
accepting parole, and other acts of disloyalty). For a discussion of the Code of Conduct and of the shame that continues to attach
to the act of surrender, see David Hackworth, Neglect of Code Insults Real Heroes, SUN-SENTINEL, Jan. 19, 1995, at A23.
202
The U.S. issued orders to troops in forward areas to “hold their positions at any cost,” instructions that implied that they were
to succeed or die in the attempt, rather than offer surrender if they failed. FOOKS, supra note_, at 96. The French high
command reinforced these orders, instructing U.S. forces joining the battle in 1917 that as they could anticipate German
perfidious surrenders they should themselves neither grant nor request quarter. Id.
203
th
See BARKER, supra note_, at 117 (reporting that U.S. units, including the enlisted personnel of the 28 Infantry Division,
signed pledges not to grant or accept quarter). The reasons are not difficult to fathom: during World War I, many soldiers, as
have soldiers since antiquity, considered the act of surrender to be inherently dishonorable. FLORY, supra note_, at 67.
204
Perfidious surrenders, whereby soldiers feign submission to delude and lure the enemy into close proximity only to reclaim
their weapons and resume fighting at great advantage over adversaries who have relaxed their guard, was a common practice
during World War I. See BARKER, supra note_, at 35 (citing widespread German use of perfidious surrender during the Battle
of the Somme (1916)); FOOKS, supra note_, at 121 (“The practice [of perfidious surrender] was repeated many times during the
World War, and especially in the Battle of the Somme[,]” to great effect). In response, defrauded adversaries would execute
POWs taken subsequently, including those who had committed perfidy as well as others whose only offense was to have been
members of the same army. See BARKER, supra note_, at 35 (stating that subsequent to German perfidious surrender at the
Somme, “[n]o prisoners were taken that day, and it was a long time before German cries of ‘Kamerad’ were accepted with any
confidence by the British troops involved in the action.”); FOOKS, supra note_, at 117 (relating the explanation offered by the
th
commander of the U.S. 28 Infantry Division for the relatively small number of German POWs captured by his troops at the
Battle of Cantigny (1918): “[W]hen a German officer had held up his hands to surrender, another German shot [an American
officer], and [a]fter this the captors saw ‘red’ and killed about 380 of the German captives.”). To the present, soldiers express
outrage at the perfidious killing of their comrades, and perfidy remains perhaps the most egregious breach of the martial code.
See BEST, supra note_, at 292 (describing perfidy as, “to borrow a valuable Christian idea, IHL’s ‘sin against the Holy Spirit.’”).
205
See GUY CHAPMAN, A PASSIONATE PRODIGALITY: FRAGMENTS OF AUTOBIOGRAPHY _ (1933) (recounting an
oft-repeated incident wherein, after a prolonged and bloody advance across a series of trenches, a vengeful British sergeant “halfmad with excitement” took the fieldglasses from a surrendering German officer only to “tuc[k] the butt of his rifle under his arm
and sho[o]t the officer straight through his head.”).
206
Toward the end of World War I the great mass of surrendering German s so overwhelmed the capacity of U.S. troops to secure
and provide for them that decisions were made to kill all German forces either by refusing quarter or subsequent to capture. See
FOOKS, supra note_, at 120 (reporting communication received from the commanding colonel to the effect that “[i]n the
th
advance on Sedan, just prior to the armistice, November 11, 1918, the 16 U.S. Infantry found it difficult to take all prisoners of
war who ordinarily are entitled to such treatment because of the great mass of the enemy encountered and overcome.”).
207
See HALL, supra note_, at 474 (allowing that, although the presumption runs strongly in favor of quarter, an exception may be
made when “it is impossible for a force to be encumbered with prisoners without danger to itself” from other enemy forces, such
as where “small bodies of troops remai(n) for a long time isolated in the midst of enemies.”); FOOKS, supra note_, at 44 (“There
are . . . circumstances in which surrender cannot be accepted, because to do so will endanger the victor’s own safety (not enough
water, food, being grossly outnumbered[.]”).
208
See id. at 121-22 (“Troops sent on reconnoitering duties far in advance of the remainder of their forces, or who occupy an
important strategic point, a bridge, exploration of a forest, ravine, or a fortification which is the key to a position for the purposes
of holding until the main body of their forces arrive, must not be too considerate for any small group of the enemy which
frustrates such mission.).”
209
Writing in response to his own experiences during World War II, Fussell expresses the intellectual and moral disruption
occasioned by the stochastic combat environment by noting that the “relative few who actually fought know that the war was not
a matter of rational calculation. They know madness when they see it. FUSSELL, WARTIME, supra note_, at 284. Under such
conditions, the exercise of dispassionate ethical and moral judgment and unfaltering compliance with formal legal rules expected
by lawyers and others ignorant of the combat environment is more than perhaps ought to be expected.
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necessity. Although a minority contended that the grant of quarter to persons rendered hors de combat
had reached the status of an absolute obligation from which soldiers were not permitted to derogate,210
most continued to view the grant of quarter through the prism of state practice, from which it appeared as
a custom-based privilege with respect to which the recipient could assert an entitlement only in the
absence of any military necessity that would move the grantor to deny it. In the interwar period,
humanitarians tried to harden this conditional custom into something more protective of soldiers hors de
combat, but the resulting Geneva Conventions of 1929, in some senses simply an expansion upon the
membership of their conventional predecessors, added little more than an additional declaration that
POWs were immune from reprisal and entitled to protection from the moment of capture.211
Attempts to stamp a legal imprimatur upon the customary regime governing quarter were not
confined to the international arena, as several states made minor modifications to their respective military
manuals in recognition of the interplay between developments in IHL212 and the trajectory of state
practice.213 Nonetheless, states continued to veer from the increasingly restrictive positive law crafted by
diplomats and glossed by legal scholars and hewed instead to the restatements of custom proffered by
their military establishments: updated military manuals retained the primacy of the actual practice and
usage of soldiers atop the hierarchy of sources of obligation incumbent upon their armed forces,214 and the
210

See ALBERIC ROLIN, LE DROIT MODERNE DE LA GUERRE 287-88 (1920) (holding that “neither supreme necessity and
imminent danger” permit denial of quarter or the killing of POWs subsequent to capture, as the obligation to accept surrender and
treat POWs with humanity is absolute); cf. HALL, supra note_, at 474 (limiting the scope of a military necessity exception to the
obligation to grant quarter to the vanishing point by holding that “prisoners who cannot safely be kept can be liberated, and the
evil of increasing the strength of the enemy is less than that of violating the dictates of humanity, unless there is reason to expect
that the prisoners if liberated, or a force successfully attempting rescue, would massacre or ill-treat the captors.”).
211
See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 27 July 1929, at Art. 2 (extending protective rules and
principles of Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907 and establishing comprehensive rules for protecting POWs).
212
See U.S. War Dep’t, RULES OF LAND WARFARE (1934) [“Rules of Land Warfare, 1934”], reissued in substantially
identical form as RULES OF LAND WARFARE (1940), at para. 2 (updating the Rules of Land Warfare, 1914, and making
explicit reference to parts of the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and the Geneva Conventions of 1929 as having legal
effect as between parties under the rubric of the “written rules or laws of war[.]”); see also TM-27- 250, “Cases on Military
Government” (1943) (supplementing the Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, and elaborating cases concerning the rules of armed
conflict that created legal obligations for the U.S. and members of its armed forces); TM 27-251, “Treaties Governing Land
Warfare” (1944) (explaining the legal significance of obligations undertaken by the U.S. between 1929 and 1937 under treaties
interpreting the Hague and Geneva Conventions of 1907 and 1929 respectively). For a discussion of the specifics of these
instruments and manuals, see generally DONALD WELLS, THE LAWS OF LAND WARFARE (1992).
213
Law reflects and shapes practice, just as practice reflects and shapes law, and the disposition of POWs during war is
determined by the complex relationship between positive law, custom, and the practical exigencies of combat. See FLORY, supra
note_, at 10 (“The treatment of prisoners is strongly influenced by the relation between international law and necessity[.]”).
214
Neither the 1934 or 1940 revisions to the Rules of Land Warfare withdrew support for the foundational basis of the martial
code, namely the promotion of chivalric virtue to the extent possible in light of the practical reality of military necessity. See
RULES OF LAND WARFARE (1934), supra note_, at paras. 3 & 4 (restating as its central principle the defense of the chivalric
code with deference to military necessity). As such, although the U.S. did not craft its military manuals in order to grant carte
blanche to its armed forces, nonetheless U.S. military regulations did not incorporate obligations to POWs derived from IHL
treaties in a manner inconsistent with the promotion of chivalry or the military mission of its armed forces. See id. at para. 22
(stating that “[t]he object of war is to bring about the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible by means of
regulated violence.”); RULES OF LAND WARFARE (1940), at para 22 (same). Specifically, although both the 1934 and 1940
revisions drew upon language in the 1914 Rules of Land Warfare recognizing that surrendering enemies are generally entitled to
quarter, neither revision repealed the explicit exception which provided that under certain circumstances military necessity might
permit the denial of quarter to surrendering enemies. See RULES OF LAND WARFARE 1934, supra note_, at para. 33
(restating para. 182 of the Rules of Land Warfare, 1914, to the effect that surrendering enemy personnel are generally entitled to
quarter); but see id. at para. 85 (providing that a commander could deny quarter on the grounds that it was necessary to do so in
the interest of self-preservation or that caring for enemy POWs interfered with his mission); Rules of Land Warfare, 1914, supra
note_, at para. 368 (detailing exceptions to the general entitlement to quarter). To an important extent, the retention of exceptions
based on necessity to the general obligation to grant quarter comports with the internal value system of soldiers of the era for
whom, as in earlier periods, the concept of surrender was suspect on its face as an ostensibly dishonorable act that would
disentitle the soldier offering his surrender to honorable treatment, whether from his own comrades or from the enemy. See
BARKER, supra note_, at 203 (suggesting that troops were expected, as a matter of martial honor, to govern themselves in
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martial cultures of a number of militaries retained a disdain for the very concept of surrender.

Thus, as

World War II erupted, the denial of quarter was condoned, whether explicitly or tacitly, by several
leading states, resulting in a round-robin of reprisals.216 Following their invasion of the Philippines,
Japanese troops drove, at bayonet point, over 40,000 Allied captives to their deaths on the Bataan Death
217
March (1942), a number exceeded by the Red Army after the Nazi defeat at Stalingrad (1943) after

which more than 105,000 German POWs were dispatched outright and on the march to gulags.218 German
forces repeatedly denied quarter to Allied troops,219 most notoriously at Malmedy during the Battle of the
Bulge (1944),220 and Allied soldiers reciprocated against Axis troops,221 including a mass execution of SS
camp guards during the liberation of Dachau (1945).222
accord with obligations to refuse surrender, parole, voluntary disclosure of information to the enemy, and inducements to
disloyalty). In short, the absence of an absolute prohibition against denial of quarter in military manuals may reflect this
unfavorable assessment of the honor and entitlements of a surrendering soldier.
215
Since antiquity, soldiers have been inculcated in a martial culture that ascribes dishonor to the act of surrender and insists that
good warriors simply do not permit themselves to be taken prisoner. See supra at note_. Although by the outbreak of World
War II civilian diplomats and lawmakers had drawn this martial value into some discord with their humanitarian objectives,
surrender remained anathema to the martial mind as well to the cultural imperatives of several of the belligerent parties, which
adjudged the surrendering soldier to be traitorous. See FOOKS, supra note_, at 42-43 (noting that the official Soviet response to
a Nazi request for a POW exchange advised that “[t]here are no Russian POWs” as the “Russian soldier fights on till death” and
“if he chooses to become a prisoner, he is automatically excluded from the Russian community.”); id. (noting the Japanese
attitude toward surrendering forces was one of contempt \and that their own forces were absolutely forbidden to surrender);
INSTITUTE OF WORLD POLITY, PRISONERS OF WAR 17 (1948) (indicating that neither the Soviet nor Japanese
governments recognized any interests with respect to their POWs on the ground that surrender was antithetical to their culture);
SDACPOW, supra note_, at 20 (referencing the U.S. Code of Conduct, promulgated in 1953, which codified a set of customary
obligations incumbent upon U.S. soldiers, including the following: “Art. II. I will never surrender of my own free will[.]”).
216
See, e.g., FUSSELL, supra note_, at 283 (citing BRITISH HANDBOOK OF IRREGULAR WARFARE (1942)) (“Never give
the enemy a chance; the days when we could practice the rules of sportsmanship are over . . . Every soldier must be a potential
gangster . . . Remember you are out to kill.”).
217
Although Japanese forces did not summarily execute all their POWs, the standing Japanese practice was to forcibly march
them to death and to shoot or bayonet stragglers; the practical result was identical to the summary refusal to grant quarter. See,
e.g., Trial of Baba Masao, 11 WAR CRIMES REP’TS 56 (1947) (chronicling forcible evacuation of Allied POWs in Borneo that
resulted in the death, by exhaustion and shooting, of nearly all the captives). For a detailed discussion of Japanese transgressions
against law and/or martial custom during World War II, including the denial of quarter, see LORD RUSSELL OF LIVERPOOL,
THE KNIGHTS OF BUSHIDO (1954); see also James R. Dawes, Language, Violence, and Human Rights Law, 11 YALE J. L.
& HUMAN. 215, 234-35 (1999) (detailing Japanese abuses of British POWs in Southeast Asia).
218
BARKER, supra note_, at 35.
219
See The Nuremburg Judgment, Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Opinion and
Judgment, (1946) (citing regulation issued by the German High Command to members of the German Armed Forces calling for
“ruthless and energetic action . . . by force of arms (bayonets, butts, and firearms)” against Soviet POWs and threatening any
German soldier “who does not use his weapons, or does so with insufficient energy” against Soviet POWs with punishment); The
Dostler Case, U.S. Mil. Comm’n, Rome, Italy, Oct. 12, 1945, at I LAW REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 22 (1945) (convicting
th
commander of the German 75 Army Corps, General Anton Dostler, for ordering on 25 March 1944 the summary execution of
fifteen uniformed U.S. POWs captured while on a mission to demolish a railway tunnel between La Spezia and Genoa); Abbaye
Ardenne Case, 4 WAR CRIMES REP’TS 97 (1945) (condemning the commander of a Nazi SS Regiment for having counseled
his men to deny quarter to Allied troops); Trial of Gunther Thiele and Georg Steinert, (United States Mil. Comm’n, Augsberg,
Germany, June 13, 1945), II LAW REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 56-57 (1948) (convicting two members of a German unit for the
denial of quarter to a wounded U.S. officer); Trial of Kapitanleutnant Heinz Eck and Four Others For The Killing Of Members
Of The Crew Of The Greek Steamship Peleus, Sunk On The High Seas [“The Peleus”] (Brit. Mil. Ct., Hamburg, Germany, Oct.
17-20, 1945), I LAW. REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 1, 12 (1947) (convicting German submarine commander for machinegunning
survivors of a sunken ship); LORD RUSSELL OF LIVERPOOL, THE SCOURGE OF THE SWASTIKA 22-23 (discussing
German refusals to grant quarter to, and subsequent executions of captured, British at Dunkirk in 1940); id. at 26-27 (reprinting
U.S. reports of a German massacre of captured U.S. troops at St. Vith during the Battle of the Bulge in 1944); id. at 41 (relating
German executions of U.S. airmen captured unharmed but later shot on the false claim that they were “attempting to escape”);
BARKER, supra note_, at 57 (discussing denials of quarter between British and German troops in North Africa in 1942-43);
AMBROSE, supra note_, at 112 (noting that German troops cut the throats of paratroopers caught suspended from their
harnesses, and thus effectively hors de combat, during the Normandy invasion).
220
See Malmedy Massacre Trial, U.S. Military Commission, Dachau, Germany, (12 May- 16 July 1946) (convicting 72 soldiers
of I Panzer Corps for denying quarter to U.S. troops surrendering during Battle of the Bulge in Malmedy, Belgium, Dec. 1944).
For a discussion of the Malmedy Massacre, see JAMES WEINGARTNER, CROSSROADS OF DEATH: THE STORY OF THE
MALMEDY MASSACRE AND TRIAL (1979).
221
See RICHARD FALK, GABRIEL KOLKO, & ROBERT JAY LIFTON, CRIMES OF WAR 224 (1971) (contending that U.S.
troops denied quarter to Axis soldiers, albeit with significantly less frequency than their adversaries); see also MAX HASTINGS,
37

Moreover, the belligerents seized upon the advent of large-scale guerrilla warfare and commando
operations223 to further clarify, and even codify, the preexisting martial custom conferring upon military
authorities wide latitude to self-define and apply exceptions to the general entitlement to quarter.
Although the legal status of missions undertaken to disable or destroy industrial and other strategic
installations beyond the traditional theater of operations was the subject of dispute during World War II,224
for the Nazi general staff, operations against infrastructure were ipso facto illegal methods of warfare, on
the asserted grounds that members of units engaged in such missions did not themselves grant quarter or
otherwise comply with IHL, and thus warranted reprisal in the form of the eradication of all members of
the enemy units concerned.225 With the infamous Kommando Befehl (Commando Order) in October
1942,226 Germany ordered its armed forces to deny quarter to all Allied forces on “so-called Commando
227
228
missions in Europe or Africa[,]” and this instruction remained in effect for the duration of the war.

Allied soldiers branded as “commandos” were executed with the official explanation that they were killed
“in Kamf oder af der Flucht” (in battle or attempting to escape.”)229 A similar, but informal, regime
governed the conflict in Yugoslavia, where, with few exceptions, no belligerent granted quarter.230
The academic literature in the aftermath of World War II reveals that, despite the progressive
development of IHL and its normative influence upon eminent international lawyers, the martial code had
yet to be displaced as the lodestar guiding state practice. Although statements of absolutism with respect
to the quarter were working their way into some commentaries,231 scholars continued to recognize the

OVERLORD, D-DAY AND THE BATTLE FOR NORMANDY 11-12 (1984) (stating that “overall it seems doubtful whether
[the denial of quarter] was done on a greater scale by one side or the other.”); AMBROSE, supra note_, at 206 (chronicling a
reported incident wherein a heavily decorated and widely respected U.S. officer is rumored to have impulsively machinegunned
German POWs on a work detail); STEPHEN AMBROSE, CITIZEN SOLDIERS _ (2001) (reporting that the commander of the
st
101 Airborne Division, General Maxwell Taylor, ordered his troops to deny quarter to German soldiers during OVERLORD).
After World War II, a German newspaper published the names of 369 German soldiers alleged to have been denied quarter by
U.S. troops, but a German court, under U.S. military administration, refused to assert jurisdiction. See
(http://www.scrapbookpages.com/DachauScrapbook/DachauTrials/MalmedyMassacre03.html).
222
th
See Thomas Farragher, Vengeance at Dachau, BOST. GLOBE, Jul. 2, 2001, at A1 (reporting that in U.S. soldiers of the 45
Infantry Division, after liberating Dachau, executed least 17 SS guards at least in part in reprisal for the Malmedy massacre).
223
“Commando operations” is a broad term that include missions undertaken outside the actual theater of war to demolish military
installations, sabotage industrial plants, sink warships in harbor, provide intelligence to partisan groups, rescue prisoners, and
otherwise disrupt and damage enemy capacity to conduct traditional military operations.
224
See Baxter, Spies, supra note_, at_ (discussing legal status of commando operations during World War II).
225
See KALSHOVEN, supra note_, at 190-92 (summarizing the argument offered by the Legal Department of Oberkommando
der Wehrmacht that commandos were not entitled to the protections of the customs of war as 1) they did not themselves grant
quarter to civilians or soldiers, 2) they wore German uniforms when engaging German forces, and 3) even when they did wear
proper uniforms and observe the laws and customs of war they were not honorable soldiers inasmuch as honorable soldiers did
battle against other soldiers and did not join “terror and sabotage groups.”). In fact, many of those recruited to these extremely
dangerous units had indeed been drawn from the ranks of convicted military personnel, who presumably had less to lose than
other soldiers, and some “generally behaved in a perfidious manner totally unbefitting the honourable profession of arms” by
denying quarter and by the perfidious wearing of German uniforms. BARKER, supra note_, at 21. Nonetheless, not all
members of the German High Command concurred with this legal judgment: Admiral Canaris believed that the Kommando
Befehlung was applicable only to commandos captured in civilian clothing or German uniforms and not to properly uniformed
soldiers, regardless of their missions. KALSHOVEN, supra note_, at 190-92.
226
See 26 I.M.T. Doc. 498-PS (“Commando Order” directive of 18 October 1942).
227
“From now on all enemies on so-called Commando missions in Europe or Africa challenged by German troops, even if they
are to all appearances soldiers in uniform, or demolition troops, whether armed or unarmed, in battle or in flight, are to be
slaughtered to the last man..” Id.
228
See 26 I.M.T. Docs. 551-PS.
229
KALSHOVEN, supra note_, at 190.
230
KEEGAN, supra note_, at 54.
231
th
See, e.g., 2 H. WHEATON, INTERNATIONAL LAW 179-80 (7 ed., A. Keith, 1944) (stating that by the end of World War II
the privilege of quarter was crystallizing into a near-absolute right).
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legal legitimacy of exceptions carved out of the general rule in the interest of self-preservation.

In sum,

although the customary regime governing warfare had evolved since ancient times to enhance the
protections owed to soldiers rendered hors de combat, state practice butted up against this evolving
regime, and at the time of the Normandy invasion in June 1944, martial honor, reflected in the contents of
military manuals and above all in the intersubjective understandings and practice of the professional
soldierly caste, did not categorically proscribe denial of quarter to enemy soldiers offering their
surrenders, nor did it absolutely preclude execution of POWs under circumstances of military necessity.
b) Violation of Parole
Although in ancient times most members of a defeated force could expect a swift death,233 POWs
were on occasion granted a limited parole234 and released to permit them to serve as intermediaries in
diplomatic negotiations and as couriers of the news of a defeat to a conquered people.235 Honor was
enough to ensure the effectiveness of the grant of parole: anecdotal evidence indicates that POWs granted
their release returned after their service as emissaries even armed with the knowledge that return meant
sure death.236 By the Middle Ages more POWs were released upon their promise to refrain from further
acts of belligerency,237 and special feudal courts punished breaches of the jus armorum, including
breaches of parole agreements, committed by dishonorable knights.238 During the Enlightenment the
concept of the soldier as a servant of his government not responsible for its policies began to take root,239
and as it did the system of parole was augmented by a regime whereby, although poor prisoners could
often expect the sword, wealthy captives could hope to secure parole upon the payment of a ransom.240
By the late 17th century parole was no longer accompanied by a financial transaction, and during the

232

See FLORY, supra note_, at 159 (affirming that in “very unusual circumstances” capturing personnel may deny quarter).
See infra at note_.
234
“Parole” is a legal term used with respect to POWs to refer to an agreement between the surrendering soldier and his captors
(or, in the modern era, with the detaining state) whereby the captors release the prisoner in consideration for his promise to
refrain from rejoining the conflict, contributing to the war effort, or, in some cases, leaving a certain geographic area. See Gary
D. Brown, Prisoner of War Parole: Ancient Concept, Modern Utility, 156 MIL. L. REV. 200, 200 (1998) (defining parole under
international law) (citing U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DIR. 1300.7, TRAINING AND EDUCATION MEASURES
NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THE CODE OF CONDUCT, encl. 2, para. B(3)(a)(5) (Dec. 23, 1988)). Although parole is
granted and accepted under great duress, it is an agreement with moral, and legal, consequences. WALZER, supra note_, at 146.
235
See Brown, supra note_, at 202 (noting the Carthaginian practice of granting parole to POWs for these purposes).
236
See PIERINO BELLIO, DE RE MILITARY ET BELLO TRACTUS (1563), reprinted in 2 CLASSICS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 126 (J. Scott ed., 1936) (chronicling the return of Regulus to Carthage after his parole to Rome where
he urged the Senate to abandon Roman POWs (including himself), to death).
237
See SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAL ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO (1688), reprinted in 2 CLASSICS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1150 (J. Scott ed., 1934) (asserting that the grant of parole obligated an individual to refrain from
belligerency against the grantee and his sovereign).
238
The primary constitutive force behind the medieval regime of parole was the honor of the soldier to whom it was granted. See
BALTHAZAR AYALA, DE JURE ET OFFICIIS BELLICIS ET DISCIPLINA MILITARY LIBRI (1582), reprinted in 2
CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 58 (J. Scott ed., 1912) (describing violation of parole as a breach of a sacred trust).
Strong though it was, honor was not always adequate to bind knights to their promises; death or other punishment was visited
upon the parole violator. T. KEEN, LAWS OF WAR IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES 27-34 (1965); see also Green, supra
note_, at 291 (describing conviction of a French knight in chivalric court for violating parole); MERON, supra note_, at 168
(discussing case of an English knight who escaped his French captors before receiving parole and was ordered back to custody).
239
See VATTEL, LE DROIT DE GENS, supra note_ (asserting that because quarrels were between states and not men,
individual soldiers were entitled to their release under the natural law principle of respect for human dignity).
240
See KEEGAN, supra note_, at 321. The payment of ransom to further secure the promise of the parolee largely ceased with
the Treaty of Westhpalia in 1648, and ransom was replaced by reciprocity: each contesting government had interests in the return
of its prisoners, and the release of POWs came to be governed on this basis. See GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS, bk. II,
ch. 14, §9 (1625) (describing reciprocal paroles of POWs as advantageous, or at least not disadvantageous, to both sovereigns on
the ground that prisoners, while in the custody of the detaining power, were as if already dead to the cause of their governments).
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American Revolution captured officers of both forces were routinely released upon their promises
simply to refrain from further belligerency.242 Although by the late 18th century the violation of parole was
no longer universally treated as a capital crime,243 it remained an ignominious offense.244
The Lieber Code described parole as “pledge of individual good faith and honor to do, or to omit
doing, certain acts after he . . . shall have been dismissed . . . from the power of the captor”245 and
explicitly prescribed death for violation of the conditions attached to the grant.246 The solemnity of the
grant dictated that it be offered only where the honorableness of the grantee could be accurately
determined and where the agreement could be recorded; consequently, the Lieber Code restricted the
grant of parole to officers247 and to non-combat situations,248 and it required an exchange of written
documents.249 Moreover, as parole was conditioned upon a promise secured by honor, it could be
250

accepted, but not imposed, under the Lieber Code.

Although the parole regime during the U.S. Civil

War collapsed under the weight of reciprocal violations,251 subsequent 19th and early 20th century
codifications, domestic252 as well as international,253 as well as the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme
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Parole was not exclusive to officers: enlisted personnel were occasionally granted the option in lieu of confinement. Carnahan,
supra note_, at 115 (describing parole of enlisted personnel of the Virginia Militia by British General Benedict Arnold).
242
Although the promise to abstain from further acts against the enemy was standard consideration for a grant of parole, during
the American Revolution, capturing forces imposed additional conditions, including obligations to refrain from criticism of the
opposing side and to respond to a summons if requested. See CHARLES H. METZGER. THE PRISONER IN THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 193 (1971).
243
The traditional punishment for a parole violator was death, particularly if the violator was subsequently recaptured under arms.
FLORY, supra note_, at 124; see also SPAIGHT, supra note_, at 296-97 (noting the hanging of a U.S. officer, Colonel Hayne,
by the British in 1782 for violating parole); id. (indicating that aggravating circumstances justifying death include being in
possession of arms and attempted assassination). However, some commentators restricted the ultimate sanction to mercenaries.
See, e.g., GENTILI, supra note_, at 18. Additionally, belligerents entered into agreements to specify lesser punishments for the
offense. See, e.g, Treaty of Amity and Commerice, U.S.-Prussia, 8 Bevens 78, 8 Stat. 162, entered into force Aug. 8, 1786
(providing, inter alia, that violation of parole would result in imprisonment at close confinement rather than death).
244
See SPAIGHT, supra note_, at 297 (indicating that a parole violator was “shunned by gentlemen”).
245
See Lieber Code, supra note_, at Art. 123. The standard promise given in exchange for parole was to not conduct belligerent
acts during the present conflict unless exchanged for a POW of the other belligerent. Id. at Art. 130.
246
See id. at Art. 124 (“Breaking the parole is punished with death when the person breaking the parole is captured again.”); id. at
Art. 130 (“[C]ases of breaking parole . . . can be visited with the punishment of death.”).
247
See id. at Art. 126 (“Commissioned officers only are allowed to give their parole[.]”);id. at Art. 127 (“No [enlisted soldier] can
give his parole except through an officer . . . The only . . . exception is where individuals, properly separated from their
commands, [are] without the possibility of being paroled through an officer.”).
248
See id. at Art. 128 (“No paroling on the battlefield . . . is permitted[.]”). Both the U.S. and the Confederate armies refused to
recognize paroles granted on the battlefield on the ground that the duressive environment under which they were granted vitiated
any validity they might otherwise have possessed. FLORY, supra note_, at 130 (citing U.S. War Dep’t, General Order No. 49
(1863), at art. 1, §7) (“No prisoner of war can be forced by the hostile government to pledge his parole[.]”).
249
See id. at Art. 125 (requiring that names and ranks of paroled soldiers be memorialized and exchanged between governments).
250
Id. at Art. 133. Because acceptance of the grant of parole was voluntary, the parolee continued to be obligated, upon his honor,
th
to abide by the terms of his parole. See HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 425 (4 ed. 1895) (discussing legal
obligations under parole). Paroles secured under the use of or threat of force were of no legal significance. Id.
251
See Brown, supra note_, at 205 (attributing the failure of the Civil War parole regime to the return to arms of 37000
Confederate parolees and to the execution of civilians sympathetic to the Confederacy).
252
The military manuals of numerous states conferred jurisdiction upon military courts to try violations of parole and sentence
those convicted to death, including France, Germany, Japan, and the U.S. SPAIGHT, supra note_, at 297 (citing sources); THE
LAWS OF WAR ON LAND, INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, adopted Sept. 9, 1880 [“OXFORD MANUAL”] at
Art. 78 (“A prisoner liberated on parole and recaptured in arms, forfeits his rights as a prisoner of war[.]”); BULLETIN
OFFICIEL DE MINISTRE DEL LA GUERRE 229-29 (1893) [France], at Art. 35 (same); RULES OF LAND WARFARE 1914,
supra note_, at Arts. 72-82 (restating Lieber Code with respect to parole).
253
See Brussels Convention of 1874, supra note_, at Art. 33 (“Any prisoner of war liberated on parole and recaptured bearing
arms against the Government to which he had pledged his honour may be deprived of the rights accorded to prisoners of war and
brought before the courts.”); Hague Convention of 1907, supra note_, at Art. 12 (Prisoners of war liberated on parole and
recaptured bearing arms against the Government to whom they had pledged their honour . . . forfeit their right to be treated as
prisoners of war, and can be brought before the courts.”).
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Court, supported the moral basis for parole as well as the right of states to harshly punish violators.
Violations of parole continued to excite moral outrage and although most were punished with
imprisonment at hard labor,255 some were condemned to death.256 During World War I, the custom of
257

parole fell into desuetude after serial violations early in the conflict, and the subject was little revisited,
apart from in the context of restatements of domestic military manuals,258 prior to World War II.259
Thus, as of June 1944, POWs who accepted release upon the promise to refrain from further
belligerency were expected to abide by their agreements; those who did not could expect death upon
recapture.260
c. Reprisal against POWs
Belligerents have threatened and undertaken acts of reprisal261 to deter and punish violations of
the laws and customs of war, including the abuse of POWs,262 throughout history. Enlightenment
commentary expressed approval for the use of reprisals by otherwise law-abiding states as necessary to
263
deter unlawful adversaries, and during the American Revolution, the threat of reprisal was required to

induce Britain to terminate its denial of quarter to and maltreatment of U.S. POWs.264 In the U.S. Civil
War the “infliction of retaliatory measures” against enemy POWs265 was a permissible means to transform
the conduct of the enemy.266 Soldiers committing perfidious surrenders in World War I might expect to be
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See U.S. ex rel. Henderson v. Wright, Case No. 17,777, 28 Fed. Cas. 796, 798 (1863) (holding that parole is a “sacred
obligation” the violation of which dishonors the national character and damages the “national faith”).
255
th
See SPAIGHT, supra note_, at 296-97 (suggesting that by the late 19 century opinion was divided as to whether the
appropriate punishment for a parole violator was death by hanging or strict confinement at labor).
256
Military courts treated violations of parole as serious offenses: during the Boer War, parole violators were occasionally
punished by death. See SPAIGHT, supra note_, at 88 (discussing parole violations during the Boer War and noting the execution
of a paroled Boer officer recaptured under arms in a British uniform). BRITISH MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW 298 (1884)
(providing for death for violations of parole in “aggravating case[s]”); CODE MILITAIRE, Art. 204, §2 (“Every [POW] who,
having broken his parole is recaptured with arms in hand, is punished with death.”) (cited in WELLS, supra note_, at 152).
257
Brown, supra note_, at 208.
258
For example, the revisions to the Rules of Land Warfare, 1914, simply renumbered sections of the U.S. military regulations
and added almost nothing of substance. See WELLS, supra note_, at 152 (documenting the near-verbatim recodifications of the
1914 Rules in 1934 and 1940).
259
See HALL, supra note_, at 490 (glossing the question of parole in brief).
260
Within the martial code as of 1944 the punishment for dishonor was commensurate with the crime, and for those who
purported to resume the status of combatants after promising to surrender that status in exchange for their release, death was an
appropriate sanction. FLORY, supra note_, at 262.
261
“Reprisal” is a legal term describing an act undertaken to induce enemy forces to cease violating the rules and customs of war.
See generally FKALSHOVEN, supra note_. A reprisal, if undertaken prior to an enemy violation, would constitute a violation of
the laws and customs of war, whereas when done solely for the purpose of forcing an adversary to discontinue its prior violation,
it may be adjudged legal or, at the very least, permissible. Id. Reprisals may consist of acts that mirror those of the adversary
(“in kind”) or other acts (“not in kind”), but resort to reprisal has been considered to require the failure of other means, formal
notice to the adversary, and limitation of otherwise illegal acts consistent with the requirements of proportionality.
262
BARKER, supra note_, at 196.
263
DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 20 (1777).
264
See Coil, supra note_, at 183-84, 191- 92 (noting that threats of reprisals against British POWs were successful in protecting
some U.S. POWs against execution); see also WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 15-16 (stating
that a “right of relatiation” [i.e., reprisal] existed during the Revolutionary War in cases of the denial of quarter).
265
Lieber Code, supra note_, at Art. 59. Examples of reprisals explicitly permitted include the denial of quarter to troops that
offer no quarter. Id. at Art. 62, Art. 66. Such resort was effective: in reprisal for Union executions of Confederate POWs,
Confederate Lieutenant Colonel John Singleton Mosby ordered 27 Union POWs to draw lots to determine which seven would be
hanged in reprisal. To the corpses notes were pinned with the following text: “These men have been hung in retaliation for an
equal number of Colonel Mosby’s men, hung by order of General Custer at Front Royal. Measure for measure.” Cited in Boyle,
Jr., supra note_, at 148-50.
266
See Lieber Code, supra note_, at Art. 27 (stating that “[a] reckless enemy often leaves to his opponent no other means of
securing himself against the repetition of barbarous outrage” than reprisal).
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employed as human shields or summarily executed, upon their eventual capture, in retaliation, and
reprisals against POWs, to include execution, were employed by the Allies and the Entente268 and justified
by scholars as necessary deterrent measures.269 In the immediate aftermath of World War I, international
efforts to limit reprisals against POWs failed to dislodge the settled practice of states in responding to and
270
deterring injuries to their armed forces, and diplomats settled for the requirement that reprisals against

POWs be limited to where the act was justified as having been undertaken to protect POWs of the
capturing state.271 Thus, although the Geneva Conventions of 1929 purported to subvert the custom-based
regime of reprisal and institute an absolute prohibition on reprisals against POWs,272 this declaration made
few inroads into the mass of state interests in deterring mistreatment of their own soldiers, and for the
duration of World War II reprisals remained relatively commonplace and practical measures neither
generally disfavored by nor inconsistent with the martial code.273
4. The Court-Martial of Private Ryan
No disciplinary or judicial measures were taken against any of the characters in Saving Private
Ryan. The most brutal eleven months of the war lay ahead, and Allied efforts were tightly focused upon
defeating the Nazi war machine. To have exposed soldiers to the threat of punishment in cases where
allegations of misconduct would have been considered of questionable merit would have chilled the
aggressiveness necessary to survival in combat and dulled the very instrument essential to victory. Even
more importantly, by the standards of the martial code in June 1944, none of the acts or omissions were
clearly colorable as prosecutable war crimes, and it is almost inconceivable that any commander would
have investigated, let alone charged, any defendants.274 Nevertheless, to develop the argument that the
267

See FOOKS, supra note_, at 121 n.2 (stating that, after the author, a British officer, came under fire from German
machinegunners who feigned surrender only to inflict heavy casualties before their subsequent capture, the U.S. captors marched
the German POWs before their advance to obtain a ceasefire from other German units).
268
PRZETACZNIK, supra note_, at 136.
269
See SPAIGHT, supra note_, at 465 (“The right to inflict reprisals—to retaliate—must entail the right to execute in very
extreme cases. Otherwise there would be no effective means of checking the enemy’s very worst excesses.”); see also
KALSHOVEN, supra note_, at 74 (“[N]o army could reasonably be expected to renounce in war so effective and powerful a
weapon for the redress or cessation of supposed intolerable wrong upon its own nationals at the hand of the enemy as immediate
or threatened reprisal on enemy units within its own hands.”) (quoting Chariman Lord Younger of the International Law
Association at the Hague Conference on the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 1921).
270
Domestic military manuals expressly permitted reprisal at the time of World War I. See, e.g., Rules of Land Warfare 1914,
supra note_, at para. 383 (“Persons guilty of no offense whatever may be punished as retaliation for the guilty acts of others.”).
271
th
See International Law Association, 30 Conference, The Hague, 30 August-3 September 1921, Proceedings Concerning the
POW Code: Report of the Conference by the Treatment of Prisoners of War Committee, Vol. I, 188-246, at Art. 13 (“All
reprisals, as such, on prisoners of war are deprecated . . . [POWs] shall in no case be subjected to reprisals except in retaliation
for acts committed or sanctioned by their own Governments in connection with the treatment of [POWs].”).
272
See Geneva Conventions of 1929, POW Convention, supra note_, at Art. 2 (providing that “[m]easures of reprisal against
[POWs] are forbidden.”).
273
See PRZETACZNIK, supra note_, at 137 (noting execution of 80 German POWs by French Partisans in reprisal for execution
of 80 Partisans, as well as German execution of 10 Italian POWs for every German soldier killed in the Battle of Rome in March
1944); Matthew Lippman, Conundrums of Armed Conflict: Criminal Defenses to Violations of the Humanitarian Law of War, 15
DICK. J. INT’L L. 1, 60-68 (1996) (noting pattern of reprisals against POWs during World War II).
274
The Army routinely investigates various civil and criminal matters. See DEP’T ARMY, REG. 15-6, BOARDS,
COMMISSIONS, AND COMMITTEES: PROCEDURES FOR INVESTIGATING OFFICERS AND BOARDS OF OFFICERS
(Aug. 24, 1977). If no formal accusation is made, the issue may be disposed of by this informal investigative procedure.
However, when a soldier is formally accused of a crime, the Uniform Code of Military Justice [“UCMJ”] requires a pretrial
investigation unless it is waived by the accused. See 10 U.S.C. §§801-946 (2003) (UCMJ), at Art. 32 (providing for public
adversarial hearing to determine whether charges should be proferred). Under the UCMJ, the convening authority has the
ultimate discretion to determine whether to charge an accused subsequent to an Article 32 investigation, as the report of that
investigation is merely advisory. See Everett, supra note_, at_. Moreover, the decision to launch an investigation, whether
informal or formal, is a discretionary act driven not solely by legal considerations. See Christopher D. Booth, Prosecuting the
“Fog of War?” Examining The Legal Implications of an Alleged Massacre of South Korean Civilians by U.S. Forces during the
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martial code is superior to international adjudication as arbiter of the moral and legal legitimacy of the
conduct of soldiers in war, as well as the sole mechanism of social control whereby to achieve the objects
and purposes of IHL without compromising the survivability of soldiers and the civilization they defend,
this Article will analyze the likely result of a U.S. Army court-martial275 of Private Ryan and other
members of the rescue squad on charges of denial of quarter and reprisal against the German POW for
violation of parole. The substantive elements of the crimes with which defendants might have been
charged will be those as they existed in 1944.276 However, because the rules of court-martial have evolved
Opening Days of the Korean War in the Village of No Gun Ri, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L., 933, 951 (quoting then Secretary
of the Army Louis Caldera) (“[The Army” will not investigate every firefight, every battle” in which its soldiers might be alleged
to have committed crimes). Commanders have indeed convened courts-martial to try members of their commands for serious
violations of IHL, even during total wars such as World War II. See, e.g., BISHOP, supra note_, at 286 (noting numerous courtsmartial records of members of the U.S. Armed Forces under the UCMJ for the deliberate killing of POWs); RICHARD
WHITTINGHAM, MARTIAL JUSTICE: THE LAST MASS EXECUTION IN THE UNITED STATES 259 (1971) (referencing
the court-martial of U.S. Army Private Clarence Bertucci for the deliberate killing of 8 sleeping German POWs in a detention
camp in Utah). However, the decision to convene a court-martial hinges, at least in part, upon the political purposes and risks at
issue: for example, in the waning days of World War II, U.S. Army troops executed most of the SS guards at the Dachau
extermination camp, yet, upon learning of the massacre, their commanding general, General George S. Patton, made the
prudential decision not to investigate the matter lest it cause embarrassment to the Allies and blur the moral distinction between
the forces of liberation and those of subjugation. See HOWARD A BEUCHNER, THE HOUR OF THE AVENGER (reporting
that Patton rejected the proposal to court-martial the U.S. soldiers with the following words: "Public outrage would certainly have
opposed the prosecution of American heroes for eliminating a group of sadists who so richly deserved to die."). In contrast,
although the Confederate commandant of the Andersonville POW camp, Captain Henry Wirtz, did his best to improve the
miserable prison conditions he inherited from his predecessor, the U.S. court-martialled him for unlawful reprisal against POWS
because “the public mood after a long and bloody war needed a scapegoat.” WELLS, supra note_, at 94-95. Commanders are
understandably loathe to trigger judicial proceedings the politico-military ramifications of which are unpleasant, for courtsmartial serve purposes in addition to the administration of criminal justice, and thus it is solely within the discretion of the
commander to determine whether a soldier will be investigated, as well as whether he will be tried and, if convicted, punished.
See FM 27-10, Dep’t of the Army (1956), at para. 507(b) (locating prosecutorial authority and discretion in the commander);
DEP’T ARMY, FUNDAMENTALS OF MILITARY LAW 58 (1980) (describing breadth of discretion of convening authority
with respect to trial and sentencing); ROBERT SHERRILL, MILITARY JUSTICE IS TO JUSTICE AS MILITARY MUSIC IS
TO MUSIC 73 (1969) (explaining that a court-martial is a not a judicial forum but an “instrumentality of the executive power of
the President for the enforcement of discipline in the armed forces” that permits broad exercise of discretion).
275
States derive their ultimate military jurisdiction “from the bare fact that the person charged is within the custody of the Court;
his nationality, the place where the offence was committed, the nationality of the victims are not generally material.” U.N. War
Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals x (1949). However, the sources of and authority for the military
jurisdiction of the U.S. are augmented by custom stretching back to Rome, by the Constitution, and by positive legislation.
English courts-martial borrowed liberally from Roman law, and in turn the Continental Congress, during and subsequent to the
American Revolution, adopted much of the English system to regulate the relationship between members of the Armed Forces
and the U.S. DEPT of ARMY, FUNDAMENTALS OF MILITARY LAW 1 (1980). With Article I, §8, cl. 14, the Framers of
the U.S. Constitution conferred upon Congress the power to “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces,” and recognized that the exigencies of military discipline would require a special system of military courts distinct
from Article III courts. See U.S. Const., Vth Amend. (exempting “cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia,
when in actual service in time of War or public danger” from the requirement of prosecution by indictment and, inferentially,
from the right to trial by jury); see also O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969) (recognizing the constitutional bases for
Congressional authority to create a system of military justice distinct from civil justice) (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 40
(1942)). In 1951 Congress exercised this constitutional grant and enacted the Uniform Code of Military Justice [“UCMJ”] to
regulate the conduct of all Armed Forces personnel and to define and provide for the punishment of crimes which, but for the
military status of the accused, would be tried and punished under applicable federal or State law. See UCMJ, supra note_. By
executive order in 1984, the Manual for Courts-Martial was created to aid in the application and interpretation of the UCMJ and
to provide rules of evidence and procedure. See E.O. 12473, 49 FR 17152, Apr. 13, 1984 (amended most recently Apr. 11,
2002). In addition, the respective service secretaries of the military components promulgate regulations governing the
administration of military justice to which personnel are subject in accordance with 10 U.S.C.§3012, and the decisions of Courts
of Military Review and the U.S. Court of Military Appeals (the “Supreme Court of the Military”), general and special orders of
the Department of Defense and of post and combat commanders, and military customs complement and conclude the sources of
law applicable to courts-martial. AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, HANDBOOK OF MILITARY LAW 3 (1918).
276
The term “war crime” is a legal term-of-art for a “violation of [IHL] by any person . . . , military or civilian[, and] [e]very
violation of [IHL] is a war crime.” FM 27-10, para. 499; see also 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 1241 (identifying “war
crimes” as a species of “international crime,” defined as act “universally recognized as criminal, which [are] considered . . . grave
matter[s] of international concern and for some valid reason cannot be left within the exclusive jurisdiction of the state[.]”). IHL,
as part of the “law of nations” to which Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution makes reference, is part of the law of the U.S.
even in the absence of specific incorporation provided it is not in conflict with a treaty or statute or a previous executive or
judicial determination. See The Paquete Habana 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (establishing that customary international law is part of the
law of the U.S. “where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision[.]”). However, subject
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in the intervening years, and as this analysis is undertaken in support of the claim that the contemporary
system of courts-martial, as the institutionalization of the martial code, is more suitable to the defense of
law and civilization in the ongoing War on Terror than is the ICC, the court-martial of Private Ryan et al.
will observe the procedures and structure of contemporary court-martial proceedings.277 The

matter jurisdiction over allegations of violations of IHL by members of the Armed Forces, otherwise known as “war crimes
jurisdiction,” is slightly more complex. Although the doctrine of self-execution of treaties is beyond the scope of this Article, it
suffices to note that IHL instruments have been interpreted as non-self-executing agreements that require specific domestic
implementing legislation incorporating their provisions in domestic law as a further condition in order to create obligations
binding in U.S. courts, including courts-martial. See U.S. v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791, 797 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (holding the
Geneva Conventions and other IHL instruments to be non-self executing agreements that did not create a cause of action in U.S.
courts independent of domestic implementing legislation); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829) (incorporating the doctrine of
self-execution in U.S. law). Moreover, rather than attempt the complex task of codification and specific incorporation of IHL
Congress has chosen to incorporate by reference in the UCMJ, and consequently an analysis of evolving external sources is
required to determine jurisdiction over offenses and persons in a particular case. See UCMJ, supra note_, at Art. 18 (providing
that “courts-martial shall . . . have jurisdiction to try any person who by the law of war is subject to [the UCMJ] and may adjudge
any punishment permitted by the law of war.”); see also Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (holding that the incorporation of
IHL treaties and customary IHL by reference is a permissible exercise of Congressional Article I, §8, cl. 7 authority to “define
and punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations[.]”); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1946) (“[Congress] has
incorporated by reference . . . all offenses which are defined as such by the law of war, and which may constitutionally be
included within that jurisdiction.”). Accordingly, U.S. policy is to charge soldiers with violations of the UCMJ, rather than with
violations of IHL, and as such the court-martial proceeding is an adjudication under domestic, rather than international, law. See
FM 27-10, supra note_, at para 507 (“Violations of the law of war committed by persons subject to the law of the [U.S.] will
usually constitute violations of the [UCMJ], and, if so, will be prosecuted within the United States under that code[.]”);
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 307(c)(2) (explaining that “ordinarily persons subject to the
[UCMJ] should be charged with a specific violation of the [UCMJ] rather than a violation of the law of war.”); Levie, supra
note_, at 3 n.29 (stating that, strictly speaking, courts-martial apply U.S., and not international, law). The War Crimes Act of
1996, which provides that “grave breaches” of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 are punishable under federal law, theoretically
creates independent war crimes jurisdiction in Article III courts, and it provides that grave breaches of any of the Conventions are
punishable by jail or death. See War Crimes Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-92, 110- Stat. 2014 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §2441)
(1996) (stating that the U.S. incorporates into domestic law the “grave breaches” provisions of the Geneva Conventions as
prescribing punishable war crimes); see also William Jefferson Clinton, Statement on Signing the War Crimes Act of 1996, 2
Pub. Papers 1323 (Aug. 21, 1996) (stating that the War Crimes Act “provides the U.S. with clearer authority to prosecute
violations of the laws of war.”). However, in practice any alleged acts or omissions that would constitute grave breaches of the
Geneva and Hague Conventions are expressly outlawed only in the U.S. military manual and are charged and prosecuted under
relevant provisions of the UCMJ. See FM 27-10, ch.8, §1, para. 502 (prohibiting, as grave breaches, the “making use of poisoned
or otherwise forbidden arms or ammunition, treacherous request for quarter, maltreatment of dead bodies, firing on localities
which are undefended and without military significance, abuse of or firing on the flag of truce, misuse of the Red Cross emblem,
use of civilian clothing by troops to conceal their military character before battle, improper use of privileged buildings for
military purposes, poisoning of wells or streams, pillaging or purposeless destruction, compelling prisoners of war to perform
prohibited labor, killing without trial spies or other persons who have committed hostile acts, compelling civilians to perform
prohibited labor, violations of surrender terms.”); see also Robinson O. Everett, Did Military Justice Fail or Prevail? Son Thang:
An American War Crime, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1421, 1434 (1998) (stating that in practice the UCMJ is the only viable procedure
whereby to prosecute an accused service member and that to proceed under the War Crimes Act would still necessitate resort to
the UCMJ). The U.S. does take an expansive view of its treaty-based obligations withrespect to prosecuting violations of treaty based IHL, despite its disfavor for direct incorporation and its preference for implementing legislation. See FM 27-10 (“It is the
intent of the United States to follow the Geneva Conventions of 1949 regardless of whether or not the treaty is legally binding
upon or followed by the enemy nation.”). Nonetheless, breaches of customary IHL are not specifically addressed in any positive
source of military law, although Congress retains the authority to prescribe with respect to “offenses against the Law of Nations,”
and arguably has an international legal obligation to do so, although the manner in which it chooses to incorporate customary
IHL remains its prerogative. For an extended discussion of domestic jurisdiction over alleged violations of IHL, see Michael L.
Smidt, Yamashita, Medina, and Beyond: Command Responsibility in Contemporary Military Operations, 164 MIL. L. REV. 155
(2000). Because the corpus of IHL is in a constant state of flux, it is essential to distinguish the body of law applicable in 1944
from that applicable in 2003 to evaluate the extent to which Private Ryan et al. discharged their legal obligations with respect to
the UCMJ and its forebears, the manner in which the regime of courts-martial would address any delicts, and the contemporary
compatibility of this regime with the joint defense of law and civilization.
277
Prior to 2000, Private Ryan et al. would have been, by virtue of his discharge from the U.S. Army, immune from court-martial
for any transactions occurring in 1944, irrespective of the question of any applicable statutes of limitations, as under existing law
only active-duty personnel were subject to court-martial (see infra), and discharged members of the Armed Forces could not be
recalled involuntarily to active duty unless they were entitled to receive retired pay, which is generally paid only to those who
have served more than twenty years on active duty. See Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 15 (1955) (holding that Congress lacked
the power to subject civilians who had “severed all relationship with the military,” regardless of prior military status or the nature
of the crime, to trial by court-martial under existing federal law; Willenbring v. Neurater, 48 M.J. 152 (C.A.A.F. 1998)
(upholding Toth); BISHOP, supra note_, at 63, 292 (discussing long-standing opposition with the Department of the Army to
proposed amendments to this jurisdictional gap to permit court-martial of honorably discharged service personnel). Moreover,
despite a 1968 General Assembly resolution declaring statutes of limitations inapplicable with respect to war crimes, the U.S.,
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contraposition of the likely results of a court-martial wherein current substantive laws governing parole
and reprisal are applied offers evidence in further support of this claim.
a) U.S. v. Private Ryan et al., July 1944
On July 5th, 1944, following an Article 32 investigation278 sparked by a New York Times article
under the byline of a reporter who had accompanied the 101st Airborne Division into Normandy and
described in detail the Battle of Ramelle, including the shooting of the German POW “in cold blood,” the
commanding general of the 75th Ranger Regiment, Major General Lucian Truscott, reluctantly ordered the
courts-martial of Private Ryan, PFC Reiben, and T/5 Upham.279 T/5 Upham was charged with a violation
of Article 118 of the UCMJ, “Murder,” for shooting the German machinegunner whom he had taken
prisoner in Ramelle.280 PFC Reiben was not charged with a violation of Article 118 for denying quarter to
surrendering Germans on the bluffs overlooking Omaha Beach as the prosecution determined that there
was not sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction;281 however, Reiben was charged with a violation of

while it has expressed support for expansive jurisdiction over war crimes in theory, has never recognized any obligations under
international law with respect to the waiver of otherwise applicable statutes of limitations or other impediments to jurisdiction in
cases such as that of Private Ryan et al., nor are commentators inclined to suggest that such non-applicability has ripened into
customary international law. See Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity of 1968, Nov. 26, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73, U.N. GA Res. 2391 (prohibiting applicability of any statute of
limitations for grave breaches enumerated in the Geneva Conventions of 1949) (signed by only 41 states but not by the U.S.); see
also Scott R. Morris, Killing Egyptian Prisoners of War: Does the Phrase ‘Lest We Forget’ Apply to Israeli War Criminals?, 29
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 903, 910-20 (1996) (disputing claims that the non-applicability of statutes of limitations for war
crimes or crimes against humanity is part of CIL). For a thorough discussion, see Robert H. Miller, The Convention on the NonApplicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, 65 AM. J. INT’L L. 476 (1971).
However, a transnational trend in favor of waiving statutes of limitations with respect to war crimes garnered judicial
and Congressional notice. See, e.g., Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1430 (C. D. Cal. 1985) (noting that the U.S.
officially favored the Non-Applicability Convention even if it had not signed the instrument). Over Army objections, with the
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act [“MEJA”] Congress expanded the scope of federal criminal jurisdiction over war crimes
to include civilian personnel as well as discharged former military personnel, although the latter category of defendants is still
entitled to court-martial as opposed to an Article III court, and waive the constructive statute of limitation imposed by way of the
th
more limited personal jurisdiction predating the Act. See MEJA, P.L. 106-523, 106 Cong., 2d Sess., codified at 18 U.S.C.
§3261(a) (creating jurisdiction in Article III courts over civilian personnel alleged to have committed war crimes while
accompanying the U.S. Armed Forces overseas); id. at (c) (providing that such jurisdiction is complementary to courts-martial);
id. at (d) (expanding personal jurisdiction of courts-martial to include discharged military personnel accused of having committed
prosecutable offenses while members of the Armed Forces but not previously tried by court-martial or by a foreign government).
Although if MEJA were invoked as the basis for jurisdiction Private Ryan et al. might have defenses on constitutional as well as
common-law grounds were they to assert that they are not members of the “land or naval forces, or in the Militia[,]” neither
question need be reached here. See U.S. CONST., Vth Amend. (providing that “[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital,
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger.”); see also U.S. v. McDonagh, 14 M.J. 415, 419
(C.M.A. 1983) (holding that retroactive application of a criminal statute by courts-martial violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, as
does retroactive application of a judicial construction of a statute) (citing U.S. Const., Vth Amend.). Similarly, any evidentiary or
ethical problems triggered by the trial of “’old men’ for crimes committed [sixty years] ago” is beyond the scope of this Article.
H. McCoubrey, The Concept and Treatment of War Crimes, 1 J. ARMED CONFL. L. 121, 133 (1996) (discussing ethical and
evidentiary issues associated with long-delayed war crimes prosecutions).
278
See MCM, supra note_, at Rule 405 (governing procedural rules in Article 32 investigations).
279
A general court-martial can be convened only by the President, the secretary of a military service, or a senior commanding
officer. UCMJ, supra note_, at Art. 26. To protect the substantive rights of the accused, the convening authority cannot also be
the accuser. Id. at Art. 22(b). Forthis reason, each convening authority is advised by an experienced attorney. Id. at Art. 34.
280
Article 118 of the UCMJ provides in pertinent part that “Any person subject to this chapter who, without justification or
excuse, unlawfully kills a human being, when he . . . has a premeditated design to kill; . . . intends to kill or inflict great bodily
harm; . . . [or] is engaged in an act that is inherently dangerous to another and evinces a wanton disregard of human life . . . shall
suffer death or imprisonment for life as a court-martial may direct.” UCMJ, supra note_, at Art. 118. Lesser included offenses
under Article 118 include (in)voluntary manslaughter, negligent homicide, and assault with intent to commit murder or
manslaughter. Id. Article 119 of the UCMJ, “Manslaughter,” provides that conviction can occur where “(b) Any person subject
to this chapter who, without an intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, unlawfully kills a human being—(1) by culpable
negligence; or (2) while perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate an offense, other than those . . . in [Article 118], directly
affecting the person; is guilty of involuntary manslaughter and shall be punished as a court-martial shall direct.”).
281
All of the potential prosecution witness to the events that might have led to an Article 118 prosecution of PFC Reiben—U.S.
soldiers who made the Omaha landings and the German soldiers who contested them—were dead as of July 1944. Had there
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Article 128, “Assault,” for his physical abuse of the German machinegunner subsequent to capture, and of
Article 134, “Misprision of Serious Offense,” for concealing the commission of violations by Private
Ryan and T/5 Upham.282 Private Ryan was charged with a violation of Article 134 for concealing the
283

commission of violations by T/5 Upham. The defendants were arrested and confined in late June 1944,

informed of the charges,284 advised of their rights, and appointed defense counsel.285 At arraignment286 the
defendants each entered a plea of not guilty.287 Shortly after the arraignment, Private Ryan refused a grant
of immunity to testify against T/5 Upham.288
The trial judge denied defendants’ motions to dismiss on the ground that the specifications failed
to state offenses,289 and after other preliminary matters, including the pretrial orientation of the members
of the court conducted by General Truscott,290 the common trial commenced291 before a panel of five
292

members, two of whom were enlisted soldiers.

As all defendants stipulated to the facts as presented in

293

the specification of charges, the prosecution was relieved of the potential embarrassment of having to
call as witnesses enemy POWs. However, each defendant offered a series of affirmative defenses294 to the
charges and submitted a witness list that included experts to testify in support of these defenses.295 All
defendants offered the defense of ignorance or mistake of fact as to the criminality of the offenses with
been an available eyewitness, the prosecution had been determined to charge PFC Reiben as well with a violation of Article 118,
Murder, for denying quarter to the German defenders on OMAHA BEACH.
282
See UCMJ, supra note_, at Art. 134, para. 95 (providing for punishment at discretion of a court-martial for wrongful
concealment of the commission of a serious offense by another that is prejudicial to the good order and discipline of the Armed
Forces). Failure to report the commission of a violation of the “law of war” is a violation of Department of the Army regulations.
See DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 350-4, TRAINING IN UNITS, ch. 14 (19 Mar. 1993) (requiring, inter alia, that “[s]oldiers report
all violations of the law of war to their superiors.”).
283
See MCM, supra note_, at Rule 305 (providing for pretrial confinement of the accused).
284
See id. at Rules 308, 602 (providing for notification to the accused of charges against him).
285
See generally WILLIS E. SCHUNG (ED.), UNITED STATES LAW AND THE ARMED FORCES: CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, COURTS-MARTIAL, AND THE RIGHTS OF SERVICEMEN (1972)
(detailing the extensive procedural protections of the accused in court-martial proceedings); see also U.S. v. Tempia, 16
U.S.C.M.A. 629, 633 (1967) (stating in dictum that many of the Bill of Rights are applicable to defendants in courts-martial
proceedings). Among other aspects of the due process accorded the accused in a court-martial is the entitlement to civilian
counsel. MCM, supra note_, at Rule 506. U.S. courts-martial provide more extensive safeguards to defendants than the civil
legal systems of the vast majority of states, and greater protections than those afforded at international tribunals. See Martins,
supra note_, at 673-74 (discussing safeguards afforded defendants in courts-martial and comparing these with other fora).
286
See MCM, supra note_, at Rule 904 (governing arraignment).
287
See id. at Rule 910 (listing possible pleas and providing for procedural safeguards).
288
See id. at Rule 704 (governing grants of immunity). Where the ability of the U.S. to obtain a conviction is uncertain, it is not
uncommon for the government to offer a grant of immunity in exchange for testimony, although the perception that in so doing
the U.S. permits wrongdoing to go unpunished is particularly acute in cases of war crimes. For a recent discussion of the
political and legal issues attendant to the question of a grant of immunity in courts-martial adjudicating allegations of war crimes,
see Booth, supra note_, at 952.
289
See MCM, supra note_, at Rule 907 (providing procedures for a motion to dismiss on grounds of a lack of jurisdiction over the
person or the offense or that the specification does not state an offense).
290
The Manual for Courts-Martial was amended in 1969 to reduce the influence of the convening authority upon the court and
enhance the perceptions of its impartiality, although some suggest that the practice of pretrial orientation of the court for the
purpose of influencing its decisionmaking continues. See SHERRILL, supra note_, at 77.
291
See MCM, supra note_, at Rule 812 (providing for joint and common trials of defendants and stating that “each accused shall
be accorded the rights and privileges as if tried separately.”).
292
The Sixth Amendment right to trial by a jury of peers is inapplicable to courts-martial. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 39- 45
(1942); see also United States v. Loving, 41 MJ 213, 285, 287 (1994), aff'd on other grounds, 517 U.S. 748 (1996); United States
v. Curtis, 32 MJ 252, 267 (CMA 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 952 (1991). Accused servicemembers are instead tried at general
court-martial by a panel of at least five service members who are chosen by the commander who convenes the court-martial on a
"best qualified" basis. See Art. 25(d)(2), UCMJ, 10 USC 825(d)(2); United States v. Tulloch, 47 MJ 283, 285 (1997). In the
event an enlisted soldier so elects, a minimum of 1/3 of the jury must be enlisted personnel. MCM, supra note_, at Rule 805.
293
Id. at Rule 811 (providing that parties may stipulate to any fact, written statement, or testimony of a witness).
294
See id. at Rule 916 (describing a defense as an admission of the commission of the objective acts constituting the offense
charged but denying criminal responsibility); id. at (c)-(k) (listing available affirmative defenses, including justification,
obedience to orders, self-defense, accident, entrapment, coercion, inability, ignorance, and lack of mental responsibility).
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which they were charged, while T/5 Upham and PFC Reiben offered the defenses of justification,
obedience to orders, and lack of mental responsibility. The prosecution, relying on the stipulation of the
defendants as to the facts that Upham had killed the German POW in the presence of the other two
defendants, that PFC Reiben had physically abused the German POW, and that neither PFC Reiben nor
Private Ryan had reported the events leading to the charges against other defendants that they had
witnessed, presented a brief and direct case-in-chief to prove the unlawfulness of defendants’ actions.
With respect to T/5 Upham, the prosecution introduced into evidence relevant provisions of the
Rules of Land Warfare (1940),297 the Geneva Conventions of 1929,298 and the Hague Convention of
1907299 to establish that the denial of quarter, and the execution of POWs, were categorical violations of
IHL as it existed at the time of the alleged offenses for which defenses were unavailable as a matter of
law.300 Even if, arguendo, military necessity could ever justify the extrajudicial killing of POWs,301 the
prosecution further argued, it was a defense unavailable to Upham, who could have availed himself of
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See id. at Rule 703 (governing the employment of expert witnesses).
See id. at Rule 916(j) (providing that “it is a defense to an offense that the accused held, as a result of ignorance or mistake, an
incorrect belief of the true circumstances such that, if the circumstances were as the accused believed them, the accused would
not be guilty of the offense.”).
297
RULES OF LAND WARFARE 1940, supra note_, at para. 33 (restating para. 182 of the Rules of Land Warfare, 1914, to the
effect that surrendering enemy personnel are generally entitled to quarter).
298
See Geneva Conventions of 1929, supra note_, at Art. 2 (stating that POWs “shall at all times be humanely treated and
protected, particularly against acts of violence” and “[m]easures of reprisal against them are forbidden.”).
299
See Hague Convention of 1907, supra note_, at Art. 23(c) (“It is especially forbidden . . . (c) to kill or wound an enemy who,
having laid down his arms, or having no longer means of defence, has surrendered at discretion[.]”).
300
The argument that the denial of quarter and the extrajudicial killing of POWs is absolutely prohibited was made before the
International Military Tribunals at Nuremburg and Tokyo and before other U.S. military tribunals and commissions adjudicating
the guilt of Nazi and Japanese defendants charged with the denial of quarter and the killing of U.S. POWs in the period from
1944-1951. See, e.g., Nuremburg Judgment, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression: Opinion and Judgment 57 et seq., I WAR
CRIMES REP. (1947) (refusing to consider defenses and sentencing the authors and executors of the Kommand Befehl and the
execution of Allied POWs to death); The Jaluit Atoll Case, 1 WAR CRIMES REP. 71 (1945) (sentencing the commander of
Japanese naval forces who executed U.S. POWs to death for violation of Article 23(c) of the Hague Convention of 1907 and Art.
2 of Geneva Convention of 1929); The Essen Lynching Case, 1 WAR CRIMES REP. 88 (1945) (sentencing German officer to
death for permitting a crowd to kill 3 British POWs); The Dostler Case, U.S. Mil. Comm’n, Rome, Italy, Oct. 12, 1945, at I LAW
th
REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 22 (1945) (convicting commander of the German 75 Army Corps, General Anton Dostler, for
ordering summary execution of fifteen uniformed U.S. POWs captured while on a mission to demolish a railway tunnel between
La Spezia and Genoa); Abbaye Ardenne Case, 4 WAR CRIMES REP. 97 (1945) (condemning commander of a Nazi SS
Regiment for counseling his men to deny quarter to Allied troops); Trial of Gunther Thiele and Georg Steinert, (United States
Mil. Comm’n, Augsberg, Germany, June 13, 1945), II LAW REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 56-57 (1948) (convicting two members
of a German unit for denial of quarter to a wounded U.S. officer); Trial of Amberger, 1 WAR CRIMES REP. 81 (1946) (same);
“Trial of Bury and Hafner,” 3 WAR CRIMES REP. 62 (1945); “Trial of Schosser,” 3 WAR CRIMES REP. 65 (1945) (same);
“Trial of Rauer,” 4 WAR CRIMES REP. 113 (1946) (same); The Hostage Case, II WAR CRIMES REP. 1230 (1948) (rejecting
applicability of defenses and convicting principals and accessories of, inter alia, denial of quarter to Allied POWs).
301
To permit necessity to trump the “accepted usages of civilized nations” would, in the words of the IMT, “eliminate all
humanity . . . and decency from the conduct of war.” High Command Case, 11 WAR CRIMES REP. 462, 541 (1950); see also
Einsatzgruppen Case, IV TRIALS WAR CRIM. 1317 (holding that recognition of an expansive view of military necessity urged
by the defense would cause “the rules of war . . . [to] quickly disappear.”). Unless incorporated into the positive law, the defense
of military necessity to a violation of the customs of war was, according to the U.S. at the time of the post-World War II war
crimes trials, absolutely unavailable. See Justice Case, 3 TRIALS WAR CRIM. 954, 1127 (1947) (holding that military necessity
may serve as a defense only where expressly incorporated into specific provisions of IHL). The very specific question of
whether military necessity could every justify derogation from the martial code, to include proscription against the denial of
quarter or execution of POWs, was reached by U.S. and international military tribunals in several post-World War II trials and
answered invariably in the negative. See, e.g., Trial of Baba Masao, 11 WAR CRIMES REP. 56 (1947) (rejecting defense of
military necessity to the charge of denial of quarter despite evidence that an Allied landing was anticipated, and did in fact occur,
in the area of operations from whence U.S. POWs were forcibly removed and killed); The Peleus, supra note_ (convicting a
German submarine commander of denial of quarter to the survivors of a sunken ship despite evidence that Allied air surveillance
might otherwise have spotted the survivors and led to the detection and destruction of his submarine). The case of Thiele and
Steinert is even more squarely on point with respect to the position of the prosecutor in U.S. v. Ryan et al.: members of a small
German unit surrounded by numerically superior U.S. troops who killed a U.S. POW to avoid detection and probable death were
convicted of denial of quarter under the Hague and Geneva Conventions by a court-martial that rejected military necessity as
absolutely unavailable. 3 WAR CRIMES REP. 56 (1948).
47
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alternative, non-lethal methods of preventing the harms that Upham asserted the execution of the POW
had been undertaken to prevent. Specifically, Upham might have bound or otherwise secured the POW,
disabled him in some fashion, or simply released all the POWs unharmed.302 The prosecution called the
eminent scholar Hersch Lauterpacht, who testified that under IHL as it existed at the time of the alleged
303

offense, defenses to the denial of quarter were categorically unavailable.

A second prosecution

expert—a former British infantry officer now a law professor at Oxford—testified that the defense of
military necessity was applicable only to acts undertaken under circumstances where compliance with the
law was a “genuine material impossibility,”304 and that Upham either could have complied with the
obligation to grant quarter or else was obligated to release surrendering German troops on parole.
In regard to the proffered defense of superior orders, the prosecutor argued against its
applicability with respect to war crimes and contended that, even if it applied, not only was the killing of
enemy POWs not within the scope of the orders given to Upham305 but that even if such an action could
have been reasonably construed otherwise, whether as a reprisal or on other grounds, it was an illegal
order306 that Upham knew or should have known was illegal307 and thus he was duty-bound, as a matter of
308
309
transnational military custom as well as U.S. military regulations, to disobey. To the defense of a lack

302

See OSIEL, supra note_, at 132-33 (suggesting that the question of liability for denial of quarter turns on whether non -lethal
alternatives, such as the disabling of the POWs by bindings, were reasonably available).
303
th
See 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW , 183-84 (6 ed. H. Lauterpacht 1943) (categorically rejecting any defenses
to the charge of denial of quarter).
304
See McCoubrey, supra note_, at 135 (suggesting that in the situation where a submarine commander is unable to carry out
search-and-rescue operations on behalf of the survivors of a torpedoed vessel, due to his vulnerability to detection while on the
surface, he may avail himself of the defense of military necessity to the charge of denial of quarter as compliance with the
obligation to rescue would constitute a “genuine material impossibility”)
305
Captain Miller issued verbal, and not written, orders to the rescue squad, and the defense stipulated to the fact that the orders
did not specifically authorize the killing of enemy POWs or any derogations from the laws of war.
306
The prosecutor read Article 2 of the Geneva Convention of 1929, providing that POWs are “in the power of the hostile
Government, but not of the individuals or formation which captured them[,]” and forbidding “[m]easures of reprisal against
them[,]” into the record to establish the categorical illegality of reprisals under IHL and that Upham could not characterize his
actions to have been a legal reprisal against the German POW.
307
See MCM, supra note_, at Rule 916(d) (providing that if a defendant knows an order to be illegal, or a “person of ordinary
sense and understanding would have known the orders to be unlawful[,]” he is obligated to disobey).
308
The post-World War II jurisprudence of the Nuremburg and Tokyo tribunals authoritatively established the position of the
Allies that, notwithstanding any contrary domestic practice, a “[s]oldier is bound to obey only the lawful orders of his superiors”
and thus “[i]f he receives an order to do an unlawful act, he is bound neither by his duty nor by his oath to do it.” Jaluit Atoll
Case, supra note_, at 5 (citing U.S. v. Carr, 25 F. Cas. 306, 307-08 (1872)); see also Dostler Case, supra note_ (rejecting a
superior orders defense to the charge of denial of quarter on the ground that such a defense was unavailable under IHL and that
the accused had a duty to disobey the unlawful order); Hostage Case, supra note_, at (rejecting the availability of a superior
orders defense as the “rule that a superior order is not a defense to a criminal act is a rule of fundamental justice that has been
adopted by civilized nations extensively” and only lawful orders are entitled to obedience). Moreover, the formal rules of
procedure and evidence promulgated by the Allies to govern prosecution of German and Japanese war crimes cases utterly
proscribed application of the superior orders defense. See Supreme Command of the Allied Powers, Rules Promulgated for War
Crimes Cases (1945), at 16(f) (“The official position of the accused shall not absolve hum from responsibility, nor be considered
in mitigation of punishment. Further, action pursuant to order of the accused’s superior, or of his government, shall not constitute
a defence but may be considered in mitigation of punishment[.]” (cited in Albert Lyman, A Reviewer Reviews the Yokohama War
Crimes Trials, 17 J. B. ASS’N. D. C. 267, 274 (1950)).
309
th
nd
See, e.g., Court-Martial of General Jacob H. Smith, Manila, Philippines, April, 1902, S. Doc. 213, 57 Cong, 2 Sess., 5-17
(1902) (convicting commander of U.S. expeditionary force in the Philippines, Brigadier General Smith, of a violation of good
conduct and discipline for issuing orders in violation of Article 60 of the Lieber Code that suggested it would be permissible to
deny quarter); see also JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, v. VII 187 (1906) (discussing the
Smith court-martial and the issue of unlawful orders). A mere eight months before the courts-martial of Private Ryan et al., the
section of the Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, concerning the defense of superior orders was rewritten to relegate it from the status
of a complete defense to a qualified defense inapplicable to the denial of quarter. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, RULES OF LAND
WARFARE (1944), at para. 345.1, “Liability of Offending Individuals.” (providing that “the fact that [offenses against the “laws
and customs of war”] were done pursuant to order of a superior or government sanction may be taken into consideration in
determining culpability, either by way of defense or in mitigation of punishment.”). The purpose of the 1944 revision, made at
the order of General George C. Marshall—the source of the orders to rescue Private Ryan—was to harmonize regulations
48
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of mental responsibility, the prosecutor argued that, even conceding that he was profoundly enraged by
the perfidy of the German POW and the death of Captain Miller, T/5 Upham retained sufficient mental
responsibility that, in conjunction with the presumption of mental responsibility that attaches to every
soldier, he was disqualified from offering this defense.311 Finally, the prosecution attempted to prove that,
by virtue of the extensive U.S. Army regulations governing the laws of land warfare and the manifest
illegality of his actions, T/5 Upham either knew or should have known that killing an enemy POW
rendered hors de combat was categorically illegal. Experts—military psychiatrists and professors of
military law—testified for the prosecution with respect to all aforementioned defenses.
In the case against PFC Reiben, charged with assault in violation of Article 128 and misprision of
a serious offense in violation of Article 134 for concealing the commission of violations of the UCMJ by
Private Ryan and T/5 Upham, the prosecution presented its case first as to the assault charge, attacking
the defenses of justification based on military necessity, obedience to orders, and lack of mental
responsibility on grounds virtually identical to those in the case against Upham. The prosecution
contended that no exigent circumstances required PFC Reiben to cause bodily harm to the German
POW312 subsequent to his capture, as there was no imminent threat from other enemy forces and U.S.
troops outnumbered the sole surviving German, who offered no physical resistance. The prosecution
further argued that neither PFC Reiben nor any other member of the rescue squad had received orders
instructing or otherwise urging them to mistreat enemy POWs, and that notwithstanding the influence of
the emotions associated with the death of T/5 Wade, PFC Reiben presumptively retained sufficient
responsibility for his actions that he could not assert the defense of lack of mental responsibility as a
matter of law. With respect to the misprision charge, the prosecutor supplemented the stipulation, in
which PFC Reiben stated that he had observed T/5 Upham shoot the German POW but had not
subsequently reported the shooting, with evidence that PFC Reiben either knew or should have known
that Upham’s actions were criminal, that PFC Reiben had the opportunity, but did not elect, to report, and
that under U.S. military regulations the denial of quarter is a serious offense.313 The prosecution made
effectively an identical case against Private Ryan on the misprision charge and then rested.314
Following a brief recess, the defendants’ joint motion for a finding of not guilty was denied,315
and the defendants presented their case. T/5 Upham testified that he was justified in shooting the German
POW on the ground of military necessity. According to Upham, his squad had been virtually eliminated
by enemy action, and with only three remaining soldiers it was impossible to accept the surrender of all
six German POWs without compromising his mission: the safe evacuation of Private Ryan from the

governing the conduct of U.S. Armed Forces with those the Allies had proposed would govern the prosecution of German and
Japanese soldiers who, it was anticipated, would claim to have been following superior orders. WELLS, supra note_, at 10.
310
See MCM, supra note_, at Rule 916(k) (providing that it is an affirmative defense if at the time of an offense an accused was
“unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his . . . acts” by virtue of a “severe mental disease or defect”).
311
See id. at Rule 916(k)(2) (providing that a “mental condition not amounting to a lack of mental responsibility . . . is not a
defense[.]”); id. at (3)(A) (providing that an accused is “presumed to have been mentally responsible[.]”).
312
See id. at Art. 128(b)(1) (providing that the elements for assault are the attempt to cause physical harm to another through the
use of unlawful force or violence).
313
See supra at note_.
314
See MCM, supra note_, at Rule 913 (governing presentation of the merits).
315
See id. at Rule 917 (governing motions for a finding of not guilty after presentation of the U.S. case-in-chief).
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theater of operations. Had he granted quarter, the three survivors would have at the very least been
greatly encumbered in their movements; at worst, the six enemy POWs, along with other German forces
known to be concentrated along the planned avenue of evacuation and preparing for counterattack against
the Normandy beachhead, might well have overwhelmed their captors316 and defeated a mission assigned
strategic significance by the Army Chief of Staff. Upham further testified that in shooting the German
POW he had acted consistently with lawful mission and standing orders317 requiring him to evacuate
Private Ryan at all costs in the face of a uncertain enemy threat all along his planned axis of maneuver
and that to have accepted the additional encumbrance of POWs and threat this would have entailed would
have been in contravention of his orders as he understood them.318 Further, Upham testified that he lacked
mental responsibility for killing the German POW as a consequence of extreme “battle fatigue”319 coupled
320

with uncontrollable outrage over the death of his commander at the hand of a perfidious parole violator
on whose behalf he had, days earlier, urged his unwilling comrades to grant parole. Finally, Upham

testified that he believed it was legally permissible to shoot an enemy POW for parole violation without
resort to judicial process, particularly under the circumstances outlined in his earlier testimony.
Following the testimony of T/5 Upham, PFC Reiben and Private Ryan corroborated prior
testimony as to their objective and subjective understandings of the enemy threat and of the importance
attached to their mission by the General Staff of the U.S. Army. PFC Reiben testified further that he had
not believed it possible to accept the surrender of the German POW due to concerns over the likelihood of
imminent contact with a numerically superior enemy force, that he had believed it necessary to use a
moderate degree of force to establish physical control over the POW, and that he had believed, insofar as
he knew and understood applicable law, that Upham had been justified, by necessity and by reference to
squad orders, in killing the POW and that based upon his military training he did not believe that he,
Upham, or Private Ryan had violated any laws in failing to report the circumstances of the death of the
POW through the chain of command. Private Ryan reiterated the testimony of PFC Reiben, denying that

316

Although the U.S. Theater Provost Marshal was prepared to process, in the first few days after D
- Day, as many as 50,000
German POWs in accordance, as far as possible, with the requirements of the Geneva Conventions of 1929, Allied military
planners were very concerned that once Allied forces extended the beachhead inland the ratio of enemy POWs to capturing
Allied troops would threaten not only their capacity to comply with legal obligations but also their physical security. See
AMRBOSE, supra note_, at (noting that by 20 June 1944, German POWs outnumbered their captors by a ratio of 150:1).
317
See www.army.benning.mil (Rogers’ Rangers) (listing the standing orders under which U.S. Army Rangers have served for
more than two centuries and which supplement their general and mission orders to the present).
318
See OSIEL, supra note_, at 128 (stating that fact-finders in courts-martial have traditionally undertaken an analysis of
defendants’ understandings of the lawfulness of their orders and whether such understandings were reasonable under the
particular circumstances of each case). Courts-martial have traditionally been instructed to consider whether an accused might
reasonably have mistaken his conduct as lawful on the ground that he reasonably believed that he was acting pursuant to the
orders of his superior. Id. (citing U.S. v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19 (1968)).
319
“Battle fatigue” is a historically-dated term for what is now described as post-traumatic stress disorder [“PTSD”], a mental
condition characterized by and caused by shock, trauma. See AM. PSYCH. ASSOC., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL IV (rev.), at 309.81 (describing PTSD as the development of characteristic symptoms of fear, helplessness, persistent
re-experiencing of the event, numbing of general responsiveness, and increased arousal “following exposure to an extreme
traumatic stressor involving direct personal experience of an event that involves actual or threatened death or serious injury, or
other threat to one's physical integrity; or witnessing an event that involves death, injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of
another person). Sustained exposure to combat can induce or exacerbate PTSD and warp the normal moral calculus of soldiers.
See ERIC T. DEAN, JR., SHOOK OVER HELL: POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS, VIETNAM, AND THE CIVIL WAR 1997);
Dennis Grant, Psychological Damage of Combat, 148 AM. J. PSYCH. 271 (1991).
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See supra at note_. The defense argued in effect that the violation of parole on the part of the deceased German POW was the
proximate cause not only of the death of Captain Miller but of the reaction of T/5 Upham.
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in the course of his military training he had ever been instructed that failure to report an offense was a
violation of Army regulations.
After a recess, a series of expert witnesses testified for the defense, beginning with the defense of
military necessity. The first two, retired former colonels in the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General Corps
and now law professors, testified that the U.S. Army Rules of Land Warfare expressly sanctioned the
denial of quarter under limited circumstances, including self-preservation and the preservation of the
military mission.321 These experts further testified that, although the denial of quarter was normally a
manifestly illegal act not justifiable by military necessity or superior orders, it could, under certain
circumstances, be excused where a small unit, operating behind enemy lines in a high-threat environment,
could not accept prisoners as to do so would necessitate abandoning the mission or disclosing it to the
enemy.322 The third, a former British military lawyer, did not share the opinion that the refusal to grant
quarter could be justified; however, he stated that in circumstances such as those faced by the defendants
the denial of quarter was “understandable” and excusable. Although all three experts conceded on crossexamination that an order to withhold from enemy POWs the legal protections afforded by relevant IHL
treaties would be an illegal order not entitled to obedience, and that obedience would support the charge
of murder,323 each expert insisted that military necessity had always been available, and continued to be
available, as a defense to a charge of murder arising from the denial of quarter in exceptional
circumstances,324 and that to refuse to permit “individuals confronting calamities” to act in the interest of
self-preservation would “only succeed in bringing the law [of war] into disrepute.”325
With respect to the defense of superior orders, defense experts testified that, whether deliberately
or indeliberately, illegal orders are frequently issued326 to subordinates who are nevertheless obligated to
comply327 and that U.S. Army regulations,328 as well as the Charter of the Nuremburg Tribunal,329 explicitly
provided that even if an order to deny quarter would necessarily be illegal, the very existence of that order
321

See Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, supra note_, at para. 85 (providing that a commander may deny quarter on the ground it is
necessary in the interest of self-preservation or that caring for enemy POWs interferes with his mission).
322
See WHEATON, supra note_, at 210-11 (stating that military necessity, though often a “fictitious and ubiquitous” claim,
excuses the denial of quarter when the likelihood of victory or the rapidity or secrecy of movement would be greatly
compromised otherwise); see also SPAIGHT, supra note_, at 91 (stating that quarter may be denied where the numerical strength
of the prospective POWs exceeds the strength of the prospective captors and thus would threaten their safety). Neither of these
authors served in the U.S. Army JAG Corps; however, the substance of their publications is substantially the same as the
testimony which experts with practical and academic backgrounds in operational law—the sort of witnesses the defense would
call—would have been likely to offer, and thus it is presented as if it were offered by former JAG officers now in legal academia.
323
BARKER, supra note_, at 27-28,
324
See supra at notes_ . The jurisprudence of the IMT supported the defense expert testimony that the defense of military
necessity was to be counted as among the survivors, rather than the victims, of World War II. See, e.g., Flick Case, VI TRIALS
WAR CRIM. 1187, 1192, 1201, 1206 (1952) (stating that it might be “reproached for wreaking vengeance rather than
administering justice if it were to declare as unavailable to defendants the defense of necessity,” a principle with “wide
acceptance in American and English courts and . . . recognized elsewhere”).
325
See Lippman, supra note_, at 110.
326
OSIEL, supra note_, at 157.
327
A defense expert cited the case of General Karl Stenger, a German commander charged with issuing orders directing
subordinates to deny quarter and to kill all POWs in their custody but acquitted, despite substantial inculpatory evidence, on the
supposition that “no Prussian general officer would have issued such an order[.]” (cited in CLAUDE MULLINS, THE LEIPZIG
TRIALS 151 (1921). Although his subordinates were nevertheless convicted of having denied quarter (ostensibly on their own
initiative), the charge, and the penalties, were mitigated by virtue of the suspicion they had been ordered to deny quarter. George
G. Battle, The Trials Before the Leipsic Supreme Court of Germans Accused of War Crimes, 8 VA. L. REV. 1 (1921).
328
See Rules of Land Warfare 1940, supra note_, at paras. 345, 347 (providing that U.S. Army personnel will not be punished for
war crimes ordered by their superiors).
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was, depending upon the factual circumstances, either a defense or a mitigating factor. These witnesses
further testified that soldiers could be lawfully ordered to undertake acts that would otherwise amount to
war crimes but for the fact that the purpose of the ordered acts was in reprisal for prior violation(s) of the
laws and customs of war by the enemy;330 that soldiers were duty-bound to execute these orders; and that
reprisal against a parole violator could reasonably and in good faith have been considered to be within the
scope of the orders issued to the rescue squad to which Upham had been assigned.331 On the question of
the lack of mental responsibility, a psychiatrist testified that combat soldiers are exposed to sleep
deprivation, poor nutrition, and emotional and physical trauma that conspire to warp normal moral
judgments and render the application of formal legal rules by those who to whom such experiences are
foreign a “morally questionable exercise.”332 According to this witness, where battlefield failure, and even
personal destruction, are introduced into this decisional climate, the likelihood that soldiers’ conduct will
depart from the positive law increases by orders of magnitude333 in proportion to the intensity of the
combat.334 In his opinion, considering that the defendant had immediately prior to his execution of the
parole violator witnessed the latter kill his commander, T/5 Upham was suffering from an extreme case of
battle fatigue that had destroyed his capacity to judge the moral and legal consequences of his acts.335 A
military historian testified further to the effect that the defense of lack of mental capacity, predicated upon
battle fatigue, had long been available to soldiers accused of exacting revenge upon enemy soldiers and
units for depredations against their own units.336
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See Nuremburg Charter, supra note_, at Art. 8 (“The fact that the defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a
superior . . . may be considered in mitigation of punishment[.]”).
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See II OPPENHEIM, supra note_, at 453.
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This precise question was presented in the Dostler Case, during which General Dostler offered the defense of superior orders to
the charge of denial of quarter to U.S. POWs. See Dostler Case, I TRIALS WAR CRIM., supra note_, at 2. The accused
contended that the Hitler’s Kommando Befehl, ordering the denial of quarter to Allied commandos, was legal inasmuch as it was
undertaken in reprisal for Allied denials of quarter and as such left no alternative but to obey. Id. at 28. However, the military
commission hearing the case convicted the defendant without providing any legal reasoning to support its rejection of the
superior orders defense or the argument that the Kommando Befehl rendered the shooting of the U.S. POWs a legitimate reprisal.
See KALSHOVEN, supra note_, at 192-301 (discussing the intersection of the superior orders defense with reprisals).
332
Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Mark S. Martins, Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, XVIIIth Corps (Airborne), Oct. 2, 2000.
333
The destruction that omnipresence of threats to physical survival can wreak upon the moral frame of reference through which
soldiers view the world is almost beyond the capacity of those who have not experienced combat to comprehend:
For the common soldier, at least, war has the feel, the spiritual texture, of a great ghostly fog, thick and
permanent. There is no clarity. Everything swirls. The old rules are no longer binding, the old truths no
longer true. Right spills over into wrong. Order blends into chaos, love into hate, ugliness into beauty, law
into anarchy, civility into savagery. The vapor sucks you in. You can’t tell where you are, or why you’re
there, and the only certainty is overwhelming ambiguity[.]
TIM O’BRIEN, THE THINGS THEY CARRIED 88 (1990).
334
See Smidt, supra note_, at 155 (correlating the displacement of the moral compass of soldiers off its normal bearing with the
increase in combat intensity and associated spike in destruction and death).
335
See Everett, supra note_, at 1429 (outlining, from the point of view of a JAG lawyer and a military judge, the standard
arguments in support of a defense of lack of mental capacity to a charge of a war crime).
336
The phenomenon whereby soldiers are unable to restrain themselves from exacting revenge when capturing enemy forces that
shortly before were killing their comrades is well-documented, and although the defense of lack of mental responsibility resulting
from the emotional trauma of such circumstances has not uniformly led to the acquittal of soldiers charged with denial of quarter,
it has been treated by courts-martial as an admissible defense and as an extenuating and mitigating factor. See Drew L. Kershen,
A Symposium on Film and the Law: Breaker Morant, 22 OK. CITY U. L. REV. 107 (discussing the admission and adjudication
of the defense of a lack of mental responsibility in the 1900 court-martial of British soldiers for denial of quarter to Boer POWs
captured wearing British uniforms who had ambushed and killed the commander of the defendants, and suggesting that the precapture conduct of POWs would normally have been considered as extenuating and mitigating circumstances). Even more
frequently, under such circumstances the denial of quarter to enemy POWs has been treated as a forigiveable, and even
understandable, reaction to extreme provocation not subject to referral to the military criminal justice system. The following
exchange, conducted between a senior noncommissioned officer and the author, an officer in the British Army, following the
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Defense counsel then introduced several Army publications in support of the defense of
ignorance, claiming that although ignorance of the law does not justify its violation as a general rule the
government recognized as a matter of official policy that IHL “does not in some cases possess either the
exactness or the degree of publicity which pertains to municipal law[.]”337 thereby affording the ignorant
violator a defense. A series of retired members of the Judge Advocate General corps and professors of
military law testified that knowledge of IHL, an increasingly complex regime, could not be presupposed
even in officers, let alone enlisted soldiers, by virtue of the uneven and incomplete distribution of such
knowledge in the training provided by the Army338 as well as the capacity of soldiers to absorb such
complex material in the context of other training obligations.339 These experts concluded that it was
reasonable for Upham to have relied on his superiors and to have believed that such orders were legal
even if he had been mistaken.340 Finally, the defense introduced as character witnesses341 members of the
101st Airborne Division whose lives Private Ryan had saved in combat on the night of June 5th, 1944
resulting in the award of the Silver Star;342 the defense also entered into evidence copies of the citations
issued to Private Ryan and PFC Reiben upon their respective awards of Bronze Stars343 for heroism in
combat in Italy in early 1944. After the defense concluded its case-in-chief, the court adjourned.
The next morning the judge, acting sua sponte, issued a finding of “not guilty” as to PFC Reiben
and Private Ryan344 and ordered their release from custody. The prosecution proceeded to its closing
argument as to the remaining defendant, T/5 Upham.345 The prosecutor described the denial of quarter to
execution of German POWs by a British soldier, “S___”, subsequent to the storming of a German trench in World War I, is
representative of this oft-repeated practice:
’What the hell ought I to do?’
‘I don’t see that you can do anything,’ I answered slowly. ‘What can you do? Besides I don’t see that S____’s really
to blame. He must have been half mad with excitement by the time he got into that trench. I don’t suppose he ever
thought what he was doing. If you start a man killing, you can’t turn him off like an engine. After all, he is a good
man. He was probably half off his head.’
‘It wasn’t only him. Another did exactly the same thing.’
‘Anyhow, it’s too late to do anything now. I suppose you ought to have shot both on the spot. The best thing now is to
forget it.’”
GUY CHAPMAN, A PASSIONATE PRODIGIALITY: FRAGMENTS OF AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1933).
337
Dep’t of the Army, International Law, v. II, Pamphlet 27-161-2, at 246 (1962).
338
See WELLS, supra note_, at 120-21 (making this argument); OSIEL, supra note_, at 126 (noting that in the court-martial of
Lieutenant Calley for the unlawful killing of noncombatants in My Lai during the Vietnam War, the defense of “following
superior orders unreasonably believed to be lawful” was reinforced by evidence that Calley had been inadequately trained in IHL,
leading to a reduction in the charges against him) (referring to U.S. v. Willliam Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131 (1973), 22 U.S.C.M.A.
534, 48 C.M.R. 19 (1973), habeas corpus granted, 382 F. Supp. 650 (1974), reversed 519 F.2d 184 (1975), cert. den. 425 U.S.
911 (1976)); DELISSEN & TANJA, supra note_, at 200-01 (indicating that confusion and ignorance with respect to IHL
remained endemic within the armed forces of many states as late as the 1990s due to inadequate military education programs).
339
See Dov Shefi, The Status of the Legal Adviser to the Armed Forces: His Functions and Powers, 100 MIL. L. REV. 119, 11920 (1983) (stating that the “prolific development” and “great complexity” of IHL requires significant study, guidance, and
expertise in the translation to the battlefield where faculties are dedicated to the defeat of the enemy, leaving little additional
capacity to parse the meaning of the commandments of an unclear legal regime).
340
See OSIEL, supra note_, at 356 (elaborating the “reasonable error” approach to the defense of superior orders where the
analysis centers upon whether a defendant’s mistaken belief in the legality of his orders was reasonable under the circumstances).
341
At courts-martial, evidence supporting the inference of the good character of the accused consists primarily of citations for
heroism in combat as well as the testimony of witnesses whose lives the accused has saved. Everett, supra note_, at 1432-33.
342
The Silver Star—the third-highest decoration for military valor awarded by the United States—is awarded to a person “who . .
. is cited for gallantry in action while engaged in an action against an enemy of the United States” but where the circumstances to
not justify the award of the Distinguished Service Cross. 32 C.F.R. 578.7 (1996).
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The Bronze Star is a decoration for military valor awarded for “heroic or meritorius achievement or service . . .while engaged
against an enemy of the United States[.]” E.O. No. 9419 (February 4, 1944) (superseded by E.O. No. 11046) (Aug. 24, 1962).
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Rule 917 of the Manual for Courts-Martial provides that the court, acting sua sponte, “shall enter a finding of not guilty of one
or more offenses charged after the evidence on either side is closed and before findings on the general issue of guilt are
announced if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of the offense affected.”).
345
See id. at Rule 919 (providing procedures for closing arguments and rebuttal by the government).
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the German POW as an act of premeditated murder that was no less criminal, under domestic and
international law,346 by virtue of the despicable status of the victim as a parole violator in the armed forces
of a state at war with U.S. The prosecutor then recapitulated the arguments that none of the defenses
were applicable, either as a matter of law or in the factual circumstances presented, on the grounds that
Upham knew that the denial of quarter was categorically illegal or at least illegal in circumstances
wherein he had the option to use nonlethal means to reduce the threat to the squad and the mission, and
that notwithstanding the stressors of combat Upham possessed the requisite mental capacity to freely
chose actions that he knew were illegal. In conclusion the prosecution described Upham as having
engaged in an illegal reprisal, dressed up as military necessity”347 against an enemy soldier, for whom he
held personal animus, the effects of which were to bring grievous harm and disrepute upon, as well as
compromise the good order and discipline of, the U.S. Army; the prosecution thus requested that the
panel find Upham guilty of murder in violation of Article 118 of the UCMJ.
The defense then began its closing argument by restating that T/5 Upham acted pursuant to lawful
orders issued by the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army and transmitted to him through his commanding
officer, Captain Miller, requiring him to safely evacuate Private Ryan from a position deep behind enemy
lines during the height of a German counterattack, and that in this threat posture obedience to these
orders, particularly after the Battle of Ramelle further attrited the rescue squad, required him, as senior
enlisted soldier in command, to deny quarter to an enemy soldier who had previously demonstrated his
perfidy by violating his parole. The defense insisted that the laws and customs of war permitted an
exception to a general presumption in favor of quarter in circumstances where an understrength unit was
physically unable to take prisoners and the would-be prisoner in question—a parole violator—was the
permissible object of reprisal, and that in any event Upham was so overcome by the stressors of combat
that even had he been instructed in the course of his military training that his spontaneous decision to kill
the German POW was legally impermissible, which he had not, he would have been unable, as a result of
a lack of mental capacity, to refrain from so doing. In effect, the defense propounded a standard for the
panel in determining the guilt of the defendant which would require the panel to enter a finding of not
guilty unless the panel could clearly conclude that the defendant knew his actions to be illegal and
intended to violate a legal obligation.348 Finally, the defense encouraged the panel to
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The prosecutor stated that duties of combatants, whether U.S. or foreign, included those obligations imposed by applicable
treaties limiting conduct in war, and that, because Congress had ratified such treaties and consented to their incorporation in
domestic law, to the extent domestic and international law were in disharmony (which disharmony the prosecutor did not
recognize in the instant case) the international obligations governed. For arguments that IHL is a peremptory regime that trumps
inconsistent domestic law, see Lippmann, supra note_, at 110.
347
BARKER, supra note_, at 283 (describing thusly the defense of military necessity offered by the Nazi defendants at
Nuremburg in response to the charge of war crimes for killing POWs). Although the martial code admits of and concedes terrain
to military necessity, it does not categorically justify all acts, including manifestly unlawful acts, alleged to have been undertaken
in light of necessity; rather, the martial code immunizes legitimate acts essential to self-preservation and to the accomplishment
of a mission but rejects the necessity defense in cases where other options were available and would have been chosen by
honorable soldiers. See TALYOR, supra note_, at 338 (“[I]f military law does no more than track operational considerations jot
for jot, mirroring commanders’ calculations of military necessity, it becomes largely superfluous. But if it departs too greatly
from these considerations, it quickly comes to be ignored and . . . thereby ceases even to be formally binding.”).
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Some commentators suggest that legal culpability in courts-martial should be restricted to those circumstances where an
accused knew his actions to be illegal. See HELD et al., supra note_, at 66 (noting advocacy in favor of this more stringent
standard of proof based upon actual knowledge of illegality and intent to commit an illegal act).
54

look past the dusty books written by old lawyers who never smelled a whiff of cordite, never seen gouts of
blood gushing from the shattered hulk of a buddy, never had to decide whether to protect their buddies and
lose their innocence or keep their innocence and lose their buddies. Look past murky rules that make sense
only from the safety and comfort of Washington and seem as bizarre moralistic posturings to the brave but
terrified American boys locked in an existential struggle against an evil regime that every day violates more
rules of war than the eminent experts testifying before this court could ever hope to identify and record and
catalogue. This is a normal man under abnormal circumstances made all the more aberrant by the perfidy
and treachery of the deceased, a willing and eager exponent of a criminal government, and he did nothing
more than protect himself and accomplish his mission as ordered by the Chief of Staff of this United States
Army. There is a ocean of difference between peace and war, between those who went to war and those
who have stayed behind, between the murderous criminals who run the government that declared war upon
our nation and this bewildered young man sitting before you. Does deliberately killing an enemy soldier
who has proven his untrustworthiness constitute a war crime? If it is, then how do you justify the carpetbombing of Hamburg and Tokyo and the deliberate roasting to death of women and children in the name of
breaking the enemy’s will to fight? One of the greatest ironies of human history is the fact that if you kill
one hundred thousand civilians with bombs dropped from an airplane you’re a hero, whereas if you shoot
one enemy soldier for perfidy you get a seat in the docket at court-martial with a firing squad looming in
the wings. Do not erect an insurmountable double-standard for those who are struggling merely to survive
in a world gone mad. Do not profane the very ideals and principles you exalt by punishing this man unless
you yourselves would wish to bear the burdens of your own judgment and unless you can proclaim
precisely how, during that frightful fortnight, you would have managed to retain your life and your sanity
while faithfully discharging your duty would it have been you, rather than he, who your government tapped
to hold that no-man’s land between the civilization the so-called laws and customs of war have been
instituted to defend and the relentless advance of modern-day barbarians for whom any imperative, save for
349
the urge to conquest, death, and destruction, is but a nuisance to be circumvented by deception and force.

With this, the defense rested, and on rebuttal the prosecutor urged the panel not to permit a “code of
complicity between brothers-in-arms” or the “natural sympathies for those fighting in a noble cause” to
prevent the administration of justice in accordance with law.350 Following this the court adjourned.
The following morning, after reviewing proposed jury instructions submitted by the parties,351 the
judge provided the members of the panel with a detailed statement of the law with respect to the elements
that constituted the charge of “Murder,” Article 118 of the UCMJ, along with the lesser-included
offenses352 of Article 119, Manslaughter,353 as and proffered defenses, as well as a detailed statement of the
law with respect to military necessity, the extent of any duty to obey illegal orders, the effect of mental
capacity on legal responsibility for one’s actions, and the effect of ignorance of the law. The judge then
charged them with answering a series of question to ascertain the guilt or innocence of the accused,
including 1) whether the denial of quarter to an enemy POW was categorically illegal as a matter of U.S.
law (and if so they were to return a finding of guilty); 2) whether the defendant’s orders expressly ordered
the denial of quarter or could reasonably have been construed to authorize denial of quarter; 3) if the
answer to #1 was negative, whether under the circumstances of the case the defendant had any available
defenses to the charge of murder; and 4) if the answer to #3 was affirmative, whether one or more of these
349

The defense summation is loosely patterned after that offered by Major J.F. Thomas, counsel for Lieutenant “Breaker” Morant,
at his court-martial before a British panel in 1900, as well as an editorial from former U.S. Navy Secretary James Webb
castigating the absolutism of NGOs that sought to prosecute U.S. soldiers for alleged violations of IHL during the Korean War.
See Kershen, supra note_, at 115 (discussing the Morant court-martial): James Webb, The Bridge at No Gun Ri, WALL. ST. J.,
Oct. 6, 1999, at A22 (arguing against absolutism and in favor of the martial code in the post hoc review of the legitimacy of
actions undertaken by soldiers in combat).
350
See Lippmann, supra note_, at 110 (stating that a “code of complicity among armed comrades complicate[s] the reconstruction
of events and the apprehension and prosecution of offenders” at courts-martial).
351
MCM, supra note_, at Rule 920(c).
352
Id. at Rule 920(e).
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defenses constituted a complete or partial defense or a factor in mitigation. The judge then expressly
advised the members of the panel that, if they reached Question #4, they were permitted to consider any
environing circumstances supported by the evidence354 in determining whether an ordinary soldier in the
position of the defendant could have a) reasonably mistaken the circumstances under which he shot the
German POW to be such that it was militarily necessary to deny quarter to preserve his own life, the lives
of his fellow soldiers, or the success of the mission, or b) reasonably understood himself to be acting
pursuant to a reasonable interpretation of superior orders355 that were not manifestly illegal,356 or c)
reasonably been unaware that his actions were illegal, or d) unable to understand the illegality of his
actions due to a lack of mental responsibility.357 The judge then instructed the panel to consider the extent
to which the defendant departed from the standard practice of the U.S. Army in the European Theater of
Operations as he had witnessed that practice.358 Finally, the judge instructed members of the panel that to
reach a finding of guilty a two-thirds majority was required.359
The members of the panel retired to deliberate in closed session360 and the senior member, a
colonel on the staff of General Eisenhower, initiated deliberations361 by suggesting that the duty of the
panel was solely to determine whether the government had established that the killing of the German
362

POW was unlawful, as the question of whether the defendant had committed the act had already been
definitively resolved by stipulation. Without dissent, the panel, by informal voice vote,363 swiftly and
unanimously answered Question #1 in the negative, concluding that, on the basis of evidence as to
applicable law and as to the actual practice of soldiers in battle, denial of quarter to an enemy POW was
353

See UMCJ, Art. 119, “Manslaughter” (criminalizing the unlawful killing of a human being “in the heat of sudden passion
caused by adequate provocation” with the intent to kill). Maximum punishment for manslaughter is 15 years confinement,
dishonorable discharge, and forfeiture of pay and allowances. Id. at Art. 119(e)(1).
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The “infinitely varied circumstances and conditions of combat never produce exactly the same situation twice,” and as “terrain,
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form new patterns of physical encounter.” Richard D. Hooker, Jr., The Mythology Surrounding Maneuver Warfare, 23
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law. Lippmann, supra note_, at 55.
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consider “a host of environing circumstances[,]” and to attempt in so doing to assume the perspective of the “ordinary soldier.”
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criminal act it is necessary, in the interests of justice, to view that act against the backdrop of the prevailing practices of the
Army. TAYLOR, supra note_, at 155-56.
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See UCMJ, supra note_, at Art. 52 (10 U.S.C. §852(a)(2)) (requiring a 2/3 majority for a guilty finding).
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not categorically illegal.

On Question #2, the members unanimously concluded that the orders issued

by the Chief of Staff and transmitted down the chain of command did not expressly obligate Upham to
deny quarter. However, although the three officers, only one of whom had experienced combat,
disdainfully rejected the defense argument that the orders in question were susceptible of an interpretation
authorizing the killing of Germans attempting surrender, the two enlisted members, both of whom came
ashore on Omaha Beach with the 1st Battalion of the 75th Ranger Regiment and were lightly wounded in
subsequent combat, insisted that an order from the command apex of the U.S. Army to evacuate a private
soldier was so remarkable that ordinary measures of force protection could not apply and the denial of
quarter, as well as any other measures necessary to the success of what was presumptively a mission of
strategic significance, could have been constructively authorized; moreover, the enlisted members
pronounced that they themselves might have interpreted the orders in this fashion and, to the
consternation of two of the officers, offered anecdotal evidence from their combat experience that enlisted
soldiers in circumstances such as those faced by T/5 Upham—executing orders to complete a mission of
national importance with severely attritted forces in a fluid threat environment characterized by
overwhelming enemy strength and enemy perfidy along the planned axis of maneuver—neither granted
nor expected quarter.365 Although the enlisted members did not sway the officers, only three of the five
members found against the defense on the question of whether an interpretation of the defendant’s orders
to authorize denial of quarter was reasonable under the circumstances.
In regard to Question #3, the panel began with the defense of military necessity, which fared the
same as the defense of superior orders with which it was treated by the two enlisted members as closely
intertwined. The two enlisted soldiers reiterated their argument that even if the post hoc review of others
might reach a different conclusion, military necessity might have justified the killing of the German POW
from the perspective of the defendant, who could not have been certain, given the heavy attrition his
squad had suffered and the concentration of enemy forces preparing to counterattack against the Allied
salient, that he could successfully evacuate Private Ryan encumbered by an enemy POW whose perfidy
had already been established by the violation of his parole and the bearing of arms against his former
captors. Although heated criticism of this argument, centered upon the contention that the defendant
could have simply released the German POW without appreciably increasing the threat profile or further
compromising the mission and without committing a putative violation of law, failed to budge the
agitated junior members of the panel, to whom this argument was the “the sort of wishful armchair
officer’s thinking that winds up getting men killed,” it had the reverse effect with respect to a lieutenant
whose injuries sustained during training in England in early 1944 had resulted in his reassignment from
the 82nd Airborne Division to a pending assignment as an airborne instructor in the U.S. By the end of a
lengthy debate over the precise meaning of military necessity, the enlisted members of the panel were
prepared to accept the defense of necessity and move directly to acquit the defendant, while the lieutenant
was as yet undecided. With tempers flaring, the sergeant-at-arms excused them for the day.
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The members of the panel in the case of U.S. v. Private Ryan et al. did not have the benefit of the jurisprudence emanating
from the Nuremburg and Tokyo tribunals in reaching their findings. See supra at notes_.
365
See supra at note_ (chronicling such incidents in military history of WWII).
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In the calmer atmosphere of the next morning, the panel pressed on to the consideration of the
remaining defenses. All members immediately rejected the defense of a lack of mental responsibility,
with the enlisted soldiers expressing particular indignation that the defendant would have permitted his
counsel to employ the argument that he had not been in possession of his faculties. “First he says he
knew what he was doing and why, that he had to complete the mission, and now he says he was out of his
mind over his captain,” fumed one of the enlisted soldiers. “Don’t blame him, it’s the lawyer,” the other
reminded him. On the defense of ignorance, all but one of the panel concluded that the defendant had not
known that the denial of quarter was arguably an illegal act and that the military training he received had
not instructed him otherwise. “Might be a good idea to add another week to basic training,” opined the
lieutenant, to shrugs from the others. The sole member who rejected the ignorance defense, a major of
infantry and a veteran of the World War I Battles of St. Mihiel and Cantigny, did so on the ground that he
believed that the defendant had in fact known the status of the law, including, in his estimation, the fact
that the law permitted reprisals in the field against a parole violator. “When you catch one in arms after
he granted his parole, you shoot him. That’s something every soldier knows. Last time I checked it’s the
first rule in the law book, Rule M1,” the major said, to grim smiles from the enlisted soldiers.366 “It ain’t
like the Nazis,” one of the enlisted soldiers added. “He didn’t kill him in cold blood. He gave a war
criminal what he had coming. Any of us would’ve done the same thing. That’s war.”367 In other words,
T/5 Upham had acted lawfully, and now three members were prepared to acquit the defendant of murder.
In recognition of the vector along which deliberations were traveling, the colonel suggested that a
finding of guilty on the specification of Murder was impossible and that, because none of the defenses
proffered had been ruled complete defenses, the panel should consider the lesser-included offense of
Manslaughter as well as the cumulative effect of various defenses and any extenuating or mitigating
circumstances. An enlisted soldier countered with the possibility of considering Article 134, para.
60(c)(3), Assault with Intent to Commit Voluntary Manslaughter, 368 but because this offense had not been
specified the judge, responding to a query, instructed that this was not within their jurisdiction. The panel
deliberated for hours without progress: the enlisted soldiers and the lieutenant were committed to the
defense of necessity, the colonel strongly favored conviction, and the major was inscrutable.369
366

The M1 Garand Rifle was the primary personal weapon carried by U.S. soldiers in the European Theater of Operations in
1944. Reference to “Rule M1” is a sardonic acknowledgement that the most important principles and customs governing war are
those that are practiced on the battlefield, that soliders are expected to kill enemy soldiers with their M1 rifles, and that no
positive legal regime can regulate soldiers’ conduct unless it is compatible with the custom of reprisal, which continues to hold a
most prominent place in the martial code. At the court-martial of Lieutenant Morant for denial of quarter to Boer POWs, Morant,
asked under what rule of military regulations he had ordered the execution of POWs, replied “We caught them and we shot them
under Rule 303,” referring to the caliber, .303, of the British-issued Enfield rifle. Kershen, supra note_, at 111.
367
Adjudication of individual criminal responsibility on the part of commanders who issue orders to others to commit war crimes,
or on the part of those who commit such crimes after a long opportunity for repose, is arguably a less morally and legally
complicated exercise than is the determination of the liability of those who act in the heat of battle, while under threat from their
enemies, on their own initiative. See BARKER, supra note_, at 27-28 (stating that it was less difficult at the post-World War
tribunals to attribute criminal liability for war crimes to “decisionmakers far from the scene of the action” than to prove the
liability of “those who carry out . . . orders[.]”).
368
Article 134 of the UCMJ punishes “all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces,
[and] all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces[.]” UCMJ, supra note_, at Art. 134(a). Art. 134(a)(2)(b)
specifically provides for punishment for a “[b]reach of custom in the service,” defined as the “long established practices by which
common usage have attained the force of law in the military[.]”
369
This intense internal debate, rather than frustrate administration of military justice, is essential to the determination of the
requirements of martial honor as applied to the specific case before a jury of military peers and is protective of the rights of the
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Late that afternoon, the panel voted by show of hands as to the guilt or innocence of T/5 Upham.
Only one—the colonel—voted to convict on the charge of Manslaughter, and following the vote, the
colonel posed this question to the other members: “Do we really want the defendant to walk away from
this with nothing? Can we really say that Upham was not morally culpable at all? Even though that Nazi
was a dishonorable son-of-a-bitch, is what Upham did the way we as soldiers are supposed to behave?”370
The four other members of the panel pondered for a long moment, and one-by-one shook their heads save
for one of the enlisted men. “I reckon not,” the other enlisted soldier said. “If he had really wanted to he
could have had one of the other POWs tie that German up, or better yet had them all tie each other up.
But he had a score to settle. Not too sure I blame him, although . . .” he said, trailing off into thought.371
The colonel then proposed that the panel convict T/5 Upham of Manslaughter but take into
372
consideration extensive factors in mitigation of the sentence, reminding them that they had authority to

pronounce any sentence they should choose.373 The panel deliberated for another three hours and then,
late in the afternoon, returned to the courtroom to announce its findings.374 On the charge of
Manslaughter, Article 119, UCMJ, the panel convicted T/5 Upham by a vote of 4-1. In the sentencing
hearing, which followed immediately, the prosecution admitted that T/5 Upham had no prior convictions
and that there was significant rehabilitative potential but argued that the deliberate nature of the offense
should be considered as an aggravating factor375 and that the maximum sentence of fifteen years’
confinement, along with a forfeiture of benefits and a dishonorable discharge, was appropriate.376 The
defense introduced evidence that Upham, only 19 years old, had been an exemplary civilian and soldier
who had volunteered at 17 rather than wait to be drafted, and whose services, including his native fluency
in German and French, were very much in need. The defense contended that the likelihood of a repetition
of the offense was minimal as Upham would not likely be assigned again to a combat unit (his duties had

accused as well as the integrity of the profession of arms. OSIEL, supra note_, at 285 (describing process whereby military
professionals debate and resolve standards of virtue crucial to the functioning of the martial code).
370
The fundamental question of liability in courts-martial can only be resolved by a determination of whether the accused was
morally culpable, within the framework of reference of honorable soldiers, of any wrongdoing; the “arcane and logically
irresolvable questions” of whether particular descriptions of the accused’s conduct violated various textual and customary
prescriptions and proscriptions, though of great interest to IHL lawyers, are far less relevant. OSIEL, supra note_, at 356.
371
As one military scholar notes, even the most honorable soldiers may find that, subject to the stress and exigencies of combat,
there is simply “no time to even ask this question . . .: ‘What kind of person do I want to be, and what would such a person do?’”
Reed Bonadonna, Above and Beyond: Marines and Virtue Ethics, 178, in ROBERT L. TAYLOR & WILLIAM ROSENBACH,
EDS., MILITARY LEADERSHIP (1996).
372
See UCMJ, supra note_, at Art. 52 (providing that the members of a court-martial also determine the sentence and may take
into consideration factors in mitigation, aggravation, and extenuation).
373
In some senses, the power of the jury in courts-martial to pronounce a very lenient sentence amounts to a form of quasinullification in cases where equity demands its application. Perhaps the most (in)famous example occurred during World War II,
when a black Army officer, charged with physical violence for allegedly pushing an officer attempting to prevent him from
entering an officer’s club designated for whites only, was, although convicted of the charge,sentenced by a court-martial jury to
pay a $150 fine despite being eligible for the death penalty. See James Allison, Mutiny At Freeman Field: The Life and the Art of
James Gould Cozzens, 92 BLACK HIST. NEWS (May 2003) (discussing jury nullification in the court-martial of 2LT Roger C.
Terry in 1945). Jury nullification occures with respect to even the most serious of crimes: in the court-martial of Lieutenant
Duffy for ordering the murder of an unarmed Vietnamese POW in 1969, the jury, after hearing testimony that other officers had
been given orders to deny quarter but nonetheless convicting Duffy of murder, amended the first two findings to find Duffy
guilty of conspiring to commit involuntary manslaughter, and sentenced him to confinement for six months and forfeiture of
$250.00 per month for six months. U.S. v. Duffy, 47 C.M.R. 658, 1973 WL 14807 (ACMR).
.
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MCM, supra note_, at Rule 922 (proving that findings are announced immediately in the presence of all parties).
375
See id. at Rule 1001 (providing procedures for adversarial hearing on sentencing and the introduction of evidence as to general
character, rehabilitative potential, and evidence in aggravation as well as mitigation and extenuation).
376
See MCM, supra note_, at Art. 119(e)1) (providing for a maximum penalty of 15 years confinement, dishonorable discharge,
and forfeiture of pay and benefits upon conviction of manslaughter).
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theretofore been largely in support of Army intelligence at brigade echelon) and as he now knew that
execution of a parole violator was contrary to law. The defense argued further that Upham could best be
rehabilitated, and the interest of the U.S. would best be served, were he to remain subject to Army
jurisdiction. The defense proposed, in lieu of confinement, a sentence of forfeiture of pay and benefits,
reduction in rank to E-1, and a bad conduct discharge377 subsequent to the termination of the war against
Germany, and supported this proposal with precedential evidence suggesting that in addition to their
already broad equitable powers courts-martial have great discretion to pronounce lenient sentences, such
as admonishment378 and other disciplinary punishments,379 upon a conviction of denial of quarter during a
“desperate struggle . . . with a cruel and savage foe” such as those against which the U.S. was now pitted.
Following arguments as to sentencing, the judge instructed the panel that the maximum sentence
for manslaughter was 15 years’ confinement and instructed the members on procedures for voting,380 at
which time the panel retired to deliberate. Three hours later the panel returned and the colonel, as
president of the court-martial, pronounced the sentence:381 one year confinement, forfeiture of six months’
pay, reduction in rank to E-1, and a general discharge, with the one year confinement suspended382 and the
383

remainder of the sentence deferred until the end of the war against Germany.

A petition for clemency,

signed by four of the five jurors, accompanied the sentence.384 With that the court-martial adjourned.385
The next morning the Staff Judge Advocate [“SJA”] assigned to the 75th Ranger Regiment to
assist Major General Truscott in determining whether and how to exercise his command prerogative386
reported his recommendation that the sentence be executed as pronounced. However, rather than do so
General Truscott, who had argued vehemently against the courts-martial of Private Ryan et al. only to be
overruled by General Eisenhower, transmitted the trial record to the Judge Advocate General of the Army
with an expression of his views387 that “the killing of the German POW without judicial process was a
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Punitive discharge, forfeiture of pay and benefits, reduction in rank, and formal admonishment are distinctively non-penal
military punishments for which the Manual for Courts-Martial makes specific provision. See id. at Appendix XII, President’s
Table of Maximum Punishments. The use of non-penal sanctions, even with respect to the punishment of serious crimes, is not
unique to domestic law or to the system of courts-martial: in post-civil war Bosnia, where domestic prosecutions are difficult to
conduct due to evidentiary, political, logistical, and financial difficulties, the UN mission has recently begun, with some success,
to introduce non-penal sanctions to reach the conduct of thousands of culpable individuals who remain in official positions in
public life, including the domestic constabulary, despite having committed prosecutable crimes, including genocide, war crimes,
and crimes against humanity, during the civil war. See Gregory L. Naarden, Nonprosecutorial Sanctions for Grave Violations of
International Humanitarian Law: Wartime Conduct of Bosnian Police Officials, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 342-52 (2003) (discussing
the regime of non-penal sanctions administered by the UN in Bosnia).
378
See U.S. v. Private Ryan et al., Defense Motion in Support of Proposed Sentence (citing Court-Martial of General Jacob H.
th
nd
Smith, Manila, Philippines, April 1902, S. Doc. 213, 57 Cong., 2 Sess., 5-17, at 17) (sentencing BG Jacob H. Smith to be
“admonished by the reviewing authority” for having issued orders to subordinates directing denial of quarter to enemy guerrillas).
379
SHELDON GLUECK, WAR CRIMINALS, THEIR PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT 31-32 (1944).
380
MCM, supra note_, at Rule 1005.
381
Id. at Rule 1007.
382
Id. at Rule 1108.
383
See id. at Rule 1101 (providing for deferment of sentence by the convening authority or officer with jurisdiction).
384
Id. at Rule 1106(d)(3)(B).
385
Id. at Rule 1011.
386
See id. at Rule 1106 (providing for assistance of legal counsel to convening authority in determining a course of action with
respect to the sentence of court-martial). The role of the SJA is to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence and make
recommendations for action in light of the service record of the accused and other relevant considerations. Id. Although the
convening authority normally accepts the SJA recommendation, he has “absolute power to disapprove the findings and sentence,
or any part thereof, for any reason or no reason[,]” and thus the SJA role is simply advisory. DEP’T ARMY, supra note_, at 58.
387
See DEP’T ARMY, supra note_, at 58 (“In those unusual cases in which a convening authority is in disagreement with his
[SJA] or legal officer as to the effect of any error or irregularity respecting the proceedings, as to the adequacy of the evidence, or
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regrettable, but momentary, lapse in the maintenance of the discipline and honor that distinguish our
Armed Forces from those of our enemies,” that after further reflection he “could not clearly conclude that
T/5 Upham had committed any offense under the military regulations as they are commonly understood
by the enlisted soldier,” and that the execution of the sentence “would not serve the interests of justice but
would rather, if widely publicized, be detrimental to the morale and fighting spirit of the troops under my
command who are even now preparing for an invasion of Germany that will require the maximum
devotion from every available soldier if victory is to be ours.” In short order, the Judge Advocate General
of the Army relayed his opinion, in respect to which the Chief of Staff, writing under separate cover,
concurred, that in light of further review, General Truscott had articulated an adequate basis for
disapproving the sentence of the court-martial388 as well as, in his discretion, ordering a rehearing389 or a
390

dismissal of the charge.

With the major offensive against Germany already underway, and with an

immediate rehearing thus impracticable391 if Upham was to be returned to service, General Truscott
elected to dismiss the charge against T/5 Upham and immediately ordered his transfer to the headquarters
of the 3rd Army, soon to be commanded by Lieutenant General George S. Patton.
th
On December 26 , during the Battle of the Bulge, T/5 Upham was killed in combat in the town of

Bastogne, Belgium. Six months later Germany surrendered unconditionally to the Allies.
That a court-martial convened to try Private Ryan et al. in 1944 could not adjudge the killing of a
parole violator to disencumber a unit engaged in a mission of strategic importance during a counterattack
by a numerically superior foe to be the sort of dishonorable and egregious violation of the martial code
disentitling a soldier to continued membership in the martial caste is not surprising. The putative victim
had not conducted himself as a honorable soldier and thus could not claim all the privileges and
immunities attendant to that status, and the treatment meted out by T/5 Upham was precisely that which
the martial code would have prescribed, albeit after judicial determination of guilt, were Upham to have
accepted his surrender. Moreover, the claims of military necessity and ignorance of the law struck a
chord with those members of the jury to whom, as enlisted infantry soldiers, the vicissitudes of combat
and the extraordinary requirements of survival in battle were not alien but for whom scienter of the “black
letter” of IHL, a body of regulations so uncertain that even experts could disagree as to its precise
commandments, was, through no omission or fault of their own, glaringly absent. While Upham might
not have exhibited that degree of professionalism, temperance, and martial virtue demanded by his peers,
neither did he entirely excommunicate himself from their fellowship by executing a dishonorable member
of the armed forces of an atavistic regime dedicated to the destruction of the civilization the defense of
which, on the afternoon in question, was his duty. In short, the jury, in consideration of all the
circumstances, including conflicting expert statements as to the rules of IHL, issued a judgment that
as to what sentence can legally be approved, the convening authority may transmit the record of trial, with an expression of his
own views and the opinion of his . . . legal officer, to the Judge Advocate General of the armed force concerned for advice[.]”).
388
See MCM, supra note_, at Rule 1107(d)(1) (“The convening authority may for any or no reason disapprove a legal sentence,
and change a punishment . . . as long as the severity of the punishment is not increased[.]”).
389
See id. at Rule 1107(e)(1) (providing for rehearing as to charged offenses or sentence at discretion of the convening authority).
390
See id. at Rule 1107(c )(2)(A) (allowing convening authority to set aside a guilty finding and dismiss a charge).
391
See id. at Rule 1107(e)(1)(B)(iii) (stating that “[I]f the convening authority finds a rehearing as to any offenses impracticable,
the convening authority may dismiss those specifications and, when appropriate, charges.”).
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reproached and disciplined Upham for his true crime—falling short of a professional ideal that demands
of soldiers that they accept significant additional personal risks before they deny quarter to even the most
reprehensible POWs—without inflicting inordinate punishment disproportionate to the offense, without
conceding any absolute obligation to grant quarter, and without branding Upham, of whom the Army still
had great need in its titanic struggle against the Axis, as beyond the pale of the martial code and thus unfit
for duty. With the spectre of Nazism looming large as a backdrop, the seriousness of the delict in
question assumed its proper proportion, meriting disciplinary, rather than penal, sanction.
b) U.S. v. Private Ryan et al., 2003
The drive to humanize war gained impetus from World War II, and the Geneva Conventions of
1949 [“GCs”],392 consisting of four multilateral treaties, updated and enlarged the IHL regime and
imposed upon parties393 the obligation to pass domestic legislation criminalizing “grave breaches”394 of
their provisions. Denial of quarter and reprisal are specifically and categorically prohibited as grave
395
breaches; the Geneva Conventions, on their face, appear to obligate parties to render inapplicable any
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See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, [“GCI”];
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea
[“GCII”]; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War [“GCIII”]; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War [“GCIV”]. Four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. (1950) (increasing categories of
persons entitled to POW status, improving treatment of POWs, improving post-conflict repatriation procedures, and codifying a
specific set of war crimes, known as “grave breaches”). These Care known collectively as the “Geneva Conventions.”
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The Geneva Conventions have been ratified by almost all states and can thus be considered binding not only upon parties but
upon non-parties as customary IHL. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.),
Merits, Un. 27, 1986, 1986 ICJ Rep. 14, 114 (holding that common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions is declaratory of
customary IHL); Meron, supra note_, at 252 (stating that Common Article 6/6/6/7 of the Geneva Conventions, providing that
parties may conclude bilateral agreements conferring protection upon individuals greater than that afforded in the Geneva
Conventions, has attained the status of a quasi-norm of jus cogens and is evidence of customary IHL); ICRC COMMENTARY
TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS (J. Pictet ed.), at 368 (suggesting that Common Article 3 is declaratory of a customary
international obligation to suppress all breaches of the Geneva Conventions); Howard S. Levie, Enforcing the Third Geneva
Convention on the Humanitarian Treatment of Prisoners of War, 7 U.S.A.F.A. J. LEG. STUD. 37, 38 (1996-1997) (arguing more
broadly that the substantive provisions of the Geneva Conventions are enforceable against non-parties as customary IHL). For a
minority of commentators, the substantive provisions of the Geneva Conventions have attained the status of customary norms of
jus cogens from which no derogation is permitted. See Rumudiger Wolfrum, The Decentralized Prosecution of International
Offenses Through National Courts, 24 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 183, 1888 (1994) (suggesting that the entirety of the Geneva
Conventions is directly applicable as customary IHL in domestic courts); Alexide, The Legal Nature of Jus Cogens in
Contemporary International Law, 172 RECUEILS DES COURTS 223, 262-63 (1982) (same).
394
Although any violation of the Geneva Conventions might theoretically be categorized or described as a “war crime,” the
Conventions provide that only certain acts constitute such exceptionally opprobrious violations of IHL, known as “grave
breaches,” that parties are obligated to take measures to actively suppress them, largely by implementing domestic legislation
criminalizing these acts and prosecuting those who commit them. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces I in the Field of August 12, 1949, 75 UNTS (1950) 85-133, at Art. 49 (creating the
duty to suppress and prosecute grave breaches of GCI); Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War III of
August 12, 1949, at Art. 129 (creating same duty under GC III); GC IV, supra note_, at Art. 146 (creating same duty under GC
IV). Specific grave breaches include, inter alia, “wilful killing” and “torture or inhuman treatment” (GC I, Art. 50; GC III, Art.
130) and “wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health . . . or wilfully depriving a prisoner of war of the
rights of fair and regular trial[,]” (GC III, Art. 130; GC IV, Art. 147). Not all delicts constitute grave breaches under the Geneva
Conventions; only those analogous to felonies under domestic law, or violations of norms of jus cogens under customary
international law, committed by members of the military forces of parties to the conflict qualify and thereby impose upon statesparties investigatory and prosecutorial duties , whereas acts better characterized as misdemeanors do not. See ICRC
COMMENTARY, GENEVA CONVENTIONS RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 617-20 (J.
Pictet, ed.) (elaborating distinctions between grave breaches and other violations of the Geneva Conventions); see also M. Cherif
Bassiouni, The Normative Framework of International Humanitarian Law: Overlaps, Gaps and Ambiguities, 8 TRANSNAT’L
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199 (1998) (further elaborating this distinction and contrasting state duties with respect to grave
breaches and other violations of the Geneva Conventions); KASTO, supra note_, at 46-47 (suggesting that grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions have been so classified because they constitute violations of norms of jus cogens, norms whjch are nonderogable and which are “essential to the protection and coexistence of the peoples and States members of the international
community” and which are “derived from the legal conscience of the international community as a whole.”).
395
Grave breaches include, inter alia, willful killing or inhuman treatment of protected persons, willfully causing unnecessary
suffering, extensive destruction or appropriation of property not justified by military necessity, willfully depriving a POW or the
right to a fair trial, taking of hostages, and forcible relocation or deliberate targeting of civilians. See (note).
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defenses, such as military necessity or superior orders, to domestic prosecutions of individuals accused of
the denial of quarter and of reprisal,396 as well as to investigate, prosecute, and punish all violations with
“effective penal sanctions.”397 Extending individual criminal responsibility for violation of the prohibitive
398

regime of IHL still further, the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions [“AP I”] frontally
396

See Art. 3(1) (Common) to the Four Geneva Conventions (“Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members
of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other
cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely . . . To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any
time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: (a) violence to life and person, in particular
murder of all kinds . . .”) (emphasis added); see also GC I, supra note_, at Art. 46 (“Reprisals against . . . personnel . . . protected
by the Convention are prohibited.”); id. at Art. 50 (“Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those
involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons . . . protected by the Convention: wilful killing . . .”); GC III
supra note_, at Art. 13 (“[POWs] must at all times be humanely treated. Any unlawful act or omission by the Detaining Power
causing death or seriously endangering the health of a [POW] in its custody is prohibited, and will be regarded as a serious
breach of the present Convention. In particular, no [POW] may be subject to physical mutilation . . . Measures of reprisal against
[POWs] are prohibited.”) (emphasis added); id. at art. 130 (“Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those
involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons . . . protected by the Convention: wilful killing . .”).
397
GC III, supra note_, at Art. 129. The legal effect of the Geneva Conventions, in the estimation of the ICRC and other NGOs,
has been to further extend that prohibitive regime of IHL to encompass within the field of individual criminal responsibility
actions that theretofore were either condoned or excused on grounds such as military necessity. See ICRC, COMMENTARIES
ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS (note) (stating that with respect to the obligations of parties to prosecute abuses of POWs,
including denial of quarter, “[n]o possible loophole is left; there can be no excuse, no attenuating circumstances.”); see also
OSIEL, supra note_, at 132 (stating that GCIII prohibits killing POWs “even on grounds of self-preservation or because it
appears certain they will regain their liberty.”). However, the Geneva Conventions are imprecise as to what constitutes “effective
penal sanctions,” and states-parties may discharge their obligations by prosecuting those whom an investigation indicates may
have committed grave breaches. See GCI, supra note_, at Art. 49(2); GCII, supra note_, at Art. 50(2); GCIII, supra note_, at Art.
129(2). Moreover, the Geneva Conventions, contemplating a regime of complementary jurisdiction, accord states-parties the
latitude to investigate and prosecute under their own domestic laws without obligating them to submit to international
supervision. GCIII, supra note_, at Art.99(1. Whether, by exploiting this indirect enforcement mechanism, states may thereby
attenuate their obligations under the Geneva Conventions, is a matter open to debate. See BOTHE, MACALISTER-SMITH, &
KURZIDEM (EDS.), NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (1990) (indicating
that the extent to which states-parties to the Geneva Conventions discharge their duties under those instruments varies
considerably in substance and procedure); Esgain & Solf, The 1949 Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War: Its Principles, Innovations, and Deficiencies, 4 N.C. L. REV. 537, 580-81 (1963) (discussing variations in imposition of
effective penal sanctions for violations of the Geneva Conventions across the range of states-parties); M. Cherif Bassiouni,
Repression of Breaches of the Geneva Conventions Under the Draft Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of August
12, 1949, 8 RUTGERS CAMDEN L. REV. 185, 196 (1977) (suggesting that complementary jurisdiction in an international
tribunal is contemplated by the Geneva Conventions where domestic prosecution is inadequate or ineffective); Oren Gross, The
Grave Breaches System and the Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 783, 792 (1995) (suggesting
that the principle of universality of jurisdiction permits states other than the state of nationality of the accused to assert
jurisdiction in the event that state does not undertake good-faith investigation and prosecution); ANTONIO CASSESE, ED.,
THE NEW HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 212 (1980)(noting that some hold that the duty to prosecute
grave breaches under the Geneva Conventions is incumbent only upon belligerents, while others maintain that universal
jurisdiction obligates all states to prosecute grave breaches).
Whether states-parties elect themselves to investigate and prosecute allegations of grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions they remain obligated under the customary international legal principle aut dedere aut judicare (“extradite or
prosecute”), to which the Geneva Conventions make explicit reference at Articles 49/50/129/146, to either undertake a good-faith
investigation and, where appropriate, to initiate prosecution, or, in the alternative, to extradite to a state-party that will do so. M.
CHERIF BASSIOUNI & EDWARD M. WISE, AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE: THE DUTY TO EXTRADITE OR
PROSECUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW x (1995). The U.S. officially recognizes this obligation as a state-party. See U.S.
Department of the Army, Pamphlet 27-1, Treaties Governing Land Warfare (1956), at 183-84 (stating that the duty to investigate
and prosecute those who commit grave breaches includes not only enemy war criminals but also U.S. nationals).
398
See API, supra note_. The API, an instrument largely the work of the ICRC, updates the Geneva Conventions in light of an
additional three decades of state practice. See Solf & Cummings, supra note_, at 219 (tracing the role of the ICRC in the
development of the API). The principle supplementation of the API concerns the addition of grave breaches, including making
civilians, public works and installations, the ICRC emblem, and cultural or religious objects the object of attack and unjustifiably
delaying the repatriation of POWs. See API, supra note_, at Arts. 11(4), 85(3)-(4). In addition, the API obligates states-parties
to cooperate with the UN “in situations of serious violations of the [Geneva] Conventions or of [the API],” (Art. 89), as well as
with international fact-finding commissions (Art. 90), in the suppression of grave breaches. The API has come under criticism
for introducing controversial positions into IHL, including the legitimization of decolonization (Art. 1(4)), the legal protection of
terrorists (Art. 44), the withdrawal of the protection of GCIII from mercenaries (Art. 47), the definition of a military objective
(Art. 52), and the prohibition of attack upon certain military objectives (Art. 56), and the question of whether these or other
provisions of AP I are binding upon non- parties as customary IHL or as norms of jus cogens is open to considerable debate and
will be discussed infra at note_. Although most states have ratified the API, a number of states have either declined ratification
or attached a series of reservations purporting to limit legal obligations under that instrument despite ratification. See CASSESE,
supra note_, at 243 (noting that the “Western powers” were “very reluctant” to embrace API without reservations); David Turns,
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rejects the military necessity defense and reinforces the absolute, nonderogable obligations to grant
quarter and refrain from reprisal399 incumbent upon parties to AP I and, arguably, as a matter of customary
IHL,400 even in regard to a parole violator captured under arms.401
th

th

Although national military establishments had labored for much of the 19 and early 20 centuries
to defend against encroaching legal absolutism with a pragmatic approach that privileged necessity in its
intersection with humanitarianism, in the aftermath of World War II the military manuals of the leading
powers began to reflect a generalized strategic withdrawal from this position toward an accommodation,
and even to an extent a convergence, with the treaty-based regime codified in the Geneva Conventions.402
Specifically, in 1956, U.S. Army Field Manual 27-10 [“FM 27-10”],403 declared denial of quarter404 and
reprisal against POWs405 to be categorically illegal as a matter of international and domestic law and, save
406

for exceptional circumstances, non-justifiable by military necessity.

Moreover, FM 27-10, an

Prosecuting Violations of International Humanitarian Law: The Legal Position of the United Kingdom, 4 J. ARMED CONFL. 1
(1998) (describing the UK position with respect to API and the reservations it has taken to that instrument limiting domestic
prosecutions for violations of its provisions). The U.S. has signed the API but since taken the position that it is a “fundamentally
flawed” instrument that would “politicize [IHL] and efface the distinction between terrorists and lawful combatants, and
accordingly has not ratified that instrument. See Matheson, Session One: The United States Position on the Relation of
Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y
419-31 (1987). Nonetheless, the U.S. has publicly accepted that some of the provisions of the API are declaratory of customary
IHL and are thus binding in courts of the U.S.; no official statement clarifying precisely which provisions, however, has yet to be
offered. For an argument that AP I is neither customary IHL nor expressive of norms of jus cogens and therefore not binding
upon non-parties, see KALSHOVEN, supra note_, at 301; Suzanne M. Bernard,An Eye for an Eye: The Current Status of
International Law on the Humane Treatment of Prisoners, 25 RUTGERS L. J. 759, 766 (1994) (“It is generally accepted that the
Geneva Conventions have achieved the status of customary international law even if Protocol I . . . ha[s] not.”). For a contrary
argument, see Kenneth J. Keith, Rights and Responsibilities: Protecting the Victims of Armed Conflict, 48 DUKE L. J. 1081,
1095 (stating that although some commentators consider the API to be an instance of “la trahison des clercs” (treachery of the
intellectuals), the fact that more than 150 states have ratified suggests that it has become declaratory of customary IHL).
399
See API, supra note_, at Art. 40 (“it is prohibited to order that there shall be no survivors, to threaten an adversary therewith or
to conduct hostilities on this basis.”); see also id (“a person who is recognized or who, in the circumstances, should be recognized
to be hors de combat, shall not be made the object of attack.”); id. at Art. 40 (prohibiting issuance of an “order that there shall be
no survivors, to threaten an adversary therewith or to conduct hostilities on this basis.”); id. at Art. 20 (“Reprisals . . . are
prohibited.”). The obligations created by AP I with respect to quarter are absolute, even in the case of a greatly outnumbered unit
physically unable to take prisoners. Id. at Art. 41 (requiring that even “under unusual conditions of combat which prevent . . .
evacuation [of enemy POWs], they shall be released and all feasible precautions shall be taken to ensure their safety.”).
400
See supra at note_.
401
The Geneva Conventions recognizes that POWs who are paroled “are bound on their personal honour scrupulously to fulfil . . .
the engagements of their paroles or promises.” GC III, supra note_, at Art. 21. However, under Article 20 reprisals are expressly
prohibited against parole violators, who are entitled to judicial process and to the protected status of POW in the interim. See GC
III, supra note_, at Art. 85 (stating that POWs “prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power for acts committed prior to
capture shall retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the present Convention.”); PICTET, supra note_, at 181 (stating that the
Geneva Conventions afford parole violators the opportunity to defend against charges of breaking parole).
402
See W. Michael Reisman & William K. Lietzau, Moving International Law from Theory to Practice: The Role of Military
Manuals in Effectuating the Law of Armed Conflict, in 64 UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL
LAW STUDIES, THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 1 (Horance B. Robertson, Jr., ed., 1991) (discussing this trend).
403
THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, U.S. Department of the Army Field Manual FM 27-10, Washington, D.C., 18 Jul. 1956
[“FM 27-10”] (updated without significant changes in 1976).
404
See FM 27-10, supra note_, at para. 28, “Refusal of Quarter” (“It is officially forbidden . . . to declare that no quarter will be
given.”) (quoting, almost verbatim, Article 23(d), Hague Regulations of 1907, supra note_); id. at para. 29, “Injury Forbidden
After Surrender” (“It is especially forbidden . . . to kill or wound an enemy who, having laid down his arms, or having no longer
means of defense, has surrendered at discretion. (quoting Article 23(c), Hague Regulations of 1907, supra note_).
405
See id. at para. 497(c) (stating that reprisals “against the persons or property of [POWs] . . . are forbidden[,]” although reprisals
against enemy forces not yet in the control of the U.S. forces are permitted) (citing GC III, supra note_, at Art. 13).
406
See id. at Art. 3 (stating that the “[p]rohibitory effect of the law of war is not minimized by ‘military necessity’ which has . . .
been generally rejected as a defense for acts forbidden by the customary and conventional laws of war[.]”); see also id. (limiting
the definition of military necessity to justify only “those measures not forbidden by international law which are indispensable for
securing the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible.”). Some scholars argue that FM 27-10 effected the complete
rejection by the U.S. Army of the defense of military necessity to allegations of war crimes. See, e.g., WALZER, supra note_, at
130-31 (stating that subsequent to FM 27-10 an accused soldier can no longer “justify his violation of the rules by referring to the
necessities of his combat situation or by arguing that nothing else but what he did would have contributed significantly to
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407

affirmation of principles of existing IHL in light of the experience of World War II promulgated “to
provide authoritative guidance to military personnel on the customary and treaty law applicable to the
conduct of warfare [,]”408 directly addresses the question of whether military necessity can ever justify
denial of quarter in the negative:
A commander may not put his prisoners to death because their presence retards his movements or
diminishes his power of resistance by necessitating a large guard, or by reason of their consuming supplies,
or because it appears certain that they will regain their liberty through the impending success of their
forces. It is likewise unlawful for a commander to kill his prisoners on grounds of self-preservation, even in
the case of airborne or commando operations, although the circumstances of the operation may make
409
necessary rigorous supervision of and restraint upon the movement of prisoners of war.

Finally, FM 27-10 identifies the grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, to include denial of quarter
and reprisal, as punishable war crimes410 under the UCMJ,411 and imposes upon those under UCMJ
jurisdiction to refuse to obey illegal orders and to report violations of FM 27-10 and the UCMJ.412
However, despite their willingness to incur limitations upon their sovereign prerogatives, states,
with respect to the denial of quarter has cleaved far more closely to their historical pattern than to the
modern prohibitory regime. During the Korean War (1950-1953), North Korean forces, unwilling to
spare food for POWs, frequently shot them instead,413 and in the Sinai Campaign (1956) Israeli forces,
claiming military necessity, executed scores of Egyptian POWs.414 During the Vietnam War (19541975), political pressure to maximize numbers of enemy dead (known as “body counts”) as tangible
evidence of battlefield successes, coupled with the psychological stress of combat, led U.S. forces and

victory[.]”). However, the use of the language “generally rejected” seems to suggest that some vestige of a military necessity
defense might yet remain available to a defendant charged with violation of the provisions of the UCMJ.
407
See WELLS, supra note_, at 11 (discussing the drafting of FM 27-10, written primarily by Prof. Richard Baxter of Harvard
Law School and an officer in the U.S. Army JAG Corps). FM 27-10 has been as influential in the transformation of the military
th
th
regulations of other states as was the Lieber Code in the 19 and early 20 centuries.
408
FM 27-10, supra note_, at para. 1.
409
Id. at para. 85. FM-27-10 states further that military necessity is “generally rejected as a defense for acts forbidden by the . . .
laws of war[.]” Id. at para.3. Subsequent Army publications, designed to train soldiers in the laws of war, reinforce the
categorical prohibition of the denial of quarter first articulated, as a matter of U.S. military law, in FM 27-10:
His patrol is operating an area believed to be heavily infested with enemy soldiers. He discovers a young man hiding in
a shallow hole. Though dressed as a farmer and unarmed, he thinks he is an enemy soldier and fears his presence may
jeopardize the unit’s security. May this captured person be killed? The answer is no. . . . No one can be harmed or
killed who, in the language of the Convention, has “fallen into our hands” . . . Murder or physical abuse never is, has
been, or will be humane treatment. It is strictly prohibited. Furthermore, under the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
murder is a capital offense.
DEP’T OF THE ARMY, supra note_, at 97
410
FM 27-10, supra note_, at para. 502 (listing, inter alia, “wilful killing” of POWs as violations of the Geneva Conventions); id.
at para. 504, “Other Types of War Crimes” (listing, inter alia, “[k]illing without trial spies or other persons who have committed
hostile acts” as a punishable war crime).
411
See id. at para. 506(c) (stating that grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other war crimes “committed by persons
subject to [U.S.] military law . . . constitute acts punishable under the [UCMJ].”).
412
DEP’T OF THE ARMY, supra note_, at 101.
413
See EUGENE KINCAID, WHY THEY COLLABORATED 43 (1953) (“In the first five months of the (Korean) war, North
Korean . . . often shot soldiers they could have taken prisoner . . . simply because they did not want to bother with them[;] . . .
[t]hey had little food . . . and they had no place to put them[.]”).
414
In October 1956, an Israeli parachute infantry company inserted 100 miles behind enemy lines near the Mitla Pass in Sinai
captured a platoon of Egyptian troops. However, Egyptian forces in the vicinity, which already greatly outnumbered the Israelis,
were increasing, and the Egyptian Air Force enjoyed operational superiority. Ordered to redeploy elsewhere to prepare for
another parachute insertion, and without adequate numbers to guard or relocate the POWs, several of whom were taunting his
forces with the threat that “the Egyptian Army will slaughter you![,]” the Israeli commander positioned the POWs face-down in
the sand and directed their execution, claiming years later that military necessity justified his actions. See Morris, supra note_, at
905-08 (“I didn’t give an explicit instruction, and I didn’t ask for one. Only a fool can ask his commander for permission to do
what he has to do.”) (quoting General Arye Biro, Israeli Defence Forces (Ret.), then-commander of the company in question).
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415

their allies to deny quarter and undertake reprisals, and the summary execution of POWs is a present
feature of enduring conflicts wherein military necessity abuts conflicting legal prohibitions.416
The schizophrenic quality of state conduct, revealed in the disjunction between concrete
expressions of commitment to evolving IHL and serial violations of that very regime, has not escaped the
notice of contemporary commentators, who themselves are divided on the question of quarter. For one
group, “circumstances arise when military necessity . . . causes rules to be disregarded[,]” and “small
detachments on special missions” ordered to execute strategic missions deep behind enemy lines are
justified by military necessity417 in denying quarter to enemy forces on the ground that to release prisoners

415

Numerous sources document a widespread practice of denying quarter during the Vietnam War. See, e.g., JOHN DUFFET
(ED.), AGAINST THE CRIME OF SILENCE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE RUSSELL INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES
TRIBUNAL 310 (1968) (concluding that as of 1968 “finishing off of the wounded on the battlefield and summary executions are
frequent [practices during the Vietnam War]”); ESQUIRE, Aug. 1965, at (reporting the execution of enemy wounded by a U.S.
Army captain in the Special Forces following an unsuccessful ambush as a relatively commonplace occurrence)(cited in FALK
ET AL., supra note, at 270-71). Much of the responsibility for this practice is attributed to the pressure to produce body counts
to satisfy domestic critics of the war, as well as public opinion, that American military operations were succeeding. See, e.g.,
FALK ET AL., supra note_, at 246-47 (stating that the policy that U.S. forces would deny quarter was not instituted by formal
order but rather emerged from pressure to produce “body counts” emanating from the highest echelons). In the absence of orders
to the contrary, the pressure to increase enemy dead was translated at the company and platoon level, and tacitly authorized by
higher echelons, as an order to deny quarter, as the following statement by an infantry platoon commander in 1969 illustrates:
I decided I was not going to take any more prisoners. If at all possible I was not going to let the situation arise where a
prisoner might be taken . . . I told all my men that if they were going to engage someone, not to stop shooting until
everyone was dead . . . Nobody ever said anything against this policy and I think most of the men agreed with it. My
company commander felt the same way I did about it . . . I know in my case, platoon leaders never got any guidance on
treatment of prisoners. Battalion HQs never said anything about them. There was no SOP, there was never a request
that we take any prisoners. The only thing we ever heard was to get more body count, kill more VC! We heard that all
the time; it was really stressed. The only way anybody judged a unit’s effectiveness was by the number of body counts
they had . . . That is really the only mission we have in the field, to kill the enemy.”
Cited in FALK ET AL., supra note_, at 248-52.

Combat-invoked emotions such as rage and the desire for revenge contributed to the denial of quarter as well. See id. at 248-52
(“Before these two friends were hit I had sort of a lukewarm feeling against the enemy[,] . . . [b]ut after seeing them hurt so bad I
had a true hatred for all VC and from then on I wanted to kill as many of them as I could.”) (quoting a U.S. Army platoon
commander); see also DAVID A. HALBERSTAM, THE MAKING OF A QUAGMIRE (1965) (reporting upon the capture a
group of “cocky” Viet Cong who shouted “anti-American slogans and . . . curses” their U.S. Marine captors “simply lined up the
seventeen guerrillas and shot them down in cold blood[.]”); Raymond R. Coffey, CHICAGO DAILY NEWS, Nov. 19, 1965:
(reporting execution of North Vietnamese wounded following a battle); Kenneth A. Howard, Command Responsibility for War
Crimes, 21 J. PUB. L. 7, 12 (1972) (noting that orders given to company commanders before the battle of My Lai to effectively
deny quarter were issued in part as a matter of revenge against a “hidden enemy that have been clobbering us” and from whom it
was now possible to “get our pound of flesh”) (citing battalion mission orders to company commanders) TAYLOR, supra note_,
at 36 (noting, during the Vietnam War, that “[i]n the heat of combat, soldiers who are frightened, angered, shocked at the death of
comrades, and fearful of treacherous attacks by enemies feigning death or surrender, are often prone to kill rather than capture.”).
416
See INSTITUTE OF WORLD POLITY, supra note_, at 130 (stating that “It is well known that the rule [prohibiting denial of
quarter] . . . is often broken” and “All that can be hoped for is that responsible commanders hold [rule violations] to a
minimum.”); HELD ET AL., supra note_, at 50 (stating that denial of quarter remains common practice); WALZER, supra
note_, at 308 (indicating that, although denial of quarter is becoming more rare, the practice continues). In 1993 an Israeli naval
special forces unit, Shayetet 13, was conducting anti-terrorist operations near a terrorist camp in Lebanon when it was discovered
by a group of terrorists. Shayetet 13 killed one terrorist and captured a second, but a third escaped. The captured terrorist
attempted to escape despite having been bound with rope, and after the commander was refused permission to evacuate the
terrorist with his unit, he elected to disable him by shooting his legs. Despite his wounds, the terrorist was able to escape into
nearby brush, and the commander, concerned that permitting escape would endanger his force, ordered one of his soldiers to
execute the terrorist. Upon formal investigation, the Israeli JAG determined that the commander had acted out of military
necessity in preserving his men and his mission and that no charges should be specified against any persons. See Bagaz 2888/99
Advocate Holander v Hayoaz Hamishpati Lamemshala (Isr. 1997).
417
Some scholars, in supporting a military necessity exception to a general rule prohibiting denial of quarter, restrict the
application to circumstances colorable as requiring the execution of POWs in the interest of self-preservation, thereby
disallowing justifications predicated primarily upon concerns that their release might compromise missions. See WALZER,
supra note_, at 305 (“But if it is only the safety of the unit that is in question . . . the proper appeal would be to self-preservation[,
as] [h]e argument from necessity has not . . . been accepted by legal writers . . . [while] the argument from self-preservation has
won greater support[.]”); HELD ET AL., supra note_, at 78 (“[E]ven those who say that the prisoners may be killed are not
necessarily relying on the principle of military necessity—a much narrower principle of (state) self-preservation will suffice.”).
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would “greatly endanger the success of the mission[s] or the safety of the unit[s].”

To permit enemy

forces the freedom to jeopardize the mission or the survival of one’s own forces would, for this scholarly
camp, constitute an exercise of “asinine ethics.”419 Furthermore, this non-absolutist camp accepts that
denial of quarter may be excusable, or at the very least not the cause for severe legal remonstrations, by
reference to the psychological dimensions of the circumstances giving rise to the decision to refuse
surrender420 and to the moral and legal culpability of the soldier(s) offering surrender: parole violators, by
virtue of their own misconduct, expose themselves to the penalty of death,421 even if they remain entitled
to due process in a judicial forum,422 and expressions of outrage at their perfidy that take the form of
summary execution are understandable, if not permissible, under positive law. Other scholars argue that
the legal prohibition against denial of quarter is absolute and that even in the unusual circumstance where
the grant of quarter would threaten the mission or the lives of the forces to whom an offer of surrender is
made, there can be no exception in extremis: “The law is quite clear . . . Quarter may not be denied nor
may prisoners be executed because they are burdensome.”423 According to this position, it is an
“obligation of soldiering as an office” to accept the additional risks posed by the release of POWs,424 and

418

TAYLOR, supra note_, at 36 (stating further that “no military or other court has been called upon, so far as I am aware, to
declare such killings a war crime.”). Others, while striving hard to refuse any exceptions to a general prohibition against denial
of quarter, admit that “[t]here may be time in war when it is permissible to kill combatants who have laid down their arms and
tried to surrender.” HELD ET AL., supra note_, at 76; BEST, supra note_, at 348-50 (recognizing that when “hard-pressed
troops in continuing action find themselves with prisoners on their hands whom they have no means to conduct under guard to
safety away from the combat zone[,]” denial of quarter is neither unexpected nor unjustifiable on the ground of necessity); PAUL
RAMSEY, THE JUST WAR 435-36 (accepting that “in fluid, jungle situations in which the [POW] is liable to return quickly to
the status of combatant, there being no stockades in which to insure that he will remain a non-warrior[,]” it is permissible to deny
quarter); OSIEL, supra note_, at 355-56 (allowing that despite the absolutist language of sources of conventional IHL, the
general practice of states reveals that military necessity can still be invoked in justification of the denial of quarter under
circumstances where to grant quarter would compromise the outcome of a mission); WALZER, supra note_, at 250 (“In a
supreme emergency, indeed, it may be necessary ‘to hack one’s way through[.]’”).
419
MAO TSE TUNG, BASIC TACTICS 98 (1966) (stating in explanation that in the case described by other authors it is
impossible to take prisoners and that if it is not feasible to disarm and disperse enemy forces it is obligatory to execute them).
420
See BEST, supra note_, at 348-49 (stating that “[t]here are limits to the amount of humanitarian observance that desperately
fighting flesh and blood can actually stand” and that “when a well-protected machine-gunner, defending his safely-retreating
compatriots, succeeds in killing a great many of his attackers before at the last moment emerging (if he is very unwise, with a
confident smile) to surrender to their surviving mates[,]”that grief-stricken and enraged soldiers should deny quarter to the
would-be POW should not come as a surprise); MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note_, at 75-76 (“It may be observed that in
case of close and sustained combat in land war, where the signal of surrender is postponed and resistance continued to the very
last moment, quarter may in practice be difficult [due to the emotional state of the attackers] to grant.”).
421
See Brown, supra note_, at 212 (noting that the death penalty remains among the sanctions currently available to punish parole
violators); HINGORANI, supra note_, at 65 (noting that surrendering soldiers who have committed war crimes pre-capture are
occasionally denied quarter on this ground).
422
POWs who violate parole are disentitled to POW status but may not be subjected to summary execution and are entitled to
defend themselves against the charge of breach of parole. See GC III, supra note_, at Art. 5 (stating that POWs are entitled to
protection from the time of capture until repatriation); id. at Art. 85 (stating that POWs may be prosecuted under the laws of the
Detaining Power for acts committed pre-capture); Hague Convention of 1907, supra note_, at Art. 12 (stating that a parole
violator recaptured bearing arms must “be brought before the courts.”).
423
INSTITUTE OF WORLD POLITY, supra note_, at xi; see also ROGERS, supra note_, at 147 (“A long-range patrol
ambushes a group of enemy soldiers and in the exchange of fire kills all its members except one who is wounded. A soldier is
ordered to kill the wounded man because the patrol cannot take him with them and if he is left behind he may endanger the patrol
by reporting its existence. The order is illegal, so the soldier carrying it out would be liable to prosecution[.]”); M.
GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 103 (1959) (“A commander is not entitled to kill his prisoners to
preserve his own forces, even in cases of extreme necessity . . . [whether] because they slow up his movements, weaken his
fighting force because they require a guard, consume supplies, or appear certain to be set free by their own forces.”); Mark S.
Martins, LTC, Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, XVIIIth Airborne Corps, Telephone Interview, 2 Oct. 2000 (stating that each
member of the U.S. Army recognize that “’you may find yourself behind enemy lines, and in order not to be a war criminal you
may have to expose your mission.’ You accept this as the quiet professional you are.”).
424
WALZER, supra note_, at 305.
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425

the killing of enemy forces that have indicated their intention to surrender is always a war crime

immune from excuse or justification.426 Enemy soldiers over whom military personnel are unable to
exercise custody without compromising their own safety or the success of their mission simply cannot be
dispatched, although they may be otherwise rendered incapable of inflicting injury.427 Moreover, reprisal
is categorically prohibited.428 In short, an exegesis of scholarly texts demonstrates little more than the
academic community is a house divided on the question of the legality of the acts and omissions at issue.
In the sixty years since the court-martial of Private Ryan et al., the positive rules of IHL and the
military regulations governing members of the U.S. Army, have waxed increasingly formal and
prohibitive,429 drawing the legal issues of the conduct at issue into sharper focus and thereby increasing
the likelihood that the defendants’ conduct would be discerned as illegal and that they would be
prosecuted. Moreover, a number of U.S. Army courts-martial convened over the past several decades
have sentenced soldiers to periods of confinement for the crime of murder arising from denials of
quarter,430 providing important precedent as to applicable law as well as guidance to a jury in determining
whether and how far the conduct of the defendants departed from that expected of honorable members of
the martial profession. Thus, it is not inconceivable that a court-martial convened in 2003 might accept
the absolutist pronouncements of the drafters of the various IHL instruments, which brook no claims that
military necessity or lack of knowledge about the boundaries of the permissible in combat can ever
absolve an accused of even partial legal responsibility for violations, and thus conclude, upon the same
evidence available to the court-martial of 1944, that military necessity as it has been shaped by the
evolution of positive law and practice can no longer be invoked to justify the denial of quarter and that,
given the much broader dissemination of knowledge about and training in IHL to which Upham had been
exposed, in the form of FM 27-10 and a much more intensive military education,431 Upham either knew or
425

See DEP’T OF ARMY, supra note_, at 100 (stating that even under extreme circumstances “[t]he decision to execute (murder)
the prisoner . . . is . . . a war crime . . . , and . . . the one doing this can be tried and executed.”).
426
Some members of the absolutist school-of-thought accept the argument that a superior orders defense might serve as a partial
excuse where the accused lacked any possible moral choice other than to deny quarter. See, e.g., HELD ET AL., supra note_, at
58 (stating that a superior orders defense to a charge of denial of quarter is available only to those accused who were subject to
execution as the “announced, probable, and understood penalty for disobedience” and as a result lacked true moral choice in
determining whether to follow the order).
427
Capturing forces may take actions to reduce the threat posed by the release of enemy POWs provided such measures are
“legal, humane, and . . . fit the military situation.” See DEP’T OF ARMY, supra note_, at 100 (stating that such options include
the detachment of several soldiers to evacuate the POW, the binding and gagging of the POW for forced march in
accompaniment of the detaining forces, and the secreting of the POW in a hidden location for subsequent evacuation).
428
Derek Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (1972) (“[C]oming after the event and
when the harm has already been inflicted, reprisals cannot be characterized as a means of protection.”).
429
See supra notes_.
430
See, e.g., Ex parte Keenan, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 108 (1969) (holding that there is an absolute duty to disobey an order to deny
quarter and sentencing a soldier convicted of denial of quarter to 5 years’ imprisonment) (citing cases). During the Vietnam War,
U.S. courts-martial tried over 100, and convicted 60, defendants for the crime of murder. BISHOP, supra note_, at 291.
431
The API imposed upon parties the duty to ensure that “legal advisers are available, when necessary, to advise military
commanders at the appropriate level on the application of the Conventions and this Protocol and on the appropriate instruction to
be given to the armed forces on this subject.” API, supra note_, at Art. 82. Although the U.S. does not concede any specific
legal obligations under the API, in the past twenty years U.S. Army JAG lawyers, whose mission is “to support the commander
on the battlefield by providing professional legal services as far forward as possible at all echelons of command throughout the
operational continuum” and to provide authoritative guidance to soldiers of all ranks in the lawful discharge of their duties, have
accomplished the purpose of Article 82, transforming the defense of ignorance to simultaneously render it less frequently
available but, where available, more likely to succeed. DEP’T OF ARMY, FM 27-100, LEGAL OPERATIONS 1 (Sept. 1991).
Determining the extent of law applicable to combat has become an increasingly complex endeavor in a modern era in which nonstate actors and other nontraditional combatants have proliferated, technologies have become more potent and more precise, and
instruments purporting to declare IHL have continued to accrete. See Timothy P. Bulman, A Dangerous Guessing Game
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should have known that the killing of a POW was manifestly unlawful. A present-day court-martial might
therefore conclude that denial of quarter was categorically illegal under the UCMJ and that the defenses
accepted in partial mitigation of sentence—necessity and ignorance—are unavailable to T/5 Upham,
whose deeds dragged his brothers-in-arms into disrepute and who thus deserved public disassociation
from the corps of honorable soldiers. By this analysis, Upham would be convicted of murder or
manslaughter and serve a lengthy prison sentence.432
However, this outcome is as unlikely at present as it would have been in the last year of World
War II, even conceding that IHL is in a constant state of development and that acts which would have
been permissible at one point in time have been proscribed with the progression of that regime.433
Although the post-World War II revision of military regulations in reflection of the increasing absolutism
in the IHL regime may overcome any hesitancy to investigate and charge the defendants, the ultimate
determination of their guilt or innocence remains the responsibility of their peers, for whom, despite the
codification of a prohibitory legal regime, the defenses accepted in partial mitigation by the 1944 court
might be at least as persuasive. Moreover, neither the regime of IHL nor FM 27-10 are directly
incorporated in the UCMJ,434 and, notwithstanding the fact that these sources directly proscribe the
conduct in question, the jury, in evaluating the defendants’ conduct, would likely be instructed, consistent
with the rights that defendants are guaranteed under the system of courts-martial, to consider whether a
defense such as military necessity, under the specific circumstances, could justify killing an enemy parole
violator who posed a potential threat to their physical safety and the success of their mission. By the
same token, the 2003 jury would be instructed to determine the extent to which ignorance of IHL, a body
of regulation no less difficult for the enlisted soldier to fathom than that which existed in 1944, should be
Disguised as Enlightened Policy: United States Law of War Obligations during Military Operations Other Than War, 150 MIL.
L. REV. 152, 173 (1999) (noting that the failure of the U.S. to authoritatively state which provisions of the Geneva Conventions
and Additional Protocols are binding frustrates attempts at compliance by combat commanders); Shefi, supra note_, at 119-20
(stating that translating the “prolific development” in IHL, much of it unclear, into something of use to soldiers who are “usually
more preoccupied in fulfilling the task of insuring military success than in carrying out the law” requires significant study,
guidance, and expertise typically to be found only in JAG lawyers). Despite the trends in law, technology, and strategy, the
expert legal guidance provided by JAG lawyers at all phases of the planning and execution of military operations denies the
combat commander the opportunity to claim a lack of knowledge that his actions are legally impermissible, on the contemporary
battlefield, “where time permits, it is now objectively unreasonable for an American commander to refrain from consulting such a
legal advisor whenever there is any ground for doubting the legality of a contemplated use of force.” OSIEL, supra note_, at
345. At the same time, combat commanders and their subordinates, entitled to reasonably rely upon the guidance of legal
advisors whose approval of their plans is evidence of the presumed legal propriety of their intended objectives and methods, are
partially insulated from the legal consequences of decisions made in reliance upon the judgment of JAG lawyers that upon post
hoc review are determined to have been unlawful. See Jonathan Tomes, Indirect Responsibility for War Crimes, MIL. REV. 37,
43 (1986) (“It is difficult to accuse a commander of lack of concern about the law of war if he has a Staff Judge Advocate
approval of a plan.”). Modifications to military manuals have augmented the work of JAG lawyers in enhancing “awareness of
the objects of the use of forces and sensitivity to ethical, moral, and legal considerations in the conduct of warfare.” R.R. Baxter,
Modernizing the Law of War, 78 MIL. L. REV. 165, 182-83 (1978). The supporting system of military education further
inculcates soldiers in their legal obligations during wartime through courses in IHL conducted in basic and advanced individual
training, as well as at the Army JAG School. For a complete listing of all such courses in the system of U.S. Army military
education, see http://www.jagcnet.army.mil/CLAMO.
432
Although not without a legal foundation, such a punishment would run the risk of criticism as a “revisionist moral judgment
half a century after the fact” that elides the question of fundamental fairness to a defendant whose conduct, by the standards of
his era, was neither manifestly unlawful nor wholly at odds with the martial code. Webb, supra note_, at A22 (making this
argument in regard to criticisms over U.S. hesitancy to investigate allegations of U.S. massacres of civilians in the Korean War).
433
An example in support of this assertion is the March to the Sea by General William T. Sherman in 1864-65 during the U.S.
Civil War, during which Union forces committed acts legal at that time that would today constitute grave breaches of IHL,
including denial of quarter and deliberate destruction of civilian property. See generally Thomas G. Robisch, General William T.
Sherman: Would the Georgia Campaigns of the First Commander of the Modern Era Comply with the Current Law of War
Standards?, 9 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 459 (1995).
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considered in defense or in mitigation of the charge of murder, as well as the extent to which state
practice in regard to denial of quarter should be considered in determining whether Upham comported
himself in the manner expected of soldiers.435 Furthermore, the similarity of the threat posed by Islamic
terrorists to the Nazi regime might sway members of a jury toward acquittal or toward a sentence that
nullifies much of the legal consequences of a guilty verdict, and the jury might well struggle toward a
conclusion along the lines of the following: that Upham, despite having committed a technical violation
of the laws and customs of war, violated none of the constitutive tenets and precepts of the martial code in
taking reprisal against a parole violator and that his conduct, although not to be extolled as the epitome of
martial honor, merits mere disciplinary, rather than penal, sanctions, particularly in the context of a global
challenge to fundamental national interests such as is posed by the intersection of international terrorism
and the proliferation of WMD. On the basis of such a finding, the jury might well impose lenient
sanctions similar to those pronounced by the 1944 court-martial.
In summary, the essential point is that a determination of the legal responsibility of a soldier
accused of a violation of IHL under the system of military justice entails an searching inquiry by fellow
members of the military community—the group most directly injured in reputation as well as life and
limb by violations of the martial code and thus the party with the greatest incentive to claim standing to
complain of violations and to police its own ranks—conducted under conditions of relative normative
autonomy,436 to ascertain not whether the accused ran afoul of a provision of positive law drafted by
outsiders without obligations to the martial caste but whether, in consideration of all the surrounding
434

See supra at note_.
IHL may well remain as impenetrable to the average enlisted mind in 2003 as it did in 1944. See DEP’T OF ARMY,
PAMPHLET 27-161-2, 2 International Law, at 246 (1962) (conceding that ignorance of IHL may well excuse soldiers from
liability for its violation since IHL “does not in some cases possess either the exactitude or degree of publicity which pertains to
municipal law.”). Although the U.S. has mandated adherence to IHL at all times in every military operation as official policy, it
has made little if any effort to authoritatively determine which of the various sources of conventional and customary IHL creates
legal obligations that bind the U.S. Armed Forces. See Timothy P. Bulman, A Dangerous Guessing Game Disguised as
Enlightened Policy: United States Law of War Obligations during Military Operations Other Than War, 150 MIL. L. REV. 152,
166-74 (1993) (discussing U.S. failure to specify with precision the obligations it accepts under IHL and suggesting that, until
such a specification is forthcoming, the best insight into U.S. policy with respect to the extent of these obligations is an
observation of U.S. practice). Although federal legislation enacted in 1996 indicates that the grave breaches provisions of the
Geneva Conventions, various articles of the Hague Conventions of 1907, and the texts and protocols of “such convention[s] to
which the United states is a party” are applicable sources of law in the domestic prosecution of “war crimes” in federal district
courts, as of 2003 IHL remains such a muddled and conditional body of regulation that, with the exception of manifestly
unlawful acts, it is virtually impossible for soldiers to know with certainty what is prohibited in war. See War Crimes Act of
1996, supra note_ (enumerating various provisions of IHL the violations of which constitute criminal offenses punishable in
federal district courts, although not displacing courts-martial jurisdiction in the case of military personnel). Moreover, enlisted
soldiers inquiring of their superiors as to whether their orders are lawful in a desire to tailor their conduct in accordance with the
law might find themselves being told simply “Not to worry, the complexities are beyond your ken; just obey the order, unless it
calls for atrocities.” OSIEL, supra note_, at 108. Consequently, soldiers in 2003 attempting to meet their legal obligations might
be left with little more guidance than their peers of 1944, and the absence of support at higher levels in the chain of command
might well be dispositive of whether a superior orders defense to an alleged violation of IHL is permitted. For an in-depth
discussion of the superior orders defense, see infra at note_.
436
Proponents of the martial code rest their faith on two principle assumptions. The first is that “actions performed by
professionals in professional roles can be evaluated only with respect to criteria internal to the professional practice.” See Arthur
Applbaum, Are Lawyers Liars?, 4 LEG. THEORY 62, 73 (1988). The second is that “[a]n approach to professional ethics that
casts itself as an interpretation of [the] ordinary moral experience [of soldiers] . . . would do well to stay close to the terms of
soldiers’ self-understanding.” OSIEL, supra note_, at 18. To falsify the first assumption it would be necessary to demonstrate
that professionals are less well-suited to self-regulation than outsiders; to attack the second it would be necessary to show that
soldiers’ understandings of the requirements of their profession and the moral experiences associated with soldiering can be
readily moulded by external, particularly legal, regulations that are contrary to those understandings and experiences. For
reasons discussed supra, attempts to falsify either assumption and impose legal modification inconsistent with the values that are
internal to the military caste are unlikely to prevail. Id. at 164-65 (stressing that the only legal regulations likely to transform the
behavior of soldiers are those which build upon “existing commitments and self-understandings.”).
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circumstances, the accused can fairly be said to have failed in his duty to his brothers-in-arms by
engaging in unchivalrous or otherwise reprehensible acts that shock the martial conscience and would, if
unpunished, shame and dishonor the martial profession. Although the normative universe in which this
more parochial model of justice operates refuses to accept the subordination of its internal values to
external review or to impose punishment for acts undertaken in self-defense or in furtherance of the
military mission, it is ultimately conducive to a more holistic and stricter standard of judgment, for
despite the absence of any provision of IHL proscribing a particular act a court-martial might well
adjudge the author to have transgressed against his obligation under the martial code.437 In sum, under the
martial code positive law is significantly less dispositive of the boundaries of permissible conduct, and of
the consequences for overstepping these boundaries, than the professional and ethical judgments of
members of the profession of arms.438 Nevertheless, a court-martial convened in 2003 to evaluate the
conduct of Private Ryan et al. is likely to accept that T/5 Upham, while not wholly blameless, has neither
committed an act worthy of professional banishment nor demonstrated himself beyond moral redemption,
and the punishment levied under the martial code is likely to foster his rehabilitation and continued
service to the military mission: now, as then, the defense of civilization.
B. Trying Captain Ryan: International Legal Absolutism, Allegations of Crimes in the War on Terror, and
the International Criminal Court
1. International Legal Absolutism: The Judicial Model
Legal absolutists,439 deeply skeptical that professional self-regulation is sufficient to suppress
violations of IHL by members of the armed forces whose mission, after all, is to win wars rather than to
observe law,440 and unwilling to cede any regulatory terrain, reject martial honor as a thoroughly
437

In other words, as compared to the judicial model the martial code
prohibits a greater range of conduct but makes it easier to argue it is excusable to go beyond the bounds in certain
circumstances: while strict on the rules themselves, it is relatively more lenient in allowing exceptions to them . . . [It]
allows a small area at either extremity, that which is absolutely permissible and that which is absolutely impermissible,
but concentrates its energies upon the middle ground where the debate takes place. Transgressing the boundaries
becomes something which requires justification . . . In addition to the realms of [clear] permission and prohibition is the
area of debate where what is normally prohibited can be argued for if the circumstances are sufficiently compelling.
Id. at 285.
Put slightly differently, humanization of war is the product of overweening notions of custom, honor, and professionalism, and
“There is no substitute for honour as a medium for enforcing decency on the battlefield, never has been, and never will be.”
Kenneth Anderson, TIMES LIT. SUPP., Jul. 31, 1998 (reviewing First in the Field: The Unique Mission and Legitimacy of the
Red Cross in a Culture of Legality) (quoting John Keegan).
438
“Law is only one among several kinds of norms that govern [martial] life. In striving to influence a given societal sphere, law
ignores these other norms, assuming its supremacy over them, at its peril . . . Law’s efforts to avoid atrocity inevitably intersect
with and rely upon the continuing efficacy of these other norms and mechanisms, which have historically played a much greater
role toward this end.” Id. at 162-63. More general research suggests that formal legalization, while it may advance the interests
of “compliance communities”—particularly lawyers whose influence and financial interests are served thereby—does not
enhance compliance in every context and is not necessarily preferable to regulation by other means, including professional selfregulation. SeeMiles Kahler, Conclusion: The Causes and Consequences of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 661 (2000).
439
“Legal absolutism” is the school-of-thought that posits that it is never justifiable to violate positive law in the pursuit of moral
values as law, the universal distillation of natural legal principles and moral virtue, is the highest value human beings can serve;
in contrast, legal relativism holds that where a positive law is intolerably incompatible with the requirements of justice, the
provision of positive law must be disregarded. See GUSTAV RADBRUCH, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1932) (elaborating
theory of legal relativism). For a thorough discussion of legal absolutism and legal relativism, see generally KENNETH
CAUTHEN, NATURAL LAW AND MORAL RELATIVISM (1998).
440
See, e.g., WELLS, supra note_, at 178 (stating that IHL cannot safely be entrusted to the care of those “who understandably
are preoccupied with winning wars and who cannot be expected to [interpret IHL] with a view to humanizing war[.]”); OSIEL,
supra note_, at (explaining that even many of those who cannot be classified as legal absolutists are suspicious of military selfregulation). When challenged, legal absolutists point to the failure of the successively revised editions of the military manuals of
leading states to directly incorporate the proliferating series of declarations of new sources of customary IHL as evidence that the
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inadequate substitute for the judicial model.

For legal absolutists, a penchant for law overrides

considerations of non-legal solutions to practical problems, and the threat of harsh punishment, rather
than the compliance pull exerted by an internal code of conduct, is necessary to condition and influence
the battlefield behavior of soldiers cossetted behind military culture; thus, only a powerful ICC, freed
from the influence of self-interested states and their military establishments and superior in the hierarchy
of sources of rules and regulations, can promote respect for and observance of IHL. Furthermore, for
legal absolutists, ignorant of the moral universe of soldiers and distrustful of military self-judgment,442
claims in defense of acts otherwise classed as violations of IHL, reliant as they are upon subjective
interpretations of variables the measurement of which is beyond the experiential realm of all but combat
soldiers, are wholly incompatible with exceptions to the universal positive commands constituting the
IHL regime.443 Failures to suppress violations of IHL are thus manifestations not of the inherent
unsuitability of positive law to the practical needs of soldiers in combat but rather of the moral culpability
of the perpetrators, and the solution lies in the punishment of the actors, the enhancement of penalties to
support the deterrent value of the regime, and the creation of additional rules to strengthen the judicial
model.444 For obdurate absolutists, military justice is a proxy for military impunity,445 and the system of
courts-martial is an obscurant institution comprised of tendentious assemblages of cronies convened to
afford legal shelter to guilty soldiers that will hold stubborn sway until swept aside by law. The next

military profession is insufficiently committed to the principles underlying IHL. WELLS, supra note_, at 17. Although courtsmartial are sometimes accused by civilian critics of offering defendants inadequate procedural protections against the influence of
commanders bent on securing their convictions, some legal absolutists further fault courts-martial as an overly lenient institution
that abuses the privilege of self-regulation to insulate its members from deserved punishment. See BISHOP, supra note_, at 22
(condemning military justice as a regime that “knows what it wants and systematically goes in and gets it.”). Legal absolutists
making the latter of these criticisms ignore evidence controverting the notion that courts-martial are a rubber-stamp for
commanders. See David A. Schleuter, The Twentieth Annual Kenneth J. Hodson Lecture: Military Justice for the 1990s—A
Legal System Looking for Respect, 133 MIL. L. REV. 1, 1-29 (1991) (discussing decades of revisions to system of courts-martial
that have enhanced fairness to parties and the integrity of proceedings).
441
By and large, the civilian polities of democratic states, who for reasons beyond this work, disparage the concept of martial
honor and despise the martial caste, are quite willing to impose dangerous legal constraints and uninformed retrospective moral
judgments upon their armed forces, and they are unwilling and in many cases unable to critically evaluate the argument that
military honor is superior to other institutions in suppressing violations of IHL. OSIEL, supra note_, at 39-40 (discussing the
legal consequences of the disjunction between civilian society and the military profession within democratic states).
442
Legal absolutists tend to hail from the ranks of those with no military experience and even less interest in acquiring insight into
the moral universe of soldiers than their fellow civilians, and as such they tend to be much more critical of soldiers’ conduct than
do those whose greater understandings temper any impulses to condemn. Id. at 162-63; see also RAMSEY, supra note_, at 503
(describing legal absolutists as very often “intellectuals and churchmen . . . [who] have forgotten if they ever knew the meaning
of a legitimate military target . . . [and] simply do not know the qualitative difference between ‘murder’ and ‘killing in war.’”).
Distrust of and disdain for soldiers’ moral competence to self-regulate is so great that for legal absolutists, soldiers are bound by
their externally-imposed legal formulations even where such formulations are incomplete, incoherent, and even contrary to
soldiers’ self-understandings. WALZER, supra note_, at 43-44 (stating that the “moral reality of war is not fixed by actual
activities of soldiers but by the opinions of mankind” and in particular the “activity of philosophers, lawyers, [and] publicists[.]”).
Whereas for proponents of the martial code an understanding of and appreciation for the experience of the combat soldier is
essential to understanding the utility and limits of IHL, for legal absolutists such knowledge is, at best, superfluous.
443
See OSIEL, supra note_, at 285 (stating that, in direct contrast to the martial code, which permits exceptions to its code of
conduct yet imposes a much broader set of regulations consistent with its more holistic regulatory purpose, the approach to the
prevention of violations of IHL advanced by legal absolutists is more “lenient in terms of the content of the rules themselves but
strict in terms of its demand for their observance” and insists that acts that are prohibited are absolutely prohibited and may not
be excused by claims such as necessity, ignorance, or other defenses available under the system of courts-martial).
444
The position that IHL compliance deficiencies are the result not of substantive inadequacy of the law itself but of deficiencies
in enforcement deficiencies that in turn are rooted in the lack of effective criminal sanctions is central to IHL legal absolutism.
See Joyner, supra note_, at 162 (stating the absolutist credo that “[w]ar crimes flourish in direct proportion to the . . . deficiency
of law enforcement.”); see also TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 3 (1990) (referring to the model of human
behavor that links legal compliance to the effectiveness of penalties as “instrumentalist”).
445
See King & Theofrastous, supra note_, at 69 (areguing, in reference to My Lai, that the “de minimis punishment” courtmartials sometimes impose is proof that courts-martial effectively immunize soldiers from responsibility for war crimes).
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section illustrates how legal absolutism, expressed through the ICC, might adjudicate alleged violations of
IHL arising in the context of a U.S. covert operation designed to eliminate WMD in the custody of
terrorists, a fictional scenario representative of future conflicts in the Age of Terrorism.446
2. Prosecutor v. Task Force Ryan et al.
In 1998 Juma Namangani, age 34, an ethnic Uzbeki447 and a former Red Army paratrooper and
veteran of the Soviet war in Afghanistan, formed the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan [“IMU”], an
Islamic terrorist organization committed to the establishment of Islamic republic in Uzbekistan448 and a
“virtual partner” with Al Qaeda.449 Namangani, a born-again Muslim who traveled to Saudi Arabia in the
early 1990s to steep in the Wahhabist sect of Islam,450 declared jihad to remove the secular government of
Uzbekistan and establish a pan-Central Asian Islamic republic, and by 1999 IMU, its forces gathered in
bases in Afghanistan and Tajikistan and its coffers bursting with funds from the intelligence agencies of
Saudi Arabia and Iran, Islamic charities in Europe,451 and the trafficking of opium between Afghanistan
and Europe,452 was launching increasingly successful attacks against government targets in the Fergana
Valley, a region on the frontier near Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and the stronghold of indigenous
Wahhabism.453 In 2000 President Karimov, a major ally in the U.S. anti-Taliban coalition, requested and
received assistance, and U.S. Special Forces based in Tashkent began to train the Uzbeki Army in
counterterrorism. However, the power of the IMU increased apace, and by spring 2001, General Tommy
Franks, head of the U.S. Central Command, commented on a visit that he “believe[d] it [wa]s possible for
very small numbers of committed terrorists to bring great instability . . . to the people in the region.”454
General Franks proved prescient: when the U.S. campaign against Al Qaeda455 and the Taliban456
th

regime commenced with heavy bombing of targets in northeastern Afghanistan on October 7 , 2001,
446

See James B. Motley, Coping with the Terrorist Threat: The U.S. Intelligence Dilemma, in STEPHEN J. CIMBALA, ED.,
INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENCE POLICY IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 165 (1987) (asserting that terrorism is the
“characteristic form of warfare of this age[.]”).
447
The Uzbeki people are a Central Asian nationality that traces their ancestry to Uzbek Khan, grandson of Genghis Khan.
AHMED RASHID, JIHAD: THE RISE OF MILITANT ISLAM IN CENTRAL ASIA 23 (2002).
448
Uzbekistan, with the capital city in Tashkent, is a landlocked, arid, predominantly Muslim nation slightly larger than California
which is bordered by Afghanistan Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Prior to 1991 it was a constituent
republic of the Soviet Union. Despite extensive natural gas and petroleum reserves and a high literacy rate, it is a very poor
nation, with a per capita GDP of only $2500, and in addition to its natural resources opium production is a major industry.
Uzbekistan, with an overwhelmingly homogenous population of 25 million largely of Uzbeki ethnicity, is governed by an
authoritarian, corrupt regime led by President Islam Karimov which has a poor record on human rights and democratization
issues. See Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2002, Uzbekistan, available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/uz.html. The secular Karimov regime has been repressive on religious issues,
preventing the Muslim majority from engaging in the free expression of their faith. RASHID, supra note_, at 85.
449
Id. at 173.
450
Id. at 136-50.
451
See id. at 8, 137-50 (tracing IMU financing to Saudia and Iranian intelligence agencies and to Islamic charities in the West).
IMU, Al-Qaeda, and other allied Islamic terrorist organizations maintain front businesses and solicit donations from Muslim
charitable organizations to support their operations. http://www.state.gov/www.state.gov/www/regions/africa/fsbinLadin.html;
452
See RASHID, supra note_, at 137-50 (detailing the sources of IMU finance, including trafficking of heroin and other opium
products between Central Asia and Europe).
453
Id. at 8, 45.
454
Id. at 192 (quoting General Tommy Franks, U.S. Army, U.S. Central Command (commanding) (now retired)).
455
Al Qaeda is a multi-national organization of several thousand armed terrorists established in the late 1980s to "unite all
Muslims and to establish a government which follows the rule of the Caliphs" by overthrowing non-Islamic governments and
expelling Westerners and non-Muslims from Islamic states. See http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/ladin. It is commanded by the
charismatic Usama bin Laden, the wealthy son of a Saudi businessman, who has ordered all Muslims to kill US citizens—civilian
or military—and their allies everywhere. Yassin El-Ayouty, International Terrorism Under the Law, 5 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 485, 487 (1999). Al Qaeda is responsible for a host of acts of international terrorism, most notoriously the attacks on the
th
World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11 , 2001 which killed more than 3,000 innocents, mostly civilians. Prior to
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After Namangani, the commander of joint IMU-Taliban operations in that sector, was killed in battle, his
second-in-command, Tahir Yuldashev, withdrew IMU and Al Qaeda forces in strength, slipped through
the noose, and crossed the border into the Fergana Valley, and by late 2003 IMU-Al Qaeda forces had
defeated the Uzbeki Army in a series of battles.457 Success bred converts, and early 2004, IMU forces,
bolstered by additional troops drawn from allied Islamic terrorist organizations,458 captured Tashkent,
executed President Karimov, and proclaimed the Islamic Emirate of Uzbekistan.459 Yuldashev, the Emir
of Uzbekistan, moving swiftly to create a Wahabbist state, declared Uzbekistan bound by no legal
obligations save those imposed by Shari’ah (Islamic law),460 and soon the teaching of foreign languages,
the failure of men to wear beards, and the provision of co-educational academic and medical services
became punishable by stoning and amputation.461 Worse was to come: in summer 2004, U.S. human
intelligence sources reported that an international gathering of terrorists in Tashkent had assembled to
plan the “eviction of the U.S. from the Muslim world and the liberation of Jerusalem,”462 and, on the third
anniversary of September 11th, 2001, members of Al Qaeda launched simultaneous attacks upon U.S. and
international targets across Central Asia, destroying the U.S. embassies in Tashkent, Astana, Kazakhstan,
and Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, the offices of the Amoco Oil Company in Astana and Dushanbe, Tajikistan,
the offices of the World Bank and the UN Development Program in Fergana City, and the headquarters of
the 10th Mountain Division at its base in Khanabad, Afghanistan. Among the more than 5000 people
killed were the directors of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
The U.S. immediately declared a national emergency,463 passed domestic legislation authorizing
military action against those responsible,464 and dispatched investigatory teams to Central Asia. In the
coalition attacks in October 2001, Al Qaeda was based in Afghanistan, but it has now dispersed in small groups across Asia and
the Middle East. CIA World Factbook, supra note_, Afghanistan.
456
U.S. initially supported the Taliban to promote security for pipeline projects and end the drug trade, but cut support in response
to serial violations of the human rights of women and children in 1997. VINCENT IACOPINO, THE TALIBAN’S WAR ON
WOMEN 35 (1998).
457
Events presented from July 2003 and forward are fictional.
458
See Testimony of Ambassador Michael A. Sheehan, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, Hearings
th
Before the Subcomm. on Near E. and S. Asian Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 106 Cong. (Nov. 2, 1999)
(testifying that by the late 1990s Uzbekistan had become a safe haven and a recruiting base for the Egyptian Islamic Jihad,
Algerian Armed Islamic Front, Kashmiri separatists, and other terrorist groups).
459
See IACOPINO, supra note_, at 27 (noting that the victorious Taliban renamed the country the “Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan”).
460
See U.S. Dep’t of State, Afghanistan Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996 (Jan. 30, 1997) (cited in Marjon E. Ghasemi,
Islam, International Human Rights and Women’s Equality: Afghan Women under Taliban Rule, 8 S. CAL. REV. L. &
WOMEN’S STUD. 445, 445 (1999) (describing the same process instituted by the Taliban immediately subsequent to their
seizure of power in Afghanistan in 1996).
461
See IACOPINO, supra note_, at 3 (describing the arbitrary detention, torture, disappearance, and cruel punishment of
thousands of Afghanis under the Taliban).
462
In the summer of 2003, Al Qaida claimed to have completely reorganized following the devastating U.S. attacks on its bases in
Afghanistan, and spokesman Thabet bin Qais is reported to have stated that Al Qaida is “way ahead of the Americans and its
allies in the intelligence war,” that American security agencies still are ingnorant of the changes the leadership has made,” and
that an “attack the size of the Sept. 11 attacks'” is being devised against the U.S.” See Sarah al-Deeb, Al Qaida Reportedly Plans
Big New Attack, ASSOC. PRESS, May 8, 2003.
463
The text of the declaration is as follows:
Declaration of National Emergency by Reason Of Certain Terrorist Attacks By the President of the United States of
America, A Proclamation: A national emergency exists by reason of the terrorist attacks in Central Asia, and the
continuing and immediate threat of further attacks on the United States. NOW, THEREFORE, I, GEORGE W. BUSH,
President of the United States of America, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and
the laws of the United States, I hereby declare that the national emergency has existed since September 11, 2004, and,
pursuant to the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), I intend to utilize the following statutes: sections
123, 123a, 527, 2201(c), 12006, and 12302 of title 10, United States Code, and sections 331, 359, and 367 of title 14,
United States Code. This proclamation immediately shall be published in the Federal Register or disseminated through
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aftermath of what came to be known as “9/11 2” the CIA belatedly discovered that Usama bin Laden and
Al Qaeda had taken shelter in Uzbekistan,465 and President Bush demanded that the Yuldashev regime
either extradite a list of suspects, including Usama bin Laden,466 or else accept responsibility for their
467

actions on the theory of vicarious state responsibility.

Yuldashev, disclaiming any criminal association

with bin Laden, refused to surrender any Muslim suspects without a determination of their guilt in an
Islamic court;468 within a week the Supreme Islamic Court of the Emirate of Uzbekistan “exonerated” bin
Laden and other senior leaders of Al Qaeda of all charges of terrorism.469 Outraged, the President
dispatched several carrier battle groups to the Mediterranean and, at a White House news conference,
declared that “countries like Uzbekistan must know that if they harbor terrorists they cannot complain if
we bomb.”470 Late in 2004, the day after the U.S. announced the major enhancement of the capabilities of
471
472
its special operations forces, a joint U.S.-Israeli intelligence operation determined that several Iraqi

microbiological scientists who had escaped after the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime in April 2003 had
surfaced only to recommence their work in Uzbekistan,473 sparking fears that the Yuldashev regime was
the Emergency Federal Register, and transmitted to the Congress. This proclamation is not intended to create any right
or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party against the United States, its agencies, its officers, or
any person. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this fourteenth day of September, in the year of
our Lord two thousand four, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and twentyninth. GEORGE W. BUSH
th
th
(Patterned after the Declaration of the same title issued on September 14 , 2001 in response to the attacks on September 11 ).
464
In a Joint Resolution dated September 12, 2004, Congress, recognizing in a series of “whereas” clauses the right to selfdefense, the threat posed by terrorist attacks to the “national security” of the U.S., and the “inherent powers of the President to
take action to deter and prevent acs of international terrorism” against U.S. interests, passed legislation authorizing “the use of all
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons [the President] determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2004, in order to prevent any future acts of terrorism
against the United States.” See (note). The Joint Resolution further authorized the President to “use United States Armed Forces
against those responsible for the recent attacks launched against U.S. nationals, property, and interests in Central Asia” and
provided that such authorization was consistent with the requirements of the War Powers Resolution. (note).
465
The sheltering of members of other tribes is an ancient Central Asian tradition followed by contemporary terrorists of the
region that is agnostic as to the moral virtue, or lack thereof, of the guest, and it was this tradition which in part provided the basis
for the Taliban to provide sanctuary to Usama bin Laden. See Tim McGirk, Pakistan Seizes a Suspect in the U.S. Embassy
Bombings, TIME, Aug. 31, 1998, at 34 (reporting that the Taliban reluctance to release bin Laden stemmed from a Central Asian
tradition so absolutist that it mandates sheltering from their pursuers “even your own worst enemy or a murderer[.]”).
466
Usama bin Laden, the mastermind, financier, and spiritual leader of Al Qaeda, has been in hiding for over a decade and has
declared a jihad against all U.S. citizens and interests. See El-Ayouty, supra note_, at 492 (noting issuance of a fatwa, or
religious commandment, by bin Laden in 1996 calling for war of genocide against Americans).
467
See Michael Lacey, Self- Defense or Self-Denial: The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 10 IND. INT’L & COMP.
L. REV. 293, 305 (presenting the argument that states are responsible for the actions of terrorist groups they permit to operate
within their borders on a theory of vicarious state responsibility).
468
This is the precise position taken by the Taliban regime with respect to bin Laden and other members of Al Qaeda upon the
U.S. demand for their extradition to the United States in 1998. See Taliban Willing to Discuss What to Do With Osama bin
Laden, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Aug. 29, 1998 (reporting an agreement reached with the Taliban to try members of Al
Qaeda in an Islamic court provided the U.S. provided credible evidence).
469
See Afghans Silence but Won’t Expel bin Laden, SUN SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Feb. 13, 1999, at 32A (reporting the
acquittal of bin Laden in a Taliban court).
470
See Hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Fed. News Service, Oct.
8, 1998, at 1 (testimony of U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan) (cited in Stephanie R. Nicolas, Negotiating in the Shadow of
Outlaws, 9 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 385, 392 (2000)).
471
The U.S. Special Operations Command [“SOCOM”], headquarted at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida, has been the
recipient of greatly increased budgets since 2000, with much of the resources dedicated to procurement of troops and weapons
systems for the War on Terror. See Thom Shanker, Jump in Elite Forces’ Budget Foreseen, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2003, at A10.
472
Israeli collaboration with U.S. intelligence operations in Iraq was critical in unmasking Iraqi concealment of its WMD
programs in the late 1990s. See Allison Van Lear, Loud Talk About a Quiet Issue: The International Atomic Energy Agency’s
Struggle to Maintain the Confidentiality of Information Gained in Nuclear Facility Inspections, 28 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
349, 355-56 (2000) (detailing extensive U.S.-Israeli intelligence coordination in the context of the UNSCOM inspections in Iraq).
473
Despite coalition efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of and debrief Iraqi weapons scientists, many of the senior Iraqi weapons
scientists are as yet unaccounted for. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union, many Russian scientists who had been detailed to
biological weapons programs dispersed to China, Syria, Iran, and Egypt, ostensibly to resume such work in those states. See
Annual Report: Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements 9,
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developing biological weapons.

The following week the Uzbeki government official responsible for

weapons programs defected while at a conference in London, corroborating CIA reports and providing
additional details, including partial information about Al Qaeda plans to deploy BWs in reservoirs across
the U.S.475 The Director of Homeland Security,476 in consultation with the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency,477 estimated that Uzbekistan was less than ninety days from testing its arsenal478 and ordered his
staff to begin planning the declaration of martial law and the commandeering of vaccinations.479
http://www.acda.gov/reports/annual/comp97.htm. It is not inconceivable that Iraqi weapons scientists might seek other
employment opportunities in their field in states able and willing to pay for their services and shelter them from apprehension.
474
Poisonous weapons, a subset of WMD, are organized into three categories: 1) biological weapons [“BWs”] (consisting of
living organisms, whether bacteria or viruses, disseminated for ingestion by a target population to create an epidemic, which are
capable of auto-reproduction), such as anthrax, cholera, ebola, plague, and yellow fever; 2) toxins (consisting of harmful
substances produced by living organisms but which are not themselves living organisms and are thus incapable of reproduction),
such as botulim and staphylococcus; and 3) chemical agents (consisting of inorganic, harmful substances), such as mustard gas
and chlorine. See Matthew S. Meselson, Chemical and Biological Weapons, SCIENTIFIC AM., May, 1970, at 303 (discussing
taxonomy of poisonous weapons); James R. Ferguson, Biological Weapons and U.S. Law, 278 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 357, 359
(1997) (discussing various categories of infectious and toxic agents).
BWs, the first category of poisonous weapons, vary in lethality, incubation period, and their capacity for diffusion.
David R. Franz, Clinical Recognition and Management of Patients Exposed to Biological Warfare Agents, 278 J. AM. MED.
ASSOC. 399 (1997). They are typically delivered by bombs and other systems that cause the lethal organisms to disperse as
aerosolized particles, although they can also be delivered by terrorists using less sophisticated means, including the use of cropdusting aircraft, in the air circulation systems of large buildings, in food and water supplies, and by mail. Raymond A. Zilinskas,
Iraq’s Biological Weapons: The Past as Future, 278 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 418, 420 (1997) (listing traditional methods of
delivery of BW); Jeffrey D. Simon, Biological Terrorism: Preparing to Meet the Threat, J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 428, 429 (1997)
(discussing methods of dissemination of BW by terrorists). Even the most lethal agents are difficult to control due to the
complexities in managing their wind dispersal patterns. John D. Steinbruner, Biological Weapons: A Plague Upon All Houses,
109 FOR. POL’Y 85, 87-88 (1997-98). As a consequence, many states have foresworn BWs and destroyed existing stockpiles
and turned to other weapons systems for strategic defense. See Scott Keefer, International Control of Biological Weapons, 6
ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 107,108-09 (1999) (discussing trend towards demilitarization in field of BWs since late 1960s).
However, despite their inherent unpredictability, BWs are potentially very effective weapons to terrorist organizations.
BWs, the “poor man’s atomic bomb,” are tremendously lethal in small quantities and can thus be ported and distributed to great
operational effective without the use of significant manpower. See Robert P. Kadlec et al., Biological Weapons Control:
Prospects and Implications for the Future, 278 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 351, 351 (1997) (discussing the aspects of BWs that
render them especially suited to use by terrorists, including lethality and portability); DOD News Briefing, M2 PRESSWIRE,
July 9, 1998, available in 1998 WL 14095268 (“Five pounds of anthrax, properly dispersed, would kill over 200,000 in
Washington, D.C.”); see also Vaccine Improves Odds Against Anthrax, REGULATORY INTELLIGENCE DATABASE, Apr. 6,
1998, available in 1998 WL 194056 (F.D.C.H.) (“When inhaled, an unvaccinated, unprotected person has about a one percent
chance of surviving a concentrated anthrax exposure.”) (discussing the chance of survival after inhaling anthrax used as a
biological weapon). Moreover, as their effects are often not observed for days, the radius of lethality can expand to cover a wide
target population as victims, unaware of their condition, move about, continuously infecting others. Id. Further, BWs are
relatively simple and cost-effective to produce, and they can be manufactured in otherwise innocuous-seeming facilities such as
pharmaceutical laboratories, light industrial facilities, and even in civilian residential infrastructure. See David G. Gray, “Then
the Dogs Died”: The Fourth Amendment and Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 567, 574
(1994) (discussing the relative ease of producing chemical weapons and BWs). Because BWs can be readily produced in these
“dual-use” facilities (facilities that have a second, or “dual,” purpose other than their military character) it is difficult to detect
their manufacture and easy to deny the same. See Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin Laden, 24
YALE J. INT’L L. 559, 559-60 (1999) (discussing the ease with which any dual-purpose production facility can be readily
converted from the manufacture of chemical weapons or BWs to the production of pharmaceutical drugs).
475
See Burrus M. Carnahan, Protecting Nuclear Facilities from Military Attack: Prospects After the Gulf War, 86 AM. J. INT’L
L. 524, 524 (1992) (indicating that a primary method of verification of human intelligence reports with regard to the existence of
clandestine WMD programs has been defector reports); see also Vernon Loeb, Iraqi Defector Says Saddam Was Near to Building
A-Bomb, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2000, at A2 (reporting that reports of the chief Iraqi nuclear scientist, Khidir Hamza, who
defected to the U.S., were instrumental in establishing proof of the status of Iraqi efforts to obtain nuclear weapons).
476
The Department of Homeland Security [“DHS”] was created on Oct. 8, 2001, to develop and coordinate the implementation of
a comprehensive national strategy to secure the U.S. from terrorist threats or attacks. See The White House, the Office of
Homeland Security, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/
477
Over the past seven years the U.S. perception of the threat posed by BWs has transformed dramatically. Whereas BWs were
once conceived of as a weapon unlikely ever to be used by virtue of their possession solely by the Soviet Union and perhaps a
handful of other states against which the deterrent threat posed by U.S. nuclear weapons was sufficient, the troubling diffusion of
BWs has altered U.S. calculations. In 1996, Congress passed legislation in recognition of the fact that the U.S. lacked adequate
plans and countermeasures to defeat the threat posed by the possession of BWs by terrorists and rogue states. See Defense
Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, 50 U.S.C. §§2301—66 (1996) [“DAWMDA”]. The Nunn-Lugar
Amendment to DAWMDA included significant Congressional findings that supported establishment of a specialized agency
th
tasked to meet this threat. See Nunn-Lugar Amendment No. 4349, S. 1745, 104 Cong. (1996) (noting that no specific response
unit existed for emergencies involving chemical or biological weapons). After President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,868
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This revelation did not catch the U.S. completely by surprise: although Uzbekistan ratified the
Biological Weapons Convention [“BWC”] in 1996,480 this was not the first time an avowed member of a
non-proliferation treaty had violated the terms of its membership by producing the prohibited weapons in
question,481 and the notion that a small and impoverished state could inflict massive devastation upon the
U.S. had been on the minds of policymakers for over a decade.482 However, the BWC did not of its own
effect constitute prior authorization of the use of military force to ensure compliance,483 and the 2001
declaring a national emergency in response to the “unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and
economy of the United States” posed by the proliferation of WMD, Congress expressed the sense that the use of WMD was an
“abhorrent” act in contravention of international law that “should trigger immediate and effective sanctions.” See Chemical and
th
st
Biological Weapons Threat Reduction Act of 1997, S.495, 105 Cong., 1 Sess. (1997) (finding further, throughout Title II,
§207(a), that the “threats posed in chemical and biological weapons to the United States Armed Forces deployed in regions of
concern will continue to grow . . .” that “the use of chemical and biological weapons will be a likely condition of future conflicts
in regions of concern,” and that “the United States Armed Forces should make countering the use of chemical and biological
weapons an organizing principle for U.S. defense strategy and for the development of force structure, doctrine, planning, training,
and exercising policies of the United States Armed Forces.”). Despite these legislative and executive statements of policy, by
1998 little concrete progress had been made to enhance preparedness against an attack against the U.S. using BWs. See U.S.
Lags in Biological Warfare Protection Threat Said to Be On the Rise, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 27, 1997, at
A6 (stating that “the United States is poorly prepared to defend its armed forces from the rising threat of germ warfare attack and
lags even more in protecting Americans at home.”).
In March 1998, however, a then-secret executive branch conference revealed the magnitude of U.S. unpreparedness,
and in October 1998 the Department of Defense merged several agencies to create the Defense Threat Reduction Agency with
the mission to address the problem of growing weapons proliferation and the threat from WMD in the possession of terrorist
groups and rogue nations. Dep’t of Defense, Establishment of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Research Intelligence
Database, Oct. 1, 1998 (transcript of the Department of Defense announcement on the establishment of the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency). According to then-Secretary of Defense William Cohen, “Today’s harsh reality is too powerful to ignore: at
least 25 countries have, or are in the process of developing, nuclear, biological or chemical weapons and the means to deliver
them . . . We must confront these threats in places like Baghdad before they come to our shores.” Id. The Director of DRTA,
upon assuming his post, warned that “[t]he deterrent capability of the United States is still very effective against national states . .
. [but] . . . it’s not so clear that it has the same effect on transnational organizations.” New U.S. Agency to Deal with Weapons of
Mass Destruction Threat, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 2, 1998 (cited in Matthew Linkie, The Defense Threat Reduction
Agency: A Note on the United States’ Approach to the Threat of Chemical and Biological Warfare, 16 J. CONTEMP. H. L.&
POL’Y 531, 532 n.8 (2000)). Although DTRA has centralized responsibility for enhancing U.S. capacities to respond to and
deter BW attacks launched against the U.S., the employment, by terrorist groups, of BWs against the U.S. remains the most
immediate and serious threat facing the nation. EISENDRATH, supra note_, at 15.
478
See Michael Lacey, Self-Defense or Self-Denial: The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 10 IND. INT’L & COMP.
L. REV. 293, 293 (positing, in a fictional scenario, a U.S. strike to eliminate the weapons program of a terrorist group on the
ground that the terrorist group was only three months’ removed from developing operational nuclear weapons).
479
In the event of a terrorist attack with BWs upon the U.S., the probable response of the U.S. government would include the
declaration of martial law, the closure of federal and State borders, and the commandeering of vaccines. ASSOC. PRESS,
Martial Law Possible in Biological Terror Scenario, Aug. 4, 2001; see also Telephone Interview with Cliff Ong, State of Indiana
Director of Counterterrorism and Homeland Security, August 16, 2003).
480
See Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and
on their Destruction, entry into force 1975 [“BWC”] (prohibiting the production and stockpiling of BWs). The earliest positive
legal prohibition on BWs was found in the Lieber Code, which prohibited the use of poisonous weapons. See Lieber Code, supra
note_, at Art. 16. However, current prohibitions and regulations derive from the instruments of IHL governing chemical
weapons, which preceded BWs to the arsenals of belligerents. The Hague Convention (IV) of 1907 (supra note_ at Art. 23(a)
specifically forbade the employment of poisoned weapons by parties to that convention, and the use of “bacteriological methods
of warfare” (although not the development of BWs) was prohibited after WWI. See Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in
War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571,
T.I.A.S. No. 8061. The BWC, which entered into force in 1972, is currently the primary legal instrument governing BWs. It
prohibits the development, stockpiling, and use of biological weapons, and it has been ratified by almost 150 states. For a list of
parties to the BWC, see http://disarmament.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf.
481
See David Sloss, It’s Not Broken, So Don’t Fix It: The International Atomic Energy Safeguards System and the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 841, 842 (noting that Iraq, during the 1970s and 1980s, was able to conduct a
clandestine nuclear weapons program even while a non-nuclear weapon state-member of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty).
482
See Michael Mandelbaum, Lessons of the Next Nuclear War, FOR. AFF. 22 (Mar.-Apr. 1995) (“It doesn’t take a superpower
to pose a nuclear threat. A small, poor country with a few [WMD] and the means to deliver them could wreak terrible damage on
the United States.”).
483
See Fred C. Ikle, The New Germ Warfare Treaty is a Fraud, WALL ST. J., Jul. 27, 2001 (reporting the frustration of the Bush
Administration with the lack of provisions to enforce the BWC). The lack of enforcement provisions is characteristic of
conventions designed to prevent the proliferation and use of WMD. See Scott Silliman, Symposium: Contemporary Issues in
Controlling Weapons of Mass Destruction, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 2 (1997) (noting that IHL instruments regulating
WMD, including the BWC, lack enforcement mechanisms); see also Linkie, supra note_, at 553-54 (describing more generally
the shortcomings of international law in guiding states seeking to control the threat of WMD due to a lack of explicit enforcement
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collapse of the BWC Protocol, which would have appended enforcement mechanisms to the treaty, left
the U.S. in search of multilateral enforcement mechanisms to secure Uzbeki compliance with the BWC.
Uzbekistan categorically denied possession of WMD, and U.S. pressure to permit inspection and
verification led the UN Secretary General to dispatch a delegation at the invitation of Uzbekistan.
However, Yuldashev ejected the UN weapons inspectors after three days, declaring that they were in fact
U.S. intelligence officers,485 and further requests to inspect were met with demands for financial assistance
as a precondition. When the U.S. and Britain sought to have the problem defined in the Security Council
as a threat to international peace and security486 and to have Yuldashev declared criminally responsible for
his breach of the BWC,487 critics of the U.S., domestic as well as foreign demanded proof, which the U.S.,
unwilling to jeopardize the sources and methods whereby it had developed its information and unwilling

provisions in relevant conventions and the legal and political difficulties in drafting and applying military sanctions to violators).
Although the U.S. contemplated invading Iraq in 1997 to eliminate WMD in possession of the Hussein government and did in
fact do so in 2003, the legal authority upon which it relied was not any enforcement provision of any IHL instrument but rather
relevant Security Council resolutions. See Thomas C. Wingfield, The Chemical Weapons Convention and the Military
Commander: Protecting Very Large Secrets in a Transparent Era, 162 MIL. L. REV. 180, 180 (1999) (discussing legal sources
of justification for U.S. plans to eradicate Iraqi WMD in the mid-1990s).
484
Ironically, although the U.S. was at the forefront of efforts to create a Protocol that would create mechanisms to monitor and
enforce state compliance with the BWC, it was American objections to verification and enforcement mechanisms proposed at the
Fourth Review Conference of the BWC that doomed the long-anticipated Protocol. For the U.S., a proposal that would have
obligated states-parties to declare whether they possessed BW defense programs and, if so, to submit to random site visits that
would include not only defense installations but such potentially dual-use facilities as pharmaceutical plants and medical research
facilities, was “incurably flawed” on the grounds that, inter alia, it would threaten national security and reveal pharmaceutical
industrial secrets without contributing to the enforcement of the BWC. See Ambassador Donald Mahley, U.S. Special Negotiator
for Chemical and Biological Arms Control Issues, Statement by the United Nations to the Ad Hoc Group of Biological Weapons
Convention States Parties, Geneva, Switz. (Jul. 25, 2001), at http://www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/rm/2001/5497.htm (presenting grounds
upon with the Bush Administration rejected the proposed BWC Protocol); see also Alexander Higgins, U.S. Rejects Anti-Germ
Warfare Accord, ASSOC. PRESS, Jul. 25, 2001 (“In our assessment, the draft protocol would put national security and
confidential business information at risk.” (quoting Ambassador Mahley). Although a majority of the 56 states in attendance
favored adopting the Protocol, an instrument that represented the fruits of 7 years’ negotiation, following the U.S. withdrawal
from the Review Conference talks were suspended. Germ Warfare Talks Suspended: U.S. Pullout Makes Accord Useless,
Delegates Say, ASSOC. PRESS, Aug. 4, 2001. Many commentators expressed outrage at the U.S. position; UN Secretary
General Kofi Annan stated that the U.S. is “practically standing alone in opposition to agreements that were broadly reached by
just about everyone else” and urged the U.S. to “close ranks with the rest of the international community.” Id. To date, talks
have not resumed, and the BWC continues to lack any enforcement provisions.
485
When UNSCOM, the UN team of weapons inspectors dispatched by the Secretary-General to locate Iraqi WMD, began to
make progress in late 1998, Iraq responded by ejecting UNSCOM and declaring that some of its members were espionage agents
of the U.S. Allison Van Lear, Loud Talk About a Quiet Issue: The International Atomic Energy Agency’s Struggle to Maintain
the Confidentiality of Information Gained in Nuclear Facility Inspections, 28 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 349, 354-55 (2000).
Although it is unclear whether there was any substance to the allegation, it provided justification and political cover for an action
that might well have otherwise precipitated a swift, decisive military response to force Iraq to submit to inspection. Id. at 356-59.
486
When the UN Security Council makes the finding that a situation constitutes a “threat to international peace and security,”
under the Charter of the United Nations the Security Council is empowered to take any of a series of escalating measures in
response, ranging from the creation of an investigative and advisory commission to the imposition of an economic embargo on
the offending state and ultimately to the authorization of the use of force against the offender. See Charter of the United Nations,
supra note_, at Arts. 36-43. However, even where a threat to international peace and security is apparent, a Security Council
response depends upon the political will of its members and cannot be presumed. See Ruth Wedgwood, The Enforcement of
Security Council Resolution 687: The Threat of Force Against Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 724,
728 (noting that despite the ongoing threat to peace and security posed by Iraqi refusal to permit weapons inspections are
required by UNSCR 687, the Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan, insisted that ‘some sort of consultation with other
members” was required before enforcement action could be undertaken).
487
The issuance of a UN Security Council resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, indicating international condemnation
of a particular individual and expressing the intent to hold him criminally responsible for his actions, is effectively an
international “arrest warrant,” and one such warrant was the catalyst for the U.S.-led mission to capture Mohammed Farah
th
Aideed, the warlord responsible for the conflict in Somalia, in October 1993. See UNSCR 865, U.N. SCOR, 3280 mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/865 (1993) (condemning attacks on UN personnel and “reaffirm[ing] that those who have committed or ordered the
commission of such criminal acts will be held individually responsible for them.”). Although refusal to permit international
inspections is not in and of itself a criminal act under IHL, it can be considered evidence of potential violations of legal
obligations. See Robert A. Bailey, Why Do States Violate the Law of War?: A Comparison of Iraqi Violations in Two Gulf Wars,
27 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L/ & COM. 103, 112 (2000) (making this assertion).
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to spend months making such a demonstration, was hesitant to provide.

A Russian-Chinese-French

489

bloc prevented the issue from coming to a vote, and with Iraq and Iran sitting as heads of the UN
Disarmament Committee490 and no further assistance forthcoming in the UN system, the U.S. shifted
diplomatic gears and attempted to assemble a “coalition of the willing” to compel Uzbeki compliance,
491

commencing with NATO and U.S.-allied Islamic states.

However, in the absence of a Security Council

resolution authorizing force, only Britain, Australia, Italy, Poland, and Croatia, states with whom the U.S.
had shared all or some of its sensitive intelligence, committed to a U.S.-led coalition,492 and in a press
conference denouncing NATO and Security Council inaction the President of the U.S. warned that “any
country who would threaten . . . our people with . . . biological weapons . . . [will] be met with a
devastating response that would be quite swift and overwhelming.”493

488

The production of proof that a state is in possession of prohibited weapons is a time-consuming process made all the more so
by the machinery of the UN system. See Post-Cold War International Security Threats: Terrorism, Drugs, and Organized Crime
Symposium, MICH. J. INT’L L. 655, 716 (discussing bureaucratic inefficiencies and glacial pace of the UN system); Michael A.
Lysobey, How Iraq Maintained its Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs: An Analysis of the Disarmament of Iraq and the
Legal Enforcement Options of the United Nations Security Council in 1997-1998, 5 U.C.L.A. J. INT’L L. & FOR. AFF. 135,
152-53 (2000) (describing determination of material breaches of peace and security as “plodding” and subject to the “whim of
whatever political and economic factors are motivating the Council.”). Moreover, proof requires the sharing of intelligence,
something states are loathe to do with all but their closest allies for fear that revelation of the evidence will permit deductions as
to how the evidence was acquired (methods) and by whom (sources), as well as the possibility that reviewers sympathetic to the
target might share the intelligence with the target. Sara N. Scheideman, Standards of Proof in Forcible Responses to Terrorism,
50 Syracuse L. Rev. 249 (2000); see also Linkie, supra note_, at 573 (explaining that the U.S. cannot reveal all its evidence
without compromising the human intelligence sources, who may be placed within terrorist organizations or supply networks, or
disclosing its methods of interception and decryption of enemy communications); Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism:
The Strikes Against bin Laden, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 559, 567 (1999) (“[I]n the midst of a . . . war, a country defending its
territory and its nationals will rarely be able to disclose intelligence sources in a public forum.”). Moreover, even after reviewing
the evidence, states unwilling on other grounds to approve a proposed military operation to sanction the state in violation are far
less likely to concede that the proferred evidence is probative of the existence of the weapons in possession of the accused state.
Id. Despite its post-hoc production of physical evidence that the Sudanese Al Shifa facility it destroyed had been producing
chemical precursors for VX nerve gas, the U.S. continued to face claims, contrary to the evidence, that the facility was engaged
in the benign purpose of producing animal feed and that the U.S. strike was an unlawful reprisal. Linkie, supra note_, at 569.
For a discussion of this case, see Pentagon and C.I.A. Defend Sudan Missile Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1998, at A5; Serge
Schmemann, U.S. Fury on Two Continents, How Can Terror Best Be Combatted, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1998, at A11.
489
Russian, Chinese, and French opposition to military action to enforce relevant Security Council Resolutions requiring Iraq to
disarm prevented the use of UN collective security, and thus upon the Iraqi suspension of UNSCOM activity in August 1998 the
UN, rather than impose the “unavoidable and explicit” military consequences promised, was left in the position of offering Iraq
financial inducements to comply. See generally Lysobey, supra note_, at 101 (discussing the failure of collective security and
enforcement of Security Council resolutions in the case of Iraq).
490
Ironically, Iraq and Iran—states which have been sanctioned for the use and possession of WMD and which are both suspected
of currently possessing WMD—were co-chairs of UN Conference on Disarmament, the UN agency responsible for monitoring
compliance with nonproliferation treaties, from January through June 2003, during which time Iraq was in material breach of
numerous UN Security Council resolutions requiring its disarmament.
491
See El-Ayouty, supra note_, at 496 (recommending that the U.S. create a pan-Islamic military force to acquire both the
military strength, intelligence cooperation, and political legitimacy necessary to defeat Islamic terrorists).
492
The legal justifications for the use of force against Iraq in the period between the ceasefire in March 1991 and the overthrow of
the Hussein regime in April 2003 (Second Gulf War) were twofold: 1) UN Security Council Resolution 687 of April 3, 1991,
which expressly linked the ceasefire ending the First Gulf War with “unconditional . . . acceptance” of the elimination of WMD
and verification by UNSCOM (see UNSC Res. 687 (April 3, 1991), 30 ILM 847 (1991)), and 2) the continued Iraqi violation of
the terms of the ceasefire by virtue of the continued possession of WMD, which violation constitutes an ongoing threat to the
peace and security the restoration of which UN members were authorized, by UNSC Res. 687 to effect. See Wedgwood, supra
note_, at 724 (1998) (discussing legal justifications for coalition operations against Iraq). In other words, everything hinged upon
UNSCR 687; in the absence of Security Council authorization, military operations against Iraq could have been justified, under
the Charter framework, only by a claim of self-defense which would be more difficult to support on the ground that the evidence
necessary would have been proof of the existence of Iraqi WMD coupled with an Iraqi intent to use those weapons. It is
precisely this evidence that has yet to surface even after several months’ occupation of Iraq, and precisely this sort of evidence
that, in the scenario in this Article, the U.S. is unwilling to publicly disclose.
493
See Frontline: Interviews: William S. Cohen, 3-4
(http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/plague/interviews/cohen.html) (cited in Keefer, supra note_, at 114) (quoting
the former Secretary of Defense with respect to responses to the use of WMD against the U.S.).
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On January 3, 2005, electronic intercepts of telephone and radio communications between senior
members of Al Qaeda and Uzbeki officials corroborated the reports of U.S. agents within the Uzbeki
opposition that the Namangani regime and Al Qaeda were collaborating on the production and planned
use of BWs,494 and the next day a Special National Intelligence Estimate495 presented by the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency [“DCIA”] to the President concluded that the Government of Uzbekistan, in
consortium with Al Qaeda, was producing and stockpiling weapons-grade anthrax and ebola in an ancient
mosque in a densely populated urban neighborhood496 in Namangan (a city of 430,000 in the northern
Fergana Valley),497 that Usama bin Laden had ordered a wave of BW attacks on major U.S. cities to
commence with the inauguration of the President on January 20th, and that in preparation the stockpiled
weapons were to be moved to Al Qaeda cells in the U.S. within 48 hours.498 After a brief discussion with
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [“CJCS”] and the National Security Adviser, the President,
concerned about the repercussions of failure and the possibility that members of Congress might delay
and even refuse his proposals, rejected overt military options499 and ordered CJCS to present plans to
494

The National Security Agency [“NSA”], the federal agency charged with the protection of U.S. government communications
and the interception of foreign communications, or SIGINT, intercepted and decoded exchanges between the Qadhaffi regime
and the Libyan People’s Bureau in East Berlin, including an order from Libya to carry out a terrorist attack on U.S. military
personnel, a response that the attack would occur the next day, a confirmation of the attack, and assurance that the attack was
untraceable. See Bob Woodward & Patrick E. Tyler, Libyan Cables Intercepted and Decoded, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1986, at
A1. NSA monitors the communications of enemy states and terrorist organizations for the purpose of countering hostile
intentions and acts. See http://www.nsa.gov.
495
A Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) is a judgmental assessment based on a consensus of the intelligence
community as to a time urgent and specific problem that presents a grave threat to national security.
496
The siting of military facilities within civilian areas makes it inordinately difficult for attacking forces to preserve the principle
of distinction and separate civilians from military objectives. See supra at note_ (discussing principle of distinction). The
objective of actors who situate such facilities is to effectively remove legitimate military objectives from the list of those targets
an adversary committed to preservation of innocent life will choose to attack. For a discussion of this strategy, see infra at note_.
497
Electronic interception of communications between officials at the Al Shifa factory and Iraqi weapons scientists corroborated
the role of Al Shifa in the production and transshipment of chemical weapons, and similar intercepts revealed the possibility that
a facility in a populated suburb of Khartoum, Sudan, was being established as a production center for WMD. Linkie, supra
note_, at 571. On the strength of this intelligence, President Clinton ordered the destruction of both facilities. See President
William Jefferson Clinton, Remarks on Departure for Washington, D.C., from Martha’s Vineyard, Massachusetts, 34 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 1642 (Aug. 20, 1998). The production and storage of WMD in densely populated civilian centers, a
strategy designed to safeguard prohibited weapons from preemptive attack, is of particular concern in IHL. See infra at notes_.
498
A congressional investigation suggests up to 70,000 members trained by Al Qaeda are in the U.S. prepared to initiate terrorist
missions on command. David Pace, Up to 120,000 Were Trained by al-Qaida, Senator Says, ASSOC. PRESS, Jul. 14, 2003.
499
While an overt military strike against a “rogue state . . . producing biological weapons at a clandestine factory which are to be
used in a terrorist action against the United States” would, particularly if approved by the UN Security Council, satisfy the
requirements of IHL with respect to the right under jus ad bellum to undertake military action, to conduct operations openly,
particularly if preceded by “elaborate discussions in the Security Council with a view to agreeing on some coordinated response
or authorization for a unilateral action[,]” would “alert the rogue state, allowing it the time to take evasive action and increasing
the likelihood and extent of casualties which would be suffered by the state contemplating the preemptive action.” Reisman,
supra note_, at 17-18; see also Johnson, supra note_, at 303-04 (stating that in the case of potential attack by WMD, the need to
act with alacrity and the languid pace of diplomatic negotiations may dictate that covert operations, even where unauthorized by
the UN, are preferrable to all other policy options, especially large-scale overt operations that increase the likelihood of civilian
casualties). To maintain the secrecy essential to limiting casualties and to mission success, covert operations are preferred in
such circumstances. See Wedgwood, supra note_, at 567 (stating that the political advantage of submitting military operational
plans to multilateral bodies such as the UN for approval is more than outweighed by the compromise of secrecy and that by
publicizing operational plans “[a] country may even have to reshape its military operations in order to avoid alerting the
enemy[.]”). Moreover, covert operations are perhaps less likely to be perceived by other states, if their existence ever becomes
publicly known and acknowledged, as the sort of serious “assaults on the international order” that unauthorized overt military
interventions, which tend to be undertaken on a far broader scale and for a much more extended duration and with far greater
effects, are often claimed to constitute. See Loch K. Johnson, On Drawing a Bright Line for Covert Operations, 86 AM. J.
INT’L L. 284, 284-85 (1992) (explaining that covert operations tend to be of more limited scope, intensity, duration, and
discoverability than overt operations, and are consequently less likely to arouse hostile scrutiny). Covert operations can also
confer domestic political benefits: they need reduce risks, minimize losses in lives and treasure, and are less likely to be revealed
in the event of their failure, thus creating less domestic political liability than overt military operations, and they “give Presidents
[who need not report them to Congress until after the fact] freedom from . . . difficult and annoying democratic constraints.”
EISENDRATH, ED., supra note_, at 83. Thus, even if overt options might generally more defensible, legally and politically,
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conduct a covert operation with the primary mission the destruction of the BWs and the secondary
objective the capture or elimination of bin Laden if found at or near the target.501 The plan provided that
the neither the participation of U.S. Armed Forces nor responsibility for the results was to be attributed to
the U.S. until the President authorized such disclosure. The proposed rules of engagement [“ROEs”]502

than covert operations, and even as a “more honorable option[,]” there are circumstances where covert operations are preferred as
policy options, and legal and political arguments in support of the choice to operate covertly. Johnson, supra note_, at 305.
500
A “mission” is “the primary task assigned to an individual, unit, or force” and “the elements of who, what, when, where, and
the reason therefore[.]” DEP’T ARMY, FM 101-5-1, OPERATIONAL TERMS AND SYMBOLS 1-47 (21 Oct. 1985).
501
As a matter of international law, most commentators conclude that the policy of killing terrorist leaders, whether labeled
assassination or simply an act of anticipatory self-defense, does not contravene convention or custom. See J. Nicholas Kendall,
Israeli Counter-Terrorism: “Targeted Killings” Under International Law, _N. C. L. REV. 1069, 1070 (2002) (arguing that
although customary IHL prohibits assassination of the civilian political leadership of states, it does not prohibit the killing of
terrorists in self-defense under the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense); Louis Rene Beres, On International Law and Nuclear
Terrorism, 24 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 29, 33 (1994) (same). Domestic law is somewhat more restrictive: Executive Order
No. 12,333, promulgated by President Ronald Reagan, provides that “[n]o person employed by or acting on behalf of the [U.S.]
shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination.” E.O. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (1981). However, assassination may
well “offer the best available remedy” in combating terrorism. Louis R. Beres, The Permissibility of State-Sponsored
Assassination During Peace and War, 5 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L. J. 231, 249 (1991); see alsoThwarting Terrorist Acts by
Attacking the Perpetrators or their Commanders as an Act of Self-Defense: Human Rights Versus the State’s Duty to Protect its
Citizens, TEMPLE INT’L & COMP. L. J. 195, 229 (discussing utility of a policy of assassination of terrorists). Moreover,
precisely what is meant by “assassination” is unclear, as EO 12,333 does not provide any insight into the meaning of, or the
limitations on, assassination. W. Hays Parks, Memorandum of Law: Executive Order 12,333 and Assassination, ARMY LAW.,
Dec. 1999, at 4, 4, 7 (contending that the fact that the U.S. has continued post-EO 12,333 to engage in “the use of military force
to capture or kill individuals whose peacetime actions constitute a direct threat to U.S. citizens or U.S. national security” suggests
that the order is meant to have limited applicability); Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126
MIL. L. REV. 89, 119 (1989) (arguing that the killing of terrorists are lawful acts undertaken in self defense and not
assassinations, which term implies killing civilian political leaders for political, rather than military, purposes); Patricia Zengel,
Assassination and the Law of Armed Conflict, 43 MERCER L. REV. 615, 635 (1992) (stating that the definitional ambiguity
attached to the term “assassination” allows for a flexible approach that “leaves potential adversaries unsure as to exactly what
action the U.S. might be prepared to take if sufficiently provoked”). Accordingly, several Presidents have claimed the right to
assassinate leaders and members of terrorist organizations and have issued policy guidance to the Department of Defense to this
effect. See David E. Sanger, Bin Laden is Wanted in Attacks, “Dead or Alive,” President Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2001, at
A1 (quoting President Bush in speech to Department of Defense officials on Sept. 17, 2001 as granting authority to the Armed
Forces to kill , rather than capture, bin Laden); Paul Richter, Clinton Administration Reserves Right to Assassinate Terrorists,
MINN. STAR TRIB., Oct. 30, 1998, at A23. Consequently, the U.S. Army maintains that “the clandestine, low visibility, or
overt use of force against legitimate targets in time of war, or against similar targets in time of peace, where such individuals or
groups pose an immediate threat . . . does not constitute assassination.” Alan Einisman, Ineffectiveness at Its Best: Fighting
Terrorism with Economic Sanctions, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 299, 323 (2000) (citing U.S. Army sources).
502
“Rules of engagement,” or “ROEs,” are statements of the means and methods by which the military chain of command
authorizes subordinates to employ military force against specific targets and limits the degree of permissible force. F.M. Lorenz,
Law and Anarchy in Somalia, 23 PARAMETERS 27, 29 (1993-94); see also JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF PUBLICATION 1-02,
DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (23 Mar. 1994) (defining ROEs as “[d]irectives issued by military authority
which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States Forces will initiate and/or continue combat
engagement with other forces encountered.”). ROEs are drafted, disseminated, and interpreted by JAG officers in collaboration
with combat commanders and their staffs. Standard ROEs, which conventional soldiers carry into battle on printed cards, direct
soldiers to engage armed civilians only in self-defense, to arrange the evacuation of civilians prior to attack where possible, to
obtain approval from proper command authority prior to the use of certain weapons systems, and to use only that degree of force
necessary and proportional to the threat. John Embry Parkerson, United States Compliance with Humanitarian Law Respecting
Civilians During Operation Just Cause, 133 MIL. L. REV. 31, 53-54 (1991); see also Martins, supra note_, at 6 (explaining that
ROEs, regardless of their specific provisions, are interpreted to permit soldiers to use the degree of force “which is required to
decisively counter the hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent and to ensure the continued protection of US forces or other
protected personnel or property.”). ROEs do not preclude the use of force in self-defense; on the contrary, standing ROEs require
members of the Armed Forces to use whatever force is necessary to accomplish what is known as “force protection”. See Joint
Chiefs of Staff Standing Rules of Engagement, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, INSTR. 3121.01A,
STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR U.S. FORCES (15 Jan. 2000) (providing that the right to use force in selfdefense is never limited); U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02, DOD DICTIONARY (23 Mar. 1994)
(updated April 1997) (requiring members of the Armed Forces to participate in force protection, defined as a “[s]ecurity program
designed to protect soldiers, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations,
accomplished through planned and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal
protective services, and supported by intelligence[.]”). Moreover, soldiers are required to remain alert and responsive to changes
in their mission and threat dictated by events, and ROEs are to be interpreted in light of these variables. Mark S. Martins, Rules
of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of Training, Not Lawyering, 143 MIL. L. REV. 1, 1 (1994). Overly restrictive ROEs
can “handicap and endager U.S. forces, especially ground troops[.]” Mark S. Martins, Deadly Force is Authorized, but Also
Trained, 25 ARMY LAW. 1, 1 (2001). Thus, although ROEs are, by nature, restrictive regulations that limit the legal use of
force as a matter of domestic law, ROEs are guidelines, rather than categorical prohibitions, and the interpretation of decisions
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drafted by the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, Task Force Ryan, provided that 1) temporary
detention of noncombatants was authorized for security reasons or in self-defense, but personnel were
advised that enemy combatants were unlikely to be uniformed or to grant quarter; 2) known or suspected
terrorists were to be eliminated if capture was not feasible as inadequate lift capacity was available to
evacuate significant numbers of enemy POWs and the successful completion of the mission precluded
diversion of resources; and 3) best efforts were to be used to prevent civilian casualties and destruction of
civilian property without compromising the requirements of force protection.
Within hours the President, in an operations order limiting civilian access to the National Security
Adviser and DCIA,504 approved a CJCS plan, OPERATION JEREMIAH,505 calling for a Special Forces
assault force to infiltrate Uzbekistan, proceed to and seize the mosque, and destroy the weapons, with
execution to commence within 18 hours. Although the President instructed his staff to “do what needs to
be done and worry about the legal niceties later[,]”506 the White House Office of Legal Counsel drafted a
Memorandum507 outlining relevant legal authority508 and a finding in support of the operation:509
I, President George W. Bush, President of the United States of America, find that the grave acts of violence
committed by foreign terrorists against U.S. nationals and interests, coupled with the possession of
weapons of mass destruction and the intent to use these weapons against the U.S., constitutes an unusual
and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, and
hereby authorize covert action by the Armed Forces of the United States to eliminate this threat.

soldiers make while operating under the restraint of ROEs are “viewed from the perspective of the man on the scene—who may
often be forced to make split-second decisions in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—and without the
advantage of 20/20 hindsight.’” Martins, supra note_, at 5 (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989)).
503
A JAG officer is assigned to draft a classified Legal Annex to each military operation clarifying relevant IHL issues and
providing instruction as to compliance. Bulman, supra note_, at 169.
504
The decision to restrict access to aspects of a military operational plan is consistent with applicable federal law and is
necessary in order to preserve operational security. See Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-433, 100 Stat. 1992 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.) (authorizing classification of
operational plans and restricting access of cabinet officials).
505
See Jeremiah 21:4-6 (“Thus saith the LORD God of Israel; behold, I will turn back the weapons of war that are in your hands,
wherewith ye fight against the king of Babylon, and against the Chaldeans, which besiege you without the walls, and I will
assemble them into the midst of this city. And I myself will fight against you with an outstretched hand and with a strong arm,
even in anger, and in fury, and in great wrath. And I will smite the inhabitants of this city, both man and beast: they shall die of a
great pestilence.”).
506
See ASSOC. PRESS, Martial Law Possible in Biological Terror Scenario, Aug. 4, 2001 (quoting Suzanne Spaulding, former
attorney with the Central Intelligence Agency, on the legal protocol that would in reality be pursued by executive branch officials
responding to a terrorist attack with BWs against the U.S.).
507
For an example of a memorandum of law providing the President with a legal opinion as to the authority of the President to
commit U.S. Armed Forces to engage in operations, see Authority of the President to Use United States Military Forces for the
Protection of Relief Efforts in Somalia, 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 8, Dec. 4, 1992.
508
Among the sources of legal authority cited by the White House Counsel in support of the covert action against Uzbekistan was
a 1996 statute in which Congress found that “the President should use all necessary means, including covert action and military
force, to disrupt, dismantle, and destroy international infrastructure used by international terrorists, including overseas terrorist
training facilities and safe havens[.]” Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §324(4), 110
Stat. 1255 (codified at 22 U.S.C.A. § 2377.
509
Under federal law, the President may not authorize covert operations unless he determines that “such an action is necessary to
support identifiable foreign policy objectives of the United States and is important to the national security[.]” Intelligence
Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 102-88, 105 Stat. 441, Aug. 14, 1991, at §503(a) (requiring that such a finding be in writing
unless time does not permit). However, although special operations forces are frequently used in execution of covert operations,
the mere fact of special operations forces participation in a military mission does not convert a traditional military mission into a
covert operation, which is legally distinct in that the role of the U.S. is intended to remain unacknowledged. Nonetheless,
because a proposed amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991, known as the “Cambone Understanding” after the
sponsor, would redefine all special operations missions as covert operations requiring a Presidential finding as a condition
precedent to their deployment, this scenario incorporates such a finding. Bill Gertz, Congress to Restrict Use of Special Ops,
WASH. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2003 (reporting impending amendment of Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991).
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The next evening—a moonless night—twenty-four U.S. Army Special Forces soldiers of the 3
Special Forces Group, headquarted at the JFK Special Warfare Center in Fort Bragg, North Carolina but
already prepositioned in Afghanistan511 and trained for OPERATION JEREMIAH,512 crossed the border

and parachuted into the arid Alay Mountains in Uzbekistan from MH-53J Pave Low helicopters flown by
th
the 160 Special Operations Aviation Regiment. Upon landing, the two Alpha teams accessed

prepositioned gear and weapons, mounted camouflaged dune buggies, and sped north down the
mountains and through the Fergana Valley, bypassing areas of human settlement toward Namangan. The
heavily-laden teams disembarked on the city outskirts, buried unneeded equipment in a cultivated field,
established communications and received confirmation of their mission, and proceeded on foot the final
several kilometers toward the Central Mosque. As the teams maneuvered through the twisted streets,
several unarmed men in civilian clothing rounded a corner, reacted in surprise, and began running in the
opposite direction, shouting warnings in Uzbeki. After brief hesitation, the commander of the mission
and of Alpha One, Captain James F. Ryan, grandson of Private Ryan, ordered a team member to kill the
would- be messengers. This done, the teams proceeded otherwise unmolested toward their objective.
A dozen lightly armed sentries in Islamic civilian dress, posted in the porticoes, surrounding
gardens, and twin minarets, guarded the compound. Within minutes Alpha One established perimeter
security while Alpha Two moved into position, quickly and quietly eliminated the sentries, and accessed

510

The United States Special Operations Command [“USSOCOM”] was formed on 1 April 1987 and tasked to train and equip
special operations forces as the branch of the Armed Forces with primary responsibility for a variety of rapid-reaction, critical
missions of strategic importance, including, inter alia, counterterrorism. See P.L. 99-661, §1311 (1986) (“Cohen-Nunn
Amendment”) (Nov. 14, 1986) (mandating creation of USSOCOM, a Board for Low-Intensity Conflict within the National
Security Council, and the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict);
Department of Defense Authorization Act (1986), P.L. 99-145, 99 Stat. 760 (29 July 1985) (codified at §1453) (providing that
“The special operations forces of the Armed Forces provide the United States with immediate and primary capability to respond
to terrorism.”); 10 U.S.C. §167(j) (providing that the statutory missions of special operations forces include “short-duration,
small-scale offensive activities such as raids, ambushes, hostage rescues, and ‘surgical’ strikes to neutralize, seize, or destroy
critical targets that could include weapons of mass destruction and associated production facilities” and counterterrorism).
Special operations forces are “specially trained, equipped, and supported for a specific target whose destruction, elimination, or
rescue . . . is a political . . . imperative.” CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, Joint Pub. 3-05 (Test), Doctrine for
Joint Special Operations (1990), at E-5. Special operations, governed by political considerations, “requir[e] clandestine, covert,
or low-visibility techniquest,” and they differ from conventional operations in the “degree of physical and political risk . . . [and]
operational techniques.” Id. By capitalizing upon “speed, surprise, audacity, and deception” they “accomplish missions in ways
that minimize risks of escalation and maximize returns compared with orthodox applications of military power[,]” rendering
special operations forces particularly suited to covert counterterrorism missions. JOHN M. COLLINS, SPECIAL
OPERATIONS FORCES: AN ASSESSMENT 6 (1994). As such, in practice special operations forces play an inordinate role in
the “protect[ion] [of] their parent society against disorder, intimidation, and terrorism.” LLOYD, supra note_, at 204.
Special forces, drawn from each of the components of the Armed Forces and task organized into Special Operations
Groups, are one of the components of the broader community of special operations forces, which include psychological
operations, civil affairs forces, Rangers, Marines, and aviators. U.S. Army Special Forces, known colloquially as “Green
Berets,” are the most elite soldiers in the Army, selected on the basis of general proficiency, maturity, intelligence, imagination,
cognitive flexibility, determination, and experience as well as familiarity with local cultures, languages, and the politicoeconomic climates in the geographic regions in which they are operational. Carl W. Stiner, U.S. Special Operations Forces: A
Strategic Perspective, 22 PARAMETERS 4, 6, 9(1992). When deployed, Special Forces soldiers operate in 12-man “Alpha”
teams, each of which is a self-contained unit, and employ streamlined communications links, technical and tactical proficiency,
and an understanding of the incident environment to preserve secrecy and accomplish their missions.
511
U.S. Army Special Forces troops have been posted to a number of locations in or near the Middle East and Central Asia
th
following September 11 . See, e.g., Thom Shanker & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Moves Commandos to Base in East Africa, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 18, 2002, at A20 (reporting stationing of hundreds of SF soldiers in East Africa for missions against Al Qaeda);
Patrick E. Tyler, Yemen, an Uneasy Ally, Proves Adept at Playing Off Old Rivals, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2002 (reporting increase
in U.S. Special Forces presence in Yemen in 2002).
512
U.S. Army Special Forces soldiers have been training for covert counterterrorist operations at a high operational tempo
th
following September 11 , and have developed a number of missions for rapid execution on short notice. See ASSOC. PRESS,
Reviewing Ideas for Fighting Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2002, at A10 (reporting high-level covert operations planning
th
within SOCOM for counterterrorist mission post-September 11 ).
83

the building. While Alpha One maintained security, Alpha Two moved through the assembly, down the
ornate corridors, and into the madrasa, where, within the living quarters for the religious teachers and
students. There, stored in sealed crates readied for shipment and stamped with markings indicating their
contents to be religious literature, were what Alpha Two estimated, and subsequent scientific testing
established, to be more than two tons of weapons-grade anthrax genetically modified to be extremely
antibiotics-resistant and readily dispersible by inhalation.513 While Alpha Two collected samples and
planted a series of incendiary, chlorine dioxide, and high explosive devices throughout the weapons
cache,514 Alpha One, maintaining security, began to come under fire from a rapidly gathering number of
armed men, dressed in civilian clothing but suspected to be Al Qaeda terrorists. Alpha Two emerged
from the mosque, requested evacuation, and joined Alpha One in suppressing opposition as the force of
the battle mounted. Although the U.S. force had begun to absorb casualties, none were serious, and the
coordinated and accurate fire from the Alpha teams inflicted far more devastating consequences upon the
enemy, a number of whom burst into houses and dragged unarmed civilians, including women and
children, into the streets as human shields against U.S. fire.515 Despite their best efforts, which included
516
517
the use of non-lethal weapons such as blinding lasers and riot control agents to disorient and disable

attackers, the Alpha teams were unable to prevent civilian casualties as they defended against the Al
Qaeda assault, and by the time the MH-60 Black Hawk helicopters began circling overhead, hundreds of
bodies littered the streets surrounding the Central Mosque.518 As several companies of Uzbeki infantry
encircled U.S. forces, the Black Hawks dropped ropes, lifted the Alpha teams to safety, and brought
suppressive fire to bear before speeding southward through the airspace of Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and
Pakistan to the U.S.S. Carl Vinson waiting on station in the Arabian Sea.
Minutes later, as the recorded voice of the muezzin began calling the faithful to prayers from
loudspeakers atop the Central Mosque, chlorine dioxide gas began seeping into the surrounding
neighborhood, and thousands of civilians rising from their beds were afflicted with hacking coughs,
headaches, and shortness of breath. Panicked soldiers and civilians fled as the mosque began to burn and
the flames jumped to nearby houses, and within a quarter hour a series of explosions tore through the
513

See http://www. mercola.com/2001/oct/10/anthrax_highlights.htm (discussing properties of anthrax)
The destruction of anthrax requires either extremely high temperatures or exposure to potent biocides such as chlorine dioxide.
See http://www.epa.gov/epahome/hi-anthrax.htm#FORRESPONDERS. The oxidizing effects of chlorine dioxide are enhanced
by high temperatures. See http://www.inchem.org/documents/icsc/icsc/eics0127.htm. Consequently, the choice of a combination
of incendiary, biocidal, and explosive devices would likely be used to neutralize a large volume of anthrax.
515
This practice was employed by Somali warlords to some effect against U.S. forces operating to provide humanitarian relief
during the civil war in Somalia in 1992-1993. See Lorenz, supra note_, at 36 (discussing numerous violations of IHL by Somali
warlords during the Somali Civil War).
516
Tactical blinding lasers are specially designed to temporarily blind enemy forces in order to provide force protection without
causing unnecessary casualties, and special operations missions and hostage rescue situations are particularly suitable uses. See
Burrus M. Carnahan, Unnecessary Suffering, The Red Cross and Tactical Laser Weapons, 18 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J.
705, 729 (1996) (“A blinding laser rifle may be useful from a humanitarian standpoint in dealing with hostage situations, where
enemy forces are using civilians as a shield. Blinding some or all of the enemy forces may . . .permit the hostages to escape.”).
517
“Riot control agents” are chemical irritating substances such as CS gas and pepper spray used to temporarily “distract, deter, or
disable disorderly people” without permanent injury to permit friendly forces to operate unimpeded. DEP’T ARMY, FIELD
MANUAL 19-15, ch.9, Riot Control Agents (25 November 1985).
518
Even where women and children divest themselves of the privileges of noncombatancy by taking up arms, members of the
U.S. Armed Forces are very reluctant to fire upon them. See Lorenz, supra note_, at 39 (describing emotional difficulties
encountered by U.S. forces in Somalia engaged by armed women and children). Where women and children are employed
against their will as human shields, the reluctance expands to include the reluctance to bring fire down upon their captors lest
innocents become inadvertent and unintended casualties. Id.
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stricken mosque. Thick clouds of smoke drifted on a gentle breeze blowing from the east, smudging the
rising sun from view. The Central Mosque burned to rubble over the course of the day.
One hour after U.S. forces departed Uzbekistan, the UN Secretary-General received a personal
letter from the President which noted that Uzbekistan was a “Barbary State upon which the civilized
world had no choice but to impose law and order,”519 that there was no distinction between terrorists and
those who harbored them, that “in light of the present anarchic and hostile world environment the U.S.
must defend itself in every possible way,”520 that “the world had reverted to [a] primitive system”521
because the Security Council had “repeatedly and materially breached its obligations to the world
community” and “damaged its credibility as an enforcer of international law,”522 that the U.S. had “acted
pursuant to the right of self-defense confirmed by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,” and
that the “target struck, and the time and method of attack used, were carefully designed to minimize risks
of collateral damage to civilians and to comply with international law, including the rules of necessity and
proportionality.”523 At H-Hour Plus Three, 8:00 P.M. Eastern Time, the President of the United States
addressed the nation in a live broadcast carried by national networks around the globe. In his hour-long
address, the President stated that “today we have done what we had to do. If necessary, we shall do it
again.”524 The President stated further that the “reckless threats and attacks on Americans” had created an
“imminent danger” against which the U.S. was “entitled to take measures necessary to defend our nation
and its people.”525 Although the U.S. “regretted the loss of civilian life,”
I was forced to order this action, as an obligation of the office with which the American people have
entrusted me, for five reasons: First, because we have convincing evidence that Al Qaeda, supported and
sheltered by the Yuldashev regime, are the authors of the recent attacks on American citizens and property
in Central Asia; second, because Al Qaeda had executed murderous terrorist attacks on the United States in
th
the past, most notoriously on September 11 , 2001; third, because we have compelling information that
Uzbekistan and Al Qaeda were planning additional terrorist attacks against our citizens and those of other
countries; fourth, because these terrorists and their state sponsors had acquired biological weapons and
other weapons of mass destruction which they had stored in a place of worship and which they intended to
use in a genocidal war against this great nation; and fifth, because the failure of the UN and NATO to play
526
a serious role in the maintenance of peace left us no choice but to act alone.

The President stated that although the U.S. would continue to observe international law it would not
“respond like a man in a barroom brawl who will fight only according to Marquis of Queensbury
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See Al-Ayouty, supra note_, at 492 (arguing in 1999 that Afghanistan, under the Taliban, had abdicated state responsibility to
suppress terrorism and “should be treated as a Barbary State” upon which “law and order should be imposed . . . from the outside
until it cooperates internationally with the extradition or the apprehension in prosecution and punishment of all those implicated
in th[e] genocidal war against the American people.”).
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Johnson, supra note_, at 293-94.
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Myres McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 AM. J. INT’L L. 507, 597-98 (1963).
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Lysobey, supra note_, at 103-04.
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This language is drawn from correspondence delivered by the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations to the UN SecretaryGeneral formally notifying the UN of the U.S. attack on terrorist targets in Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998. See Bill Richardson,
Letter Dated 20 Agust 1998 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed
to the President of the Security Council (Aug. 20, 1998), U.N. Doc. S/1998/780 (1998), available at
http://www.undp.prg.missions/usa/s1998780.pdf.
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These precise words were uttered by President Ronald Reagan in announcing the bombing of Libya in reprisal for the attack on
a West Berlin disco in 1986. President Ronald Reagan, Address (Apr. 14, 1986), in WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1986, at A23.
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See Statement of President George Bush (Dec. 20, 1989) (Office of the Press Secretary, The White House) (announcing the
U.S. intervention in Panama).
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This “quote” is very loosely patterned after the statement offered by President William Clinton as justification for U.S. attacks
against Al Qaeda in 1998. Statement of President William Jefferson Clinton, Aug. 18, 1998.
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Rules,” because “the world isn’t Beverly Hills, it’s a bad neighborhood at two o’clock in the morning.

Law will not be perverted by evildoers into an instrument to be used to restrain and threaten people who
desire to live in peace and justice. We will defend ourselves against enemies who store weapons of mass
destruction in houses of worship and who hide behind their own women and children when called to
task.” He concluded by promising that
the United States “will not stand by as peril draws closer and closer . . . If we wait for threats to fully
529
530
materialize, we will have waited too long.” The “survival of states is not a matter of law,” but rather a
question of courage. We will remain vigilant in the defense of civilization against barbarism, and those
who by their actions declare themselves beyond the pale of human civilization shall be treated accordingly
by a nation aroused as never before in its history. They shall reap that which they sow. As the Book of Job
teaches us, we shall “put out the lamps of the wicked, . . . and they shall be like straw before the wind, and
531
chaff that the storm carries away.”

The next day, President Yuldashev angrily denounced OPERATION JEREMIAH, which he
claimed was responsible for more than 800 civilian casualties,532 reiterated his claim that Uzbekistan
possessed no prohibited weapons, and demanded that the Security Council meet in emergency session to
impose sanctions. Although a Sino-Soviet effort to pass a resolution in the Security Council condemning
the U.S. action failed in the face of a U.S.-UK veto,533 the UN Secretary-General angrily condemned the
operation in an open letter published in the New York Times, the General Assembly passed a resolution in
denunciation,534 calling upon the U.S. to “arrest and prosecute those responsible for war crimes and crimes
against humanity in accordance with international law,”535 and most of the “street” across the world,
viewing pictures of the carnage and the destroyed mosque, was outraged.536 Within forty-eight hours,
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condemned under Chapter VII, however, when no permanent member of the Security Council exercised a veto. U.N.S.C. Res.
487 (June 19, 1981). See infra at note_ (discussing the Israeli action and subsequent legal analysis).
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the military action. See G.A. Res. 41/38, U.N. GAOR, 41 Sess., 78 mtg., 1986 U.N.Y.B. 257.
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The General Assembly resolution cited a 1973 Resolution calling for every state to cooperate in the arrest and prosecution of
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U.N. GAOR 3 Comm., 28 Sess., 2187 plen. Mtg., Supp. No. 30, at 78, U.N. Docs A/9326 and A/9030 (1973).
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Much of public opinion across the globe was intensely critical of the U.S. decision to attack terrorist facilities in Sudan and
Afghanistan in 1998, an operation undertaken for the same purposes, against the same sort of threat, and in the same
circumstances of a lack of multilateral political support in the United Nations. See Bashir Maa, Missiles Will Only Make Matters
Worse, HERALD (Glasgow), Aug. 24, 1998, at 13. To some extent, the expression of short-term outrage for the attack upon the
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international anti-U.S. sentiment exploded when CNN began broadcasting reports that several thousand
Uzbeki civilians had been hospitalized with symptomatology including fever, malaise, and respiratory
distress, and preliminary toxicological reports provided by the Uzbeki national medical service and the
World Health Organization [“WHO”] indicated exposure to chlorine dioxide and anthrax. Within the
next two days fifty thousand Uzbekis were hospitalized and the WHO reported ten thousand Uzbeki
fatalities. Although the U.S. offered to airlift antibiotics and experts from the Center for Disease Control,
President Yuldashev rejected the U.S. offer, and within five days post-raid more than seventy-five
thousand Uzbekis were dead.538 A joint communiqué promulgated by the League of Arab States and the
Organization of the Islamic Conference condemned the “use of biological weapons against Uzbeki
civilians” as an “unlawful act of aggression and a crime against humanity,”539 and the UN SecretaryGeneral met with President Yuldashev in Tashkent and demanded that the U.S. launch an investigation
“to determine the criminal responsibility of those involved in the attack on the house of worship.”
In his second national address, the President of the U.S. stated that the outbreak of anthrax in
Uzbekistan, while unfortunate, had resulted from the partially successful attempt to eliminate BWs that
the Yuldashev regime had permitted Al Qaeda to stockpile and that any civilian casualties resulting from
the U.S. action were thus directly attributable to Al Qaeda and to the Uzbeki Government; consequently,
the U.S. would not be investigating any parties involved in the operation but would rather be decorating
them, where appropriate, for heroism. Congress passed a joint resolution commending the President and
the members of the Armed Forces that conducted OPERATION JEREMIAH, and polling indicated over
90% domestic approval. Two weeks after the strike, President Yuldashev personally lodged a declaration
with the ICC Registrar accepting, on behalf of Uzbekistan, as the territorial state, the exercise of ICC
jurisdiction with respect to the U.S. attack on the Central Mosque540 and requesting that the ICC
Prosecutor “investigate the situation for the purpose of determining whether one or more specific persons
should be charged with the commission of . . . crimes.”541 Within a week, the Prosecutor concluded on the
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Id. at Art. 14(1).
87

542

basis of information submitted by Uzbekistan, other UN members, and human rights NGOs that a
reasonable basis existed to investigate, and he submitted to the Pre-Trial Chamber a request for
authorization.543 The Pre-Trial Chamber found a “reasonable basis to proceed” and that the case was
544

within ICC jurisdiction and thus authorized the investigation.

U.S. efforts to procure a Security Council

resolution deferring the investigation for 12 months were trumped by a Sino-Soviet veto.545
On March 15, 2005, after a month-long investigation during which an additional 40,000 Uzbeki
civilians died from anthrax inhalation, the Prosecutor sparked a firestorm with his announcement of the
indictments of each member of the Alpha Teams, the commander of SOCOM, CJCS, the Secretary of
Defense, and the President on multiple counts of aggression, war crimes, and crimes against humanity in
the context of OPERATION JEREMIAH.546 Although the U.S., a non-party to the Rome Statute, brought
547
a jurisdictional challenge, the ICC, self-determining its jurisdiction, held that the case was properly

before it and that the U.S. decision not to investigate was made to shield persons from criminal
responsibility, rendering it admissible.548 The indictment charged all defendants with “Crimes Against
Humanity” under Article 7(a), (f), and (k)549 and “War Crimes” under Article 8(2)(a)(i), (ii), (iii), and (iv)
542

The Prosecutor has discretion to seek information from any “reliable sources that he or she deems appropriate” in determining
whether to bring an indictment, including “non-governmental organisations.” Id. at Art. 15(2).
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within the Court’s jurisdiction has been committed.” David, supra note_, at 398-99. Moreover, even if the attacking state agreed
to share its intelligence and conduct a domestic investigation, the ICC might elect to conduct its own investigation to
independently corroborate or refute the evidence proferred by the attacking state and to establish its independence. Id.
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See Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial
Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. United Kingdom and U.S.) (Provisional Measures) (Orders of 14 April 1992), ICJ Rep. 1992, at 1
(holding that UN Security Council could, under UNSCR 748 (1992) bypass an existing treaty mechanism for the prosecution of
individuals in order to determine, a priori, the question of state responsibility for the crimes in question). Whether it will do so in
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Security Council was seized under Chapter VII was defeated. Jelena Pejic, Creating a Permanent International Criminal Court:
The Obstacles to Independence and Effectiveness, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 321-22 (1998).
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“‘[C]rime against humanity’ means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; . . . (f) Torture; . . . (h)
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and 8(2)(b)(i), (ii) (iii), (iv), (ix), (xiii), (xvii), (xviii), (xx), and charged the President and the Defense
Secretary with command responsibility551 for “Aggression”552 under Articles 5, 25,553 27,554 and 28.555
550

See id. at Art. 8(2)(a) (defining “war crimes” as, in addition to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, “(i) Wilful killing;
(ii) Torture or inhuman treatment[;] (iii) Wilfuly causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health; [and] (iv) Extensive
destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity[.]”);id. at Art. 8(2)(b) (defining as “war crimes”
other “serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, . . . namely . . . (i) intentionally
directing attacks against the civilian population as such . . . ; (ii) Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects . . . ; . . .
(iv) Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or
damage to civilian objects . . . clearly excessive in retaliation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated; . .
.(ix) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic
monuments, [and] hospitals . . . provided they are not military objectives; . . . (xvii) Employing poison or poisoned weapons;
(xviii) Employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices; . . . [and] (xx)
Employing weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or
unnecessary suffering or which are inherently indiscriminate in violation of [IHL], provided that such weapons, projectiles and
material and methods of warfare are the subject of a comprehensive prohibition and are included in an annex to this Statute[.]”).
551
By virtue of their unique responsibility commanders are obligated, as “society’s last line of defense against war crimes,” to
“control . . . a military force’s organic capacity for destruction and the conduct of their subordinates.” Smidt, supra note_, at 165,
167. Command responsibility is “the legal and ethical obligation a commander assumes for the actions, accomplishments, or
failures of a unit.” DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 101-5, , 1-1 (May 1997). Theoretically, command responsibility
extends up the chain of military and civilian command to the highest reaches of power, although in practice it is largely
immediate military commanders who are under a duty to ensure that their subordinates observe IHL. C. J. GREENWOOD,
COMMAND AND THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT 35 (1993). Prior to World War II the limits of commanders’
responsibility extended only so far as to preclude issuance of unlawful orders. ROGERS, supra note_, at 130 (stating that
criminal liability for acts of subordinates that do not flow from superiors orders is a “comparatively recent development”);
RULES OF LAND WARFARE (1917), supra note_, at para. 366 (stating that although commanders who issued illegal orders
could be held criminally liable, mere toleration of unlawful conduct was insufficient). Neither the Nuremburg nor the Tokyo
Tribunal directly criminalized failure to prevent atrocities. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 7, 59 Stat. 1544, 1548 (“Leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices
participating in the formation or execution of a common plan or conspiring to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible
for all acts performed by the persons in the execution of such plans.”). Still, the enduring legacy of prosecutions of Axis war
criminals, and one of the grounds opponents seized upon to brand these proceedings “victor’s justice,” is the extension of liability
on a negligence theory. See Yamashita Trial, IV WAR CRIMES REP. 35 (convicting commander of Japanese Army,
Philippines, for murder of U.S. POWs despite no charge or evidence that he knew or approved, on the inference that given their
scale he must have known they were occurring); U.S. v. Soemu Toyoda (Official Transcript) (convicting Commander in Chief of
Japanese Fleet of command responsibility for failure to learn of violations committed by his troops); “High Command Case,”
supra note_, at 568 (convicting commanders where a “personal dereliction . . . amounting to a wanton, immoral disregard of the
[unlawful] action of [their] subordinates[,]” including execution of U.S. POWs, constituted “criminal negligence.”). Still, the
World War II prosecutions did not create an absolute liability standard for commanders, who “cannot keep completely informed
of the details of military operations of subordinates,” nor did they equate mere knowledge of violations with criminal liability.
Dostler Trial, I WAR CRIMES REP. 22 (holding that “mere knowledge of the happening of unlawful acts does not meet the
requirements of criminal law” and that a commander could be held liable only where he “orders, abets, or takes a consenting part
in the crime.”); IV WAR CRIMES REP. 35 (“It is absurd . . . to consider a commander a murderer or rapist because one of his
soldiers commits a murder or rape.”). The contemporary formulation provides that criminal responsibility can be imputed to the
commander, even if he did not issue orders requiring violations of IHL, only if he had effective control over forces under his
command (the “structural element”) and either knew or should have known that his subordinates would commit the violations
(the “mental element”) and failed to take reasonable measures to prevent and/or punish their commission (the “physical
element”). See API, supra note_, at Art. 87 (“Any commander who is aware that subordinates or other persons under his control
are about to commit, or have committed a breach of the law of war, is obliged to initiate such steps as are necessary to prevent
violations of the law[.]”). This restrictive contemporary standard is adopted in the Rome Statute at Art. 28 and in U.S. military
regulations, which require that the prosecutor prove either that the commander issued a direct order requiring a subordinate to
execute a manifestly unlawful act or that the commander is grossly negligent in supervising subordinates. See FM 27-10, supra
note_, at para. 501 (providng that “commanders may be responsible for war crimes committed by subordinate[s]. . . when the acts
in question have been committed in pursuance of an order. . . [or] if [the commander] has actual knowledge, or should have
knowledge, through reports received by him . . . that troops or other persons subject to his control are about to commit or have
committed a war crime and he fails to take the necessary and responsible steps to insure compliance with the law of war or to
punish violators thereof.”); MCM, supra note_, at Art. 77 (providing that command responsibility requires proof a commander
intended to and did in fact encourage subordinates to commit the unlawful act). Although in practice courts-martial, on the rare
occasions they adjudicate an allegation of command responsibility, are prone to apply an even more restrictive standard that
permits liability only where a commander is alleged to have issued an unlawful order, the de jure standard is identical to that at
IHL—either a direct order, or gross and wanton negligence, is required to sustain a charge, and evidence necessary to prove such
negligence is limited, essentially, to the failures to train troops in advance and investigate after the fact. See Kenneth A. Howard,
Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 21 J. PUB. L. 7, 21 (1972) (stating that no principle of U.S. military law requires a
commander to restrain acts of subordinates he has not ordered); Smidt, supra note_, at 193 (concluding that in practice courtsmartial employ the very restrictive standard requiring proof of a direct order or post hoc failure to investigate to sustain a charge).
Still, the precise standard the ICC will employ to determine whether to impute knowledge of violations of IHL to a commander—
whether actual or constructive knowledge, ormere negligence—is unclear. Shay and Michaeli, supra note_, at 852. Similarly,
where a commander is alleged responsible on a negligence theory, liability ultimately requires an determination of whether the
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Count One charged all defendants with crimes against humanity for “engaging in a conspiracy
to commit, and committing, an armed attack on the Central Mosque in Namangan, Uzbekistan, a civilian
house of worship, on or about January 5th and 6th, 2005, in a manner and by means, including chemical
weapons and blinding lasers, intentionally calculated to systematically and directly expose civilians to
557
great mental and physical suffering amounting to torture, serious injury, and death and which did in fact

cause torture, injury, and death.” Count Two charged all defendants with war crimes for “unenumerated
violations of the laws or customs of war, as recognized by Articles of the Statute of the ICC and sources
of conventional and customary law, including but not limited to UNGA Resolution 2444558 and 3675,559

act was so manifestly unlawful that a reasonably diligent commander would have learned of and prevented it or, at the very least,
investigated and prosecuted its author; the discovery that subordinates committed acts not manifestly unlawful would not
necessarily obligate investigation or punishment. OSIEL, supra note_, at 161. Because the Rome Statute does not specify which
acts are manifestly unlawful, the precise boundaries of a commander’s legal responsibility remain unclear. Finally, the Rome
Statute is silent on whether a commander can discharge supervisory responsibilities, and thus offer an absolute defense, by
proving his subordinates were trained in IHL and provided access to legal officers. ROGERS, supra note_, at 141.
552
The scenario presumes, contrary to facts, that 7/8 of the Assembly of States Parties agreed to a definition of “aggression,” that
the preclusion on prosecution of the crime of aggression for 7 years after entry into force of the Rome Statute is inoperative, and
that prosecution of an individual for the crime of aggression does not require a prior determination of the Security Council that
his state of nationality, on behalf of which he is alleged to have undertaken acts constituting the elements of the crime, has
engaged in aggression. See supra note_ (discussing legal issues concerning the definition of and preconditions to the prosecution
of the crime of aggression). The following definition is employed for purposes of this scenario. “1. For the purpose of this
Statute, the crime of aggression is committed by a person who is in a position of exercising control or capable of directing
political actions in his State, against another State, in contravention of the Charter of the United Nations, by resorting to armed
force, to threaten or violate the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of that State. 2. Acts constituting
aggression include the following: (a) the invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any
military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack . . . (b) bombardment by the armed forces of a
State against the territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State . . . or (g) the
sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against
another State[.]”). David, supra note_, at 389-90 (offering prospective definition of aggression).
553
See Rome Statute, supra note_, at Art. 25(3)(b) (providing that a person shall be criminally responsible if he “[o]rders, solicits
or induces the commission of . . . a crime which in fact occurs[.]”).
554
See id. at Art. 27(1) (providing for the applicability of the Rome Statute “without any distinction based on official capacity . . .
as a Head of State or Government, a member of Government . . .or a government official[.]”).
555
See id. at Art. 28 (establishing command responsibility liability by providing that a “military commander . . . shall be
criminally responsible for crimes . . . committed by forces under his or her effective command and control . . . where [t]hat . . .
person either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were committing or about to
commit such crimes; and . . . that . . . person failed to take all necessary and reasonable measure within his or her power to
prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.”).
556
The concept of a “crime against humanity” entered into existence not by way of a multilateral treaty or by the ripening of
custom into law but rather with Article 6(c) of the Charter of the IMT, which defined it as “murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population . . . or persecution on political, racial, or religious
grounds[.]” Charter of the IMT, supra note_, at Art. 6. Under customary IHL as it has developed, a crime against humanity is
“one of a list of prohibited acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack pursuant to or in furtherance of a state or
organizational policy directed against any civilian population with knowledge of the attack.” Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT
94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, paras. 639-43, Trial Chamber, ICTFY, May 7, 1997, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 908, 939-41 (1997)
(citing Article 5, ICTFY) (creating jurisdiction over crimes against humanity). The existence of an armed conflict is not required
as an element of a crime against humanity, but acts prohibited as crimes against humanity typically “involve, or at least occur in
the context of, massive killings or mistreatment of civilians in . . . a time of armed conflict” under the direction of an official
policy. Fenrick, supra note_, at 779 (emphasis added). Because crimes against humanity are most often committed during armed
conflict by soldiers as agents of their governments, and because the applicability of IHL has been extended through the Geneva
Conventions to apply to most internal armed conflicts, there is thus some overlap between war crimes (when civilians are the
victims) and crimes against humanity, and several commentator has called for the elimination of distinctions between the two
categories of crimes and for their merger into a single analytical concept. See L.C. Green, “Grave Breaches” or Crimes Against
Humanity?, 8 U.S.A.F. ACAD. J. LEG. STUD. 29 (1997-98) (making this argument); Marler, supra note_, at 849 (noting that
suspects have been charged in predecessor tribunals with war crimes and crimes against humanity for the same acts).
557
The Torture Convention, cited by the Prosecution in the Indictment, supplied a definition of torture. See Convention Against
th
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, U.N. GAOR, 39 Sess., Supp. 51, at
197 (defining torture as an intentional act inflicted by or under the responsibility of public officials that causes severe pain).
558
See General Assembly Resolution 2444, Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, G.A. Res. 2444, 23 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 18) at 164, U.N. Doc. A/7433 (1968) (declaring customary IHL principle of civilian immunity and complementary
principle requiring belligerents to distinguish civilians from combatants at all times).
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560

Article 26 of the Hague Convention of 1907, Articles 3, 32, and 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of
1949,561 Article 4(4) of the Hague Convention on Cultural Property,562 Articles 35(2),563 51,564 52,565 53,566
567

56,
559

568

569

570

and 57 of the First Protocol Additional, and Articles 4(2), 13, 15,

571

572

16, of the Second

See General Assembly Resolution 3675, Basic Principles for the Protection of Civilian Populations In Armed Conflicts, GA
th
Res. 3675, 25 Sess., Resolutions, (No. 28) at 76, U.N. Doc A/8028 (1971) (specifying that “every effort should be made to spare
civilian populations from the ravages of war[.]”).
560
See 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note_, at Art. 26 (providing that the “commander of an attacking force, before
commencing a bombardment, except in the case of an assault, should do all he can to warn the authorities.”).
561
See GCIV, supra note_, at Art. 3(1)(a) (prohibiting the application of “violence to life nad person, in particular murder of all
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture” to civilians and to combatants rendered hors de combat); id. at Art. 32 (prohibiting
the taking of any measures “of such a character as to cause the physical suffering or extermination of protected persons,”
including murder, torture, corporal punishment, [and] mutilation[.]”); id. at Art. 53 (prohibiting “[a]ny destruction . . . of real or
personal property . . . except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.”).
562
See Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S., at
Art. 4(4) (obligating states-parties to “refrain from any act directed by way of reprisals against cultural property.”).
563
See API, supra note_, at Art. 35(2) (“It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a
nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.”).
564
See API, supra note_, at Art. 51 (“(1) The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against
dangers arising from military operations . . . (2) The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the
object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are
prohibited. (3) Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in
hostilities. (4) Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are: (a) Those which are not directed at a specific
military objective; (b) Those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military
objective; or (c) Those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by this
Protocol; and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without
distinction. (5) Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as indiscriminate: (a) An attack by
bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct
military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects;
and (b) An attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or
a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. (6) Attacks
against the civilian population or civilians by way of reprisals are prohibited. (7) The presence or movements of the civilian
population or individual civilians shall not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations, in
particular in attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield, favour or impede military operations. The Parties to
the conflict shall not direct the movement of the civilian population . . . in order to attempt to shield military objectives from
attacks or to shield military operations. (8) Any violation of these prohibitions shall not release the Parties to the conflict from
their legal obligations with respect to the civilian population and civilians[.]”
565
See API, supra note_, at Art. 52 (“(1) Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals. Civilian objects are all
objects which are not military objectives as defined in paragraph 2. (2) Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In
so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use
make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military of advantage. (3) In case of doubt whether an object which is normally
dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling or a school, is being used to make an
effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used.).”).
566
See API, supra note_, at Art. 53 (“[I]t is prohibited: (a) To commit any acts of hostility directed against the historic
monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples; (b) To use such
objects in support of the military effort; (c) To make such objects the object of reprisals.”).
567
See API, supra note_, at Art. 56 (“1. Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear
electrical generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, even where these objects are military objectives, if such
attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population. Other military
objectives located at or in the vicinity of these works or installations shall not be made the object of attack if such attack may
cause the release of dangerous forces from the works or installations and consequent severe losses among the civilian population.
2. The special protection against attack provided by paragraph 1 shall cease: (a) For a dam or a dyke only if it is used for other
than its normal function and in regular, significant and direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only feasible
way to terminate such support; (b) For a nuclear electrical generating station only if it provides electric power in regular,
significant and direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support; (c) For
other military objectives located at or in the vicinity of these works or installations only if they are used in regular, significant and
direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support. 3. In all cases, the
civilian population and individual civilians shall remain entitled to all the protection accorded them by international law,
including the protection of the precautionary measures provided for in Article 57. If the protection ceases and any of the works,
installations or military objectives mentioned in paragraph I is attacked, all practical precautions shall be taken to avoid the
release of the dangerous forces. 4. It is prohibited to make any of the works, installations or military objectives mentioned in
paragraph 1 the object of reprisals. 5. The Parties to the conflict shall endeavour to avoid locating any military objectives in the
vicinity of the works or installations mentioned in paragraph 1. Nevertheless, installations erected for the sole purpose of
defending the protected works or installations from attack are permissible and shall not themselves be made the object of attack,
provided that they are not used in hostilities except for defensive actions necessary to respond to attacks against the protected
works or installations and that their armament is limited to weapons capable only of repelling hostile action against the protected
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Protocol Additional, occasioned by the unlawful, wanton, and indiscriminate armed attack, not justified
by necessity and out of proportion to any legitimate military purpose and without warning to civilian
inhabitants, upon the Central Mosque, a historic facility dedicated to a religious purpose and known by
defendants to be so, with lasers, asphyxiating gases, and other weapons of mass destruction573 in a manner
calculated to cause widespread death, inhuman treatment, and unnecessary suffering to civilians, as well
as the unnecessary and willful destruction of civilian property, and which did in fact cause such death and
unnecessary suffering to many thousands of civilians and the extensive destruction of civilian property.”574
works or installations. 6. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict are urged to conclude further agreements
among themselves to provide additional protection for objects containing dangerous forces. 7. In order to facilitate the
identification of the objects protected by this article, the Parties to the conflict may mark them with a special sign consisting of a
group of three bright orange circles placed on the same axis, as specified in Article 16 of Annex I to this Protocol. The absence of
such marking in no way relieves any Party to the conflict of its obligations under this Article.”).
568
See API, supra note_, at Art. 57 (“1. In the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian
population, civilians and civilian objects. (2) With respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be taken: (a) Those who
plan or decide upon an attack shall: (i) Do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor
civilian objects and are not subject to special protection but are military objectives within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article
52 and that it is not prohibited by the provisions of this Protocol to attack them; (ii) Take all feasible precautions in the choice of
means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians and damage to civilian objects; (iii) Refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated; (b) An attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes
apparent that the objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection or that the attack may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated; (c) Effective advance warning shall be given of attacks
which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit. (3) When a choice is possible between several
military objectives for obtaining a similar military advantage, the objective to be selected shall be that the attack on which may be
expected to cause the least danger to civilian lives and to civilian objects.4. In the conduct of military operations at sea or in the
air, each Party to the conflict shall, in conformity with its rights and duties under the rules of international law applicable in
armed conflict, take all reasonable precautions to avoid losses of civilian lives and damage to civilian objects. 5. No provision of
this Article may be construed as authorizing any attacks against the civilian population, civilians or civilian objects.”).
569
See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, [“APII”] at Art. 4(2) (providing that noncombatants and civilians are to be protected against, inter
alia, “violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being[.]”).
570
See id. at Art. 13 (“The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protections against the dangers arising
from military operations . . . [and] shall not be the object of attack.”).
571
See id. at Art. 15 (providing unqualified immunity for specified civilian facilities).
572
See id. at Art. 16 (providing for the protection of cultural objects and houses of worship without waiver in cases of necessity).
573
Due to unresolved disputes over the inclusion of the use of nuclear weapons as a war crime, as of 2003 the Rome Statute does
not expressly prohibit the use of WMD or other weapons systems, requiring that “weapons, projectiles and material and methods
of warfare . . . which are of such a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering or which are inherently
indiscriminate in violation of [IHL]” must be “the subject of a comprehensive prohibition” and be “included in an annex to this
Statute, by an amendment in accordance with the relevant provision set forth in articles 121 and 123.” Rome Statute, supra
note_, at Art. 8(2)(b)(xx). However, the Prosecutor might be able charge the use of riot control agents and chlorine dioxide gas
by the U.S. as illegal methods of war, and thus war crimes, through Article 8(2)(b)(xvii) and/or (xviii), which prohibit the
employment of poison and poisoned weapons as well as asphyxiating and poisonous gases. Rome Statute, supra note_, at Art.
8(2)(b)(xvii), (xviii); see also Bailey, supra note_, at 110 (arguing on behalf of this interpretation). With respect to blinding
lasers, potential criminal liability under Article 8, if not Article 7, is much less clear. The ICRC has denounced blinding lasers as
a cause of unnecessary suffering prohibited under existing IHL and advanced the adoption of a protocol to the CCW prohibiting
“employment of laser weapons specifically designed, as their sole combat function or as one of their combat functions, to cause
permanent blindness to unenhanced vision, that is to the naked eye or to the eye with corrective eyesight devices.” Additional
Protocol to the Convention on the Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV),
CCW/CONF.1/7 (Oct. 12, 1995), at Arts. 1, 2. Moreover, the ICRC has rejected claims that blinding lasers can inflict merely
temporary blindness, that the suffering such weapons inflict are justified by the military advantage gained through their use, and
that blinding lasers, as nonlethal weapons, necessarily inflict less suffering than weapons that induce fatalities. See ICRC,
BLINDING WEAPONS 3, 4, 7 (1995) (stating that “anyone whose eyes are hit by the [laser] beam would be blinded, in most
cases permanently[,] and that “it is impossible to develop a laser which can only flash blind[.]”). Nonetheless, the Rome Statute
has not been amended to include an annex prohibiting blinding lasers, and even if this weapons system were to be characterized
as prohibited by customary IHL its use is not explicitly criminalized by the Rome Statute.
574
With respect to war crimes alleging a violation of proportionality and distinction, it is unclear whether the Rome Statute
requires the Prosecutor to prove actual knowledge or practical certainty that a military operation would cause loss of life or injury
to civilians or damage to civilian property clearly excessive in relation to the military advantage gained or whether a negligence
standard will suffice. The actual or subjective knowledge standard imposes a heavier burden of proof than an objective,
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Count Three charged the SOCOM CinC, CJCS, the Secretary of Defense, and the President with
aggression, alleging that by “dispatching members of the Armed Forces of the United States to invade the
sovereign state of Uzbekistan, occupy Uzbeki territory, and attack the Central Mosque with conventional
weapons and weapons of mass destruction,” the defendants had, “without justification575 or
authorization,576 employed armed force against the territorial integrity and political independence of
Uzbekistan in a manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations,”577 in derogation of the
“independence and freedom of the Uzbeki people,” and in contravention of the “clear pronouncement
[established at Nuremburg] that aggressive war is a crime.”578 The indictment stated further that “the U.S.
was not the victim of an armed attack and OPERATION JEREMIAH was a prima facie act of
aggression.”579 The Pre-Trial Chamber issued arrest warrants for all defendants,580 and the Prosecutor
581
582
forwarded copies to the Secretary of State requesting cooperation in their arrest and surrender “in

accordance with Articles 87,583 89584 and 93.”585
The U.S. Ambassador presented this address the next morning in the UN Security Council:586
It is my solemn duty to report that after the U.S. acquired clear and compelling information
concerning plans by Al Qaeda, a terrorist organization aided and abetted by the Government of
587
Uzbekistan, to infiltrate the U.S. and attack our citizens with biological weapons, the President ordered
United States Armed Forces to take preemptive measures to eliminate these weapons, which were stored in
negligence-based standard which imposes liability if commanders or soldiers were unaware of a substantial risk of harm but
should have known that the attack would cause collateral loss of civilian life and damage to civilian property “clearly excessive
in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.” Rome Statute, supra note_, at Art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
575
See Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua Nicaragua v. U.S., ICJ 1986 (holding
that no customary IHL rule permits a state to self-defend absent an armed attack and that alarming military preparations
undertaken by a second state justifies a report to the UN Security Council but not an act of anticipatory self-defense).
576
See David, supra note_, at 403-04 (stating that the risk to the U.S. of being subjected to charges of aggression before the ICC
arises “only where the U.S. acts unilaterally, eschewing resort to the mechanisms of the United Nations for reasons of
expediency, or fear of insufficient international support.”). Precedent bears out this assertion: when NATO employed force
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [“FRY”] in 1999 absent UN Security Council authorization, FRY sued NATO
members on ten separate counts in the ICJ alleging, inter alia, that the bombing was an illegal act of aggression. See Legality of
the Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United States) (http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iyuk/iyukframe.htm) (dismissing case for
lack of jurisdiction). For a discussion of the cases, see Gerry Simpson, The Situation on the International Legal Theory Front:
The Power of Rules and the Rule of Power, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 439 (2000).
577
See UN Charter, supra note_, at Art. 2(4) (“All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state[.]”).
578
Quincy Wright, The Law of the Nuremburg Trial, 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (1947). Although the Nuremburg defendants
contended that positive IHL did not prohibit aggressive war and that the principle nulla poena sin lege (“no punishment without
law”) precluded trial on that charge, the IMT ruled against them. See International Military Tribunal, Motion Adopted by All
Defense Counsel, Nov. 19, 1945, 1 Trials of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal 168-70 (1945).
Moreover, the chief prosecutor, Justice Robert Jackson, maintained that “[w]hile the law is first applied against German
aggressors, if it is to serve any useful purpose it must condemn aggression by any other nations. “ TAYLOR, supra note_, at 12.
579
David, supra note_, at 395 (warning that the ICC may disagree with the U.S. as to the propriety of a particular use of force).
580
See Rome Statute, supra note 59.
581
Id. at Art. 58(1) (providing for issuance of arrest warrants by Pre-Trial Chamber upon application of Prosecutor).
582
See id. at Art. 91(1)(“A request for arrest and surrender shall be made in writing.”).
583
See id. at Art. 87(5) (“The Court may invite any State not party to this Statute to provide assistance . . on the basis of an ad hoc
arrangement, an agreement with such State or any other appropriate basis[.]”)
584
See id. at Art. 89(1) (“The Court may transmit a request for the arrest and surrender of a person, together with the material
supporting the request . . . to any State on the territory of which that person may be found and shall request the cooperation of
that State in the arrest and surrender of such a person. States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Part and the
procedure under their national law, comply with requests for arrest and surrender.”).
585
See id. at Art. 93 (creating obligations to assist the ICC in its investigation and prosecution, including with respect to
production of persons and documents and access to victims and witnesses).
586
No provision of the Rome Statute enables a requested State to set aside a request for the arrest and surrender of persons present
within its jurisdiction, although Article 87(5) of the Report of the Preparatory Committee contained a provision to that effect. See
United Nations Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Working Group On Procedural
Matters (WGPM), NGO Coalition Report of 19 June 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1, at 161-62.
587
See President Bush, Address to the United Nations Security Council, Oct. 7, 2001 (“If any government sponsors the outlaws
and murderers and killers of innocents, they have become outlaws and murderers themselves.”).
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the Central Mosque. This defensive action, undertaken to prevent the deaths of millions of Americans, was
588
clearly permissible under customary international law, as well as under the UN Charter States and their
588

International law has long justified preemptive measures in defense of life and property. See, e.g.,HUGO GROTIUS, DE
JURE BELLUM AD PACTUM 32, 75 (A.C. Campbell trans., 1901); Caroline Case (note) (permitting self-defense where “the
necessity . . . is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.”). However, the UN
Charter narrowed the category of permissible acts of self-defense to those undertaken in response to an “armed attack” and
excludes, or at least abridges, the natural right of self-defense subsequent to the moment the Security Council becomes seized of
the matter. See UN Charter, Art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security.”) (emphasis added); Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, Shifting Boundaries of the
Right to Self-Defence—Appraising the Impact of the September 11 Attacks on Jus Ad Bellum, 36 INT’L LAWYER 1081, 1809
(2003) (contending that once the Security Council assumes “primary responsibility” for the restoration of international peace and
security, the right to self-defense under Article 51 lapses and the threatened state must subordinate its response to this
mechanism, regardless of its efficacy). Some thus contend that preemptive measures are categorically prohibited and that a state
must wait to be attacked prior to defending itself. See, e.g., BERT V. A. ROLING, THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION
ON THE USE OF FORCE 5 (1986) (positing the restrictive theory of self-defense); Lacey, supra note_, at 307 (“Without the
sine qua non of imminence, [preemptive] self-defense becomes nothing more than the slippery slope of naked aggression.”); IAN
BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 112 (1963) (advocating a restrictive
interpretation of Article 51). Others argue that a state need not wait for its attacker to strike first but may, consistent with Article
51, preempt such an attack, on the ground that states possess the natural legal right to take necessary and proportional measures
in self-defense. See Oscar Schacter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1634 (1984); William V.
O’Brien, Reprisals, Deterrence and Self Defense in Counterterror Operations, 30 VA. J. INT’L L. 421, 478 (1990) (supporting
right of preemptive self-defense). Moreover, as this permissive school asserts, the natural right to self-defend can be easily
harmonized with the provisions of positive law by recognizing that, where the Security Council is unable or unwilling to take
measures to that end, states are freed to pursue their own salvation. Lysobey, supra note_, at 127. Because “analysis of the
legitimacy of an act of preemption requires replacing the objectively verifiable prerequisite of an ‘armed attack’ with the
subjective perception of a “threat” of such an attack in the sole judgment of the state believing itself about to be a target,”
preemptive self-defense has been a thorn in the side of IHL, and the UN, since the 1960s. See U.N. SCOR 188, Apr. 9, 1964
(rejecting Portuguese claim of self-defense in the shelling of Senegal); U.N. SCOR 488, Jun. 19, 1981 (rejecting Israeli
invocation of Article 51 as basis for destruction of Iraqi nuclear weapons facility at Tamuz despite Israeli evidence that the
reactor was to be used to make bombs to target Israel); G.A. Res. 6/2, Jan. 14, 1981 (rejecting invocation of Article 51 by Soviet
Union as justification for invasion of Afghanistan). Similarly, the ICJ, in a much-criticized and –cited opinion, has held that the
legitimacy of a claim to self-defense rests upon and is “subject to the State concerned having been the victim of armed attack[,]”
thus seeming to rule out preemptive measures entirely. See Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities, supra note_, at
193-95. State practice is inconclusive: he U.S. is one of the few states that openly embraces the right to preemptive self-defense.
W. Hays Parks, Memorandum of Law: Executive Order 12,333 and Assassination, ARMY LAW, Dec. 1989, at 7. However,
international tterrorism, along with the proliferation of advanced and lethal weapons systems, has invigorated the debate.
Because the threat posed by the use of WMD against civilian population centers is many orders of magnitude greater than the
threat of conventional weapons used against military targets, and because terrorist attacks can materialize almost without warning
whereas traditional military operations are transparent to a much greater degree, several scholars consider that impending terrorist
WMD attacks can reasonably treated as imminent in circumstances where an attack by conventional means would not be so
regarded. See Guy B. Roberts, The Counterproliferation Self-Help Paradigm: A Legal Regime for Enforcing the Norm in
Prohibiting the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 27 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 483, 485 (1999) (arguing that
when rogue states or terrorist groups possessed of WMD directly threaten the the survival of another state, the threatened state
has the right to engage in “preemptive use of force to either deter acquisition plans, eliminate acquisition programs or destroy
illicit WMD sites[.]”); John Shaw, Startling His Neighbors, Australian Leader Favors First Strikes, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2002,
at A11 (quoting Australian Prime Minister JHoward as stating that a politician would be “failing the most basic test of office” if
he did not order preemptive action); Lacey, supra note_, at 293-94 (arguing that “the threat [posed by terrorists with WMD] is
simply too great for states not to act”); El-Ayouty, supra note_, at 492 (stating that “in the case of universal and catastrophic
terrorism . . . striking at the terrorists does not wait until a definite nexus is established between the terrorists and their actions.”).
Perhaps the most compelling version of this permissive interpretation of Article 51 is as follows:
[C]ommon sense cannot require one to interpret an ambiguous provision in a text in a way that requires a state
passively to accept its fate before it can defend itself. And, even in the face of conventional warfare, this would also
seem the only realistic interpretation of the contemporary right to self-defence . . . [T]his view accords better with State
practice and with the realities of modern military conditions than with the more restrictive interpretation of Article 51[.]
Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It 242 (1994), cited in Christopher Greenwood,
International Law and the Pre-Emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, and Iraq, 4 SAN DIEGO INT’L L. J. 7, 15 (2003).
In sum, the permissive interpretation would permit a state to resort to preemptive self-defense provided it has “(1)
reasonably determined that [WMD] are to be used as an aggressive force against it; (2) affirmatively pursued alternative
modalities of resolution and remained engaged in the diplomatic process until the moment of action; (3) acted only after the
aggressor’s conduct has coalesced into a coherent . . . threat; and (4) achieved minimal destruction, using only as much force as
necessary to effectively eliminate the threat.” Mark E. Newcomb, Non-Proliferation, Self-Defense, and the Korean Crisis, 27
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 603 621 (1994) (building upon an earlier formulation in YORAM DINSTEIN, AGGRESSION
AND SELF-DEFENSE 165-90 (1988)). Arguably, where the UN takes no action in response to a request from a threatened state,
or moves too slowly to neutralize the threat, the threatened state has the natural right, as well as a right under Article 51, to take
military action unilaterally or in concert with others. Moreover, with respect to terrorists in possession of WMD, it is arguable
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589

590

citizens possess the inalienable right to life, and to defend life. When a terrorist organization couples
591
hostile intent with the means to execute that intent, neither the U.S. nor any other peaceful state need wait
592
to be devastated before responding. Although the U.S. delayed action for several months to pursue
593
peaceful modalities of resolution in this august body, diplomacy failed. While the risk in waiting was
patently obvious, wait we did, until terrorist attack was imminent and the slightest further delay would have
jeopardized the lives of millions of innocent men, women, and children. The last resort is always the stark
594
reality of armed force, which the U.S. was morally obligated to employ to protect its people. To brand
our response an unlawful act of aggression is an ill-considered measure that simply obliterates the
595
distinction between terrorism and self-defense. Some may question the factual predicate that gave rise to
the decision to employ measures of self-defense to preempt the terrorist threat. When the United States
determines it is possible to share some or all of the sensitive intelligence that prompted the military
596
response without compromising its national security, it will do so. In the interim, the ICC ought never to
that the Security Council, with Resolutions 1368 and 1373 recognizing the inherent right ot self-defense and authorizing the
exercise of this right against terrorists on the territory of states unable to prevent terrorist attacks, has accepted the permissive
interpretation and pre-authorized preemption. Arai-Takahashi, supra this note_, at 1087. However, the law has been slow to
respond, and the UN Charter, because of its susceptibility to interpretation as a categorical prohibition on self-defense except in
the aftermath of an armed attack, presents a formidable legal obstacle to the application of customary doctrine. Moreover, the
lawfulness of specific acts of preemptive self-defense often does not become apparent until long after the fact when information,
tightly held by states, surfaces. See Reisman,supra note_, at 17- 18 (stating that, whereas most scholars condemnded the 1981
Israeli attack on the Iraqi reactor, in light of the discovery that Iraq had an advanced WMD program in 1991 “now the general
consensus is that it was a lawful and justified resort to unilateral, preemptive action.”). Thus, in conjunction with the precedent
of Nuremburg and the expansive powers of the ICC to define aggression, individuals who order or participate in preemptive selfdefense in the War on Terror may incur criminal liability. See, e.g., FRANCIS A. BOYLE, THE CRIMINALITY OF
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE (2002) (equating U.S. preemptive strike in Afghanistan with Nazi “self-defense” argument and
contending that the Bush Doctrine is the primary reason for U.S. opposition to the ICC); Letter Dated 23 September 1999, supra
note_, at annex, para. 7 (1999) (condemning U.S. bombing of suspected chemical weapons site in Sudan as an “unlawful act of
aggression). In sum, the legitimacy of preemption remains an open, political, question, and the prospect that an ICC Prosecutor
might deem a particular exercise of preemption a crime within ICC jurisdiction is a real possibility. David, supra note_, at 393.
589
See Lacey, supra note_, at 294 (arguing that the legal justification for preemptive self-defense should be the argument that
states have an inherent juris ad vitae (“right to life”) that “prevents the random annihilation of their populations from WMD in
the hands of unstable regimes or the murder of their citizens by rogue terrorist bands.”).
590
As the ICJ, presented with the question whether a threatened state could lawfully use nuclear weapons where its survival was
at issue, could not reach a definitive conclusion, the position that a state may use less destructive means to protect against its
eradication is, at the very least, a good-faith legal argument. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ Rep. 66,
80 (1996), 35 ILM 809 (“[T]he court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful
or unlawful in an extreme circumstances of self-defence, in which the very survival of a state would be at stake.”).
591
The Department of Defense defines “hostile intent” as “the threat of imminent use of force by a foreign force or terrorist unit . .
. against the [U.S.], U.S. forces, . . . U.S. citizens and their property, U.S. commercial assets, or other designated non-U.S. forces,
foreign nations and their property.” CJCS 3121.01, supra note_.
592
State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2003) http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html (“Since
when have terrorists . . . announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike. If this threat is permitted to
fully and suddenly emerge, all words and recriminations would come too late.”).
593
A number of scholars center their post-hoc analysis of the legitimacy of preemptive self-defense on the question of whether the
threatened state sought the assistance of the Security Council. For this bloc, where a state seeks such assistance but is offered
none, whether through the political paralyis of that body or some other unjustifiable delay, the threatened state is tacitly granted
authorization to act unilaterally and preemptively. See, e.g., W. Thomas & Sally V. Mallison, The Israeli Aerial Attack of June 7,
1981, Upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor: Aggression or Self-Defense, 75 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 417, 427-28 (1982) (stating
that legitimate claims to preemptive self-defense require as conditions precedent the unsuccessful referal of the matter to the
Security Council and pursuit of “peaceful modalities of resolution,” including mediation and diplomacy); David, supra note_, at
402 (suggesting that failure to resort to the Security Council for assistance in reducing a threat attenuates the strength of a
subsequent claim of legal legitimacy for an act of preemptive self-defense). However, not all commentators that support the right
of states to undertake self-help following failed resort to the Security Council concur that such resort will “obviat[e] the need for
force . . . and . . . eliminate the risk to civilians.” David, supra note_, at 402.
594
Liberal democratic social theory holds that the most important function of government is ensuring the physical safety of the
governed, and international law will be interpreted by democratic governments to support this mission. See Lacey, supra note_,
at 308 (contending that states, as a creation of social contract, are obligated to protect their citizens from harm emanating from
outside their boundaries and that “regardless of how international law describes the use of force against a . . . target, . . [the] state
will continue to fulfil its duties to its citizens.”); Reisman, supra note_, at 89 (“[A] government in a functioning democracy
whose population faces such violence will not last long if . . . it tells its electorate that international law prevents it from taking . .
. preemptive action.”).
595
See John Quigley, Missiles with a Message: The Legality of the United States Raid on Iraq’s Intelligence Headquarters, 17
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 241, 241 (1994) (suggesting that the distinction between self-defense and reprisal is
disappearing under a scholarly assault upon the principle of anticipatory self-defense).
596
A state may refuse to cooperate with an order or measure of the ICC on the basis of “an existing fundamental legal principle of
general application.” Rome Statute, supra note_, at Art. 93(3). Articles 72 and 93(4)-(6) permit a state to refuse assistance if the
request concerns the production of any document or disclosure of evidence that relates to its national security. Id. at Arts. 72,
93(4)-(6). States are inclined to be reluctant to comply with requests for assistance with the prosecution of their own nationals,
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permit military operations conducted in good-faith to be the germ of criminal prosecutions which would
disclose to our enemies the process whereby sensitive sources and methods of U.S. intelligence operations
597
lead to the development and implementation of military options.
Moreover, OPERATION JEREMIAH was planned and conducted with great care to minimize
598
casualties to innocent civilians and civilian property, as are all U.S. military operations. The U.S. deeply
regrets the loss of innocent civilian lives, as well as the destruction of the Central Mosque. It is
599
unnecessary to reenter the divisive debate over the legal force or the wisdom of the Additional Protocols
to conclude that in choosing a perfidious and dishonorable strategy, the terrorists and their state sponsors,
and not the United States, made of the Central Mosque, a cultural treasure otherwise entitled to the broadest
600
degree of immunity, a legitimate military target. In striking this target, which made direct and significant
particularly if the requested assistance concerns divulging classified military matters or national intelligence product. VON
HEBEL ET AL., supra note_, at 119. However, the ICTFY has ruled that state obligations to cooperate with international
tribunals are extensive and that “to admit that a State holding [documents concerning military operations] could lead to the
stultification of international criminal proceedings[,]” thereby undermining the “very raison d’etre of [international criminal
tribunals].”). Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Judgment on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial
Chamber II of 18 July 1997, Case No: IT-95-14-AR108, 29 October 1997, para. 65. Whether the ICC would follow this
precedent is uncertain; however, if it concludes that an invocation of Article 93(4) as grounds to refuse a request is not in
accordance with obligations under the Rome Statute, the ICC may refer the alleged breach to either the Assembly of States
Parties or, in the case of non-parties, the Security Council. Rome Statute, supra note_, at Art. 93(4). In other words, U.S.
unwillingness to share sources and methods with the ICC might lead to a Security Council vote on whether the U.S. has a duty to
share national security information with potential adversaries.
597
Some commentators suggest that the U.S., as a precondition to ICC membership, seek and receive the assurance that military
operations based upon sensitive intelligence sources and methods are not criminalized in exchange for a solemn representation
that its military operations will be predicated upon a good-faith belief in the legitimacy of the same. See, e.g., FRYE ET AL,
supra note_, at 66-68 (arguing further that “[g]ood faith differences in military doctrine should be argued in military journals and
the public press, not in a criminal courtroom.”).
598
See Marc L. Warren, Operational Law—A Concept Matures, 152 MIL. L. REV. 3362 (1996) (“In combat the goal of the
United States forces is always to minimize civilian casualties[.”]); see also UN Security Council, Letter Dated 7 October 2001
from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the
Security Councul, U.N. Doc. S/2001/946 (2001) (“In carrying out these [military] actions [against the Taliban regime and Al
Qaida], the United States is committed to minimizing civilian casualties and damage to civilian property.”).
599
Although a number of militarily significant states have not ratified either of the Protocols Additional, several scholars, as well
as many human rights NGOs and at least one international tribunal, contend that API and APII in their totality have reached the
status of customary IHL and are thus binding even upon non-parties. See, e.g., Frits Kalshoven, Prohibitions or Restrictions on
the Use of Methods and Means of Warfare, in The Gulf War of 1980-1988: The Iran-Iraq War in International Legal Perspective
97, 99 (Ige K. Dekker & Harry H.G. Post eds., 1992); Stefan Oerter, Methods and Means of Combat, in THE HANDBOOK OF
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 111-13 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995); Prosecutor v. Dusan Tadic (Appeals
Chamber), ICTFY, IT-94-1- AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 Oct. 1995, at
para. 117 (“Many provisions [of the Protocols Additional] are now declaratory of existing rules or . . . have crystallized emerging
rules of customary law or else . . . have been strongly instrumental in their evolution as general principles.”). However, the
drafters of the Rome Statute could not reach an agreement as to whether some or all of contents of the Protocols Additional have
risen to level of CIL. BASSIOUNI, supra note_, at_. Several major military powers, including the U.S., have either refused to
ratify the Protocols Additional or have entered extensive reservations, contradicting the claim to status as customary IHL.
Parkerson, supra note_, at 51. The official position of the U.S., which has signed but not ratified either instrument, maintains that,
while various provisions of the Protocols Additional, such as the principle of distinction in targeting set forth in Articles 48 and
49 of API as well as the principle of proportionality codified at Article 57 of API, are expressive of customary IHL, many others
are not, including, inter alia, restrictions in Article 56, API, and Article 16, APII, on attacks against civilian facilities converted to
military use, the blurring of the distinction between combatants and noncombatants, the presumption of the civilian character of
facilities, the abdication of the responsibility for protecting civilians on the part of defending forces, and the relaxing of other
obligations. See George H. Aldrich, Prospects for United States Ratification of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 12 (1991) (noting statements of understanding offered by the U.S. Delegation during the
negotiation of API; Letter of Submittal from Secretary of State George P. Schultz, PROTOCOL II ADDITIONAL TO THE 1949
GENEVA CONVENTIONS, AND RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF NONINTERNATIONAL ARMED
th
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CONFLICTS, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 2, 100 Cong., 11 Sess., at VII, IX (1987) (enumerating Department of Defense
objections, including that the Protocols “grant[] guerrillas a legal status that often is superior to that accorded to regular forces[,] .
. . unreasonably restrict[] attacks against . . . legitimate military targets[,] . . . and [are] too ambiguous and complicated to use as a
practical guide for military operations.”). Moreover, for the U.S. and several other advanced military powers, the Protocols
Additional are less a serious attempt to regulate armed conflict than an incorporation of the “political and propagandistic goals of
certain delegations, and a number of the Protocol’s provisions simply cannot be reconciled with the basic realities of military
strategy and tactics.” Roberts, supra note_, at 168.
600
Terrorists, along with rogue states, have made a practice of siting weapons and forces in and in close proximity to sites legally
protected under IHL, including hospitals, religious buildings, and archaelogical sites, “precisely to make public charges of
indiscriminate use of force and of war crimes to the international community through the mass media.” Phillip S. Mellinger,
Winged Defense: Airwar, The Law, and Morality, 20 ARM. FORCES & SOC’Y 103, 111 (1993). This strategy is intended to
confer a degree of immunity upon defenders, for some attackers are loathe to attack churches, medical institutions, and cultural
monuments, while some commentators dispute the notion that such facilities can ever be construed to make an “effective
contribution to military action” despite their investiture with troops or war materiel. See KALSHOVEN, supra note_, at 89-90
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contribution to the military operations of Al Qaida and Uzbekistan, it appears that some of the biological
weapons stored within leaked from that site, causing civilian injury and death, despite the fact that the
United States took great precautions, including the use of a ground-based assault rather than aerial
601
bombardment, to avoid this. Some, including the ICC Prosecutor, intimate that the failure to warn the
Government of Uzbekistan of our impending military action prevented the evacuation of civilians and thus
constitutes a crime. Had it been possible to provide warning without jeopardizing the mission, we would
(positing a broad view of the protections due to categories of facilities). However, defenders who elect this strategy present
attackers with factual circumstances that support the legal argument that sites invested with military significance are thereby
divested of their immunities as civilian facilities. See API, supra note_, at Art. 52(2), (3) (limiting attacks to “military
objectives[,]” defined as “objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action
and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, . . . offers a definite military of advantage” and providing that
doubts as to whether an object is a military objective are to be resolved in favor of a determination of civilian status); Hague
Convention of 1907, supra note_, at Art 27 (permitting attacks against civilian facilities stripped of civilian character by virtue of
their use by the enemy in support of the military effort).
From the U.S. perspective the question of whether a facility is a legitimate military objective is ultimately a factintensive inquiry, and where attackers discover that an otherwise-immunized facility has been converted by defenders to the
“efficient conduct of hostilities and minimization of their casualties[,]” attackers are not likely to presume the contrary to their
peril. Roberts, supra note_, at 150 (warning of “dire consequences” for attackers who refuse to engage such targets). During the
negotiation of API, the U.S. Delegation made numerous statements regarding their understandings of the text, including, inter
alia, 1) that Article 52 prohibts only those attacks directed against nonmilitary objectives and does not prohibit incidental
collateral damage resulting from attacks on military objectives; (2) that if cultural objects and places of worship protected by
Article 53 are used in support of the military effort they lose the special protection of that article; (3) that in relation to Articles
51-58, commanders and others responsible for planning, ordering, or executing attacks necessarily must reach decisions on the
basis of information available to them at the relevant moment of decision, rather than in hindsight. Aldrich, supra note_, at 18.
The U.S. made similar expressions of understanding with respect to APII that indicated that “[t]he United States understands that
Article 16 [of APII] establishes a special protection for a limited class of objects that, because of their recognized importance,
constitute a part of the cultural and spiritual heritage of people, and that such objects will lose their protection if they are used in
support of the military effort.” STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT SUBMITTED TO PRESIDENT REAGAN, S. Treaty Doc.
th
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No. 2, 100 Cong., 1 Sess. (1987), at 7. Thus, according to the U.S., where defenders, who share with attackers responsibility
for reducing the risks faced by civilians, unilaterally strip otherwise protected sites of their immunity, these sites, whether they be
schools, nuclear plants, hospitals, or mosques, are by their actions converted into legitimate military targets. See Aldrich, supra
note_, at12 (stating that attacks against otherwise protected nuclear generating stations are permitted as militarily necessary
where such stations are furnishing power to military facilities or used for weapons research or stockpiling); Meron, supra note_,
at 277 (contending that targets with a generally civilian character may be lawfully attacked if they meet the definition of military
objective under API, Art. 52(2)); United States Department of Defense, Report To Congress On The Conduct Of The Persian
Gulf War—Appendix on the Role of the Law of War, 31 I.L.M. 612, 627 (1992) (stating unequivocally that, when civilian
structures are invested with weapons or defending troops, these structures become legitimate military targets under the rule of
military necessity). Some, including a number of NGOs, contest the U.S. interpretation, suggesting that certain enumerated
categories of facilities can never be divested of their civilian character. See, e.g., 12 HUM. RTS. WATCH, Civilian Deaths in the
NATO Air Campaign (2000) (available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato/index.htm) (charging NATO targeting of
bridges and communications facilities used by Yugoslavia in support of the war effort against NATO as war crimes in violation
of the targeting restrictions imposed by Articles 51-58 of API). These redefinititions of legitimate military targets, posited by
what one commentator terms an “extreme” and “fringe” group, have begun to influence international legal jurisprudence. See
Meyer, supra note_, at 164-65. However, if, as the U.S. and a number of other states contend, the Protocols Additional,
particularly Articles 51-58, are not yet expressive of customary IHL, the U.S. position is a permissible interpretation of the sole
applicable instrument of IHL governing restraints on combat targeting, the Hague Regulations of 1907, which are silent with
respect to the targeting of particular categories of facilities. See supra note_. Whether the deliberate targeting of civilians to
shatter enemy morale is permissible under the Hague Regulations is beyond the scope and purpose of this Article; it suffices to
note in passing that the U.S. Air Force answers the question in the affirmative. See Jeanne Meyer, Tearing Down the Façade: A
Critical Look at the Current Law on Targeting the Will of the Enemy and Air Force Doctrine, 51 A.F. L. REV. 143 (2001)
(stating that current Air Force doctrine “clearly recognizes and allows for . . . choosing targets that also affect the enemy's will
and morale, both of their military forces and their civilian population.”).
601 Although the API proscribes attacks against targets likely to release “dangerous forces” for the sole purpose of killing
civilians via such release and requires attacking parties to take “all practical precautions” to avoid the escape of “dangerous
forces” from targets likely to release such forces, it does not categorically proscribe attacks on such targets, nor does it define
what sort of measures are within the bounds of the practical. API, supra note_, at Art. 56. By selecting those tactics and
weapons most likely to minimize the release of dangerous forces and providing warning where possible, attacking forces are
most likely to substantiate the claim that they have taken “all practical precautions.” Parkerson, supra note_, at 62; see also API,
supra note_, at Art. 51(4)(c) (proscribing methods and means of attack that cannot be controlled sufficiently to protect civilians
from injury). In comparison to aerial bombardment, which requires significantly more ordnance and increases the potential for
errant targeting and collateral damage, a ground assault, while more dangerous to exposed attacking forces, permits the more
surgical application of force and enhances the opportunities to limit collateral damage. See Michele L. Malvesti, Bombing Bin
Laden: Assessing the Effectiveness of Air Strikes as a Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 26-SPG Fletcher F. World Aff. 17 (2002 ); U.
MICHIGAN, Post-Cold War, supra note_, at 717 (reporting that the Department of Defense estimated during Desert Storm that
the destruction of Iraqi biological weapons sites located in urban areas by aerial bombardment, as opposed to ground-based
assault, could have the unintended effect of releasing toxic fallout and killing as many as 6 million Iraqi civilians). Thus, the
U.S., by employing Special Forces to eliminate the BWs in the Central Mosque, would arguably be judged by an independent
reviewer to have taken “all practical precautions” in preventing collateral damage.
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have done so. Unfortunately, because Al Qaida intended to immediately transfer the weapons for use
against the United States, it was not. Nonetheless, and consistent with the felony murder doctrine in
603
common-law, the ultimate authors of death and destruction associated with OPERATION JEREMIAH
are Al Qaida and Uzbekistan, who chose to deliberately site prohibited weapons of mass destruction in a
604
crowded urban area in a cowardly attempt to shield themselves and their weapons from attack.
Not only does the U.S. lack responsibility for civilian casualties associated with OPERATION
JEREMIAH, but the mere fact that a great number of civilians perished during and subsequent to the U.S.
military attack does not support the conclusion that the U.S. is responsible for any crimes. Although the
U.S. accepts a customary obligation to adhere to the doctrines of proportionality and distinction in the
605
conduct of its military operations and to use its best efforts to limit and prevent civilian casualties, it is or
should be patently obvious that the United States neither targeted civilians nor intended that civilians
become casualties of OPERATION JEREMIAH, which was directed solely against the weapons of mass
destruction in the hands of terrorists and their rogue state sponsor. Civilian casualties are, tragically, an
606
inevitable concomitant of armed conflicts conducted in urban areas. For this reason, proportionality is
not an element in the charge of a crime against humanity, which imputes the intentional targeting and not
607
the inadvertent killing of civilians, nor is there a magic formula that can be fairly applied post-hoc to
answer the subjective question of whether civilian casualties are disproportionate to the military advantage
602

Assault confers upon attacking forces the tactical advantage of surprise, which is lost when a defender gains prior warning and
is able to prepare defenses, and, in relevant circumstances, even relocate WMD. Parkerson, supra note_, at 49. IHL concedes
that military necessity may require attacking forces to attack without warning. Article 26 of the Hague Regulations of 1907
(supra note_) obligates attacking forces, where circumstances permit, to grant advance warning of an intended assault in order to
permit the evacuation of civilians from the target area, the development of state practice since 1907 indicates that derogation is
permitted where “circumstances do not permit advanced warning.” OPPENHEIM, supra note_, at 420. Similarly, Article
57(2)(c) of API provides that “effective advance warning shall be given of attacks which may affect the civilian population,
unless circumstances do not permit.” (emphasis added). U.S. practice reinforces the conclusion that the obligation to grant
warning is limited: paragraph 43(c) of FM 27-10 limits circumstances in which a warning is required to those “whe[re] the
situation permits[,]” and U.S. forces have withheld warnings in recent operations on the ground that to have issued warnings
would have increased casualties to attacking and defending forces as well as to civilians. See Parkerson, supra note_, at 48-50
(discussing legal questions related to warnings to defending forces during OPERATION JUST CAUSE in Panama (1989)).
603
The felony murder doctrine, developed at common-law and codified in several States, provides that any death which occurs
during the commission of a felony is first degree murder, and all participants in that felony or attempted felony can be charged
with and found guilty of murder. See IND. CODE §35-42-1-1 (“A person who . . . kills another human being while committing
or attempting to commit [a felony] commits murder[.]”).
604
API obligates the defending party “to the maximum extent feasible” to remove civilians from the area of military objectives, to
locate military objectives away from densely populated areas, and to take other necessary precautions to protect civilians. API,
supra note_, at Art. 58(a). Even more pointedly, Article 51(7), along with Article 28 of GCIII, imposes a duty upon the defender
to avoid using civilians to shield military objectives. See API, supra note_, at Art. 51(7) ( ); see also GCIII, supra note_, at Art.
28 (providing that civilians may not be used to render an area immune from attack,). Thus, when defending forces fail to
discharge their obligations to remove civilians from the area of military objectives, the resulting civilian casualties are arguably
attributable to this breach of the defender.
605
In upholding obligations under proportionality and distinction to minimize incidental loss of civilian life, military planners
consider a wide range of factors, including 1) the military importance of the target or objective, 2) the density of the civilian
population in the target area, 3) the likely incidental effects of the attack, including the possible release of hazardous substances,
4) the types of weapons available and their accuracy, 5) whether the defenders are deliberately exposing civilians or civilian
objects to risk, and 6) the mode and the timing of the attack. However, in so doing, military planners are hampered by imperfect
information, the fog of war, the imperative of military necessity, and the need to make rapid decisions. Commentators attempting
to establish the legal standard under which to impose liability upon belligerents for violations of IHL committed in the process of
target selection and mission tailoring offer what is essentially a gross negligence, rather than an absolute liability, standard,
suggesting that the relevant question to be asked and answered after the fact is whether a “normally alert atacker who is
reasonably well informed and who ma[de] reasonable use of the available information could have expected the excessive damage
among the civilian population” in prosecuting an attack against a given target with the means and methods selected. Kalshoven,
supra note_, at 99-100. Determination of liability under a negligence standard thus is a factual question which rests upon an
assessment of the information actually or reasonably available to the attacker at the time the decision was made to target a given
site with particular means and methods. See David K. Linnan, Iran Air Flight 655 and Beyond: Free Passage, Mistaken SelfDefense and State Responsibility, 16 YALE J. INT’L L. 245, 366-74 (1992) (discussing application of negligence standard to
assess liability for deaths of civilians resulting from the mistaken targeting of a civilian airliner believed to be a military aircraft).
606
See Department of Defense, Report To Congress On The Conduct Of The Persian Gulf War—Appendix on the Role of the
Law of War, 31 I.L.M. 612, 624 (1992) (concluding that civilian casualties are inevitable in modern military operations); W.J.
Fenrick, Attacking the Enemy Civilian as a Punishable Offence, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 539 (1997) (same).
607
Whereas crimes against humanity implies intentional targeting of civilians, the war crime of committing an unlawful attack
envisages circumstances where unintended civilian deaths or injuries result in the course of an attack against a legitimate target.
See Rome Statute, supra note_, at Art. 6 (creating liability solely for the intentional commission of enumerated crimes against
civilian victims in violation of the principle of distinction but maintaining silence with respect to the principle of proportionality);
cf. id. at Art. 8 (note); Fenrick, supra note_, at 783 (arguing against expansion of conceptual definition of crimes against
humanity to incorporate the crime of creating disproportionate civilian casualties during an attack on the ground that to do so
could theoretically criminalize the conduct of all soldiers, depending upon how proportionality is determined, and thereby
remove legal incentives for moderation during armed conflicts).
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608

gained by a legally permissible attack preceding those casualties, or otherwise great in comparison to
609
resulting military casualties. To the extent that any parties were in a privileged position to prevent
civilian casualties, that distinction is reserved to Al Qaida and Uzbekistan, which, rather than exploit
ambiguities in the laws of war to support their propagandistic claims that the United States has engaged in
an indiscriminate attack, might have evacuated their prohibited weapons and relocated innocent civilians
610
but chose, for political purposes, another course of conduct. This is not the first time terrorists have
611
cynically manipulated civilian populations, nor will it be the last. However, to “resort to counting bodies
and placing monetary values on destruction and then applying a ‘but for U.S. intervention this would not
612
have occurred’ kind of formula” to find a violation of the laws of war is as much a perversion of the law
as it is of the facts and of the requirements of justice, and is beneath the dignity of this institution.
Furthermore, the most basic conceptions of morality and law rail at the notion that terrorists, a
613
group beyond the pale of the law, can don civilian garb and hug the civilian population to make
614
themselves invulnerable, but the Al Qaida terrorists, who know that the U.S. Armed Forces are populated
608

See Parkerson, supra note_, at 59 (noting that although the general principles of distinction and proportionality elaborated in
API are “unobjectionable as customary [IHL], . . . [a]ssessing what is the ‘concrete and direct military advantage anticipated,’ the
‘incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects’ that may be expected, or the ratio between the
two prior to attack is an extremely difficult, if not impossible, task to perform with any degree of certainty.”). Several states and
commentators challenge Article 51(4)(c) of API as constituting a “radical revision” of the “inherited principle of distinction” in
that it would not permit the continued immunization of attacks not intentionally directed against civilian targets where such
attacks employed “methods and means of combat” that had the effect of causing disproportionate civilian casualties. See
Roberts, supra note_, at_. (rejecting the substitution of a proportionality determination, assessed by an evaluation of the method
and weapons employed in an attack, for the intent of the combatant as the relevant evidence in determining compliance with the
principle of distinction). Other commentators, favoring the modifications of API, have operationalized legal obligations under
the principles of proportionality and distinction by suggesting that the two are so interrelated that, although adherence to the
principle of distinction does not require that an attack produce no civilian casualties, an attacker must simply strike a balance
between the value of the military advantage gained and the collateral damage produced—in other words, distinction drops away
(save for those cases involving the intentional targeting of civilians) and what is left is simply that the attacker not violate the
principle of proportionality by using excessive force or by using particular weapons systems where less lethal alternatives are
available. See, e.g., Stuart Walters Belt, Missiles Over Kosovo: Emergence, Lex Lata, of a Customary Norm Requiring the Use of
Precision Munitions in Urban Areas, 47 NAVAL L. REV. 115, 148 (2000); Kalshoven, supra note_, at 99 (stating that an attack
on a military target satistifes the principle of distinction only if “the attack could be carried out without unduly severe losses
among the civilian population.”); Parkerson, supra note_, at 61 (indicating that some adherents to this position consider that the
U.S. doctrine of “highly sophisticated weaponry and tactics to present an overwhelming superiority of firepower that would make
any resistance unthinkable” unnecessarily causes civilian casualties and therefore ipso facto violates the proportionality
principle); Belt, supra note_, at 173 (reporting arguments that the U.S. practice of employing precision-guided munitions
[“PGMs”] over the last 10 years has modified the meaning of proportionality to require the use of PGMs in urban areas). In sum,
determination of proportionality is an inherently political exercise, since the value of a military objective, as well as how many
civilian casualties are necessary to constitute “unduly severe losses,” is a function of interests rather than law.
609
Americas Watch, a human rights NGO, has intimated that it is possible to draw inferences as to U.S. compliance with the
principles of distinction and proportionality by comparing the number of civilian dead resulting from a U.S. military operation to
the number of casualties suffered by attacking U.S. forces. See Parkerson, supra note_, at 61 n. 155 (decrying the use of this
compliance determination protocol by Americas Watch as a “macabre and distorted method of viewing proportionality[.]”). The
unstated assumption is that some proper proportion of military casualties to civilian casualties exists against which U.S.
operations can be assessed for compliance with IHL and that insufficient military casualties permit the inference that an operation
was not sufficiently protective of civilians. Id. Unsurprisingly, this view is diametrically opposed by the view that in evaluating
compliance with the principle of proportionality by assessing whether the degree of force used was necessary to accomplish a
legitimate military objective, “we are entitled to take into account not only the force needed to subdue the military force of the
enemy, but also the danger posed to [U.S.] forces, when proceeding to subdue the enemy force, within the framework of the
military action of defending against [the enemy.]”). Temple, supra note_, at 237.
610
See Parkerson, supra note_, at 59 (“[P]rior to attack, the attacking commander knows much less than the defender about the
location of civilians[,] . . . [and] [t]herefore the emphasis in Protocol I on placing the primary responsibility for minimization of
incidental civilian casualties upon the atacker, rather than upon the more informed defender . . . encourag[es] defenders to charge
‘indiscriminate attack’ and to call for analysis of attack results without consideration of the cause of those casualties, thereby
exploiting civilians for tactical and propaganda purposes.”).
611
See O’BRIEN, supra note_, at 123 (stating that U.S. violations of proportionality and distinction in Vietnam was “in
substantial measure the result of deliberate Communist policies of using the population as a shield[,] [as] [o]ften it was
impossible to get at the enemy without risking disproportionate and indiscriminate actions.”).
612
Parkerson, supra note_, at 139-40.
613
Traditionally, terrorist groups did not come within the application of IHL, a regime framed in contemplation of wars between
regular military forces; terrorists were classed as common criminals. See generally KWAKWA.
614
Quoting WALZER, supra note_, at 195. Terrorists are heavily reliant upon secrecy and surprise, and largely immune from
considerations of ethics and morality. Baxter, supra note_, at 328. To maximize secrecy and minimize the risk of drawing
hostile fire, terrorists often site their operations within densely populated civilian centers in the expectation that their adversaries
will be loathe to attack them for fear of creating incidental civilian casualties and arousing condemnation. See WALZER, supra
note_, at 180 (“If you want to fight against us, the [terrorists] say, you are going to have to fight civilians . . . Therefore, you
should not fight at all, and if you do, you are the barbarians, killing women and children.”). Although the practice is contrary to
law and hostile to the civilian populations wherein they take refuge, and although the U.S. does not succumb to the urge to
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with decent individuals who recoil at the thought of pressing an attack likely to result in civilian casualties,
capitalized upon the moral and ethical distinction between themselves and our soldiers by electing the
criminal strategy of fighting in civilian clothing and taking women and children hostage in direct violation
615
of the international law. That the ICC Prosecutor should undertake the selective prosecution of U.S.
violate distinction in order to counter the strategy, terrorists ‘ refusal to distinguish themselves from civilian populations “invites
enemies to attack civilians because the civilians might be [terrorists] in disguise.” Laura Lopez, Uncivil Wars: The Challenge of
Applying International Humanitarian Law to Internal Armed Conflicts, 69 N.Y. U. L. REV. 916, 929 (1994).
615
The taking of civilian hostages as human shields to protect against enemy fire is categorically prohibited by GCIV as a grave
breach. See GCIV, supra note_, at Art. 34 (). A determination of the legal ramifications of the wearing of civilian clothing into
battle requires deeper analysis, although the Geneva Conventions do not treat the wearing of civilian clothing into combat as a
grave breach. See GCIII, supra note_, at Art._ (enumerating grave breaches and providing that the perfidious wearing of enemy
uniforms, but not the wearing of civilian clothing per se, constitutes a grave breach). Still, to preserve the capacity for belligerent
forces to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants and thereby uphold obligations under the principle of distinction,
IHL has long required combatants, as a matter of custom, to dress so as to distinguish themselves from the civilian population
and permit enemy forces to clearly identify permissible, and impermissible, targets. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, DA
PAMPHLET NO. 27-1-1, PROTOCOLS TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 138 (1979) (noting that
customary IHL requires those claiming entitlement to belligerent status upon capture to be under the command of a responsible
commander, to wear a fixed, distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, to carry arms openly, and to conduct operations in
accordance with IHL). The positive rules of IHL reinforce this custom by stripping the benefits to which POWs are entitled upon
capture from belligerents who do not conform to these requirements by, e.g., fighting out of uniform. See GCIII, supra note_, at
Art. 4(a)(2) (codifying customary IHL with respect to the elements of conduct required of belligerents to maintain their
entitlement to status as POWs, immune from trial for acts of lawful belligerency, upon capture); GCIII, supra note_, at Art. 85
(entitling POWs to protections of the GCs even if prosecuted for pre-capture offenses). Under the Geneva Conventions, even as
modified by the Protocols Additional, terrorists, who adhere to none of these obligations, are thus common criminals not entitled
to POW status upon capture and may, in contrast to POWs, be tried as unlawful combatants under the domestic law of the
detaining state. Baxter, supra note_, at 338 (explaining that this legal status extends to spies, saboteurs, guerrillas, and all others
who fail to meet the conditions established under international law for favored treatment upon capture by “engag[ing] in hostile
conduct without meeting the qualifications established by Article 4 of the [GCs].”); see also id. at 327 (stating that such unlawful
belligerents are “subject to the maximum penaltiy which the detaining belligerent desires to impose.”); API, supra note_, at Art.
44 (providing that combatants who do not carry arms openly while preparing for or engaging in hostilities are acting perfidiously
and thus disentitle themselves to POW status upon capture and may be tried under the domestic law of the capturing state). The
same is true of civilians who take up arms without donning a uniform: they lose their protected status under IHL and become
combatants, albeit unlawfully, and thus legitimate targets as well as the legitimate subjects of post-capture judicial proceedings.
See GCIV, supra note_, at Art. 4(a)(2) (defining noncombatancy and enumerating categories of noncombatants, including
civilians, soldiers rendered hors de combat by wounds or capture, and medical personnel); id. at Art. 5(3) (stripping protections
as noncombatants from civilians who take up arms); API, supra note_, at Art. 51(3) (“Civilians shall enjoy the protection
afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”); RAMSEY, supra note_, at 435-36
(explaining that “’combatant’ means anyone who is an actual bearer of the force one seeks to repress by resorting to arms.”);
DEP’T OF THE ARMY, supra this note, at 138 (“Civilians who take direct part in hostilities are ‘unlawful combatants’” who
may be legally targeted . . . and may be tried . . . if captured by the adverse party.’). This is true without regard to the age or sex
of the civilian who becomes an unlawful combatant. ILENE COHN & GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, CHILD SOLDIERS: THE
ROLE OF CHILDREN IN ARMED CONFLICT 148 (1994) (noting that even women and children lose their protected status
under IHL when they render military assistance to a belligerent). The question of whether providing material support to a
belligerent without actually taking up arms, whether by destroying enemy property, providing intelligence support, or in some
other fashion, converts a civilian out of uniform into an unlawful combatant is a relevant issue beyond the scope of this Article.
See Lisa L. Turner & Lynn G. Norton, 51 A.F. L. REV. 1, 26-28 (2001) (arguing that the answer must be judged on a “case-bycase basis.”); Faculty, supra note_, at 27 (arguing that civilians forfeit immunity from attack “whenever they take any action
intended to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of an armed force.”); but see ICRC, COMMENTARY ON THE
GENEVA CONVENTION (IV) 51 (Jean S. Pictet, ed. 1952) (“Every person in enemy hands must have some status under
international law: he is either a prisoner of war and, as such, covered by [GCIII], a civilian covered by [GCIV], or again, a
member of the medical personnel of the armed forces who is covered by [GCI] . . . Nobody in enemy hands can be outside the
law.”). Similarly, disagreements over the provisions of API which create a presumption of civilian status is beyond the current
scope, as is the current controversy over whether the designation by the Bush Administration of individual belligerents captured
in the War on Terror as “unlawful combatants” creates a separate juridical status of persons not privileged either as civilians or as
lawful belligerents to whom the protections of the GCs are not available. See API, supra note_, at Art. 50 (defining as a civilian
a person who “does not belong to one of the categories of persons referred to in Article 4(A)(1), (2), (3) and (6) of [GCIII] and in
Article 43 of this Protocol” and providing that “[i]n cases of doubt, . . . that person shall be considered a civilian.”).
Although the requirements that must be met to entitle an individual to treatment as a lawful belligerent upon capture
were fairly well-settled under the Geneva Convention, API unsettled this body of law, and the requirements that would-be lawful
combatants must uphold during a “military deployment preceding the launching of an attack” are now the subject of heated
contestation. Article 44 of API provides that “combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian population while
they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack[,]” but Article 43 eliminates part of the juridical
distinction between soldiers and civilians by deleting the requirement that irregular forces wear a distinctive symbol and
providing that irregular forces are lawful combatants if they meet the lesser obligations of organization under a responsible
commander, adherence to IHL, and a relationship to “a Party to the conflict.” API, supra note_, at Art. 43. These two articles
have been roundly condemned for blurring the principle of distinction between combatants and noncombatants and permitting
interpretations of its text that would unilaterally allow “guerrillas” to disguise themselves as civilians, hide amongst civilian
populations until just before the moment of an attack, produce insignia and weapons at the very moment of an assault launched
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personnel, but not the terrorists and their state sponsors, for actions associated with OPERATION
JEREMIAH is no more surprising than that U.S. forces, under heavy fire from these craven terrorists,
616
should exercise their inherent right to self-defense. “U.S. forces never have to wait until they take
617
casualties before they do what is needed to defend themselves[,]” and although our soldiers, forced to
make split-second decisions, did everything possible to prevent civilian casualties, some hostages were
killed as a result of gunfire. While the U.S. regrets their deaths, again, responsibility for this tragedy lies
heavy upon Al Qaida and the Government of Uzbekistan.
Moreover, the United States elected to employ various non-lethal weapons systems, including
lasers and riot control agents, solely to enable U.S. forces to minimize civilian casualties while eliminating
the illegal biological weapons stored in the Central Mosque. Although the U.S. Government recognizes
various restrictions upon its right to employ certain weapons systems under the Conventional Weapons
618
619
Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention, the United States has never accepted restrictions
upon its sovereign right to employ those means of war best calculated to strike a balance between military
620
necessity and humanitarian considerations. All instruments of war are cruel and inhuman in the sense
that they cause destruction and suffering, but to brand the use of lasers and riot control agents—systems
designed and employed to temporarily incapacitate, rather than to kill—as inflicting “unnecessary
621
suffering” suggests, contrary to fact, that there is such a thing as necessary suffering, or that it would be
622
preferable to kill by gunfire rather than to incapacitate by other means. It is not the amount of destruction

from within the cover of the civilian population, draw fire from enemy forces that will have great difficulty discerning
combatants from civilians (many of whom will be unintentionally killed as a result), and evade criminal liability for these actions,
viewed widely as unlawful combatancy, upon capture. See Aldrich, supra note_, at 764 (stating that the modifications to the
Geneva Conventions proposed by API “virtually assur[e] that guerrillas . . . will disguise themselves as civilians and that the
civilian population will suffer as a result.”); DEP’T OF ARMY, supra this note, at 138-39 (discussing official U.S. objections to
Articles 43-44 of API); KWAKWA, supra note_, at 90 (parsing Article 43 of API and identifying erosion of obligations
incumbent upon irregular forces; L. Green, The New Law of Armed Conflict, 15 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 3, 14 (1977) (suggesting
that if Article 44 is read to permit irregular forces to disguise their status for almost the entirety of their operations it will sully the
principle of distinction and leave exposed the civilians it is designed to protect). In light of the foregoing, the answer to the
question of whether members of Al Qaida could be considered unlawful combatants during their counterattack on the Alpha
teams during OPERATION JEREMIAH is a function of applicable law, which remains unsettled, contested, and ultimately a
political issue. Clearly, however, the taking of civilian hostages constitutes a grave breach of the GCIV, and thus a prosecutable
war crime. For a thorough discussion of the concept of unlawful combatancy, see Manooher Mofidi & Amy E. Eckert, “Unlawful
Combatants” or “Prisoners of War”: The Law and Politics of Labels, 36 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 59 (2003).
616
Just as states possess the inherent right to self-defense, individuals possess the right, under IHL, to defend themselves against
attack. See XIII L. REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 149, 151 (1949) (holding, in acquitting Erich Weiss and Wilhelm Mundo, tried
on 9-10 November 1945 by U.S. military commission for the alleged unlawful killing of a U.S. POW, that “self-defense which,
according to principles of penal law is an exonerating circumstances in the field of common penal law offenses when properly
established, is also relevant, on similar grounds, in the sphere of war crimes.”). Actions taken in self-defense must be necessary
and proportional to the threat. See United States v. Carl Krauch, VIII TRIALS WAR CRIM. 1081, 1179 (1950) (restricting the
defense of self-defense to those instances where actions taken in self-defense are necessary and proportional).
617
Faculty, The Judge Advocate General’s School, United Nations Convention on the Safety of United Nations (UN) and
Associated Personnel Enters into Force, 1999 ARMY LAW. 21, 30 (1999).
618
Although the U.S. is a party to the Conventional Weapons Convention [“CWC”] it has entered extensive reservations and
accepted only parts of that instrument as binding, including Protocol I (prohibiting use of weapons that create fragments not
detectable by x-ray) and Protocol II (concerning use of mines and booby traps); it has not accepted Protocols III (banning
incendiary weapons) or Protocol IV (prohibiting blinding weapons). Commentators suggest that although the U.S. does not
recognize Protocol IV it is adhering to it. See David Atkinson, New Weapons Technologies Offer Complex Issues for Review,
DEF. DAILY, Sept. 1, 1999, at 2 (quoting W. Hayes Parks, Special Sssistant to U.S. Army Judge Advocate General) (“We are
not parties to [Protocol IV] but we are abiding by it.”). For a list of CWC parties, see http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf.
619
Official U.S. policy has long approved the use of riot control agents [“RCAs”] (see supra note_) to aid in the rescue of downed
aircrews and the dispersal of civilians being used as human shields. See E.O. 11,850 (3 C.F.R. 980 (1971-1975)), reprinted in
FM 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE (note); CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION 3110.07,
NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL DEFENSE; RIOT CONTROL AGENTS; AND NON-LETHAL WEAPONS (3
July 1995) (authorizing and instructing U.S. Armed Forces in the use of RCAs). Although neither the Executive Order nor the
Instruction have been superseded, the U.S. Senate ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, and President Clinton
took the position that the CWC prohibits RCAs as analogous to prohibited chemical weapons. Warren, supra note_, at 55 n.91.
The interpretation of the Clinton Administration is not binding upon successor administrations, which in future conflicts might
well order the use of RCAs on the ground that such weapons are non-lethal alternatives effective in particular tactical situations
and do so consistent with their belief that RCAs are not prohibited under existing IHL.
620
The U.S. has developed and deployed portable ground-based low-energy lasers for target-marking and range-finding but has
not officially sanctioned their use, although at least one commentator suggests that their use in force protection and reprisal is
consistent with IHL. See, e.g., Carnahan, supra note_; Noone, supra note_ at 27-35. Other commentators maintain that blinding
lasers are necessarily prohibited means of warfare in that they unavoidably cause unnecessary suffering. See Carnahan, supra
note_, at 730-31 (summarizing but criticizing position that laser weapons are of no military value and categorically illegal).
621
See Hague Convention of 1907, supra note_ (prohibiting methods and means that create “unnecessary suffering”).
622
See Carnahan, supra note_, at 712 (“’[U]nnecessary sumplies that there is such a thing as necessary suffering, because the
“infliction of some suffering and injury [is] an inherent feature of armed conflict.”
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or suffering that is relevant in appraising the lawfulness of a particular weapon but rather the superfluity of
623
harm involved in accomplishing a legitimate military objective with that weapon. In the best judgment of
U.S. military commanders, based upon the tactical considerations and available intelligence, use of lasers
and riot control agents constituted the most practical, and the most humane, means to afford our forces the
security necessary to destroy the weapons of mass destruction.
Finally, the President, acting in his official capacity as Commander-in-Chief in defense of the
United States, issued lawful orders through the lawful chain of command to members of the U.S. Armed
Forces who executed OPERATION JEREMIAH. Members of the U.S. Armed Forces who receive and
follow lawful orders such as these are entitled to rely upon the legal judgments of their military and civilian
624
superiors. The soldiers of Task Force Ryan did precisely what they were ordered to do in a professional
623

In determining whether a given weapon inflicts unnecessary suffering it is necessary to consider not merely the extent of that
suffering but to balance it with the effectiveness of that weapon, and military effectiveness is calculated by measuring the success
in destroying or neutralizing military material, in restricting the movement of enemy forces, in interdicting enemy lines of
communication and command, in depressing enemy morale and elevating friendly morale, in eroding the stamina and cohesion of
enemy forces, and in enhancing the security of friendly forces. Carnahan, supra note_, at 713. Soldiers can only carry so much
equipment on any given mission and are never able to access the entire range of weapons in their national arsenals, and
commanders must make decisions, based on information available, in equipping their forces. DAVID HUGHES-MORGAN,
LEGAL CRITERIA FOR THE PROHIBITION OR RESTRICTION OF USE OF CATEGORIES OF CONVENTIONAL
WEAPONS (1974). Moreover, where alternate weapons are unavailable, too costly, or ineffective, the use of the chosen
weapons system is entitled to a presumption that it does not cause unnecessary suffering. Carnahan, supra note_, at 713.
624
Prior to the 1920s, unquestioning obedience was demanded of soldiers, and soldiers who followed superior orders enjoyed
absolute immunity for violations of IHL, as did the high government officials who issued such orders. ROGERS, supra note_, at
137; WELLS, supra note_, at xiv (stating that prior to 1944 U.S. soldiers were expected to obey orders without questioning their
legal legitimacy). The domestic military regulations of leading states explicitly exempted soldiers acting on superior orders from
criminal liability. See, e.g., Rules of Land Warfare (1917), supra note_, at para. 366 (exempting from liability those whose
violations of IHL were committed under orders from their “government” or “commanders”); R. v. Smith, 17 SCR 561 (1900)
(acquitting a British soldier who obeyed an order to shoot a civilian who refused to assist the British military effort on the ground
that the 1899 Manual of Military Law provided that obedience to superior orders was an absolute defense and soldiers were
entitled to rely upon the lawfulness of the orders issuing from their superiors). The Nuremburg Tribunals began to erode superior
orders as a defense, confining it to mitigation of punishment and refusing to permit its applicability as a defense. See Charter of
the IMT, supra note_, at Art. 8. Anticipating this transformation, as well as the impending prosecution of Axis defendants, the
U.S., under the direction of Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall, modified its Rules of Land Warfare in November
1944 to provide that superior orders did not automatically immunize the commission of manifestly unlawful acts. See Rules of
Land Warfare (1944), supra note_, at para. 345.1 (amending previous version of superior orders defense to permit prosecution of
individuals for manifestly unlawful acts). Although manifestly unlawful acts are generally described as those horrific and ghastly
deeds which are objectively and gravely morally wrong and positively and clearly prohibited by law, specification of the exact set
of such acts is difficult, as the law changes over time, and many of the acts soldiers can be lawfully ordered to undertake—
namely, the deliberate killing of strangers—evoke the sentiments of intense revulsion, remorse, disgust, and horror that follow
directly upon the heels of the commission of a manifestly unlawful act, such as the deliberate killing of POWs, the execution of
schoolchildren, and rape. See OSIEL, supra note_, at 113-14 (discussing manifest illegality in depth). The grave breaches
provisions supply a ready enumeration of manifestly illegal acts, and most national codes of military regulation accept that a
soldier may presume the lawfulness of superior orders and be excused from punishment for executing those orders if they prove
unlawful provided the acts required of him by those orders neither run afoul of the grave breaches provisions nor “involve acts so
transparently wicked as to foreclose any reasonable mistake concerning their legality.” Id. at 5 (“The law is now generally
understood to require that soldiers resolve all doubts about the legality of a superior’s orders in favor of obedience. It therefore
excuses compliance with an illegal order unless [the order is manifestly unlawful.]”). The corollary to this compromise is that a
soldier who commits acts of manifest illegality may not defend himself by asserting reliance upon superior orders.
Contemporary U.S. military regulations track this formulation closely, providing that courts-martial are prohibited from
issuing jury instructions as to the superior orders defense in cases alleging the commission of manifestly illegal acts but free to do
so in cases where a defendant reasonably did not know that the act giving rise to the allegation of a war crime was unlawful.
LAW OF LAND WARFARE (1976), supra note_, at para. 509 (“(a) The fact that the law of war has been violated pursuant to an
order of a superior authority, whether military or civil, does not deprive the act in question of its character of a war crime, nor
does it constitute a defense in the trial of an accused individual, unless he did not know and could not reasonably have been
expected to know that the act ordered was unlawful. In all cases where the order is held not to constitute a defense to an
allegation of war crime, the fact that the individual was acting pursuant to orders may be considered in mitigation of punishment.
(b) In considering the question whether a superior order constitutes a valid defense, the court shall take into consideration the fact
that obedience to lawful military orders is the duty of every member of the armed forces; that the latter cannot be expected in
conditions of war discipline, to weigh scrupulously the legal merits of the orders received; that certain rules of warfare may be
controversial; or that an act otherwise amounting to a war crime may be done in obedience to orders conceived as a measure of
reprisal. At the same time it must be borne in mind that members of the armed forces are bound to obey only lawful orders.”);
U.S. v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19, 27 (1973-74) (“[T]he acts of a subordinate done in compliance with an unlawful order given him
by his superior are excused and impose no criminal liability upon him unless the superior’s order is one which a man of ordinary
sense and understanding would, under the circumstances, know to be unlawful, or if the order in question is actually known to the
accused to be unlawful.”); U.S. v. Medina, C.M. 427162 (1971) (case not reported) (same); U.S. v. Griffen, 39 CMR 586, 588
(1968) (same); Kenneth A. Howard, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 21 J. PUB. L. 7, 8-12 (1982) (“It is an affirmative
defense that the actor, engaging in conduct charged to constitute an offense, does no more than execute an order of his superior in
the armed services that he does not know to be unlawful.”).
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manner, and each and every one of their acts and omissions were both permissible under the laws of war
and well within the scope of their lawful orders. As such they bear no legal responsibility whatsoever for
625
OPERATION JEREMIAH. Nor can any legal liability be imputed, even under the most expansive
interpretation of thecommand responsibility doctrine, to any senior military or civilian officials, whose
lawful orders to subordinates were executed faithfully, professionally, and with all due attention to
626
humanitarian considerations. There can be no question of superior negligence where each and every act
and omission of subordinates is both lawful and in compliance with orders, and where, as here, the orders
627
themselves are lawful, the issue never arises. Furthermore, the President, as head-of-state, along with the
628
Secretary of Defense and other public officials, are entitled to immunity for their official acts, and
The legal issue to be determined at a U.S. court-martial is thus whether the act giving rise to the specification with
which the defendant was charged constitutes a manifestly illegal act for which the superior orders defense is unavailable. The
Rome Statute, however, is silent as to the availability of a superior orders defense, suggesting either that the entirely of its
jurisdiction is concerned with manifestly unlawful acts or that the negotiating parties intended to eliminate the defense.
625
For arguments supporting and criticizing the proposition that military personnel who follow orders resulting in extensive
civilian deaths and destruction can be held criminally responsible on the theory that reasonable military personnel would have
recognized that the orders required the commission of manifestly unlawful acts, a position essentially identical to that staked out
by the ICC Prosecutor in this fictonal scenario see Richard Falk, The Shimoda Case: A Legal Appraisal of the Atomic Attacks
upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 59 AM. J. INT’L L. 759 (1965) (discussing the conclusion by a Tokyo District Court that the
U.S. bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki violated the principles of proportionality and distinction under IHL).
626
See supra at note_ (discussing the absolute liability standard of command responsibility proposed by several scholars). The
ICC might in theory interpret Article 28 of the Rome Statute to create de facto absolute liability of commanders for the acts of
their subordinates by dispensing with the element that a commander either order an unlawful act or demonstrate gross and
wanton negligence by failing to train and supervise his troops and failing to investigate and/or prosecute wrongdoing. See infra
at note_. However, such an interpretation, even if it were to attain the status of customary IHL, would not be directly enforceable
in U.S. courts-martial or in civilian courts of the U.S.. Customary international law is inferior to statutory law and will not be
enforced in U.S. courts where there is a statute contrary to the international rule. United States v. Yunis, 924 F. 2d 1086, 1091
(D.C. Cir. 1991); Committee of Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F. 2d 929, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The statute on
point, Article 77 of the Manual for Courts-Martial providing the standard of command responsibility to be applied in a courtmartial thus will trump the emerging customary IHL standard the ICC would seek to apply against U.S. defendants. See MCM,
supra note_, at Art. 77. Whether the ICC, after adopting the absolute liability standard, would concede, under the principle of
complementarity, that the U.S., in applying the restrictive standard of liability resulting in the acquittal at court-martial of a
defendant accused of command responsibility, had discharged its obligations in good-faith is a question without an answer.
627
The argument that the U.S. President and other senior civilian decisionmakers are immune from criminal liability for the acts
of subordinates in the absence of proof of a direct order requiring performance of unlawful acts or of criminal negligence is
squarely within the contemporary jurisprudence of command responsibility:
The President of the United States is Commander-in-Chief of its military forces. Criminal acts committed by those
forces cannot in themselves be charged to him on the theory of subordination. The same is true of other high
commanders in the chain of command. Criminality does not attach to every individual in this chain of command from
that fact alone. There must be a personal dereliction. That can occur only where the act is directly traceable to him or
where his failure to properly supervise his subordinates constitutes criminal negligence on his part. In the latter case it
must be a personal neglect amounting to a wanton, immoral disregard of the action of his subordinates amounting to
acquiescence.
High Command Case, supra note_, at_ .
628
Since the inception of the state-centric international political and legal order with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, heads-ofstate, along with other very senior civilian officials, enjoyed absolute immunity for their official acts. See Gilbert Sison, Recent
Development, A King No More: The Impact of the Pinochet Decision on the Doctrine of Head of State Immunity, 78 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1583 (2000). Although ultimate responsibility for the composition, missions, and rules of engagement of a military force
rest with the highest civilian decisionmakers, and although it is these senior political leaders who, by authorizing or tolerating
violations of IHL, bear ultimate responsibility for the crimes of their subordinates, international law, for most of the past four
centuries, shielded persons in the highest echelons of state power from individual criminal responsibility for violations of IHL.
M. Cheriff Bassiouni, The Normative Framework of International Humanitarian law: Overlaps, Gaps and Ambiguities, 8
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 202 n.13 (1998). However, the historical trend since 1945 has been to hold
individual government officials, including heads-of-state, accountable for their official actions on the ground that the most
heinous criminality is ultimately the work of these senior decisionmakers and that to continue to shield their conduct would
effectively foreclose the imposition of criminal responsibility altogether or, alternatively, hold low-ranking personnel responsible
for the orders of their superios. FRYE, supra note_, at 2. The jurisprudence of the ICTFY suggests that under limited
circumstances senior civilian and military leaders may be held criminally liable for the acts of subordinates. See, e.g., Prosecutor
v. Zejnil Delalic, IT-96-21-T (16 Nov. 1998) (Celebici Case), paras. 356-63, 368-78 (available at
http://www.un.org.icty/celecici/trialc2/judgment/celtj98116e.pdf) (citing ILC Draft Code Report of the International Law
th
Commission on the work of its Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 49 Sess., 6 May-26 July 1996,
st
GAOR, 51 Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/51/10) (extending doctrine of command responsibility to civilian superiors to the
extent that they exercise a degree of control over their subordinates similar to that of military commanders and thus are de facto
part of the chain of command); Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95- 14/1-T, Judgment, para. 75, Trial Chamber,
ICTFY (1999) (extending command responsibility over subordinates to civilian leaders who have the “power to sanction” within
the military hierarchy). Some commentators warn that the erosion of immunity for the official acts of senior civilian and military
officials may encourage a “victorious nation [to] convict and execute any or all leaders of a vanquished foe, depending upon the
prevailing degree of vengeance and the absence of any objective judicial review. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 38, 40 (J. Murphy,
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nothing could be more within the scope of official acts of state than a dispatch of national armed forces to
do battle in self-defense.
The United States has traditionally been in the forefront of efforts to codify and improve [IHL]
with the objective of giving the greatest possible protection to victims of [armed] conflicts, consistent with
629
legitimate military requirements. Accordingly, the U.S. recognized and scrupulously upheld the laws of
630
war during OPERATION JEREMIAH. However, war crimes and crimes against humanity have become

dissenting) (suggesting further that, by virtue of the majority opinion upholding the conviction of a senior military commander
for the unlawful actions of subordinates, all executive officials, including the President of the United States, were now potentially
liable for the unlawful actions of the armed forces). Critics of the detention of former Chilean head-of-state General August
Pinochet on a warrant issued by a Spanish magistrate alleging responsibility in the disappearance of the nationals of several states
during a 1973 coup reiterated the argument offered by Justice Murphy and claimed that the rejection by a British court of the
defense of head-of-state immunity, a decision contrary to customary international law, threatened to unsettle a domestic
compromise reached in Chile and create a political dispute between Chile and the United Kingdom that could threaten
international peace and security. See The Queen v. Bow Street Metro, Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Pinochet Ugarte [1998], 3
W.L. R. 1456 (H.L.) (citing Article 27, Rome Statute, which states that heads of state are not exempt from criminal prosecution,
as the basis for rejecting the proferred defense of head of state immunity; Lippman, supra note_, at 58 (warning that extension of
criminal liability to the policy level is “politically precarious” and potentially destabilizing). Whether customary IHL still makes
room for the immunity of heads-of-state and the most senior civilian and military decisionmakers is unclear. The ICJ ruled that
an incumbent Minister of Foreign Affairs enjoys immunity from criminal prosecutions conducted in foreign domestic courts
during the pendency of his service in office. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April (Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 121 (Feb. 14, 2002), at
http://www.icj-cij.org, reprinted in 41 I.L.M. 536 (2002). However, the Rome Statute expressly eliminates the immunity of these
officials. See Rome Statute, supra note_, at Art. 25. Whether the ICC would forge a course similar to that of the ICTFY and
futher strip immunity from senior civilian and military decisionmakers, or else cotton to the opinion of the ICJ and protect that
immunity, is uncertain. For a discussion of the trends in the doctine of the immunity of heads of state and senior civilian
decisionmakers, see Hazel Fox, The Resolution of the Institute of International Law on the Immunities of Heads of State and
Government, 51 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 119 (2002); Salvatore Zappala, Do Heads of State in Office Enjoy Immunity from
Jurisdiction for International Crimes? The Ghaddafi Case Before the French Cour de Cassation, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 595
(2001); Andrea Bianchi, Immunity Versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 237 (1999).
629
Message from the President of the United States to the Senate Transmitting the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Concluded at Geneva on
th
st
June 10, 1987, S. Treaty Doc. No. 2, 100 Cong., 1 Sess. (1987).
630
Prior to World War II states, protective of their sovereignty, did not accept the notion that IHL applied to armed conflicts not
constituting “wars” in the international legal sense of the term—conflicts between sovereign states. David Turns, Prosecuting
Violations of International Humanitarian Law: The Legal Position of the United Kingdom, 4 J. ARMED CONFL. 1, 24 (1998).
State sovereignty continues to play a role in determining the applicability of IHL: at present, IHL is applicable in its entirety only
to international armed conflicts of significant intensity or where war has been declared: noninternational armed conflicts, and
interstate conflicts of limited dimensions, give rise to a more limited set of obligations incumbent upon states and members of
their armed forces. Geoffrey S. Corn & Michael L. Smidt, “To Be or Not to Be, That is the Question”: Contemporary Military
Operations and the Status of Captured Personnel, ARMY LAW (June 1999), DA PAM. 27-50- 319; see also CHAIRMAN,
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTR. 3121.01, STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR U.S. FORCES (1 Oct. 1994)
(stating that only international armed conflicts trigger all the obligations under IHL, and “not all situations involving the use of
force are armed conflicts under international law.”); KWAKWA, supra note_, at 47 (noting that although the Geneva
Conventions, widely considered to be the primary source of conventional regulation under IHL, are applicable to interstate
conflicts, a significant level of intensity is required before an internal armed conflict comes within the limited coverage of
Common Article 3 of those instruments, and states contest even the applicability of this lesser standard of protection); UNESCO,
INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMANITARIAN LAW 96-97 (conceding that it is “unclear whether the application of
[IHL] . . . is called for under conditions of small-scale or low level violence between the armed forces of two or more states”
unless war has been declared, in which case its applicability is ipso jure and without question); id. at 222 (indicating that the
question of whether IHL applies to low-intensity conflicts and covert operations is susceptible of multiple pronouncements).
Nonetheless, the Department of Defense has adopted the official policy that all members of every service component are
obligated to “comply with the law of war during all conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and with the principles
and spirit of the law of war during all other operations[,]” effectively vitiating the significance of the nature of the particular
conflict at issue in terms of determining applicable sources of IHL. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIR. 5100.77, DOD LAW
OF WAR PROGRAM (DEC. 9, 1998), para. 5.3. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has ordered that “[t]he Armed Forces
of the United States will comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts however such conflicts are characterized and
unless otherwise directed by competent authorities will comply with the principles and spirit of the law of war during all other
operations.”). CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTR. 5810.01, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DOD LAW OF
WAR PROGRAM (12 Aug. 1996). The official U.S. position, one adopted by many states, comports with the recommendations
of various NGOs and other organizations which suggest that IHL be actively merged with human rights rights laws and principles
the better to protect the participants and victims of armed conflicts. See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF WORLD POLITY, supra note_, at
xiii (advocating the “[e]xtension to all persons actually participating in armed hostilities amounting to ‘war’ of all the rights and
duties under the law of war that may be reasonably demanded, regardless of formal recognition of their legal status or their
conformity to all of the ‘conditions’ traditionally required for belligerent status.”); OSCAR M. UHLER ET AL.,
COMMENTARY IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF
WAR 36 (1958) (arguing for liberal extension of protections of Common Article 3 during internal armed conflicts); Parkerson,
supra note_, at 44 (stating that an examination of state practice reveals that the Geneva Conventions in their entirety are applied
to every armed conflict between states).
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elastic concepts stretched by propagandists to reach lawful acts of self-defense. Even as the U.S. sets the
standard for other nations to follow in their observance of humanitarian principles, we must not, and need
632
not, give . . . protection to terrorist groups as a price for progress in humanitarian law.
To reiterate, OPERATION JEREMIAH was a proportionate, discriminate response ordered by the
President of the United States consistent with the inherent right of self-defense recognized in the UN
Charter. That it resulted in civilian casualties is regrettable, but the responsibility for the destruction of
civilian lives and property is the sole responsibility of the terrorist group Al Qaida and the Uzbeki sponsors,
whose decision to site weapons of mass destruction in a house of worship needlessly imperiled the civilian
population in serial violation of applicable humanitarian law. The object was limited to the destruction of
those weapons, which the terrorists intended to use against U.S. citizens, and the choice of weapons and
tactics—made in consultation with legal advisors in reference to applicable law—was calculated to reduce
the suffering of the civilian population. None of the U.S. civilian or military personnel that operationalized
and executed the lawful orders of the President violated any laws. Once again, although the U.S. regrets
civilian casualties subsequent to OPERATION JEREMIAH, given the foregoing the U.S. had no legal
obligation to investigate or prosecute any of its nationals for their acts or omissions in furtherance of this
mission, which, by eliminating weapons of mass destruction the terrorists had imminent plans to use
against U.S. citizens, clearly prevented significantly greater number of civilian deaths. In sum, no acts or
omissions of any U.S. nationals satisfy any elements of any crime within ICC jurisdiction, and the U.S. will
633
not submit to any tribunal other than the moral judgments of history.

The Ambassador submitted a draft resolution calling upon the Security Council to delay
prosecution for one year as provided in Article 16 of the Rome Statute, but it was immediately voted
down by China, Russia, France, Syria, Iran, Netherlands, and Iraq. In response, he declared that the U.S.,
as a non-party to the Rome Statute, had no obligation to cooperate634 with an institution the “sole purpose
of which is to put U.S. citizens and U.S. foreign policy, along with the citizens and policies of our
adversaries in the War on Terror, up to the skewed judgment of the world.”635 The next day the U.S.
President issued a terse letter to the ICC President refusing cooperation in the arrest and extradition of the
named defendants, and in turn the ICC President reported U.S. non-cooperation to the Security Council636
637

and requested assistance.

The Security Council voted that afternoon on a Sino-Soviet resolution,

defeated by a U.S.-UK veto and a bloc of abstentions, which would have condemned the U.S. and
imposed economic sanctions under Chapter VII for its “failure to surrender for trial the defendants

631

See BEST, supra note_, at 350 (stating that the treatment of POWs, as well as the prosecution of soldiers who mistreat POWs,
is part of the propaganda campaign at the heart of every modern conflict).
632
Message, supra note_, at 7 (reprinted in 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 910 (1987).
633
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“The chief restraint upon those who command the
physical forces of the country . . . must be their responsibility . . . to the moral judgments of history.”).
634
Article 87(5) permits the ICC to “invite” states that are not parties to cooperate in its investigation and prosecution of their
nationals but does not of its own legal force compel them to do so, and Article 89(1) simply provides that the ICC can “request”
of non-parties the arrest and surrender of their nationals and that only “States Parties” are obligated to comply. As such, nonparty states cannot be said to have legal duties to cooperate with the ICC unless such duties arise under customary international
law, which position the U.S. has and would likely continue to reject although the ICTFY has ruled otherwise. See Prosecutor v.
Tihomir Blaskic (Judgment on the Request of the Government of Croatia for Review of the Decision of the Trial Chamber of 18
July 1997, IT-95- 14- AR 108, 29 October 1997, at para. 26 (holding that cooperation with the ICTFY was an obligation “erga
omnes.”). However, some of the most outspoken advocates of the ICC concede that it “makes little sense for State parties that
have not accepted the jurisdiction of the [ICC] with respect to the particular crime under investigation or prosecution to be under
any legal obligation to cooperate with the [ICC].” Michael P. Scharf, Getting Serious About An International Criminal Court, 6
PACE INT’L L. REV. 103, 117 (1994).
635
Mark Matthews, Court has to Get By Without U.S.; Tribunal: Denied the Right to Exempt its Nationals from the Jurisdiction of
the Planned International Criminal Court, America Opts Out of the Treaty, BALT. SUN, Jul. 22, 1998, at A2 (quoting
spokesman for Sen. Jesse Helms).
636
See Blaskic, supra note_, at para. 33 (“[The ICTFY] is endowed with the inherent power to make a judicial finding concerning
a state’s failure to observe the provisions of the Statute or the Rules. It has also the power to report this judicial finding to the
Security Council[.]”). Similar power might be conferred upon the ICC.
637
See Blaskic, Judgment on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of the Trial Chamber of 18 July
1997) (IT-95- 14-AR108), 2 October 997, paras. 25-37 (holding that the president of an international criminal tribunal may
request that the Security Council force compliance with arrest warrants).
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associated with OPERATION JEREMIAH, an act of state terrorism,” although the General Assembly
called upon member states to contribute forces to enforce the ICC request for U.S. cooperation.638
In light of the failure of the Security Council to compel U.S. cooperation in the case of
639

Prosecutor v. Task Force Ryan., the Prosecutor tried the defendants in absentia.

After a bench trial

lasting one month, all were convicted on all counts of the indictment. In response, the U.S. Congress
passed a joint resolution authorizing the President “to use all necessary force to prevent the forcible
abduction or rendition of any U.S. national associated with OPERATION JEREMIAH.”640 The
legislation also resolved that should any state assist the ICC in its efforts to obtain physical custody over
these U.S. nationals, “a state of war will exist between the United States and that nation.”
C. Lessons
The preceding analysis suggests that the substantive content of IHL secures compliance to the
extent that it does so not because the rules and regulations are constitutive of a positive legal canon but
because those aspects of the canon that soldiers obey are already internal to the martial profession in the
form of the martial code. The juxtaposition of the two paradigms suggests further that “to be broadly
acceptable in practice, rules [of IHL] must respect the reasonable requirements of the armed forces for the
efficient conduct of hostilities and minimization of their casualties, while equally being consistent with
generally accepted humanitarian principles.”641 Accordingly, institutions called to adjudicate alleged
violations of IHL ought to immunize, rather than criminalize, good-faith measures undertaken to defend
law and civilization, even if and where such measures depart from the formal, positive legal prescriptions
and proscriptions of IHL, particularly as that canon comes to be interpreted by outsiders to the martial
profession.642 Where a modality of adjudication would criminalize acts promotive of the ends law is
638

See Uniting for Peace Resolution, G.A. Res. 377(A) (June 1950) (“Resolv[ing] that if the Security Council fails to exercise its
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security . . . the General Assembly shall consider the matter
immediately with a view toward making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures[.]”) (providing legal
justification for collective enforcement measures against North Korea when the Security Council was paralyzed).
639
Although the Rome Statute as codified prohibits trial in absentia, the Statute can be amended to provide for de novo trial of a
defendant upon his capture and rendition to the custody of the ICC even if he has been previously tried and convicted before the
ICC. See Rome Statute, supra note_, at Art._ (prohibiting trial in absentia); but see id. at Art. 121 (permitting amendment of the
Rome Statute). Some scholars urge the amendment of the Rome Statute to permit trial in absentia in order to enable the
preservation of witness testimony and documentary evidence as well as to diminish the incentive for states to resist cooperation
with the ICC. See, e.g., Chase, supra note_, at 196. The ICTFY has considered, but not attempted, the trial in absentia of
defendants not in the custody of the tribunal, a proceeding permissible under Rule 61 of the Statute of the ICTFY, on the ground
that to fail to do so would likely have the effect of permanently precluding the adjudication of their guilt or innocence and as such
would frustrate the interests of justice and the purpose of the ICTFY. See U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 25, 1997, at 47
(quoting Richard Goldstone, former Chief Prosecutor of the ICTFY).
640
Under customary international law, the forcible rendition of acriminal suspect or convict in connection with a crime committed
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the rendering state is permissible under the principle of universal jurisdiction in regard to
crimes including, inter alia, war crimes and crimes against humanity. See United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir.
1991); Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, Dist. Ct. Jerusalem (Isr. 1961), 36 INT’L L. REP. 5 (1961). Forcible rendition to
hale the offender into the U.S. is permissible as well under U.S. law. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992)
(applying the Kerr-Frisbie rule to hold that the forcible rendition of a criminal suspect from a state with which the U.S.
maintained a treaty of extradition was permissible under U.S. law); United States v. Rezaq, 908 F. Supp. 6 (D. D.C. 1995) (same).
Moreover, the Rome Statute imposes general and specific obligations upon States Parties to cooperate with the ICC under
Articles 86, 87, and 93, and 111, to include in the rendition of persons it has formally accused or convicted of crimes within its
jurisdiction. For the U.S. to object to the rendition of U.S. nationals, forcible or otherwise, by State Parties to the ICC, it would
appear obligated to do so upon non-legal grounds, and to seek non-legal remedies in the event of such rendition.
641
OSIEL, supra note_, at 31-32.
642
The duty to defend Western civilization—the highest good imaginable—implies the duty to craft and wield those weapons that
enable this defense. See Gross, supra note_, at 460 (charging the West with this duty). Thus, the duty of the Western democratic
state, engaged in a war against Islamic terror, to its own citizens may mitigate, or even obviate, any correlative duty to noncitizens to strictly observe of all the politically malleable principles of IHL.
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tasked to serve, that modality is objectively dysfunctional. Martial honor, reliant upon a regime of selfregulation that secures compliance with a rigorous code of conduct upon pain of disgrace and death while
nonetheless recognizing exigencies unique to the experience of the combat soldier and immunizing all but
those acts that genuinely and universally smack of barbarism, is not only conducive to a more holistic and
stricter standard of judgment of the martial caste but better suited than the ICC to accomplishing the
critical functional task of suppressing inhumanity in war without disabling the defense against existential
threats posed by manifestly evil adversaries dedicated to the destruction of civilization.643
Moreover, the contrast between martial honor and the ICC also demonstrate that the stakes
associated with the choice of paradigms have been raised by the drift of the IHL canon over the past
quarter-century. The provisions of the Protocols Additional purporting to redefine proportionality and
distinction drain the principle of necessity of nearly all meaning,644 and pronouncements upon the legality
of particular weapons systems have similarly inured to the benefit of terrorist groups and rogue states
masquerading as lawful combatants.645 Further, the proliferation of dubious declarations as to what
constitutes customary IHL, and perhaps even more importantly, how it is to be interpreted in adjudging
individual criminal responsibility in connection with the use of certain methods and means of war, along
with intemperate claims that preemption is synonymous with aggression, threaten to disrupt what remains
of the equilibrium between operational necessities and IHL and fetter the self-defense measures
undertaken by states in response to global terrorism. In short, contemporary IHL absolutists, by eliding
distinctions between lawful and unlawful combatants and adopting an interpretive approach absolute with
respect to observance of self-declared rules concerning methods and means of war (the jus in bello)646 but
agnostic with respect to the justice of the cause on behalf of which combatants take up arms (the jus ad
bellum),647 privilege terrorists at the expense of their targets.
In other words, the credibility of IHL, cut adrift to terrorists’ advantage, is at a nadir at an
extraordinarily unpropitious moment in world history to bull forward with an ill-conceived, absolutist
catechism. The contemporary push to simultaneously formalize and internationalize adjudication of
(alleged) violations committed under such exigent circumstances, a misguided crusade that offers succor
to terrorists, is the legitimate subject of critical examination.648 However, despite incipient awareness that
IHL is waxing perilously anachronistic with respect to the scourge of terrorism,649 heretofore there has
643

For a discussion of functionalist theory, see infra at note_.
See Carnahan, supra note_, at 232 (describing the principle of military necessity from the perspective of IHL absolutists as
“something that must be overcome or ignored if [IHL] is to develop[.]”).
645
See supra at note_.
646
See supra note_ (defining jus in bello).
647
See supra note_ (defining jus ad bellum).
648
Criticism is a “crucial part of the historical process through which [IHL] is made.” WALZER, supra note_, at 43-44. Just as
its historical evolution toward greater protections was induced by post hoc casuistry and subjected to philosophical criticism, its
venture into a new era of asymmetrical warfare ought to be accompanied at every step by the requisite degree of criticism
necessary to ensure its continued functionality lest IHL become an unrealistic regime inapplicable to modern combat. See
FLORY, supra note_, at (asserting that only the constant re-examination of IHL can forestall its “complete breakdown[.]”).
649
IHL evolved in consideration of traditional force-on- force conflicts and has been viewed for more than a decade as unsuitable
for application to conflicts with terrorists and other subnational actors. Personal Conversation with Guy Roberts, May 28, 2003
(stating that the Protocols Additional were drafted in response to the perception that IHL as it existed in the late 1960s was not
designed to govern the sort of Third World conflicts likely to predominate in the future). However, few commentators, until
recently, have brought this point to the fore. In a development perhaps unimaginable only several years ago, a growing, yet still
quiescent, chorus consisting not solely of American voices is calling for the general revisitation of IHL in light of its inutility
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650

been no proposal for its substantial modification.

In part this is attributable to the magnitude of the

venture: the defense by rationalization of IHL necessitates more than the modification of tactics: it
requires re-examination, and perhaps re-imagination, of the IHL canon, as well as the reclamation of
responsibility for its creation and application651 by the predominant actor—the U.S.—that has consistently
been able and willing to defend it, and the civilization from whence it sprung, against barbarism. In some
measure it is due to a lack of scholarly temerity: the very act of challenging the adequacy of IHL, save by
advocating greater restrictions upon state military forces, is considered by many within the academy to be
impolitic, if not heretical, and repudiating the prevailing claims of moral equivalence between democratic
states and their terrorist enemies and suggesting a wide margin of appreciation for the former, may be
grounds for excommunication.652 Nonetheless, because the defeat of terrorism is prefigured by the
development of not merely an effective military strategy but also a common legal strategy with which
those arrayed against terror can reverse the base exploitation of IHL that occupies so central a position in
the terrorist campaign,653 the next Part reintroduces the concept of “barbarians” as the framework around
which to craft a legal strategy intended to internalize the costs of terrorists’ violations of IHL while
empowering, rather than hobbling, the robust application of military force to the defense of global order.
III. Contra Barbarum: A Proposal for a Rationalized Theory of the Laws of War
A. Barbarians: A Conceptual Definition
The ancient Greeks and Romans, who believed in a natural moral order inherent in the universe
which bound all peoples and upon which law rightly supervened,654 divided the world into two spheres,

with respect to the War on Terror. See, e.g., Address by Pierre-Richard Prosper, U.S. Ambassador for War Crimes Issues, at the
Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, Feb. 20, 2002 (“The war on terror is a new type of war not envisioned when the
Geneva Conventions were negotiated and signed . . . We should look at all international documents to see whether they are
compatible with this moment in history.”); see also Embassy of Switzerland, Washington, D.C., Communication to U.S.
Department of State, Sept. 13, 2002 (stating that the Swiss Foreign Ministry “wishes to . . . provide a space for debate on the
reaffirmation and development of [IHL] in light of the new and evolving realities of contemporary conflict situations.”).
650
The ICC framers did contemplate the eventual addition of terrorism to ICC jurisdiction. See Rome Statute, Annex I, Res. E,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/10 (1998). However, neither the Rome Statute nor any other instrument or commentary has propounded
the sort of major revision several commentators suggest is essential to the defeat of terrorism. See Roberts, supra note_, at 43
th
(expressing surprise that, despite the shock of September 11 , as of January 2003 “[t]here has neither been a serious suggestion
that the existing legal framework [of IHL] should be abandoned, nor substantial proposals for an alternative set of rules.”).
651
See supra at note_ (discussing the detrimental shift in “ownership” over IHL).
652
So powerful is its compliance pull that even official U.S. policymakers shy away from acknowledging its shortcomings. JEAN
B. ELSHTAIN, JUST WAR AGAINST TERROR 71 (2002) (“Somewhere along the line, the idea took hold that, to be an
intellectual, you have to be against it, whatever it is. The intellectual is a negator.”). A few brave scholars admit that IHL is due
for consideration.. See, e.g., George Wright, Combating Civilian Casualties: Rules and Balancing in the Developing Law of
War, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 129 (2003) (stating that the law of war is “due for reassessment”); Bryan Hehir, Just War
Theory in a Post-Cold World, 20 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 237, 238 (discussing danger in “understating how completely we need
to rethink war, politics, and ethics today”).
653
To suggest the centrality of a legal strategy to the defeat of terrorism is not to deny the importance of other policy instruments,
such as diplomacy and the dissemination of democratic principles, to the long-term objective of civilizational coexistence with
Islam. See JEFFREY F. ADDICOTT, WINNING THE WAR ON TERROR (2003) (arguing that the War on Terror requires a
short-term military solution and a long-term political solution achievable through promotion of democracy and human rights).
654
See WOODROW W. BORAH, JUSTICE BY INSURANCE 6 (1983) (discussing Greco-Roman concept of divine ordination
of universal moral-legal order); O.F. ROBINSON, THE SOURCES OF ROMAN LAW (same). Ancient Confucian societies
shared the Greco-Roman concept of a natural universal order to which barbarians did not conform. See Alice Erh-Soon Tay,
Legal Culture and Legal Pluralism in Common Law, Customary Law, and Chinese Law, 26 HONG KONG L. J. 194, 205 (1996)
(“The barbarians are covetous for gain—human-faced but animal-hearted . . . As for clothing, food and language, the barbarians
are entirely different from the people of the Middle Kingdom . . . Therefore, the sage rulers . . . neither established contact with
them nor subjugated them. . . [T]hey are always to be considered as outsiders, never as citizens. Our administration and
teachings have never reached their people . . . Punish them when they come in and guard against them when they retreat . . .
Restrain them continually[.]”) (quoting official Han Dynasty history). However, Confucian societies closed themselves off from
barbarians not because barbarians abjured responsibilities under public law in favor of private authority but because barbarians,
unlike Confucians, required extensive regulation. See ZIN REN, TRADITION OF THE LAW AND LAW OF THE
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with the first inhabited by “civilized” peoples whose affairs were governed by public laws and ethical
principles derived from this order and the second the domain of savage, hedonistic, immoral “barbarians”
who rejected public legal authority and invested political power in a head-man in whom they tolerated
corrupt authoritarianism.655 Whereas civilized people committed themselves to cities, culture, learning,
commerce, and diplomacy, barbarians were nomadic groups bereft of letters, culture, and alliances656
whose sole occupations were destruction, pillage, and war.657 To keep barbarism at bay, Roman law
incorporated stark dichotomies as between barbarians,658 near-rightless persons who by virtue of their
existence beyond the pale of law-governed civilization were not entitled to the sacred privileges of
Roman citizenship659 including the protections of Roman civil law (jus civile),660 and citizens (cives), who
enjoyed full legal personhood under jus civile.661 In other words, “barbarian” connoted rejection of a
civilization constituted around public law and obligations descending therefrom in favor of parochial
customs and rules and private sources of authority. In contrast, a “citizen” was a member of civilization
who accepted the rule of public law and attendant obligations, including taxation and military service,662
and citizenship, a precious concept, imposed the unremitting obligation to behave in keeping with duties
to the natural legal order upon which civilization rested: a citizen convicted of a serious crime forfeited
663

664

his citizenship and assumed the status of a de facto barbarian, as did cives captured in war and others

TRADITION 20-21 (1997) (restating position that “law was for barbarians, not for Confucians, because an ideal society did not
require extensive legislation . . . and law was an instrument of last resort.”). The Confucian position—that the need for, rather
than the source of, regulation is determinative of barbarian status—is at variance with the Greco-Roman position. For purposes
of parsimony, the latter position serves as the historical foundation for the conceptual definition of barbarians in this Article.
655
S.P. SCOTT, THE CIVIL LAW. For a thorough discussion of the moral, cultural, and philosophical grounds upon which the
ancients distinguished between civilized peoples and barbarians, see THEODESIAN CODE (C. Pharr transl.) at 3-7; C.
GIBBON, DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE (); M.P. Pearson, Beyond the Pale: Barbarian Social Dynamics
in Western Europe, 198- 226, in J.C. Barrett, A.P. Fitzpatrick, & L. Macinnes, Barbarians and Romans in North-west Europe from
the later Republic to Late Antiquity (1989); PETER S. WELLS, THE BARBARIANS SPEAK: HOW THE CONQUERED
PEOPLES SHAPED ROMAN EUROPE (2001).
656
See John Stuart Mill, Civilization, in Essays on Politics and Culture (Gertrude Himmelfarb, ed. 1962), at 49 (contending that
“none but civilized nations . . . ever . . form[ed] an alliance.”).
657
According to the ancient Roman historian Herodotus in his Histories, “Barbarians can neither think nor act rationally [and] . . .
are driven by evil spirits . . . who force them to commit the most terrible acts . . . [They] are incapable of living according to
written laws and only reluctantly tolerating kings . . . Barbarians are without restraint[.]” Cited in HERWIG WOLFRAM, THE
HISTORY OF THE GOTHS 6-7 (1990). Tacitus’ Germania, written in the first century A.D., elaborates a similar disgust with
barbarian venality in contrast with Roman virtue. See CORNELIUS TACITUS, GERMANIA 6-10 (J.B. Rives transl. 1999)
(describing barbarians as a violent, slothful, hedonistic people largely without laws). Contemporary accounts of the disparities
between ancient barbarians and civilized contemporaries track closely with this formulation. See, e.g., HUNTINGTON, supra
note_, at 321 (contrasting the “rich accomplishments in religion, art, literature, philosophy, science, morality, and compassion” of
the “world’s great civilizations” with their absence in barbarian “cultures”). Some scholars contest the Greco-Roman view of
barbarians as destructive, warmongering philistines bereft of morals and ethics and insist that barbarians possessed rich cultures
and effective, if private, legal systems that strove to uphold certain virtues. See generally MARC SALTER, BARBARIANS IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (2002). However, it is not necessary to prove or disprove either thesis to borrow the concept
of a distinction between civilization and barbarism and transfer that concept to analysis of the role of law in the conflict between
a Western civilization committed to law, order, and a set of ethical principles that categorically proscribe terrorism on the one
hand and a group of anti-civilizational terrorists committed to destruction of these values and principles on the other.
658
Roman jus civile originally divided free peoples into two classes—cives (citizens) and peregrini, a category that included
aliens, barbarians, and others who could claim no rights either private or public. SCOTT, supra note_. A third class, latini, was
added later. Id. Slaves could be made of persons from any of the preceding categories.
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WILLIAM L. BURDICK, THE PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN LAW 201 (1989).
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See id. at 202 (describing barbarians as outlaws subject to jus gentium (law of peoples) and not the more favorable jus civile)
661
Id. at 200 (noting that Roman jurisprudence was exclusively applicable to only those enjoying Roman citizenship, the cives).
662
SCOTT, supra note_, at_.
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Id. at_ (indicating that loss of citizenship imposed a condition akin to outlawry).
664
BURDICK, supra note_, at 204-05.
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who suffered impairment of their civic honor.

The distinction was crucial: armed operations against

barbarians could be initiated without invoking the blessings and protection of the Roman gods that
preceded wars against non-barbarians because the former did not possess the legal personality necessary
to be legitimate subjects of warmaking,666 and Roman military commanders were granted near-unlimited
authority to destroy barbarians to whom the Roman laws of war did not reach.667 When fighting
barbarians, the bellum hostile, a regime characterized by restraint, was supplanted by the unlimited bellum
romanum.668 Similarly, the Greeks accepted no restraints in conflicts with barbarians.669
The citizen-barbarian distinction, drawn to sharply limn the separation between societies
organized around public law on the one hand and the rule of man on the other, coupled with the
application of different sets of rules and norms to govern armed conflicts against citizen as distinct from
barbarian enemies, survived the fall of Rome, and from 400-900 A.D. much of Europe evolved pluralistic
legal systems that applied one law, the lex romanum, to Romans and another, known as the lex
barbarorum, to tribes and political communities beyond the reach of the Roman legal order.670 However,
by the second millennium, the diffusion of Roman law671 and the rise of strong nation-states with
institutions of organized coercion effective in securing compliance with codified systems of public law
drew vast areas outside the former boundaries of Roman rule within the realm of civilization, a process
that largely subsumed the lex barbarorum.672 Nonetheless, certain individuals and groups continued to
resist the tide of history and remain outside the reach of public laws and institutions, and the citizenbarbarian distinction thus became important less to specifying imperial boundaries than to the
development of new legal regimes to counter the emerging phenomenon of transnational criminality.
In medieval England, those who defied legal obligations by refusing to appear in court when
summoned673 or committing particularly egregious felonies were held to be beyond the protection of the
law under the doctrine of “outlawry.”674 Outlaws, as persons with no enforceable legal rights,675 could be
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Civic honor, an essential element of Roman citizenship, obligated cives to conduct themselves so as not to bring disgrace upon
Rome and so as to remain fit to render service to civilization. Id. at 208. Cives who failed in this duty suffered immediate
impairment of civic honor and were stripped of citizenship. Id. at 209 (explaining Roman doctrine of infamia immediata).
666
JULIUS CAESAR, GALLIC WARS 5.55 (note).
667
ALFRED P. RUBIN, THE LAW OF PIRACY 6-7, 9 (1988) (noting that whereas non-barbarian enemies might be taken
prisoner or otherwise granted the benefit of the protections of Roman laws of war, barbarians were generally denied quarter
unless they agreed to accept the laws and political authority of Rome). Against barbarians, in the words of the Roman Senator
and jurist Marcus Tullius Cicero utted in 50 B.C., silent leges inter arma (“In time of war the law is silent.”).
668
See HOWARD ET AL., supra note_, at 34 (elaborating distinctions between bellum hostile , a war between civilized peoples
in which nascent restraints of the era were operative, and bellum romanum, a “war of fire and sword” without any legal restraints
whatsoever which could be fought only against barbarians).
669
See PLATO, MENEXENUS (recommending moderation in relations between Greeks but none in relation to barbarians).
670
Tay, supra note_, at 198.
671
See PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY (1999) (discussing diffusion of Roman law).
672
Not all the known world became “civilized,” and medieval Christians were cnouraged by secular and clerical elites to take up
arms against the barbarian Muslims. See AUGUST C. KREY, THE FIRST CRUSADE: THE ACCOUNTS OF
EYEWITNESSES AND PARTICIPANTS (1921) (describing exhortatio ad bellum contra barbaros--the call to Christian
Crusaders to take up arms against the barbarians holding Jerusalem).
673
See 3 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 604-07 (5th ed. 1942) (stating that failure to answer
a minor charge when summoned to court resulted in forfeiture of property and chattels, whereas failure to answer a felony charge,
particularly of treason, was considered a tacit admission of the charge that resulted in conviction of the offense and outlawry).
674
See 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 449 (2d ed. 1899)
(describing “outlawry” as the condition of being an object, rather than a subject, of law, and of being beyond the protection of the
civilized legal order).
675
See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 319 (describing legal status of outlaw as “put out of the protection of
the law; so that he is incapable of taking the benefit of it in any respect[.]”).
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676

killed by all upon sight, and their property was forfeit, by operation of law, to the crown.

Likewise,

associates of outlaws were outlawed and subjected to summary punishment, as were the issue of traitors
in punishment for treason.677 A decree of outlawry could not be evaded by flight: comity provided that
678

those outlawed by one court were accorded the same status in other jurisdictions.

With the rise of

th

piracy in the 16 century, international law drew from the ancient barbarian distinction, along with the
doctrine of outlawry, to provide that pirates and other private bands of organized criminals679 were in
perpetual war with all mankind680 and thus, as hostis humani generis subject to attack by any and all
persons at any time681 without legal niceties, such as a declaration of war682 or the protection of the laws.683
Regardless of nationality, all persons were entitled, under universal jurisdiction684 and principles of natural
law harkening to the ancients,685 to capture and summarily kill pirates.686
676

See id. (noting that an outlaw under early English law was described as caput lupinum (“having a wolf’s head”), by virtue of
the fact that he might be “knocked on the head like a wolf by anyone that should meet him.”). Outlaws were effectively dead to
the law, or civiliter mortuus (“dead citizens”).
677
See 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note_, at 69 (reporting that in a defendant who suffered a "judgment of outlawry upon an
indictment for felony" or who was convicted of a felony was subjected to "corruption of blood" whereby he lost his ability to
own, inherit, or devise property.
678
See 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note_, at 584 (stating that the legal effect of outlawry extended across jurisdictions by
the principle of comity and that a “man outlawed in one shire was outlaw everywhere.”). The adoption of extradition treaties has
rendered outlawry all but obsolete.
679
See GROTIUS, supra note_, at _ (defining as international outlaws all those banded together for criminal wrongdoing,
including pirates, but excluding states that engaged in illegal acts on the ground that their wrongdoing was nevertheless
authorized by legitimate public authority and thus not anti-civilizational).
680
See GENTILI, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF WAR (1598) (classifiying pirates as outlaws and “common enemies of
all mankind”).
681
See RUBIN, supra note_, at 87 (“[A]ll Pirates and Sea-rovers, . . . are in the Eye of the Law Hostes Humani generis, Enemies
not of one Nation . . . only, but of all Mankind. They are outlawed . . . by the Laws of all Nations; that is, out of the Protection of
all Princes and of all Laws whatsoever. Every Body is commissioned, and is to be armed against them . . . to subdue and to root
th
them out.”) (citing 17 century scholar Leoline Jenkins).
682
PIERINO BELLI, DE RE MILITARY ET BELLO TRACTATUS (1564).
683
See GENTILI, supra note_ (stating that the laws of war are not applicable to pirates on the ground that the protections of
international law are applicable only to those acting under the command of a legitimate sovereign and that pirates are merely
private miscreants unauthorized to engage in violence by a legitimate public sovereign); RUBIN, supra note_, at 70 (stating that
th
pirates, by rendering themselves enemies of all mankind “ha[ve] thereby lost [their] right in the law of nations.”) (quoting 17
century statement of the King’s Advocate of the Admiralty, Dr. William Oldys); 30 Fed. Cas. 1049, No. 18,277 (16 Oct. 1861), at
1049-50 (“[Pirates] carry on war, but it is not natural war; and they are not entitled to the benefit of the usages of modern
civilized international war. There being no government with which a treaty can be made, or which can be recognized as
responsible for the acts of individuals, the individuals themselves are [liable to punishment].”). The treatment of pirates as
outlaws by virtue of their lack of connection to any legitimate public authority is consistent with the contemporary development
of the category of unlawful combatants by the Bush Administration. See supra at note_.
684
The modern principle of universal jurisdiction under international law holds that some crimes are so universally abhorrent that
their perpetrators are hostis humani generis—enemies of all manking—and that jurisdiction may be based solely on obtaining
rd
physical custody over the perpetrators. See REST. (3 ) FOR. REL. L. U.S., §494 (“A state has jurisdiction to define and
prescribe punishment for certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave
trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism, even when none of the bases
of jurisdiction indicated in §402 [such as territoriality or nationality of the accused or victim] are present.”). A state exercising
universal jurisdiction prosecutes a criminal under its own law, rather than that of the state where the crime was committed, or
under international law on the theory that the prosecuting state is acting on behalf of all mankind. The earliest origins of
universal jurisdiction trace to the struggle against piracy. For a thorough discussion of universal jurisdiction, see generally
Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785 (1988).
685
Renaissance commentators indicated that the basis for the assertion of universal jurisdiction over piracy had roots in the theory
that pirates were morally akin to barbarians in that by existing beyond the scope of public law they committed the unpardonable
sin of threatening the natural legal order constituting and defending civilization. See, e.g., CHARLES MOLLOY, DE JURE
MARITIMO 38 (1677) (stating that “the old natural liberty remains in places where are no judgments” and that instead of
resorting to judicial process “Justice may be done upon [pirates] by the Law of Nature[.]”) (RUBIN, supra note_, at 86.).
686
See id. at 40 (citing Royal Proclamation declaring “all pyrates and rovers” to be “out of [royal] protection, and lawfully to be
th
by any person taken, punished, and suppressed with extremity.”). Prior to the 19 century, pirates were typically condemned
after a brief hearing and executed. See MOLLOY, supra note_, at 38 (“If Pirats . . . happen to be overcome, the Captors are not
obliged to bring them to any Port, but may expose them immediately to punishment by hanging them up at the main Yard end
before a departure . . . So likewise, if the Captors bring [the pirates] to the next Power, and the Judge openly rejects the Tryal, or
the Captors cannot wait for the Judge without certain peril and loss, . . . the [pirates] may be there executed by the Captors.”).
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Historically, barbarians disentitled themselves from the protections of the jus in bello, a body of
regulation contracted as between legitimate public sovereigns, and in contemplation of the threat posed by
the predations of pirates and others of their ilk, states claimed the sovereign prerogative to modify the
scope of application of IHL to better enable the punishment of offenses against the “law of nations” and
the defense of civilization against such attacks.687 In the words of 17th century scholar Emmerich Vatel,
“as for those monsters who . . . act as a scourge and plague of the human race, they are nothing more than
wild beasts, of whom every man of courage may justly purge the earth.”688 Modern IHL, erected in
service to the moral conviction that the most egregious war criminals are violators of norms of jus cogens
and deserving of the most serious legal sanction available,689 is at the very least permissive of the
declaration of the authors of unlawful private acts of violence hostile to the natural legal order buttressing
civilization as barbarians subject to death upon capture.690 The precedents stretch to the Lieber Code:

th

Although pirates were afforded due process protections in the 19 century, states retained legislation permitting their summary
trial and execution. See, e.g., 30 Fed. Cas. 1049, No. 18,277 (16 Oct. 1861), at 1049-50 (“All civilized nations . . . are under a
moral obligation, to . . . suppress [pirates], . . . [who] are liable to be put to death for the suppression of their hostilities.”). A
series of treaties commit states to the suppression and punishment of piracy, and the pirate continues to be “treated as an outlaw .
. . whom any nation may in the interest of all capture and punish[.]” The Lotus Case, 1927 P.C.I.J. Series A., No. 10, at 70
(dissent); see also Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF 62/122, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (10 Dec. 1982), at Articles
100-110 (defining piracy as a crime of universal jurisdiction and requiring states to cooperate in its suppression and punishment).
687
See Wedgwood, supra note_, at 564 (stating that Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution granting power to Congress to
define and punish piracy as well as offenses against the “law of nations” was framed to permit derogation from IHL in the case of
pirates, a category of unlawful belligerents to whom the Framers did not intend to extend the protections of IHL). The extension
of Congressional jurisdiction to punish violations of the “law of nations” extends to the punishment of war criminals and
provides the basis for the assertion of jurisdiction over enemies accused of pre-capture crimes. See U.S. CONST., Art. I, §8, cl.
10 (providing Congress with broad authority for trial of those who commit criminal offenses “against the Law of Nations” and
thus creating the constitutional basis for creating tribunals to try enemy belligerents). With the Geneva Conventions of 1949 the
U.S. accepted the obligation to extend to enemy belligerents charged with pre-capture offenses, regardless of their legal status,
the benefits of the identical courts and procedures applicable to the prosecution of members of the U.S. Armed Forces for
violations of IHL. See GCIII, supra note_, at Art. 85. However, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled, prior to U.S. ratification of the
Geneva Conventions, that an enemy belligerent is not entitled to this benefit for violations committed pre-capture, and has not
revisited the question since 1945. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 22 (denying habeas corpus relief to enemy POW convicted by
a military commission on ground that the “same courts-same procedures” rule from the Geneva Convention of 1929 did not apply
to pre-capture offenses). Whether an unlawful combatant accused of pre-capture violations of the “law of nations,” specifically
violations of IHL, is entitled to the benefits of court-martial, as opposed to military tribunal, is hotly debated. For a critical
discussion of the scope and source of legislative and executive powers to create tribunals to prosecute violations of the “law of
nations,” a contentious topic beyond the scope of this Article, see, e.g., Mark S. Martins, National Forums for Punishing Offenses
Against International Law: Might U.S. Soldiers Have Their Day in the Same Court, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 659 (1996).
688
EMMERICH VATTEL, II THE LAW OF NATIONS, ch. 4, at 132.
689
A norm of “jus cogens,” or a peremptory norm, is recognized by the entire international community as one from which no
derogation is permitted and which cannot be modified save by a subsequent norm of general character. Norms of jus cogens limit
state sovereignty and immunity in that the general will of the international community takes precedence over the individual will
of states to order their international relations. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, S. Treaty Doc. No.
92-1, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entry into force Jan. 27, 1990) (defining norms of jus cogens); see also REST. (THIRD) OF FOR.
REL. L. U.S. §102 cmt. K, Reporter’s Note 6 (1987) (defining jus cogens as a narrow subset of customary international law
norms, including prohibitions against genocide, slavery, torture, and terrorism, that sit atop the international legal hierarchy and
preempt conflicting treaties and norms). Many commentators insist that prohibitions against war crimes and crimes against
humanity, acts which threaten to “subvert the very foundations of the enlightened international community as a whole,” have
ascended to the apex of the normative pyramid of international law, and that “those who commit war crimes are the
contemporary hostis humani generis. S.Z. Peller, Jurisdiction over Offenses with a Foreign Element, in 2 A TREATIES OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 5, 32-33 (M. Cherif. Bassiouni and Ved Nanda eds., 1973). The work of the post-World
War II tribunals in identifying, prosecuting, and disposing of the principle architects of aggression, genocide, and war crimes
consistent with the joint legal-moral theory that these acts constituted crimes against the entire international community supports
the argument that war criminals are an anti-civilizational force. See Joyner, supra note_, at 167-68 (arguing that Nuremburg and
subsequent jurisprudence reinforces the claim that war crimes “violent and predatory actions that descend to the level of gross
bestiality[,] . . . offend the law of civilized states and have therefore been declared . . . crimes against universal law.”).
690
Concerted post World War II efforts to immunize the conduct of broad categories of belligerents who do not meet the
traditional requirements of combatancy (including open carry of arms, acceptance of obligations under IHL, responsible
command structure, and a fixed insignia visible at a distance), including spies, saboteurs, and guerrillas, led, in part, to the
development of the provisions in the Geneva Conventions and the Protocols Additional that confer additional protections upon
these actors. See supra at note_. A number of states, and the European Court of Human Rights, have accepted the view that
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Men . . . who commit hostilities . . . without being part . . .of the organized army, and without sharing
continuously in the war, but who do so with intermittent return to their homes and avocations, or with the
occasional assumption of the semblance of peaceful pursuits, divesting themselves of the character or
appearance of soldiers . . . are not public enemies, and, therefore, if captured, are not entitled to the
691
privileges of prisoners of war, but shall be treated summarily as highway robbers or pirates.

Furthermore, the historical practice of states with regard to reprisals against and trials of war
criminals evinces that violations committed by soldiers in battle have long been considered serious
assaults upon the integrity of the system of public law that justify death as the only condign punishment.692
Although the Geneva Conventions and Protocols Additional reject the outlawry of and summary reprisal
against guerrillas and others who abjure obligations under IHL693 as archaisms in favor of an approach
originating in the broadly protective law of human rights, terrorism calls into question whether recent
expansions of the panoply of rights and privileges to which terrorists are judged entitled presumes,
contrary to fact, that they are susceptible to deterrence by legal sanctions,694 or that they have a stake in the

these instruments preclude the trial of otherwise unprivileged belligerents for unlawful combatancy in domestic military courts.
See David B. Rivkin & Lee Casey, The Crime of Unlawful Combatancy, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 7, 2003, at 9 (reporting the
British belief that the European Convention on Human Rights, to which Britain is a party, prohibits the use of military
commissions to try “unprivileged” or “unlawful” combatants). Not all states, however, accept that these instruments have
modified the international common law of war. See supra at note_ (discussing U.S. objections to various provisions of the
Protocols Additional purporting to alter the law of unprivileged belligerency). Many states and commentators consider unlawful
belligerents disentitled to treatment as POWs, and liable to prosecution, and execution, upon capture. See Nurick and Barrett,
Legality of Guerrilla Forces under the Laws of War, 40 AM. J. INT’L L. 563 (1946) (restating traditional position with respect to
unprivileged belligerents); L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 312 (2d. ed. 1912): “Since international
law is a law between States only and exclusively, no rules of International Law can exist which prohibit private individuals from
taking up arms and committing hostilities against the enemy. But private individuals committing such acts do not enjoy the
privileges of members of the armed forces, and the enemy has according to a customary rule of International Law the right to
consider and punish such individuals as war criminals.”); Baxter, supra note_, at 327 (stating that under customary IHL “it has
generally been understood that [guerrilas, partisans, so called ‘war traitors,’ francs-tireurs, and other persons who, in the face of
the enemy or behind the lines, have committed hostile acts without meeting the qualifications prescribed for lawful belligerents]
are subject to the death penalty.”); GUSTAVE MOYNIER, CONSIDERATIONS DUR LA SANCTION PENALE A DONNER
A LA CONVICTION DE GENEVE (1893) (indicating that the capturing belligerent may put the unprivileged belligerent to
death under its municipal law); U.S. v. List, 11 TRIALS WAR CRIM. 1245, 8 WAR CRIM. REP. 492 (1949) (holding that
enemy combatants who fail to meet qualifications for privileged status may be prosecuted by their captors). The doctrine, as well
as the legal consequences, of unlawful combatancy remain firmly ensconced in the domestic law of leading military powers, and
“by universal agreement and practice, the law of war draws a distinction between the armed forces and the peaceful population of
belligerent nations and also between those who are lawful and unlawful combatants.” Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942)
(holding, in denying writs of habeas corpus, sabotage activities carried out by non-uniformed enemy personnel to be unlawful
combatancy, that unlawful combatancy was violative of IHL and a war crime, and that unlawful combatants are “subject to trial
and punishment by military tribunals[.]”). To the category of unlawful combatants whom an armed force may prosecute and
punish for hostile acts against can be added terrorists, who meet none of the criteria for lawful belligerency; this is the position
taken by the Bush Administration in its classification of Al Qaida terrorists captured in the War on Terror as “unlawful
combatants.” For a discussion of unlawful combatancy generally and as applied to the War on Terror, see (note).
691
See Lieber Code, supra note_, at Art. 82.
692
See supra at notes_.
693
See supra at notes_.
694
The notion that criminals are amenable to deterrence by the prospect of punishment for their illegal acts is an argument hotly
debated in domestic criminal law scholarship, and allthough some commentators suggest that “ordinary” would-be war criminals,
as generally “’respectable’ persons . . . highly esteemed by their superiors” and “not social outcasts or marginal people[,]” can be
deterred by legal sanctions, the extension of this hypothesis to terrorists—persons who “unlike ordinary criminals . . . belong to
the category persons in need of being [sic] ‘resocialized’” can be similarly deterred—has little support. DELISSEN & TANJA,
supra note_, at 205. Successful deterrence requires rational actors to reject those choices that will result in costs that exceed
benefits and to elect those choices that produce benefits in excess of costs, and nonrational actors are exceedingly difficult to
deter from criminality. See generally STEVEN MESSNER & RICHARD ROSENFELD, CRIME AND THE AMERICAN
DREAM (1994); Chase, supra note_, at 191 (maintaining that only rational actors can be deterred through the imposition of costs
associated with the enforcement of law). Some, and perhaps most, terrorists, for whom the act of terrorism is itself an “ultimate
satisfaction” and not always a rationally-determined means to a clearly-defined and reachable goal but instead the cause of their
own destruction, are classically irrational . Michael N. Schmitt, Preemptive Strategies in International Law, 24 MICH. J. INT’L
L. 513, 518 (2003) (contrasting terrorists, “whose avoiwed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents” and who
actively seek martyrdom, with previous adversaries of the West, who were “status quo” and “risk-averse” in comparison.);
SLANN & SCHECHTERMAN, supra note_, at 20 (presenting arguments in support of the general irrationality of terrorists);
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695

civilizational order that can be used to impel them to comply with IHL, rather than a burning desire to
destroy civilization and law itself.696 Moreover, these instruments, along with the contemporary disfavor
into which reprisal has fallen,697 call into question whether the general legal principle of reciprocity, which
maintains that to be a subject of law entitled to its privileges and protection one must in turn respect the
698
legal privileges and rights of others, or the principles of contract which postulate parties of equal legal

capacity with co-dependent legal obligations699 are any longer to be elemental to the theory underpinning
IHL. If IHL is to be created and interpreted through an institutional framework so as to provide one set
of rules, less restrictive and more protective of terrorists, and another, more restrictive of and more likely
to impose criminal liability upon soldiers, IHL, and international law more generally, cannot inhabit an
anarchic world where law is respected only in the breach700 and power is again the sole convertible
701

currency.

No military force will ever conduct its operations in perfect concord with IHL—quite simply,
there are “limits to the amount of humanitarian observance that desperately fighting flesh and blood can
stand[,]”702 and no soldier or state in extremis is ever likely to privilege compliance with IHL over
703

survival.

Nonetheless, the general observance of IHL by honorable soldiers fighting in defense of

STEPHEN J. CIMBALA, ED., INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENCE POLICY IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 181 (1987)
(suggesting that deterrence based upon the threat of apprehension and punishment is inapplicable to self-sacrificial terrorists);
von CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR bk. I, ch. 1, at 2, 3, 75, 76 (Howard and Paret eds. 1976) (contrasting civilization and barbarism
and describing the use of force by barbarians as not directed toward a political objective but the “crude expression of instinct.”).
695
See Ralph Peters, The New Warrior Class, 24 PARAMETERS 16, 16 (1994) (analogizing terrorists to “erratic primitives of
shifting allegiance, habituated to violence, with no stake in civil order”).
696
See Robert McFarlane, Deterring Terrorism, J. DEF. & DIPL., June 1985, at 63 (“Terrorism is a revolting . . . form of warfare
directed against the very heart of civilization[.]”).
697
See supra at notes (discussing reprisal under IHL and evaluating contemporary arguments as to its applicability).
698
For a discussion of the general legal principle of reciprocity, see LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed.) 19-27
(1969). For a discussion of reciprocity in the structure and process of international law and international relations, see Robert O.
Keohane, "Reciprocity in International Relations," in Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in
International Relations Theory 132- 57 (1989).
699
The conception of IHL as a contract between warring parties carries with it the obligation to honor the contract and implies
that failure of either party to do so constitutes a breach with entitles the other to declare the contract to no longer be in force. See
Costas Douzinas, Postmodern Just Wars: Kosovo, Afghanistan and the New World Order, 24-41, in John Strawson, ed. (2002).
700
The endemic shortcoming of international law is that in its positive rules and regulations it is too frequently divorced from the
practical necessities and moral requirements of the actors that are the subjects of its concern, resulting in ineffectual law and a
weakening of the principles and norms that underlie the rules and regulations it declares. For a discussion of this phenomenon,
see generally DINAH SHELTON, COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE (1995). To the extent that the IHL has been unjustly
bifurcated into distinct spheres of regulation, with one functionally supportive of terrorists and the other punitive with respect to
the armed forces of states, it is not difficult to imagine that members of the latter group might come to view IHL as something
artificial to be manipulated or, worse, ignored. See DAVID CHANDLER, FROM KOSOVO TO KABUL 158 (2002) (“The gap
between ‘justice’ and what is ‘legal’ has led to the degradation of international law rather than to its development.”). If law
depends for its respect and observance upon the general perception that it is rational, functional, and just, IHL may be
endangered. See OSIEL, supra note_, at 134 (discussing dangerd posed to IHL by its inconsistency with the practical realities of
modern warfare and by perceptions that it has departed from a position of fundamental fairness).
701
The quest to transform international relations from a power-governed to a law-governed system is age-old and has contributed
to the development of international legal institutions and conventions, including the Charter of the United Nations, the
International Court of Justice, and the proposed ICC. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, LEGALIZATION AND WORLD
POLITICS (2003). However, although all forms of law rely upon at least some measure of voluntary compliance to lower the
costs of policing the regime, international law, which cannot turn to a sovereign for enforcement, is, even more than domestic
sources of law, a conciliatory law reliant upon voluntarism. For a general discussion of compliance, see EDITH BROWN
WEISS, ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW (1998); Harold
Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law, 106 YALE L. J. 2632 (1997); ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA
CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995);
HAZEL FOX, EFFECTING COMPLIANCE (1993).
702
BEST, supra note_, at 349-50 (stating a truism that is untenable to the untutored but common sense to veterans).
703
The “practical necessities, irrationalities, and uncertainties” of combat invariably impel some soldiers to elect self-preservation
over compliance with IHL. Of the many horrors of war the frequency with which soldiers, who by all accounts are otherwise
morally upstanding citizens, may be forced to contemplate and commit violations of IHL in combat in order to survive, is among
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civilization is the behavioral variable which most clearly distinguishes civilized peoples from modern-day
barbarians,704 a venal and intractable assemblage hors de loi (“outside the law”)705 that inhabits an utterly
incompatible moral universe and that, by deliberately targeting innocent civilians permanently dislocates
itself, along with its barbarian, piratical, and outlawed progenitors,706 from the ranks of the civilized. One
need not embrace the ancient ordination of territory into civilized and barbarian spheres to defend the
assertions that morality, even during war, should march in step with law,707 that the premeditated murder
of innocents is ethically and juridically distinct from their unintentional killing, and that rather than
accord terrorists enhanced status under the law defenders of civilization should withdraw the protections
of the law they shun.708 Nor need one lump all enemies together under the barbarian rubric: simply stated,
barbarians are those who deliberately attack civilians to advance the destruction of a civilization based
upon liberty, law, and respect for individual human rights and dignity.
B. Islamic Terrorists and Rogue-State Sponsors: Latter-Day Barbarians
With the fall of the Berlin Wall, Western liberal scholars reposed much faith in the prospect that a
modern and universal civilization,709 based upon Western norms and values such as liberty, individual
the most unsettling to humanitarians. See TAYLOR, supra note_, at 33 (“Otherwise law-abiding individuals will commit crimes
in order to save their own lives; national governments will likewise break treaties and international rules if necessary for their
own preservation. Intrinsically a desperate and violent business, war is not readily limitable in terms of the means to be used in
its prosecution.”). As unpleasant as this may seem to the uninitiated drafters of conventions and declarations, this has always
been, and will always be, the practice of soldiers, and while it may not comport with the expectations of civilians it is entirely
consistent with, and remediable to the extent remediation is necessary by, the martial code. See supra at note_ (presenting
principles upon which the martial code operates). Nonetheless, the phenomenon whereby soldiers engaged in combat with other
soldiers occasionally transgress against a formal legal regime to which they generally adhere ought not be accorded the same
degree of moral reprobation as the actions of terrorists, who deliberately target civilians and categorically reject IHL obligations.
704
See Gross, supra note_, at 446 (identifying respect for law as the cardinal distinguishing feature between Western democratic
states and “terrorists who trample the law in their fight[.]”). Although soldiers of Western democracies do not hold IHL
sacrosanct, their violations of IHL are nonetheless exceptional, and their adherence the norm. The converse is true for terrorists,
whose premeditated legal transgressions are standard operating procedure and whose end—the deliberate destruction of civilians
and the legal regimes instituted to protect their rights—can never justify reciprocal derogation from obligations under IHL. See
DAVID C. RAPOPORT & YONAH ALEXANDER, EDS., THE MORALITY OF TERRORISM: RELIGIOUS AND
SECULAR JUSTIFICATIONS 290 (1982) (contrasting soldiers, whose violations of IHL are incidental to their mission, with the
terrorist, who “not only violates the rights of others by violence, but . . . does so with the purpose of making everyone’s rights
insecure . . . and destroy[ing] the community of understanding and mutual self-restraint upon which the existence of rights
depends.”). In short, the difference between soldiers and terrorists rests ultimately upon the morality of both means and ends.
705
See George Aldrich, The Hague Peace Conference: The Laws of War on Land, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 42, 47 (2000) (stressing
the absolute irrelevance of law to the terrorists’ ends and means); Baxter, supra note_, at 333-34 (same).
706
See Cowles, Universality of Jurisdiction over War Crimes, 33 CAL. L. REV. 181 (1945) (tracing the terrorist genealogy
through barbarians to “bandits,” “pirates,” and “guerrillas”).
707
The philosophical position that, although the worlds of morality and law are perhaps impossible to conflate, particularly in
war, the two, which reinforce each other and are essential to the preservation of civilization, should map together as closely as
possible even in battle, dates to antiquity. See, e.g., SUN TZU, ART OF WAR (Y. Shibing, transl. 1994); V. S. SOLOVIEV,
POLITICS, LAW AND MORALITY (W. Wozniuk ed. 2000). This position is at odds with the practice of contemporary IHL
absolutism on a number of counts. See infra at pp_.
708
Perhaps the most compelling argument for the divestiture or limitation of legal rights from terrorists rests upon the moral sense
that to accord terrorists rights superior to those of their victims is fundamentally unjust:
The terrorist makes himself vulnerable . . . in that he loses the moral title to complain of [mal]treatment. Having a right
consists precisely in having the title to command respect for our demands that others act or refrain from acting in
particular ways towards us, and for our complaints when they fail to do so. The assertion of this title is inconsistent
with the position into which the terrorist has put himself to the extent of his wrong-doing. For him to claim that his
rights remain intact in spite of the harm he has done to others is for him to claim that he deserves to be left in a better
position than his victims, and the unfairness of such a claim seems clear [.]
RAPOPORT & ALEXANDER, supra note_, at 292.
709
“Civilization” refers to a human community that, although it may consist of a multiplicity of ethnicities, languages, and states,
is united by common historical experiences, traditions, values, and beliefs that influence and determine a shared normative vision
of domestic and international order, the goals that the community should collectively pursue, the values and objectives to be
promoted and defended, and the means to these ends. See Jacinta O’Hagan, Conflict, Convergence or Co-Existence? The
Relevance of Culture in Reframing World Order, 9 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 537, 539 (1999); see also Ali
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rights, free markets, limited government and separation of church and state, and a legal culture built
upon the doctrine of the formal equality of all persons,711 would emerge from decades of bipolar
confrontation.712 More pessimistic observers, anticipating that the collapse of Communism would yield a
globalorder in which religion would become the primary constituent of civilizational identity and
713
increased contacts would heighten tensions between largely incommensurable civilizations, postulated a

“clash of civilizations” in which burgeoning antagonisms, rather than Westernization, would fill the
vacuum left by receding East-West tensions.714 According to this civilizational conflict thesis, the
principal fault line along which systemic upheaval can be expected lies between the West and Islam by
virtue of stark dissimilarities between belief systems and legal cultures.715 For Muslims, law is of divine
origin and therefore incompatible with and supreme compared to a Western legal order that recognizes
human reason and the will of the majority as sources of legitimate rule-making authority,716 and perpetual
conflict with the unbelievers of the dar-al harb is therefore divinely ordained.717 Although it may shock

Ahmad, The Myth of the “Islamic Threat to the West”: Religion and Politics in the Middle East, 15 J.L
. & REL. 605, 605 (2000 2001) (defining “civilizational identity” as the “highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity[.]”).
710
See generally LARENCE M. FRIEDMAN ET AL., LEGAL CULTURE AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1996) (defining
“legal culture” as the prevailing “legal consciousness, attitudes, values, beliefs, and expectations about the law and the legal
system” within a political community).
711
See id. at 197-98 (championing Western universalist approach to post-Cold War global order as morally superior to nonuniversalist conceptions, insisting upon the necessity for moral judgment, and rejecting “cultural relativism”).
712
See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992) (elaborating thesis that the end of the
Cold War and the introduction of the integrative forces of globalization heralded the dawn of a universal civilization); Sohail H.
Hashmi, International Society and Its Islamic Malcontents, 20 SPG FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 13, 13-14 (1996) (describing
diffusion of norms, values, and principles of Western liberalism as necessary to the replacement of international anarchy with an
th
“international society”); O’Hagan, supra note_, at 540 (tracing Western universalism to 19 century evolutionary theories).
713
See Ahmad, supra note_, at 605 (listing the major civilizations as Western, Islamic, Chinese, Eastern Orthodox, Japanese,
Latin American, Hindu, and African).
714
See SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER 67-68
(elaborating his “clash of civilizations” thesis). This “clash of civilizations” thesis builds upon a skein of long-standing autocritiques of Western universalism. See OSWALD SPENGLER, THE DECLINE OF THE WEST’S PERSPECTIVES OF
WORLD HISTORY, 2 vols. (Charles Francis Atkinson trans., Alfred A. Knopf, 1928) (1922) (suggesting that the world consists
of separate and self-contained civilizations pursuing independent histories rather than a universal history); see also Tay, supra
note_, at 195 (suggesting that the “multiculturalist” rejection of Western universalism is rooted in the “mystical belief . . . that
every people has a specific and special ‘genius’ and way of life and that all . . . foreign legal influence is a violation of its soul.”).
715
Whereas Western legal systems aspire to the incorporation of universal and rational principles, Islamic law is a “status group
law” that rejects reason in favor of faith and uiniversalism in favor of limitation to a community of believers. MAX WEBER,
LAW AND ECONOMY IN SOCIETY 241-43 (1954). Although the civilizational conflict thesis concedes ground to
universalism by declaring that the central distinction to be drawn is between the West as the dominant civilization and the “nonWestern many,” it nevertheless maintains that the primary zone of conflict lies at the conjunction of Western and Islamic
civilizations. See HUNTINGTON, supra note_, at 36, 40-41 (describing Islamic and Western legal cultures as “particularly at
odds” due to marked conflicts over the relative importance of individual rights and the relationship between church and state).
716
SHIREEN T. HUNTER, THE FUTURE OF ISLAM AND THE WEST: CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS OR PEACEFUL
COEXISTENCE? ix (1998) (identifying source of irreconcilable conflicts between the Muslim and Western theories of political
and legal legitimacy); see also Khan, supra note_, at 317 (describing incompatibilities between the Islamic conception of law as
divinely-ordained and public international law—essentially a Western creation—as fashioned by treaties, customs, and the
teachings of jurists); J.I. COFFEY & CHARLES T. MATHEWES, RELIGION, LAW AND THE ROLE OF FORCE 56 (2003)
(noting widely-shared Muslim sentiment that international law is incompatible with Islamic law and therefore “alien”).
717
Islam conceives of the world as divided into two spheres: the dar al-islam (abode of peace), in which dwell the Muslims, and
the dar al-harb (abode of war), the realm of the unbelievers. FAROOQ HASSAN, THE CONCEPT OF STATE AND LAW IN
ISLAM (1981). Faithful Muslims are commanded to take up jihad and wage perpetual war with dar al-harb to defend and
spread the faith. See ENCYLOPEDIA ISLAMICUS (elaborating the dar al-islam/dar al-harb distinction); id. at (defining
“jihad” as the duty of a Muslim to struggle in defense of the faith); Khan, supra note_, at 308 (explaining that Islam justifies war
against the dar al-harb because non-Muslim societies establish men and laws, rather than God, as sovereign). The Qur’an clearly
delineates one set of duties owed to fellow Muslims and another to unbelievers. See, e.g., Surah 8:57 (commanding Muslims to
discriminate between fellow Muslims and non-Muslims with respect to the taking of prisoners); Surah 47:1 (requiring Muslims to
kill non-Muslim combatants as punishment for infidelity to God). For an extensive discussion of the militance inherent in Islam,
as well as of the call to jihad that animates Islamic terrorism against Western civilization, see Barry Feinstein, Operation
Enduring Freedom: Legal Dimensions of an Infinitely Just Operation, 11 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 201 (2002).
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untutored Westerners, the history of Muslim efforts to conquer the “infidel” West, which commenced in
7th century Spain and continued through the medieval crusades to the present,719 is very much with us, and,
if the West is to survive, the civilizational conflict thesis holds that Westerners are duty-bound to awaken
to the defense of their civilization against the growing Islamic military challenge.720
Still others treat the suggestion that differences between civilizations necessarily translate into
violent conflict as a gross oversimplification.721 They stress that Islam is akin to Judaism and Christianity
in ascribing to the divinity all legitimate authority to order the affairs of mankind722 while utterly
proscribing acts of murder;723 they insist further that the contemporary resurgence of Islam is simply an
assertion of religiosity that can be harmonized with, or at least exist in harmless parallel to, Western
civilization.724 Moreover, they clearly distinguish a liberal strain of Islamic thought725 from the schismatic
726
teachings of an untutored, if charismatic, minority, and reject the idea of a monolithic ummah dedicated

718

See DANIEL BENJAMIN & STEVEN SIMON, THE AGE OF SACRED TERROR 384 (explaining that, after a long respite
from religious warfare, the conception of religion as a violent variable in world history has become alien to the Western mind).
719
HUNTINGTON, supra note_, at 256. The historical and cultural context is important: modern Islamic terrorists do indeed
view themselves as heirs to the legacy of the Muslims who defeated medieval Christian crusaders. Cole, supra note_, at 95.
720
The social contract theory of the creation of Western liberal democracies posits that states are instituted primarily to protect
the lives and property of their citizens. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1689). A logical corollary
of the duty of the state to protect its citizens is the duty of the state to work in concert with other liberal democracies in their
collective defense, and it is this duty to which scholars refer in challenging the West to unify against the Islamic civilizational
threat. See HUNTINGTON, supra note_, at 311 (charging Westerners with the “duty” to achieve greater political, economic, and
military integration the better to restrain the development of Islamic military power); see also Regis Debray, Nous Sommes Tous
Americains, NEW LEFT REV., Jan./Feb. 2003, at 2 (suggesting that Western civilization must draw closer to defend against an
assault by the combined forces of Islamic as well as Sinic civilizations—“Confucius plus Allah”).
721
See, e.g., Jacinta O’Hagan, x, 16 THIRD WORLD Q. 1, 19 (1995) (criticizing inevitable intercivilizational conflict thesis as a
simplistic reduction of the complexity of international relations and an attempt to “look for enemies” ).
722
The most fundamentalist Muslims purport to be the bearers of the absolute revealed truth of the Creator. RAPOPORT &
ALEXANDER, EDS., supra note_, at 68. However, in this regard they are no different from the orthodox among their spiritual
forebears, Jews and Christians. HUNTER, supra note_, at ix.
723
According to perhaps the foremost Western expert on Islamic law and history,
At no point do the basic texts of Islam enjoin terrorism and murder. At no point . . . do they even consider the random
slaughter of uninvolved bystanders . . . [The 9/11 terrorism] has no justification in Islamic doctrine or law and no
precedent in Islamic history . . . These are not just crimes against humanity and against civilization; they are also acts—
from a Muslim point of view—of blasphemy, when those who perpetrate such crimes claim to be doing so in the name
of God.
BERNARD LEWIS: CRISIS OF ISLAM 47 (2003).
Furthermore, although Christianity, with its just-war doctrine, is more closely associated with the development of IHL than is
Islam, defenders of the latter can point to the sacred text of Judaism and Christianity to argue that it is these religions, rather than
Islam, that embrace terrorism and mass murder. See, e.g., Deuteronomy 7:1-6 “When the Lord your God brings you into the land
which you are entering to take possession o fit, and clears away many nations before you . . . and when the Lord your God gives
them over to you, and you defeat them; then you must utterly destroy them; you shall make no covenant with them, and show no
mercy to them . . . [Y]ou shall break down their altars, and dash in pieces of their pillars, and . . . burn their graven images with
fire[.]”). But compare Exodus 12:48-49 (“And when a stranger shall sojourn with you and would keep the passover to the Lord, .
. . he shall be as a native of the land . . . There shall be one law for the native and for the stranger who sojourns among you.”).
724
See Hamid Khan, Nothing is Written, Fundamentalism, Revivalism, Reformism and the Fate of Islamic Law, 24 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 273, 299, 307 (2002) (describing modern Islamic revivalism as a benign cultural awakening); ROBERT D. KAPLAN,
THE ENDS OF THE EARTH: FROM TOGO TO TURKMENISTAN, FROM IRAN TO CAMBODIA—A JOURNEY TO THE
FRONTIERS OF ANARCHY 107 (1996) (presenting Islam as a compassionate source of social cohesion and moral instruction).
725
Hashmi, supra note_, at 23 (describing attempts of intellectuals to accommodate Islamic ethics with a modern social world).
726
Most religious “scholars” who condone terrorism—a small minority within the Islamic faith—are adherents to Wahhabism, a
“narrow, intolerant, rigid, literalistic, and puritanical” sect of Islam that is extremely hostile to intellectualism, modernity, and
above all Western culture, which they blame for the numerous difficulties that plague Islamic societies. Khan, supra note_, at
307; see also HUNTER, supra note_, at viii (lamenting terrorism as one of the “tragic uses to which Islam has been put” to foster
intercivilizational enmity). These new Islamic fundamentalists, a group that includes Usama bin Laden of al Qaeda and Mullah
Muhammad Omar of the Taliban, are concerned less with the well-being of their societies than with their cults of personality.
RASHID, supra note_, at 3. Courageous mainstream clergy, adamant that Islam is a religion of social justice categorically
opposed to terrorism, charge this radical sect with rejecting Islamic tradition, custom, and the Qur’an itself in propounding
apostasy. See id. (differentiating political terrorism of radical Islamists from the religious piety of traditional Islamic scholars).
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to destroying the West.

728

Even if Muslim states miraculously unified, any transhistorical conflict has

withered along with the potential for any such coalition to muster sufficient military power to pose a
credible threat.729 In short, the explanation of Islam as a cultural orientation730 maintains that there is
simply no Islamic civilizational approach to law or politics and nothing to fear from Islam ascendant, and
th
U.S. Middle Eastern policy is more squarely within the chain of causation of September 11 than the

twisted version of the religion professed by those who piloted the final instruments of that tragedy.731
Whether Islam is a call to jihad or merely a call to prayer is an open question.732 Islamic terrorism
may eventually be revealed as a treatable, although severe, symptom of regional societal dysfunction,733
yet it may also be the logical outgrowth of an agenda of conquest laid down by Muhammad in medieval
Mecca.734 Nevertheless, it is unnecessary to prove the civilizational conflict thesis or probe the motives of
727

Scholars of Islam stress that the ummah—the billion members of the world Islamic community—is no more unified than are
the adherents of any other religion. See HUNTER, supra note_, at 7-8, 14- 18 (rejecting the notion that the ummah acts as a
single political bloc); Kishore Mahbubani, The Dangers of Decadence, 72 FOR. AFF. 12, 12-14 (1993) (dismissing the
adhesiveness of pan-Islamic sentiment as applied to geopolitics); Fouad Ajami, The Summoning: “ButThey Said, We Will Not
Hearken”, 72 FOR. AFF. 1, 8-9 (1993) (explaining that “the world of Islam divides and subdivides”). Moreover, “there are
growing numbers of Muslims . . . who desire nothing better than a closer more friendly relationship with the West[.]” LEWIS,
supra note_, at 47; JESSICA STERN, TERROR IN THE NAME OF GOD (2002) (same). Even if Islam imposes a dar alislam/dar al-harb distinction, the Qur’an explicitly establishes that the duty of jihad is purely defensive; aggression is
categorically proscribed. See Abulaziz A. Sachedina, From Defensive to Offensive Warfare: The Use and Abuse of Jihad in the
Muslim World (positing the defensive interpretation of jihad).
728
Although the Organization of the Islamic Conference was formed in 1969 to further cooperation between Islamic states, no
unified program has yet been crafted or proposed by that or any other entity. See Hashmi, supra note_, at 18 (discussing disunity
th
that characterizes relations within the community of Islamic states since the fall of the Caliphate in the 11 century).
729
HALLIDAY, supra note_, at 112.
730
The image of Islam as a military program calling for the defense of Islamic civilization by subjugation of non-Muslims is
starkly contrasted with that of Islam as a set of customs and values around which to order a just society, and the vast majority of
Muslims express their faith in the latter tradition. See JOHN CLARK MEAD, THE NEW WORLD WAR 47-95 (2002)
(elaborating distinctions between majoritarian “cultural Islam” and the “militant Islam” of a small minority).
731
See John Quigley, International Law Violations by the United States in the Middle East as a Factor Behind Anti-American
Thought, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 815 (2002) (arguing that, because it has supported Israel and allegedly suppressed Arab selfth
determination, the U.S. is partly responsible for September 11 and other acts of violence against U.S. targets in recent years); see
also PAUL BERMAN, TERROR AND LIBERALISM (2002) (presenting and criticizing arguments that U.S. capitalist foreign
th
policy is responsible for creating the hatred that produced September 11 ). Critics of the impulse to find the origins of September
th
11 in the consequences of U.S. foreign policy counter with the contention that the perpetrators of the unspeakable horrors of that
day simply “loathe [the West] because of who we are and what our society represents[,]” namely respect for individual liberties,
religious tolerance, and a political system governed by secular law. ELSHTAIN, supra note_, at 3.
732
A clear distinction can be drawn, and is so drawn, for purposes of this Article between Muslims and terrorists. In the
th
immediate aftermath of September 11 , the U.S. took the official position that it is terrorists who profess to be Muslims, and not
the Islamic faithful, who threaten not only the West but the Muslim faith itself:
We respect your faith. It’s practiced freely by millions of Americans, and by millions more in countries that America
counts as friends. Its teachings are good and peaceful, and those who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the
name of Islam. The terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself.
President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress, September 20, 2001.
This view is shared by religious scholars as well:
To suppose that the Islamic faith . . . somehow lead[s] men . . . to be capable of flying an airliner full of passengers into
a building crowded with unsuspecting civilians, is deeply denigrating to Muslims . . . It requires us to suppose that
Muslims . . . lie almost beyond the borders of a shared humanity . . . simply because they are Muslims.
David S. Yeager, Just War: Reflections from the Lutheran Tradition in a Time of Crisis, 10 PRO ECCLESIA 401 (2001).
Still, not all scholars believe the War on Terror can be neatly cabined to shield the broader Islamic civilization from
violent clash with the West. See, e.g, Francis Fukuyama, Their Target: The Modern World, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 17, 2001, at _
(arguing Islam is fundamentally hostile to secular civilization and that the conflict in which the U.S. is embroiled is “not simply a
‘war’ against terrorists” but is in fact a “much broader” conflict between modern ity and anti-modernity).
733
See Craig Hall, The Wake-Up Call of Terrorism, 36 INT’L LAWYER 125 (2002) (suggesting that non-religious factors such
as economic deprivation and a lack of education are the root causes of terrorism and must be resolved to prevent future attacks).
734
For arguments in support of the latter position, see BENJAMIN NATANYAHU, HOW THE WEST CAN WIN 8-9 (1986)
th
(asserting a causative relationship between “Islamic radicalism” and much of the terrorism of the 20 century); Laurie Goodstein,
Seeing Islam as “Evil” Faith, Evangelicals Seek Converts, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2003, at A1 (reporting the popularization of
the impression of Islam as a “very evil and wicked religion” and a global threat based upon its textual support for terrorism).
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736

individual terrorists to establish that the entire Society of Peoples is under assault by atavistic foes
who abjure all political, moral, and legal restraints and brandish a radical religious vision as both weapon
and justification for the deliberate mass murder of innocents.737 September 11th demonstrated something
far more profound than the futility of employing laws to deter wicked miscreants who value their own
738

lives no more than those of their hapless victims and for whom no depredation is beyond contemplation:
that tragic morning during which over 3000 innocent men, women, and children were deliberately
immolated by 19 suicidal Islamic terrorists heralded a paradigmatic shift toward an era of asymmetrical
warfare739 in which enemies of the U.S. and its allies, absolutely incapable of gathering armed forces to
meet and defeat regular armies on the field of battle, will instead employ unconventional methods in an

attempt to overcome their political will.740 Terrorism and WMD are merely the more obvious and tangible
741
weapons. It is somewhat paradoxical, although consistent with the historical development of the

analytical concept of “barbarians” as those beyond the shadow of law, that it should be IHL itself—or,
more properly, the asymmetry in compliance as between the terrorists, who proclaim their divorce from
any legal obligations and flout the rules of IHL to their advantage,742 and the Western populations they
target, for whom law is a central ordering principle—that bristles as the most potent weapon in the
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Still, a fatwa (religious command) issued by Usama bin Laden and leaders of other Islamic terrorist groups declaring that to
“kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for any Muslim who can do it in any country in
which it is possible to do it” supports the thesis that these terrorist groups, at the very least, are in civilizational conflict with the
West. Usama bin-Muhammad bin-Laden et al., Text of Fatwah Urging Jihad Against Americans, AL-QUDS AL-ARABI, Feb.
th
23, 1998. The reaction of bin-Laden to the events of September 11 further underscores this point. See Usama bin-Laden,
Statement of Oct. 7, 2001, AL-JAZEERA (“Here is America struck by God Almighty . . . [T]hanks be to God . . . God has
blessed a group of vanguard Muslims, the forefront of Islam, to destroy America.”).
736
See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 3-37 (1999) (defining the “Society of Peoples” as those states that observe
treaties, observe the duty of nonintervention, refrain from war except in self-defense, honor human rights, and assist others).
737
The terrorist group Al Qaeda, relying on its interpretation of Islamic law, explicitly rejects political solutions to disputes with
the West and advocates unrestricted murder of citizens of the U.S. and other Western governments. See Al Qaeda Training
Manual 8 (available at http:://www.usdoj.gov/ag/trainingmanual.htm.) (“The confrontation that Islam calls for with these godless
and apostate regimes, does not know Socratic debates, Platonic ideals nor Aristotelian diplomacy. But it knows the dialogue of
bullets, the ideals of assassination, bombing, and destruction, and the diplomacy of the cannon and machine-gun.”). For such
organizations, Islam offers “carte blanche justification for going to war . . . without concern for limitations upon its means[,]” and
terrorism is “divinely sanctioned[.]” J.I. COFFEY & CHARLES T. MATHEWES, RELIGION, LAW AND THE ROLE OF
FORCE 30 (2003) (discussing 1998 Usama Bin Laden fatwa calling for terrorist acts against U.S. citizens and property).
738
th
The architects of September 11 and their ideological progeny are vicious murderers who “have acquired a taste for killing, . . .
[and] are capable of atrocities that challenge the descriptive power of language.” Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., A Virtuous Warrior in a
Savage World, 8 USAFA J. LEG. STUD. 71 (1998). The deliberate targeting of innocent women and children, and the
conscription of children as warriors in the cause, are but two of the more heinous means and methods in the arsenal of these
unscrupulous terrorists. See Justus Reid Weinder, The Use of Palestinian Children in the Al-Aqsa Intifada: A Legal and Political
Analysis, 16 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L. J. 43 (2002) (describing employment of propaganda and educational incitement to
induce Palestinian children to engage in acts of terrorism, including suicide bombing of civilian targets); see also ILENE COHN
& GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, CHILD SOLDIERS: THE ROLE OF CHILDREN IN ARMED CONFLICT (1994) (same).
739
See CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT VISION 2010 (1996) (defining “asymmetrical warfare” as
“atrtempts to circumvent or undermine an opponent’s strength while exploiting his weaknesses using methods that differ
significantly from the opponent’s usual mode of operations.”).
740
The notion that non-state actors might possess the capacity to initiate an armed attack against a state of sufficient magnitude as
to vest themselves with a form of international legal personality under IHL and the UN Charter had been discussed very little
th
prior to September 11 . See Yutaka Arai Takahashi, Shifting Boundaries of the Right of Self-Defense—Appraising the Impact of
the September 11 Attacks on the Jus Ad Bellum, 36 INT’L LAWYER 1081 (2003) (noting that international law has required that
th
aggression stem from a state) (citing G.A. Res. 3314, GAOR, 29 Sess., Supp. No. 19, U.N. Doc. A/9619 (1974)).
741
That IHL should be perverted from humanizing regime to weapon of war by terrorists is perhaps not so much paradoxical as
ironic if one considers that agreements as to limitations on warfare presume shared interests and the capacity to reach rational
understandings with enemies who, if such shared interests and understandings were possible, would not likely be enemies.
742
See supra at note_ (enumerating recent violations of IHL by irregular unlawful combatants during the Liberation of Iraq); see
also Anderson, supra note_ (listing violations of categorical rules of war committed by terrorists and other unlawful combatants,
including systematic rape, use of human shields, and summary execution of POWs).
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Islamic terrorist arsenal.

Nonetheless, because a concatenation of “reforms” over the last several

decades, coupled with the ascendance of IHL absolutism, have delivered IHL into the hands of terrorists
who now wield it as a sword against civilization,744 the moral essence of the law must be reclaimed and
decocted from accumulated ideological accretions if it is to once again shield civilization against
barbarism. Accordingly, the next section crafts a legal strategy to empower the robust application of
military force in defense of global order and liberty.
C. Reforming IHL to Meet the Barbarian Threat: A Functionalist Argument
IHL, just as any other regime of legal regulation, is an ongoing functional response745 to existing
and anticipated factual circumstances that is designed and interpreted in light of the capacities, interests,
objectives, and “felt necessities” of politically relevant actors746 to the benefit of whom it
disproportionally redounds.747 However, the matrix of costs and benefits under all legal regimes tend to
be kinetic, rather than static: under the metamorphic pressures exerted by human rights NGOs and other
absolutists over the last generation it is not surprising that IHL has been warped in ways that have
redistributed the costs and benefits attendant to particular tactics, strategies, and weapons systems.748
Nevertheless, the process whereby IHL is subject to reconstruction is omnidirectional, and when states,
743

Observance of IHL would deny terrorists the very methods and means of war essential to engaging their enemies on something
approximating an equal plane, and consequently they reject its application. See W. Michael Reisman, Assessing Claims to Revise
the Laws of War, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 81, 86 (2003) (contrasting practical disparity between the legal restraints occasioned by
IHL upon territorial states, who are subject to the “dynamic of reciprocity and retaliation” that underlies international relations
and who publicly accept legal limitations upon their capacity to respond to terrorist depredations, with terrorist groups and other
nonstate actors who are difficult for states to locate and target in retaliation and who deny any legal restraints upon their actions);
see also QIAO LIANG & WANG XIANGSUI, UNRESTRICTED WARFARE (1999) (“When a nation state . . . (which adheres
to certain rules and will only use limited force to obtain a limited goal), faces off with [terrorist] organizations . . . (which never
observe any rules and which are not afraid to fight an unlimited war using unlimited means), it will often prove very difficult for
the nation state . . . to gain the upper hand.”). By selectively violating and then exploiting lacunae and ambiguity in IHL to their
military and especially political advantage, terrorists convert IHL from a shield to a sword. See Abraham D. Sofaer, The Sixth
Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International Law: Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REV. 89,
89-90 (1989) (arguing that IHL ultimately serves terrorists’ interests); Anderson, supra note_, at (stating that IHL has the effect
of “rewarding” state sponsors of terrorists who recognize that the commission of war crimes against their own civilians, and the
subsequent attribution of those crimes to retaliating states, is a very effective strategy against more powerful foes); Aldrich, supra
note_, at 3 (expressing qualified support for the argument that, in light of the Additional Protocl I, the West is prejudiced not
merely by disparities in compliance as between terrorists and liberal democracies but by the structural and normative foundations
of IHL which are evolving in favor of the protection of terrorists).
744
The contention that law is an instrument of coercion just as much as is military force dates at least to the Renaissance. See,
e.g., MACHIAVELLI, supra note_, at 99 (“There are two ways of fighting: by law and by force.”).
745
The social theory of functionalism maintains that society is essentially a set of interrelated institutions and norms each of
which has a particular essential purpose to the existence and operation of the social whole; society is analogous to a living
organism. See EMILE DURKEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (1893) (positing a general functionalist theory).
Functionalist theory postulates that law is the mechanism that structures expectations and secures compliance with a particular set
of socially desirable norms, principles, rules, and procedures at the lowest possible cost, and that the need to resort to coercive
enforcement to enforce compliance with this set of values marks the weakness, and even failure, of the law. See MICHAEL
BARKUN, LAW WITHOUT SANCTIONS 87-88, 157 (1968) (describing law as the authoritative and normative statement of
the “paths over which the affairs of [a] community are carried on” and stating that the overriding function of law is “the
preservation of order” and the “ordering [of] social relationships[.]”). IHL functions as the mechanism whereby application of
force to the resolution of otherwise intractable disputes is, via a set of positive and normative rules, prevented from destroying the
objects, norms, and principles constitutive of civilization without rendering that application of force in the defense of
civilizational values impracticable. See Douglas Cassel, Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?, 1 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 121, 126-30 (2001) (stating that international law functions to deny moral relativism, establish normative preferences
shared by the international community, and defend those preferences against violators). IHL thus simultaneously enables, yet
limits, the destruction attendant to war the better to secure civilizational security. For a thorough discussion of (neo)functionalist
theory, see JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (1984); for a defense of functionalist
theory against critics, see MICHAEL FAIA, DYNAMIC FUNCTIONALISM (1986).
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Reisman, supra note_, at 81.
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Id. (“[E]very legal regime perforce benefits some actors more than others[.]”).
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the principal authors of international law for centuries, can “no longer assure their defense within the
ambit of inherited law, those charged with national defense [will] inevitably demand changes in [IHL].”749
Thus, if even the remotest possibility exists that IHL, unwisely reformed to suit the felt needs of the
human rights community and subject to interpretation and application in the hostile politico-legal milieu
of the ICC, could be slaved to the sheltering of terrorists and rogue-states bent on the annihilation of
millions of innocents and the criminalization of the reasonable acts of honorable soldiers protecting
civilization itself against holocaust, IHL is, as the U.S. has effectively declared in renouncing the ICC, a
compromised and dysfunctional legal regime.750 That IHL should ever be marshaled to gainsay the
assertion that the Private Ryans and Captain Ryans of the world are at critical moments the sole bulwark
standing between civilization and unremitting evil, and that law should ever be permitted to punish
virtuous soldiers who brave danger in a long twilight struggle against terrorist adversaries who flout the
law as but a bothersome trapping of the civilization they aim to eradicate would be farcical if it were not
so disconcerting. In short, civilization is bracketed between the danger inherent in the order that the ICC
might well impose and the disorder engineered by terrorists,751 for whom IHL is but the substrate for evil.
It is thus logical that those states predominantly responsible for civilizational defense would
assume the van in a demanding the revision, and even the broader rethinking, of IHL and the institutions
responsible for its enforcement.752 The salvation of Western civilization depends upon victory in the War
on Terror; in turn, this calls into question whether the (primarily U.S.) soldiers defending civilization,
although they must as a moral imperative cleave as closely as practicable to the humanitarian purpose of
the IHL regime,753 may employ allegedly prohibited methods and means or otherwise derogate from a
body of law never tailored for this sort of conflict754 in order to guarantee victory. To be sure: the U.S.
remains unwaveringly committed to the observance of IHL during the conduct of post-September 11th
operations in the asymmetrical War on Terror.755 However, September 11th revealed that the defense of
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See supra at note_ (discussing effects of purported post-1977 modifications to conventional and customary sources of IHL and
the legal debates as to whether such modifications create enforceable obligations); see also supra at Part III (same); Reisman,
supra note_, at 81 (describing “tensions between formally prescribed [IHL] from a previous period and contemporary [IHL].”).
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Reisman, supra note_, at 81.
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See JOHN STRAWSON, ED., LAW AFTER GROUND ZERO xi (2002) (conceding, from the perspective of an IHL
th
absolutist, that IHL has been revealed post-September 11 as “feeble” and “fragile as our world order”); id. (describing the Bush
Administration view as the position that “we [are] at a now foundational moment at which existing legal norms and institutions
are either irrelevant or questionable” and that IHL is dysfunctional or even harmful to the task of defeating terrorism).
751
See Paul Valery, French Poet (1871-1945) (“Two dangers constantly threaten the world: order and disorder.”).
752
Although states enjoy formal equality under international law, the notion that declarations of custom offered by states that do
not engage in armed conflict and have no direct responsibility for the defense of civilization is inconsistent with the practical
reality of the context presented by the War on Terror. See supra at note_.
753
Deontological scholars, even if they accept the assumption that the defeat of terrorism is an end very much preferable to the
alternative, challenge this utilitarian assertion that it is possible to derogate from the IHL regime where absolutely necessary in
order to prevail without abdicating the moral high ground and denaturing the moral force of the rule of law. See Gross, supra
note_, at 465 (contrasting the deontological and utilitarian perspectives on IHL). However, although it is preferable that the
defeat of terrorism complement, rather than erode, IHL, if ultimate victory requires derogation under limited and precisely
defined circumstances, it would seem a small price to pay.
754
See id. at 469 (arguing that because IHL was never designed to apply against terrorists, one must look outside IHL to
determine whether a state can ever incur a moral duty to overlook IHL in order to protect its own citizens against terrorists); see
also id. at p. 484-85 (answering in the affirmative by stating that “[t]errorism . . . thereby forces upon us a ‘regime of necessity’
whereby we are compelled to put aside guiding moral principles in favor of a moral duty to protect the lives of the citizens of the
free world.”). For examples of the unsuitability of IHL in its current incarnation to the War on Terrorism, see infra at Part_.
755
See CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, INSTRUCTION 5810.01, supra note_ (insisting that the “Armed Forces of the
United States will comply with the law of war during the conduct of all military operations and related activities in armed
conflict, however such conflicts are characterized.”). The U.S. commitment to the observance of IHL, however, does not imply
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vital national and civilizational interests are in tension with a cascading series of constraints on U.S.
freedom of military action756 that, although they spring from noble impulse, have neutralized the
comparative military advantage of the U.S. and handicapped its policy options against terrorism beyond
the danger point.757 At first blush it seems we are enmeshed in a moral dilemma from which escape
requires a Hobson’s choice:758 either jettison IHL, suspend all normative restraint, and sacrifice the higher
moral terrain to a counter-jihad against terrorism, or scrupulously observe a regime whose demise will be
but a mere incident to the ritual suicide of the civilization from whence it emerged. The first choice
conflates the distinction between combatants, debases the civilization for which the war is fought, and
confers a victory upon the terrorists, whose re-creation of us in their own image would assuage their
defeat on the battlefield. The second abdicates moral responsibility to the abjectly immoral and orders the
sworn defenders of civilization to orchestrate its passage into the gloom of a darker and more fearful age.
In short, a fissure has expanded into a chasm dividing what is generally deemed lawful under IHL
from what might be charged as unlawful, although it can legitimately be described as the morally just
conduct of soldiers.759 This disjunct threatens, in synergy with the ICC, to swallow up respect for, and
observance of, law more generally. However, although this is unquestionably a moment of fragility and
perhaps even decision for international order, there is a narrow course that will maximize national and
global welfare that can be navigated between these twin moral shoals: rather than deify IHL, as the
absolutist framers of the ICC in their subsumption of its authorship from states760 would have us do, we
U.S. recognition of the full panoply of legal obligations, particularly of the customary variety, that IHL absolutists would impose
through the operation of the ICC. See supra at note_ (discussing disagreements over the parameters of IHL).
756
See Adda B. Bozeman, U.S. Conceptions of Democracy and Security in a World Environment of Culturally Alien Political
Thought: Linkages and Contradictions, in SAM C. SARKESIAN & JOHN MEAD FLANAGAN, EDS., U.S. DOMESTIC AND
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENDAS INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 55 (1994) (tracing progressive U.S. autoimposition of constraints on the use of force as evidenced by treaties, practice, and the declarations of public officials).
757
See BARNETT, supra note_, at 80 (contending that U.S. membership in IHL conventions has the effect of “removing options
from the board” and offering potential adversaries who do not adhere to these conventions opportunities to their asymmetrical
advantage); see also Bozeman, supra note_, at 55 (warning that the Western understanding of IHL is dangerously “out of date”).
758
A Hobson’s choice is the obligation to choose in a situation in which there is no available choice that is free of attendant guilt
and responsibility for resultant evils. See Thomas Nagel, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 143 (1972).
759
That objectively just conduct could ever be characterized as unlawful is an indictment either of the moral character of the
community that created the law or of the institutions wherein the conduct adjudged unlawful. For a discussion of evil legal
systems, see generally RONALD DWORKIN, JUDICIAL OBLIGATION AND THE RULE OF LAW (1976).
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NGOs and activists at the helm of this venture have capitalized upon the diminished role of the state in the post-Cold War era
and seized control over the prescription and enforcement of IHL from states—the entities that actually engage in armed conflict.
In so doing, they have extended it beyond its functional and democratic limitations:
For the past 20 years, the center of gravity in establishing, interpreting and shaping the law of war has gradually shifted
away from the military establishments of leading states and their “state practice.” It has even shifted away from the
International Red Cross . . . and toward more activist and publicly aggressive N.G.O.’s . . . [T]he pendulum shift
toward them has gone further than is useful, and the ownership of the laws of war needs to give much greater weight to
state practices of leading countries[.]
Anderson, supra note_, at_.
“Ownership” of IHL is indeed crucial. Inarguably, the substantive quality of scholarship in IHL is augmented by
knowledge of military history and especially by combat experience: those unenriched by either of these capacities are left subject
to criticism particularly where they advocate prescriptions or proscriptions that history and experience have proven untenable in
actual combat operations. See H. Wayne Elliot, MICHAEL HOWARD, GEORGE J. ANREOPOULOS, & MARK R.
SHULMAN, HISTORY, WAR, AND LAW (1994), 30 TEX. INT’L L. J. 631, 637 (1995) (book review) (“Only when one has a
firm foundation in military history can one truly begin to understand the utility and limits of the law of war.”). Many critics of
the U.S. position with respect to the ICC are civilians lacking in the experience necessary to an understanding of the stochastic,
nonrational processes that govern combat operations and exert pressures upon combatants to derogate from absolutist, positivist
legal proscriptions and prescriptions. See FUSSELL, WARTIME 283 (“The relative few who actually fought know that the war
was not a matter of rational calculation. They know madness when they see it.”) As a consequence, these critics are unable to
appreciate the environment in which individual soldiers make decisions, and thus when they recapitulate the events in question to
determine what they would do under similar circumstances and to adjudicate the criminal responsibility of individual soldiers,
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should accord it our respect and criminalize its violation only to the extent that it comports with the
practical necessities of honorable soldiers locked in total war761 against barbarians who brook no legal
restraints whatsoever. In other words, by rationalizing IHL the West can interdict evil and shepherd law,
along with the civilization law defends and reflects, through the vale of terrorism.762 The next section
operationalizes this thesis by proposing reinvention of IHL as a regime that genuinely supports the
humanization of conflicts between soldiers who observe the martial code while banishing barbarians to a
legal wasteland beyond its application.763
D. Operationalizing the Barbarian Distinction
States, as well as individuals, have the moral and legal right, independent of any institutional
arrangements, conventional understandings, or subjective beliefs, to defend themselves against terrorism.
Principles of fundamental fairness and justice militate in favor not only of restoring the pre-1977 legal
consequences of terrorists’ unlawful combatancy but of internalizing, rather than transferring to their
opponents, the legal consequences of their depredations against civilized peoples. If IHL is to continue to
defend civilization and merit compliance by state-defenders of the international community, then, in the
existential battle against terrorists who declare civilization itself as the stakes for which the war is to be
contested, the margin of appreciation to which the U.S. and allied states764 are generally entitled in
interpreting the boundaries of IHL should be stretched to its zenith, rather than contracted to its nadir.
Ultimate victory over terrorism will, on occasion, require the U.S. and other states to undertake missions
that will give rise to claims that members of their armed forces have violated provisions of IHL that do
not universally meet the definition of binding law; in other cases, otherwise valorous warriors pressed to
their physical and emotional limits may deny quarter or inflict reprisals that, while inarguably violative of
the positive law, are excusable or at least mitigated in their seriousness in light of all the circumstances,
especially the fact that it is terrorists who are the “victims.” The ratio of the evil that soldiers may
occasion in the defeat of terrorism to the evil that they avert by hastening its demise is sufficiently

they are bereft of the most essential information. IHL conceived in ignorance thus carries within it the seeds of its own
compliance failures and ultimately its unenforceability.
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Although there has not been a formal declaration of war, “only a most technical and arid legalism could deny [that the U.S. is
at war with terrorist organizations].” Reisman, supra note_, at 88 n.14.
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The term “rationalize” has traditionally been employed with respect to the scholarly review of IHL for the purpose of
suggesting those modifications that harmonize the “rules on the books” with the prescriptions and proscriptions likely to be
observed by soldiers in practice. See, e.g., FOOKS, supra note_, at 3 (calling for the modification of IHL such that “the rights of
belligerents [are] secured by such agreements as are likely to be followed in time of war.”); HINGORANI, supra note_, at 19495 (concurring with the argument that the acceptance and observance of IHL depends upon its compatibility with the realities of
warfare and stating that “[n]o belligerent will accept rules [of IHL] which run counter to its basic principles and interests.”).
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Although this distinction intersects at the level of theory with the lawful-unlawful combatants distinction by asserting that the
allocation of legal rights should reflect the degree to which belligerents assent to and comport themselves in accordance with the
rule of law, the two are of different provenance, and the former is intended as a guide less in regard to the resolution of legal
issues surrounding detention and prosecution of enemy belligerents for pre-capture crimes than to the choice of legal standards
and institutions connected with the adjudication of alleged violations of IHL by soldiers.
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Unilateralism, generally a more politically costly approach to international relations than a more multilateral foreign policy,
“sits uncomfortably” with those who fear that a “single state has taken on the role of judge, jury and policeman.” Wedgwood,
supra note_, at 726. Ideally, the U.S. will gain the support of a coalition of like-minded states who together will demand and
obtain a wider margin of legal tolerance for their concerted actions in response to terrorism. However, if a multilateral approach
fails, or if multilateral policy agreement does not translate into assistance in military operations or in providing legal support to
U.S.-led operations, the U.S. may be forced to take the path to a rationalized IHL alone. See id. (conceding that the “availability
of unilateral action may be essential to forging a result that strengthens security.”). For a discussion of the difficulty in securing
and maintaining alliances in international relations, see generally James A. Caporaso, International Relations Theory and
Multilateralism: The Search for Foundations, 46 INT’L. ORG. 599 (1992).
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favorable that any rational theory of IHL will ensure that institutions called upon to adjudicate their
criminal responsibility consider the net benefit with which their labors have endowed mankind in
balancing the scales of justice. In short, the transposition of IHL in light of the contemporary threat
directly implicates the ideological interests and perspectives of the actors and institutions that interpret
and adjudge the conduct of soldiers, and rather than permit the ICC, a politicized body disinterested in the
moral universe of soldiers and committed to an absolutist philosophy that rejects considerations of
exigency, necessity, and justice from its calculus to pass judgment in regard to alleged violations of IHL
in the War on Terror, U.S. and allied soldiers should be held to the ethical and moral strictures of the
martial code and, where appropriate, prosecuted and punished in courts-martial.
However, courts-martial will justifiably rely upon the judgment and experience of members of the
martial profession in applying nonlegal norms, interpreting ROEs, and ultimately determining whether
the conduct of the accused can fairly be said to have been contrary to that expected of the honorable
soldier, a standard radically different from legal absolutism. A rationalized approach to IHL takes a much
more conscientious approach to upholding civilizational obligations and demands that parallel institutions
respect the determinations of courts-martial. Certainly, not all transgressions across the burgeoning
boundaries of what the human rights NGOs championing the ICC declare to be IHL can legitimately be
characterized as war crimes or crimes against humanity. Viewed through the analytical prism of a
rationalized IHL, as courts-martial have been wont to do across their developmental history, it is
impossible to describe the acts of Private Ryan et al. or the personnel associated with Task Force Ryan as
barbaric, and it is utterly beyond comprehension that the conduct of those prosecuting the agendae of
Nazism and Islamic terrorism—irrefutably barbaric programs765—could ever be perceived as more
deserving of legal shelter than the soldiers who interpose between them and civilization. It is worse than
foolish to pretend that the militaries of Western democracies defending against Nazism and Islamic
terrorism spawn war criminals at the rate or on the order of their wicked foes. To forfeit moral judgment
guts IHL of its normative component and mocks justice.
This is not to suggest that courts-martial need validate the greatest fears of legal absolutists, who
distrust the professional self-regulation of the armed forces and envision courts-martial as a forum suited
principally to whitewashing military misdeeds. Although the temptation to abandon all normative and
legal restraint may be great,766 rationalization need neither imply nor countenance the general suspension

765

See AIME CESAIRE, DISCOURSE ON COLONIALISM (Joan Pinkham transl. 1972) (1955) (offering an early academic
treatment of Nazism as “the crowning barbarism that sums up all the daily barbarians[.]”).
Terrorists are the sort of “implacable enemy whose avowed objectives”—the destruction of our way of life—motivate
maximalist responses and the abandonment of “[h]itherto accepted norms of human conduct” as the price of their defeat.
Doolittle Committee, Report on the Covert Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, Sept. 30, 1954. A reknowned U.S.
constitutional scholar has advocated the judicially-sanctioned torture of terrorists to force the disclosure of information that
would prevent an imminent and massive terrorist attack. See ALAN DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS:
UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE 166-213 (2002). Another scholar suggests that
the U.S. go so far as to consider the destruction of Islamic holy sites in order to simultaneously constitute the conditions for
future deterrence and to disprove the mistaken notion held by some terrorists that Western decadence renders Western restraint
inevitable. See Daniel Pipes, Discarding War’s Rules, N.Y. POST (Online Edition), Jul. 22, 2003, available at
http://www.nypost.com/postopinion/opedcolumnists/1200.htm (previewing a forthcoming work by Lee Harris that claims it is
Western restraint, the product of an “arch-civilization,” that has “insulated its enemies from the deserved consequences of their
actions.”). Although the present argument is in some senses a call for a break with past restraints, it does not accept that the
intentional targeting of civilian structures is permissible within the ethical boundaries established by the martial code.
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of IHL in the fight contra barbarum. Even while engaged in this just cause, moral and legal
responsibility attach to all individuals—civilian or military—charged with the prosecution of the War on
Terror. In armed conflicts, however characterized, the U.S., one of the few states that has systematically
prosecuted violations of IHL, must continue its official policy of scrupulous adherence to those aspects of
the IHL canon that can be harmonized with the ethos and principles of the martial code and the practical
necessities of the War on Terror, and it should strive always to conduct its operations so as to afford the
greatest humanitarian protections to all privileged persons. Moreover, the martial code does not
necessarily disfavor the grant of humanitarian treatment, where feasible, to terrorists, in part because law
is so deeply impressed into the fabric of our civilization that it is difficult to forswear it even in response
to terrorism,767 and in part out of homage to chivalric ideals.
Nonetheless, a rationalized IHL is inimical to the absolutist argument that the legal standard to
which soldiers combating barbarism should be held is exempt from recalibration to reflect the nature of,
and threat posed, by these anti-civilizational adversaries. It is worse than foolish to pretend that the
militaries of Western states defending against Nazism and Islamic terrorism spawn war criminals or
criminals against humanity at the rate of their foes; rather, it is a dangerous, often politically-motivated
position which finds expression in the exposition of legal absolutist arguments that, actualized through the
jurisprudence of the ICC, may threaten the edifice of law and the civilization which depends upon it. In
stark contrast, the martial code, with its broad consideration of not merely legal but also non-legal
variables768 in ascertaining whether an accused has abided by the precepts that direct the conduct of
honorable member of the military profession, embraces the positions that legal and moral obligations
under IHL are, to some extent, conditional, and that the degree to which an enemy force observes IHL,
the means and methods employed by an enemy, and the justice of the cause for which an enemy fights are
relevant variables in the decisional matrix employed by those called upon to judge martial conduct. In
other words, a sliding legal-moral scale is at work within the legal machinery of a rationalized IHL
regime that weighs the experience of the combat soldier and the moral virtues and vices of combatants
without abandoning its humanizing mission. This scale would permit a far more nuanced and holistic
examination of alleged violations of IHL: although it would unhesitatingly adjudge the deliberate murder
of an innocent civilian or otherwise blameless POW serving an enemy force that accords treatment
consistent with the martial code to be ipso facto an act of barbarism, it would declare reprisal against a
parole violator or terrorist as either a justifiable offense or a much less serious crime punishable with
disciplinary sanctions, and not simply declare the act a war crime justifying imprisonment. Moreover, it
would reflexively reject any assertion of criminality with respect to the unintentional killing of civilians
located near terrorist targets. In effect, a rationalized IHL is an admixture of jus in bello and jus ad
767

This is not to suggest that soldiers in circumstances such as those faced by T/5 Upham will never undertake reprisals in
response to terrorists’ violations of IHL. However, for soldiers in the armed forces of the West, impressed as they are at all turns
with the requirements of the martial code as well as with the obligations, as members of a civilization governed and symbolized
by the rule of law, there are significant professional and cultural restraints upon the abandonment of rule-governed behavior. See
BARNETT, supra note_, at 16 (examining cultural differences with regard to willingness to violate law in pursuit of personal and
social objectives and to undertake reprisals for others’ violations of the law).
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The application of non-legal norms to the humanization of war fits into a generalized discussion of the salience of non-legal
norms in regulating the conduct of epistemic communities. See ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991).
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bellum that treats not merely the conduct of soldiers but also the cause for which they fight as practically
significant in establishing differential legal standards, canons of interpretation, and guidelines for
adjudication. Thus, the following measures are proposed to effect the formal operationalization of the
civilized peoples/barbarians distinction in a rationalized IHL regime:
1.
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The U.S., acting under the protective principle of jurisdiction, should exercise its sovereign right to
prescribe legislation designating particular states, groups, (including but not limited to those listed as
770
foreign terrorist organizations by the State Department), and individuals, regardless of nationality, as
barbarians and declaring them, by virtue of their deliberate predations against civilians, criminals against
civilization who disentitle themselves from the panoply of legal rights and privileges under international
771
and domestic law. The Actus Contra Barbarum (“Act Against Barbarians”) [“ACB”] will relegate such
actors to an inferior status under IHL—in effectively, it will redefine them as unprivileged, rightless
772
outlaws—as IHL is incorporated in U.S. law. This declaration need not be interpreted as a denunciation
of the general applicability of IHL provisions with which the U.S.disagrees; rather, it would stand as a
public proclamation that the U.S. will withhold the protections of IHL from rogue states and terrorists and
exercise restraint in its operations against them only indirectly through observation of humanitarian
773
obligations concerning civilians and other noncombatants. Terrorists and rogue states would then be
subject to attack by all means and methods at all places and times, denied quarter, and subjected to
summary execution. In short, ACB would declare bellum romanum against terrorists.
To secure domestic political support, and in light of strategic considerations, the ACB might
contain a provision suspending its legal effect for a period of months to induce affected states and
groups against whom the full military force of the U.S. would otherwise be immediately employed to
desist from terrorism and comply with IHL; failure to do so would result in immediate abandonment of

The protective principle of jurisdiction permits domestic exercise of jurisdiction where an extraterritorial act threatens interests
vital to thesecurity, territorial integrity, or political independence of the prosecting state and allows the state to prosecute foreign
rd
nationals. See REST. (3 ) FOR. REL. L. U. S § . This jurisdictional basis has been used to prosecute terrorists under U.S. law
nd
for conspiracy to engage in attacks that affected or would affect U.S. nationals. See U.S. v. Yousef et al, 2 Cir. 2003 (affirming
application of CIL principle of protective jurisdiction to uphold convictions of terrorist defendants for conspiring, outside the
U.S., to destroy civilian airliners upon which U.S. nationals were to have been on board, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §32)
770
See U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator on Counterterrorism, Appendix B: Background Information on
Foreign Terrorist Groups, at I. Foreign Terrorist Organizations (listing 29 officially designated terrorist groups), available at
<http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2000/2450.htm>
771
Although domestic definitions of war crimes generally overlap with the definitions established under IHL, the principle of
sovereignty permits states to adopt their own domestic standards provided the resulting legislation does not run counter to norms
of jus cogens. See Joyner, supra note_, at 165 (discussing sources of conflict between domestic and international law with regard
to war crimes definitions); see also supra note_ (discussing norms of jus cogens). In an attempt to restore a measure of
symmetry to the battlefield, states might elect to redefine war crimes to prohibit the tactics, weapons, or other practices of their
adversaries, and to threaten enemy combatants with punishment for the employment of these tactics, weapons, or practices upon
capture. Taken to further extreme, a state might elect to immunize the use, by its own soldiers, of all tactics, weapons, and
practices, even those otherwise prohibited by law, against the enemy. The declaration proposed herein would effectively stand as
a declaration of war against terrorists that would not only transform legal relations between the U.S. and terrorist groups but
would open up, for use against identified terrorists, a set of military options, tactics, and weapons otherwise prohibited by
domestic and international law. Constitutional amendment may be necessary to pass such legislation, as the doctrine of outlawry
has long lapsed into obsolescence under the domestic law of States and was never available at federal law, and the Due Process
th
Clause of the 5 Amendment has been interpreted in dissent by the Supreme Court as an impediment ot the resurrection of
outlawry. See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 453 (1956) (Douglas and Black, dissenting) (“The prohibition of Bills of
Attainder place[s] beyond the pale the imposition of infamy or outlawry by either the Executive or the Congress.”).
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Although the unlawful combatant distinction effectively imposes this legal status by executive order upon terrorists captured in
battle, Congressional silence leaves the door open to arguments that the civil rights of unlawful combatant detainees, particularly
those who possess U.S. citizenship, have been violated by their continued detention without the benefit of the Geneva
Conventions and without trial, as well as to arguments that such practice violates the substantive provisions of the Geneva
Conventions and the Protocols Additional. See Padilla ex rel Newman v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp.2d 42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(challenging detention of U.S. citizen, suspected of membership in the terrorist group Al Qaeda, held by the military on a
material witness warrant as an unlawful combatant without access to counsel); see also supra at notes_ (discussing the effects of
the Protocols Additional on the customary doctrine of unprivileged belligerency). Moreover, the proposed declaration
encompasses all members of the designated terrorist groups within its ambit even in advance of armed conflict with those groups,
rather than applying simply to those members caught while not in compliance with the conditions necessary to establish lawful
combatancy. Id. As such, ACB is an act of legal preemption designed to affirmatively resolve not only the constitutional
authority to detain unlawful combatants indefinitely but to discriminate, even if in contravention of IHL, as between different
categories of combatants on the basis of the objectives and methods of their armed operations.
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One commentator proposes the far narrower solution of eliminating the principle of proportionality with respect to antiterrorist operations. See Michael C. Bonafede, Note, Here, There, and Everywhere: Assessing the Proportionality Doctrine and
th
U.S. Uses of Force in Response to Terrorism After the September 11 Attacks, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 155, 189-97 (2002). This
Article proposes a much broader suspension of IHL in regard to the War on Terror.
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2.

3.

4.
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all restraint. The legislation might also incorporate a provision granting affected parties standing to
775
appeal their inclusion on the list of designated terrorist groups, and permitting special appearances,
776
along with safe passage, for this purpose. In the alternative, or in conjunction, the legislation might
authorize the President to negotiate bilateral agreements, akin to treaties, with states and terrorist
groups in which the U.S. would pledge to refrain from implementing ACB in respect to those actors
that pledge to follow IHL, refrain from military operations against the U.S. and its nationals and divest
777
themselves of all but those weapons systems required for self-defense.
To translate this strategic declaration into rules of decision for courts-martial, Congress could, as s
provision in ACB, amend the UCMJ to expressly establish the doctrine contra barbarum (“against
terrorists”) as an absolute defense that would excuse soldiers accused of committing crimes in violation of
778
the UCMJ of criminal responsibility. Alternatively, the Manual for Courts-Martial could be amended to
provide that the fact that a soldier is alleged to have committed the specified crime in question contra
barbarum is a factor in mitigation of the severity of the offense as well as of applicable sanctions upon
779
conviction.
The President not submit future IHL treaties for ratification without first negotiating a contra barbarum
clause waiving the legal effect of these instruments with respect to terrorists. The Senate might append an
understanding or declaration to such texts indicating that the U.S. position is that terrorists are not within
the protections afforded by such treaties.
780
If the ICC amends Article 120, the President might revisit the question of accession to the Rome Statute.
Conditions precedent should, however, at a minimum include the following: (a) a contra barbarum clause
in the instrument of ratification reflecting the understanding of the Senate that the Rome Statute is
781
inapplicable in cases of armed conflict with terrorists; (b) a statement to the effect that the U.S. does not
recognize any conventional instruments to which it is not a party, or any statements of custom to which it

Social science research suggests that the most efficient strategy for inducing cooperation is one that initiates relations on a
cooperative basis but immediately retaliates in response to “defections” with punitive actions. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE
EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 174-76 (1984) (describing “TIT FOR TAT” as the most effective strategy in securing
cooperation, suppressing defection, and teaching opponents to understand that noncooperation is unprofitable). The proposed
strategy, however, requires that subjects make rational calculations, an assumption potentially false in the case of terrorists. Id. at
174. Moreover, observation of the martial code and terrorism are, logically speaking, mutually exclusive: honorable soldiers
simply do not target civilians, and jihadis are programmed to the destruction, not accommodation, of unbelievers. For arguments
that Islamic warriors are incapable of assimilating the martial code, see Bassam Tibi, War and Peace in Islam, in Terry Nardin,
ed., The Ethics of War and Peace (1997): 128-45; Ignatieff, supra note_, at 147. For an argument that the regime elites that
sponsor terror, as well as leaders of terrorists groups, can be deterred, see Robert F. Turner, State Responsibility and the War on
Terror: The Legacy of Thomas Jefferson and the Barbary Pirates, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 121, 139-40 (2003).
775
See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2).
776
Terrorists might be given temporary status as protected diplomatic persons to enable their safe passage to and from the U.S. to
plead their legal cases. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95, at Art. 29 (providing
that the “person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable[,]” that he shall be immune “any form of arrest or detention[,]” and that
the “receiving State shall . . . take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom or dignity.”).
777
The U.S. has a lengthy history of negotiating treaties with states with which it continues thereafter in a state of war, including
those that would currently be characterized as “rogue states” and sponsors of terrorism. See, e.g., Treaty of Peace and Amity
between the United States and Tripoli, concluded June 4, 1805, Article XVI (cited in MALLOY, TREATIES AND
CONVENTIONS ETC. 1776-1909 v. 2) (agreeing on principles restricting conduct of war between U.S. and the Barbary States
and providing in particular that POWs would not be enslaved but would be exchanged within 1 year of capture). On April 15,
2003, the U.S. concluded its first ever accord with a terrorist organization, permitting the Mujahideen al Khalq, a 1000 member
anti-Iranian group operating out of bases in Iraq that was placed on the State Department list of terrorist organizations in 1997 for
attacks against Iranian government targets, to keep most of its weaponry and to be immune from U.S. military operations in
exchange for agreeing not to undertake hostile acts against the U.S. and to provide intelligence on Iran. See Douglas Jehl &
Michael R. Gordon, American Forces Reach Cease-Fire with Terror Group, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2003, at A1. Whether
similar such agreements are possible with organizations such as Al Qaeda is very much in doubt. See Howard Witt, Iranian
Group on Terrorist List Has Pull in D.C., CHI. TRIB., Jul 13, 2003, at A4 (suggesting that the agreement with the Mujahideen al
Khalq was possible only because Congress considers it a “pro-Western” organization); ELSHTAIN, supra note_, at 154 (valuing
a treaty negotiated with a terrorist group as “not . . . worth the paper it was written on.”).
778
See supra at note_ (enumerating applicable defenses in U.S. courts-martial)
779
See supra at note_ (considering mitigating and extenuating circumstances in trial and sentencing ib courts-martial).
780
Presently, the ICC does not permit reservations. See Rome Statute, supra note_, at Art. 120 (“No reservations may be made to
this Statute.”). Nor may amendments be made prior to 7 years after entry into force of the Rome Statute, and even then a
supermajority of 7/8 of States Parties is required. See id. at Art. 121(1) (“After the expiry of seven years from the entry into force
of this Statute, any State Party may propose amendments thereto.”); id. at Art. 121(4) (requiring a 7/8 supermajority to amend).
781
This precondition would possibly require amendment to the Rome Statute, which, under Article 21, rejects “application and
interpretation of law . . . wit[h] adverse distinction founded on grounds such as [inter alia] religion or belief, [or] political or other
opinion.” Because the doctrine of contra barbarum would alter the interpretation or application of law with respect to terrorist
on account of the acts they undertake in furtherance of their religiously-motivated political program, the Rome Statute would, as
currently conceived, be perceived as a bar to such a reservation or understanding offered by the U.S. upon its accession.
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5.

6.

has persistently objected, as creating any legal obligations; and (c) a statement to the effect that U.S.
understands that the ICC Prosecutor will in all cases recognize that a U.S decision not to investigate or
prosecute a U.S. national, or to sentence a U.S. national upon conviction at court-martial to a particular
penalty, will have been made in good-faith and consistent with the interests of justice, and that the
Prosecutor, in deference to complementarity, will not invoke ICC jurisdiction. The U.S. might pursue the
783
conclusion of a treaty to this effect, thereby securing a grant of functional immunity.
If the ICC will not amend Article 120, the U.S. should suspend all financial aid to and terminate trade
relationships with states that refuse to sign bilateral treaties pledging not to extradite U.S. nationals to the
784
ICC. The U.S. should withdraw all forces from the territory of states-parties and notify the UN that it
will refuse to provide troops to peacekeeping operations upon their territory. An amendment to ASPA
785
bolstering the Hague Invasion Clause might grant explicit notice that the transfer of a U.S. national to the
786
ICC would create a state of war between the transferring state and the U.S.
The U.S. should encourage all states to adopt similar classificatory mechanisms reflective of the
787
civilizedpeoples/barbarian distinction to facilitate a coordinated bellum romanum against terror.

Chart I presents three variant images of the relationship between law and war: the first depicts the
legal absolutist view, in which war wholly subsumed by and regulated by law; the second illustrates the
nihilist or barbarian position, in which law is irrelevant to war; and the third represents a rationalized IHL
in which military operations against honorable foes occur in the zone of intersection and are governed by
the martial code, but operations against terrorists are conducted in the peripheral space contra barbarum
where law does not reach war.788 In this third image, invocation of ACB directs soldiers to set aside the
martial code and march across the line delineating the zone of intersection from the zone contra
barbarum into total war against their barbarian adversaries; by the same token, in the third image the
border is permeable bidirectionally: the barbarians are invited to embrace the martial code, cease
attacking civilians, and engage soldiers in the zone of intersection.
(Insert Chart I about here)
In sum, a rationalized IHL, given effect through the system of courts-martial but with the door
open to parallel association with a reformed and delimited ICC, is the image best suited to humanizing
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The “persistent objector” rule of customary international law provides that a state is not bound by the maturation of a
customary international legal principle if it has consistently indicated its dissent from a practice while the law was “still in a state
rd
of development.” REST. (3 ), FOR. REL. L. U.S. §102, cmmt. d. The U.S. has at the very least an arguable claim that it has
persistently objected to many declarations of customary IHL, although its failure to specify precisely what it does recognize as its
legal obligations, coupled with its adherence to many of the principles contained in the Protocols Additional and other IHL
declarations out of humanitarian concerns if not a sense of opinio juris, complicates this claim. See supra at notes_ (noting U.S.
refusal to specify which provisions of the Protocols Additional it recognizes as creating legal obligations and describing U.S.
practice as consistent with the provisions of much of the Protocols Additional). For a discussion of the “persistent dissenter” rule
in customary international law, see T. Stein, The Approach of a Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in
International Law, 26 HARV. INT’L L. J. 457, 459-60 (1985).
783
See Jack Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 103 (2003) (arguing that the
price of enforcement of ICC decisions should be the grant of “functional immunity” to the U.S.).
784
See supra at note_ (discussing the recent proliferation of such treaties between the U.S. and over 35 states).
785
See supra at note_.
786
See supra at note_ (offering proposed language to effect such a declaration of war under these circumstances).
787
Currently, there is disagreement within the Western Alliance as to precisely which organizations merit classification as
“terrorists.” See Marc Perleman, EU Won’t Ban Hamas, Jul. 17, 2003, at www.frontpagemag.com (reporting that the EU
executive organ, the European Commission, despite significant U.S. pressure, has declined to classify the “political wing” of
Hamas a Middle East terrorist organization, although the EU considers its “military wing” to be so). Disagreements over
precisely “who is a terrorist?” threaten to impede collective action in the War on Terror. However, Israel, by declaring “all- out
war” against Hamas, appears to have adopted the very bellum romanum approach proposed. See Matthew Chance, CNN, Israel
Vows “All-Out War” on Hamas, Sept. 2, 2003, at http://www.cnn/com/2003/WORLD/meast/09/01/mideast/index.html.
788
The depiction of these images builds upon a recent critical analysis of the theories of legal absolutism, also known as classic
legalism, and legal peripheralism, a perspective into which a rationalized IHL fits neatly, in which non-legal norms and rules are
often more important in the regulation of human behavior than is positive law. See Jonathan Zasloff, Law and the Shaping of
American Foreign Policy: From the Gilded Age to the New Era, 78 N.Y. U. L. REV. 239, 254-259 (2003).
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war without neglecting civilizational obligations because it attaches practical legal consequences to the
gross moral distinction between honorable soldiers and barbarians.
IV. Conclusions
Legal absolutists, in their cupidity for a law-ruled world, may read into the call for a rationalized
IHL an entreaty to the destruction of their avatar,789 as well as to the general weakening of international
law.790 Some may attack as illiberal, imperialist,791 Islamophobic, or even racist792 the argument that only a
rationalized IHL that differentiates between combatants based upon the justice of the causes for which
they fight and the degree to which they themselves observe IHL can defend human civilization. Others,
disinclined to inject moral considerations into law, unwilling to agree upon an epistemology that enables
us to discern what is right and what is wrong and uncomfortable with revivification of the language of
good and evil,793 or unalterably distrustful of the moral fibre of soldiers, may cavil at the re-introduction of
jus ad bellum considerations, particularly if members of the martial profession sit in judgment not only of
their peers but of the causes for which their enemies take up arms. Further, the argument that any class
of persons, no matter how reprehensible, can ever be stricken from the set of rights-bearing entities may
789

See Adam Roberts, The Laws of War in the War on Terror (unpublished manuscript on file with author, forthcoming in INT’L
L. STUD. (2003) (anticipating that suggestions for the modification of IHL will be perceived by legal absolutists to be programs
for the destruction of IHL). Some observers, willing to concede in theory the propriety of modification to IHL, nonetheless insist
that any modifications be “reasonable,” “taken . . . as much as possible . . . on a collective basis,” and consistent with the
“generally accepted principles in [the] international community.” Antonio Cassesse, Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial
Legal Categories of International Law, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 993, 1001 (2001). Whether this is a genuine call for a multilateral
approach to transforming IHL or merely a sophisticated restatement of IHL absolutism remains to be determined. Other scholars
suggest that the former position is gaining adherents. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Op-Ed., N.Y. TIMES, (describing U.S. conduct
in the War on Terror as “illegal but legitimate” in light of moral considerations (referencing language from the Independent
Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned 4 (2000)).
790
See STRAWSON, supra note_, at xix (stating as of 2002 that “[i]n challenging so much in the international legal order [to
conduct the War on Terror], President Bush may have broken the spell of modern law” inasmuch as “[w]hat had appeared so
fixed has now been consciously transformed into a contested arena.”). The claim that international law is a fragile body of
regulation that relies heavily for its existence upon its near-mythic status as a kind of received truth in the minds of state
decisionmakers, that it is never acceptable to violate international law even in defense of a moral imperative, and that the fate of
international law generally hinges on the preservation and expansion of IHL are central features of legal absolutist dogma.
791
See generally ANDREW BACEVICH, AMERICAN EMPIRE (2002) (claiming that the U.S. is becoming an imperial power
through the globalizing influence of U.S. law and power and that the sole question is what form the empire will assume). The
civilization/barbarian distinction, once a predominant organizing principle in fin de siecle international relations theory, has been
challenged by realists displeased that Western states should be interested in pursuing a civilizing mission rather than the
maximization of power, as well as by dependency theorists and critical scholars as part of an imperalist justification for the use of
power to dominate “backward peoples” and thereby secure an advantage in global trade. See WILLIAM OLSON & A.J.R.
GROOM, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEN AND NOW 146 (1991) For the most plangent critique of the contemporary
resurrection of the civilization/barbarian distinction, see SALTER, supra note_ (noting that classifications of peoples as morally,
culturally, and racially inferior justified abandonment of legal restraint to aid in their domination and extermination).
792
th
th
Admittedly, 19 and 20 century Western powers have warped the civilization-barbarian distinction to the explanation and
justification of racist policies of colonialism and even genocide in the name of “progress.” See, e.g., HEINRICH VON
TREITSCHKE, ZEHN JAHRE DEUTSCHE KAMPFE (1896) (justifying extermination of “barbaric” colonial populations on
the ground that such peoples were alleged to be biologically inferior); JOHN FISKE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NEW ENGLAND
(1889) (justifying slaughter of American Indians on the ground that “civilized peoples” were entitled to use any means and
methods to defend their existence against “savages”); HENRY GRAFF, ED., AMERICAN IMPERIALISM 95 (1996) (“When a
war is conducted by a superior race against those whom they consider inferior . . . the superior race will almost involuntarily
practice inhuman conduct[.]) (citing 1902 Congressional testimony in response to reported U.S. atrocities committed against
Philippino forces). Some contemporary scholars fear that the trope of the terrorist as “frightening, foreign, barbaric beast” is
nothing more than a racialized illusion to differentiate between “us” and “them” to support the claim that “ordinary law is . . .
deficient or insufficient to deal with them” and “extra-ordinary law,” which will remain on the books long after the threat has
passed, is required. Ileana M. Porras, On Terrorism: Reflections on Violence and the Outlaw, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 119, 121-22.
793
For some, the use of terms such as “good” and “evil” is not only strategically unwise but also itself an act of immorality. See
Gavin McCormack, North Korea in the Vice, 18 NEW LEFT REV. 25 (2002) (describing the reference to an “Axis of Evil” in
the 2002 State of the Union Address to describe the linkage between North Korea, Iran, and Iraq as “historically immoral” in its
use of this judgmental language); Text of Address by Alexander Solzhenitsyn at Harvard University, Thursday, June 8, 1978 A
World Split Apart by Alexander Solzhenitsyn (lamenting a world in which evil ideas and individuals prey upon those who
internalize the “humanistic and benevolent concept according to which there is no evil inherent to human nature”).
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offend those for whom natural law dictates that all individuals possess, by the fact of their existence, an
inviolable body of rights: for these critics, the proposed rationalization may seem a nihilistic Conradian
plea to “Exterminate the brutes!”794 that tramples upon the maxim ex injuria jus non oritur795 and leaves
undesirable normative footprints in the sands of legal and moral history. The proposal may strike others
796
as the emotional sacrifice of law on the altar of expedience and the open-ended bellicization of political

life to fill a vacuum left by the end of the Cold War, and thus a capitulation to terrorism.797 Worst of all,
some may fear that the rationalization of IHL by Western democracies, particularly if promiscuously
applied to regimes not objectively barbarous, will be prologue to a vicious spiral of subsequent, and
genuinely barbaric, counter-“rationalizations” by rogue-states and terrorists.
However, best-laid plans of legal absolutists cannot bring to heel the world’s most execrable and
rapacious individuals and groups, although, ironically, it is for them as law breakers, rather than for law
followers, that all law is originally conceived.798 Reclassifying terrorists as barbarians is a pleonasm
inasmuch as both terms are descriptive of counter-civilizational entities, but it bears repetition that
terrorists are functional equivalents of the 5th-century Vandals who sacked Rome and cast the West into a
thousand years of darkness: they will not cease attempting to topple our civilization until they succeed or
799

are destroyed.

800

If terrorists are not objectively evil, nothing and no one can ever be.

The law-creating,

law-abiding, peoples of the earth—a designation inclusive of the vast majority of Muslims801—must

794

At the conclusion of The Heart of Darkness, the body of Kurz, who failed to civilize the “savages” in the quest to extract ivory
from the jungle, is discovered along with a report, written to advise the “International Society for the Suppression of Savage
Customs,” on the last page of which Kurz had concluded that if savages would not accept the gift of civilizaiton it was necessary
to “Exterminate the Brutes!” to preserve the West. See JOSEPH CONRAD, HEART OF DARKNESS (1899).
795
Tranlated loosely from the Laton, “Right cannot originate from injustice.”
796
th
See Mofidi & Eckert, supra note_, at 92 (suggesting the U.S. response to September 11 has been the product of “inflamed
passions and emotions” rather than a “commitment to the calm and rational, albeit slow, path of law.”).
797
See Yehezkel Dror, Terrorism as a Challenge to the Democratic Capacity To Govern, in Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power
73-74 (Martha Crenshaw ed., 1983) (contending that counterterrorist measures sacrifice law to the defeat of terrorists and
threaten to “barbarize” the international system). One commentator, thoroughly wedded to a judicial model that treats terrorism
as a crime “no different from any other offense,” likens the “differentiation between classes of offenders” as the broadcast of the
“moral weakness” of the society that distinguishes terrorists from other malefactors. See Emanual Gross, supra note_, at 2, 95.
798
The assumption that law is created to control, by threat of punishment, the actions of those who would otherwise be tempted to
commit the acts made illegal by positive rules, rather than to govern the conduct of those who would already obey the legal
sanction even in its absence, is of old vintage. See I Timothy 1:8-14 (“We also know that law is made not for the righteous but
for lawbreakers and rebels, the ungodly and sinful, the unholy and irreligious; for those who kill their fathers or mothers, for
murderers, for adulterers and perverts, for slave traders and liars and perjurers[.]”); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (“If men
nd
were angels, no government would be necessary.”); LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE (2 ed. 1979) (“In
international society . . . law is not effective against the Hitlers.”).
799
Elshtain urges us to recall the “brutal indiscriminate slaughter of thousands of people in an instant, along with the sight of
bodies dropping like debris from dizzying heights” and warns that it is “important to take the measure of people who not only are
th
capable of planning and executing [September 11 ] but are gleeful about the lives lost and exult in the terrible devastation to so
many families.” ELSHTAIN, supra note_, at 153. It is well that we heed her lest we suffer the “corrosive effects of
misdescription” and fail to treat terrorists for who and what they are. Id. at 12.
800
Many relativistmoral philosophers contest the argument that there are absolute and self-evident moral principles or “verdictive
beliefs” that are independent of attitudes and contexts and that some things, persons, and ideas are objectively good, whereas
others are objectively evil. See Russ Shafer-Landau, Knowing Right from Wrong, 79 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 62 (2002)
(examining such arguments and contrasting them with a “moral realist” perspective). Not all persons may agree with the moral
realist assertion that terrorists are the exemplars of pure evil. Some may reject the very concept of evil; others may simply be
unwilling to definitively state that terrorists are objectively so; still others may consider absolute evil to be the slaughter of
dolphins (as opposed to humans), or the eating of meat, or some other avalue-system or practice. We may simply have to agree
to disagree.
801
The official U.S. position with regard to the Islamic faith is one of respect and tolerance; it is the terrorists who claim their
particular version of the Islamic faith directs them to murder innocent civilians, and not the Islamic faith against whom they
blaspheme in claiming the sanction of Islam in these murders, against whom the War on Terror is directed. See George W. Bush,
“Islam is Peace,” Says President, Office of the Press Secretary, Sept. 17, 2001 (“These acts of violence against innocents violate
the fundamental tenets of the Islamic faith. That’s not what Islam is about. Islam is peace.”).
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choose between civilization and barbarism, and the creation and implementation of policy instruments
entail decisions that feed into that choice. If regulators simply cobble together additional sources of law
and foist them upon soldiers rather than identify and support rules and institutions that promote the
primary end law is intended to serve—the creation, sustenance, and manifestations of the values that
preserve humanity against chaos—then regulators are handmaidens of evildoers. Combat soldiers
fighting a desperate struggle on behalf of a civilization yet to fully awaken to the magnitude of the threat
deserve no less than that their acts and omissions, unless they can legitimately be fit into the categories of
war crimes or crimes against humanity be immunized by the official machinery of politics and law. The
Private Ryans and Captain Ryans of this world are simply not enemies of all mankind; the Usama bin
Ladens and their minions are this, and more. Truly anti-civilizational criminals—those who deliberately
set out to kill innocents en masse—do not deserve the entitlements of the laws they seek to ravage, but
evanescence of considerations of the justice of the cause for which combatants battle has utterly blurred
moral distinctions and made possible the legal morass in which the events in the fictional scenario may
well transpire. A slavish devotion to positive IHL, to which absolutists would commit us, “would be to
lose the law itself, with life, liberty, property and all those who are enjoying them with us; thus absurdly
sacrificing the end to the means.”802 The re-incorporation of traditional principles of martial custom, reconsideration of the justice of the causes for which combatants fight, and re-acquisition of an empathetic
understanding of the moral universe in which the subjects of regulation experience the cauldron of
combat are intended not to banish law from war but to rescue IHL before it withers into an elegy for the
civilization it owed a duty inter vivos.803
Law cannot cure every ill by the mere fact of its existence. Ultimately, all legal regimes are
aspirational in that they are enforceable only if there is power and will behind them. Moreover, the
formal legal equality of states does not translate into support for international order.804 The empire of law
requires an imperial power, and until it is disproven that the sole source of support for the enforcement of
IHL is U.S. military power, or the threat thereof, it is counterproductive to alienate the U.S. and forfeit its
prodigious energies in the humanization of war by clinging to a talismanic insistence upon the ICC.805 It
is further irrational, and even morally irresponsible,806 to condemn U.S. opposition to the ICC as
sovereigntist arrogance rather than hail a principled stand against the existential threat posed by Islamic
terrorism armed with WMD. Simply put, leadership is essential, and not every pooling of sovereignty
802

See BARNETT, supra note_, at 139 (quoting Thomas Jefferson from an 1810 letter to J.B. Colvin).
Very simply, the “letter of the law is too cold and formal to have a beneficial influence on society[,]” and the failure to take
seriously non-legal sources of norms by which we might govern our social life constitutes acceptance of “moral mediocrity” and
the “paraly[sis] of man’s noblest impulses.” Solzhenitsyn, supra note_. Moreover, in moments of great crisis, civilization has the
greatest need of the support of non-legal sources of norms: “[I]t will be simply impossible to stand through the trials of this
threatening century with only the support of a legalistic structure.” It is thus of no small moral concern that IHL should eschew
the martial code and its stock of non-legal norms, which in practice exert a tremendous compliance pull, in the War on Terror.
804
See SCHACTER, supra note_, at 5-6 (“Since we cannot deny the crucial role of power in the relations of States, we should
seek to understand its specific impact on the international system [.]”).
805
The ultimate answer to the question of whether the ICC is merely a flawed but improvable institution or is in fact, as this
Article asserts, an inescapably dangerous tool ripe for exploitation by terrorists and their state-sponsors, remains to be determined
by future events. See BEST, supra note_, at 400 (cautioning against the premature judgment of international criminal tribunals).
806
“Absolute adherence to pacifism makes the pacifist morally responsible for the evils that an intelligent use of force may
sometimes prevent.” SIDNEY HOOK, PACIFISM AND POLITICS _ (1947). The same might be said for an absolute
803
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807

benefits the international community.

The proposal to do so here is one the U.S. has rejected largely

upon moral considerations that do not register with the cult of legal absolutists peddling the ICC, an
institution that threatens to become the next “smelly little orthodoxy contending for our soul.”808
th

It is confounding that a mere two years after September 11 , rather than express common
resolve,809 the ardent consortium of activists championing the ICC810 will not concede that, in the absence
of a central executive, U.S. military operations, even where unauthorized by the UN, enhance the security
of the entire international community,811 that cultural and historic agnosticism of real-world military
operations should temper their absolutism, and that the U.S. deserves a margin of appreciation in its
titanic struggle.812 However, our civilization is in the crucible, and we must soberly face the fact that we
no longer have the post-modernist luxury of pretending that morality and law are estranged cousins, or
that all wars are equally unjust, or that it is beyond our ken to sift through the moral confusion
engendered by sophists and autists who have enshrined their professed ignorance about the ultimate
metaphysical foundations of justice in the provisions of modern IHL,813 to determine which of the causes
for which combatants fight are virtuous and which are vile. We need not become servants to law; rather,
law must be made to serve us,814 and IHL is not, any more than domestic law, a suicide pact.815 Evaluating
the rectitude of the cause for which combatants fight is far more essential to an ethically legitimate theory
adherence to the ICC in the face of strong evidence that it is prone to unleashing greater evils than would be suppressed by the
application of instruments of policy and law to the defeat of terrorism which the ICC would be likely to criminalize.
807
See Andrew Moravcsik, Conservative Idealism and International Institutions, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 291, 297 (recognizing that
on narrow grounds of interests, “a plausible case can certainly be made” for U.S. abstention from participation in the ICC).
808
GEORGE ORWELL, HOMAGE TO CATALONIA _ (1938) (referring to socialism and fascism).
809
See James B. Motley, Coping with the Terrorist Threat: The U.S. Intelligence Dilemma, in STEPHEN J. CIMBALA, ED.,
INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENCE POLICY IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 165 (opining that one might expect that
“[c]ompassion [would be] stirred when Americans, or citizens of other nations, become hostages to or victims of fanatical
th
terrorists[.]”). At first blush it appears that the attacks of September 11 are being treated by U.S. allies as an attack not so much
upon the West as upon the U.S. as the primary power. If true, the admonition that to understand terrorism, and responses thereto,
it is first necessary to understand “what is happening to whom, where, when, how, why and with what outcomes and effects[,]”
th
takes on additional significance in analyzing the post-September 11 political equation. SLANN & SCHECHTERMAN, supra
note_, at 3. While collective security has always been bedeviled by the free-rider problem, that the U.S. should be forced to go it
alone at a time when the necessity of collective action ought arguably to be more apparent than at any time since World War II
does not augur well for the future. See Edward A. Amley, Jr., Peace by Other Means: Using Rewards in UN Efforts to End
Conflicts, 26 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 235, 242-43 (critiquing the free-rider problem in the UN collective security system).
810
See infra at note_ (identifying and describing this coalition of states, most of which have little military capacity and no
responsibility for international peace and security, and activist NGOs). Many of the staunchest supporters of the ICC are
members of the European Union, militarily weak states that have “moved beyond power” and adopted a post-realist normative
framework for their harmonized foreign policies in which the use of force is inconceivable except where authorized by the UN
and conducted multilaterally. See James Dao, Solitaire; One Nation Plays the Great Game Alone, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 7, 2002, at
D1 (illuminating European preference for multilateral institutionalist approaches to security).
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of IHL than an assessment of the methods and means they employ or a tabulation of the casualties they
create. We need not navigate a moral maze or parse legal texts to assert that the cause to which the U.S.
and its allies816 are committed—preserving the last best hope for human freedom and dignity—is infinitely
817

more noble than that of their terrorist foes.

Application of a differential legal standard in the War on

Terror is an act of moral indignation in the face of a great evil threatening all with a stake in humanity.
All may seek and enjoy the protection of the laws, but those who would must themselves respect the
reciprocal rights of others. Legal absolutism invites catastrophe. A rationalized IHL that unabashedly
lets slip the dogs of the bellum romanum818 is no parochial approach to the “laws of war;” rather, it is an
affirmation of a universal vision of law with ubroken ties to moral reason and judgment.819
820

If we screw our civic and moral courage to the sticking point and rise to the “new height of
vision” to which we were summoned, presciently, by the Russian Nobel laureate Alexander Solzhenitsyn
a quarter-century ago, will we see the world not merely as we would wish it to be but as it is. The
barbarians are at the gates of civilization, they are evil, and they mean us grievous harm. It falls to us to
decide whether IHL is to be crafted into the battering ram that forces a breach or the sword that sweeps
away the hordes, and whether the inheritance of future generations is to be a civilization wisely governed
by law or a darkling plain821 haunted by the drifting ghosts of its humanizing promise.
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